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The study examines the work of the coroner. The thesis is 
sociological in orientation and method, drawing where necessary 
from other disciplines, e. g. law, philosophy. The study 
concentrates upon the nature of coroners' categorisations and 
the production of the socially recognised 'facts of sudden 
death'. While detailed consideration is given to the inquest 
and inquest verdicts, the whole range of coroners' work is 
examined. Differing but complementary research methods are 
employed to yield essentially qualitative material. Existing 
sociological studies, e. g. of 'official statistics' and of 
suicide, are evaluated. Coroners' methods of ascribing 
meaning to sudden death are examined. An important aim is to 
render processes of construction 'visible' for sociological 
study. 
Part One (Chapters One and Two) opens with a review of 
theoretical issues in sociology. The methodology of the study 
is 'located' within sociological theory. Part One continues 
with an historical discussion of the office of coroner, and an 
outline of legislation and formal medico-legal procedure. 
Part Two (Chapters Three, Four and Five) forms the largest 
section of the study, consisting of material collected by 
field research, i. e., interviews with the coroners of five 
counties, systematic observation of inquests, and unpublished/ 
published statistics. Provisional conclusions are discussed 
as the study progresses, covering topics which include, inter 
alia: discretionary authority; the inquest as court of law; 
the differing perceptions of individual coroners; the 
relevance of historical factors; the Press; methods of 
constructing the verdict; the roles of doctors, pathologists 
and police; social control; official statistics; and historica 
and geographical statistical variations. 
Part Three (Chapters Six and Seven) draws overall con- 
clusions about coroners' accounts of sudden death. It places 
coronerst work within bureaucratic and ideological contexts. 
The work of the coroner is situated in terms of the ways society 
conceives of and deals with death as a whole. 
Two short appendices add further statistics and further 
methodological details. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anyway, I don't envy your writing your thesis 
at this time. It must be like writing a thesis 
on the Government of France at the time of the 
Revolution. * 
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed considerable 
public debate, together with proposed and actual procedural 
change, in the hitherto fairly placid world of the coroner and 
the inquest. Toward the end of the fieldwork period upon which 
the present study is based, and during the subsequent assembly 
of the thesis, coroners' work became (or was said to have 
become) controversial. 
Whilst no academic piece of work can ever be wholly 
removed from the society and the State in which it is produced, 
the first substantive point of this. introduction must be to 
emphasise that both the. original impetus for this study and 
its continuing dominant concerns are unrelated to any current 
debates about what coroners (to put the matter crudely) should 
and should not be doing. Rather, the starting point is a 
sociological perspective upon the work of an officer who has 
attracted the attention of some historians and some writers of 
(now rather out-of-date) legal textbooks, but has not. attracted 
any sociological attention other than that of sociologists who 
wish to make points about suicide or the suicide rate. 
The present discussion is not a study in the sociology 
of suicide. It is a sociological study of the work of the 
Correspondence from one of the coroners participating in the interview programme. 
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coroner as a whole. Coroner 'system' is referred to for a 
number of reasons: firstly, because coroners' work constitutes 
an interactive social system; secondly, because the inquest 
in particular can be seen as a formal system; and, thirdly, 
because coroners' work (generally, and individually) has a 
systematic nature. 'Accounting' is similarly referred to on a 
number of grounds: firstly, because coroners routinely produce 
accounts of sudden deaths in the form of verdicts, verbal 
statements and statistical records; secondly, because the study 
is concerned inter alia with the accounts of their work offered 
by individual, coroners during interview; and, thirdly, 
because the study itself aims to achieve a sociological account 
of coroners' accounts. 'Sudden death' is used as a shorthand 
term for those deaths which are dealt-with by coroners. 
The information upon which the study is based is drawn 
from interviews with the coroners of five counties; from 
observation at a coroner's court; and from analysis of 
statistical records held in a coroner's office supplemented by 
other statistical material. Part One of the study aims to 
situate the research in terms of sociological theory and 
methodology and the historical development of coroners' work. 
Part Two draws in detail from the elements of field research 
specified above, and most of the thesis is devoted to this 
discussion of empirical material. Part Three elaborates some 
overall conclusions, locates coroners' work in a wider context, 
and reconsiders-some of the issues introduced at the beginning 
of the study. Provisional conclusions are drawn chapter-by- 
chapter throughout the study. In. addition to the principal 
fieldwork elements of interview, observation and statistical 
search, published and unpublished documentary sources were consultei 
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and these, together with those casual observations and 
discussions which necessarily (and sometimes surprisingly 
usefully) accompany the formal fieldwork programme, complete 
the stock of relevant material. 
The study aims to offer a coherent and comprehensive 
account of coronersT work; to inform description by an exam- 
ination of the historical development of the office of coroner; 
to consider significant changes in the work of the coroner and 
the use and meaning of verdicts; to examine the perceptions of 
individual coroners; to compare the formal procedural model of 
what-coroners-do with informal processes of reasoning and 
construction; to approach the topic by more than one empirical 
route and to render explicit the theoretical and methodological 
options; to move to more general considerations of the sociology 
of death and of how a significant proportion of deaths are 
organisationally processed within the coroner system; to 
examine the inquest as a court of law; and to draw conclusions 
about the organisational characteristics of a bureaucratic 
system for dealing with unformed, disorganised, events. 
A particular feature of the research process has been to 
make "visible" the theoretical and methodological bases of the 
study: to open up for inspection aims and theories in terms 
of the required internal consistency. The study adopts a 
particular theoretical orientation, deriving broadly from 
phenomenological sociology. It does not claim a position of 
ascendancy or even opposition in respect of other theoretical 
options. It has simply been made transparent for examination 
within its own terms and the overall aims of the research. 
The overall aims-are to examine how coroners (located by 
legal structure on one hand, and by their individual attitudes 
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on the other) come to ascribe meaning to hitherto meaning-less 
phenomena: how the process of constructing the facts-of-the- 
matter takes place. In short, the study addresses itself to 
the issue of how what might be called "true stories" are 
produced, from the point of referral to a coroner through to 
formal statistical disposal. 
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PART ONE 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS - SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1(1) Prefatory Remarks and the Scope of the Study 
Sociologists habitually present research methodology as a 
technical preface or appendix to a description of their substan- 
tive research. Methodology, as an atheoretical guide to how-it- 
happened, is taken to denote the framework within which the study 
occurred, the implication being that readers who 'know about the- 
methodology' can 'judge the results'. Recitals of technical 
methodology, however, can leave out rather more. than they include. 
There is always the possibility that the sociologist started to 
think seriously about methodology only after the research was 
completed, but before it was written-up, and that the research 
framework finally appears as rather more systematic than it was 
during the research. The journalistic bonhomie of attempts to 
'come clean' about research methodology, such as Bell and 
Newby's collection, (1977), may add only another gloss (that of 
'disarming frankness') to the traditional glosses. 
It is argued in the present chapter, and throughout the 
study to follow, that any informative presentation of specific 
methods adopted, or of research methodology in general, must 
transcend a purely technical review of research design. It is 
accepted, following Cicourel, that methodologies necessarily 
embody implicit theories about sociology and about society: that 
the measurementsused by sociologists "..... always have their 
theoretical and substantive counterparts" . 
(Cicourel 1964,1). 
The present introductory discussion aims explicitly to 
situate research methodology, and research subject-matter, within 
-2- 
the theoretical options constitutive of sociology. This requires 
an extensive review of sociological theories and their philosoph- 
ical underpinnings. The discussion will then be related to the 
tasks of the study as a whole. Particular concerns are to make 
visible the theoretical premises of the study, to clarify the link 
between these and the particular research methods adopted, and to 
relate all of this to some continuing problems in sociology. 
Theory and method, in short, are taken to be quite inseparable. 
It will be argued that, in terms of the aims and interests of the 
present study, phenomenological sociology, in the broadest sense, 
provides the most useful basis on which to proceed. This broadly 
phenomenological orientation will become clear in succeeding 
chapters. 
The study is a sociological analysis of the work of the 
coroner. The coroner 'accounts' for sudden deaths: his accounts 
are both 'explanation' and statistical record. The coroner 
'system' is taken to consist of the (systematic) activities of 
coroners themselves, interacting with coroners' officers, doctors, 
police personnel, pathologists and others within the framework 
of both legal and informal rules. The processing of sudden 
deaths is a central concern, and sudden deaths may, for now, be 
defined as all those deaths dealt with by coroners. It is a 
major assumption of the study that the generally available 'facts 
of sudden death' are produced or, as it were, 'constituted' 
(made real) by coroners' activities. The research is concerned 
with identifying, describing and analysing the ways in which 
coroners transform disorganised events, clues and pieces of 
evidence into coherent accounts, and then record such accounts as 
the statistical facts. One might refer to such organisationally- 
produced 'facts' as 'true stories' as, in practice, coroners' 
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categorisations amount to the 'true stories' of 'what-really- 
happened'. 
Reference is made below to existing sociological work 
referring to coroners, but it will become clear that such work 
has tended to address questions rather disimilar from the 
questions underlying the present study. Aside from differences 
of theoretical orientation, the work of Douglas (1967), Atkinson 
(1978), Bradshaw (1973), Sacks (1966), Watson (1975), Henson 
(1978) and Taylor (1982) has focussed largely upon suicide. 
While suicide is certainly given more than passing attention in 
the present study, it is not of central interest. The study aims 
to describe coroners' work rather than one particular inquest 
verdict. 
Although there are difficulties in drawing conclusions from 
national statistics (as will later be seen) Table 1(1)1 suggests 
that suicide is indeed a minor part of coroners' day-to-day 
activities: 
TABLE 1(1)1: CORONERS' WORK 1975" 
TOTAL DEATHS TOTAL DEATHS TOTAL TOTAL INQUEST 
ENGLAND & WALES REPORTED TO CORONERS' VERDICTS OF 
CORONERS INQUESTS SUICIDE 
582,700 153,366 23,455 3,717 
*Source: Unpub lished Home Offi ce statist ics derived 
from coroners' annual returns. 
In 1975, only 2.4% of deaths reported to coroners culminated 
in an inquest verdict of suicide. Such cases do, of course, 
take up more than 2.4% of coroners' time, given that coroners may 
deal with some of their cases by a single telephone call. 
However, suicide cannot be regarded as a central part of the 
-4- 
everyday work of coroners. 
Insofar as suicide is a topic of relevance in the research 
presented herein, it is a relevance arising from the importance 
of the 'sociology of suicide' as an established body of knowledge 
and from the criticisms of this body of knowledge which can be 
made. Further, suicide is amongst the most publicly-available 
aspects of coroners' work and this too is a matter which will be 
discussed. 
The research, then, has not been concerned exclusively, 
nor mainly, with suicide. Nor has it been concerned solely with 
the minority of coroners' cases dealt with by public inquest. 
However, the inquest is afforded more detailed attention than it 
might 'deserve' (purely in terms of the frequency of its use) on 
the grounds that it is, historically, of particular significance 
and also, by virtue of its public nature, because it renders the 
processes of categorisation visible. 
The discussion of sociological theory and research method- 
ology in this opening chapter also serves to define the scope 
and objectives of the research as a whole. In the second chapter, 
an historical account of the coroner system is offered, together 
with a summary of the legal and procedural elements of the con- 
temporary coroner's duties, thus providing a foundation and 
framework for the presentation of the original research material. 
Chapter Three presents the results of semi-structured 
interviews with the coroners of five counties in the North of 
England: fifteen coroners in all. Further informal interviews 
were subsequently held in some cases and material obtained from 
these, together with notes made in conversation with personnel 
other than coroners (coroners' officers or doctors, for instance) 
are also used. The purpose of the interviews was to collect 
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coroners' own accounts of their work: their perceptions, 
opinions, processes of reasoning and theorising used, and so on: 
and to compare these accounts with the formal model of coroners' 
work presented in Chapter Two, and to the material gathered in 
other parts of the fieldwork. Similarities and differences in 
what coroners do, and say, is also of interest. 
Observational information, drawn from systematic observation 
of fifty inquests in one coroner's court and supplemented, like 
the interviews, by additional informal observation, forms the 
basis of Chapter Four. The approach is ethnographic, and a 
sociological account of how the coroner constructs the 'true- 
story' of the death is sought. It is at the inquest that the 
muddled details of a sudden death are reconstituted to form the 
particular 'fact' of a suicide, an accident, or some other 
verdict. Comparisons will also be made between the coroner's 
inquest and other courts of law. 
Chapter Five presents a statistical profile of coroners' 
inquest decisions. National statistics for the period 1926-75 
are presented and discussed, using published and unpublished 
sources. Additionally, an analysis of records over the same 
fifty year period, drawn from the files of a full-time coroner's 
office, -is made, and related to the pattern of national statistics. 
Statistical material is used, like interview and observational 
data, as a qualitative resource. The status of the statistics 
of coroners' work as 'the facts of sudden death' will be 
evaluated, and the well-established sociological arguments about 
'official statistics' (discussed at some length in the present 
chapter) will be re-introduced in the light of the research 
material. Such statistics will be regarded as reliable records 
of coroners' decisions and activities: not as reliable/ 
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unreliable records of 'types of death occurring'. It will be 
argued that the status of the statistics as the 'facts of death' 
is constituted by the activities of coroners. 
Chapter Six discusses the problem of suicide as tradition- 
ally conceived in sociology, together with some central 
definitional problems. Brief consideration is given to philo- 
sophical views of suicide, followed by an analysis of the views 
of sudden death and suicide produced by quite a different vehicle: 
the Press. The chapter concludes with observations upon the 
sociology, ideology and routinisation of death, sudden death and 
suicide: and an appraisal of how far coroners' categorisations 
can be located in a wider cultural and social context. 
The final chapter attempts to draw together the research in 
the form of concluding comments and assimilation of the variety 
of material presented. The central issue is coroners' production 
of the 'facts' of sudden death. 
The chapters are arranged to form three parts: Part One, 
broadly introductory and providing a basis for presenting the 
bulk of the research material; Part Two, presenting, discussing 
and evaluating the data collected from the three chief elements 
of the research fieldwork; and Part Three, broadly concerned 
with extending the scope of discussion beyond particular coroners' 
decisions, suggesting some wider context for understanding 
coroners' work, and drawing conclusions. 
Appendices include further details on research design and 
organisation of the study. 
The task of the present study is to describe, investigate, 
analyse, and provide the means for understanding the processes 
whereby coroners, in their normal occupational activities, 
process sudden death and produce the publicly-available facts of 
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the matter. This is a study of decision-making but, more 
fundamentally it is a study of reality construction in a setting 
uniquely interesting: for the coroner retrospectively constructs 
a reality of the past, with his key informant necessarily 
unavailable. 
The initial task is to examine the theoretical and method- 
ological bases of the research, and to introduce some of the 
issues of central concern. 
1(2) Theories and Options in Sociology 
Historically, the dominant theoretical and methodological 
strain of sociology has been positivism, with early positivist 
sociology arising as a conceptual, and practical, solution to 
the problems of social order posed by political change in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The term 
'positivism' is, of course, often used in an extremely vague, 
and polemical, sense (Giddens 1974,2). Therefore it is useful 
to outline the meaning of the term as used in the present dis- 
cussion. 
The first assumption of positivism is that sociology can 
adopt the methods of natural science and can scientifically 
investigate the world-out-there. Its second assumption is that 
sociology can produce results akin to those of natural science, 
in the form of laws or invariant generalisation. Thirdly, 
positivist sociology defines itself as a technical, neutral, 
enterprise, discarding values and presuppositions (Giddens 1974, 
3-4). 
Another definition of positivism: 
..... a doctrine centering on the proposition that 
only empirically and scientifically useful know- 
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ledge deserves the title "knowledge" at all and 
that all competing types of cognition or inquiry 
belong to more primitive stages of civilization. 
(Dallmayr and McCarthy 1977,2). 
The ideological assumptions of positivism have been 
criticised by a variety of sociologists although most particularly 
by Marxists (e. g. Swingewood 1970). What concerns us here is 
that consciousness, subjectivity, reality and, most important, 
meaning, are excluded from the positivist programme almost 
completely. 
Durkheim puts the positivist position well: 
... real laws are discoverable which demonstrate the possibility of sociology better than any 
dialectical argument. (Durkheim 1970,37). 
Sociological method as we practise it rests 
wholly on the basic principle that social facts 
must be studied as things, that is, as realities 
external to the individual. (Durkheim 1970,37-38) 
When ..... the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken, we must seek separately the 
efficient cause which produces it and the function 
it fulfils. (Durkheim 1938,95). 
That the social world might be explained is still a widely- 
held notion in sociology, but by no means self-evident. The 
distinction between explanation and understanding is a crucial 
one. Causation is another sociologically problematic notion. 
Positivists have seen their task as a technical matter of dis- 
tinguishing causes from non-causal correlations (e. g. Isajiw 
1968). Yet the notion of causality in the social world remains 
speculative: a metaphor. Used as a metaphor, talk of causality 
may have some heuristic use, but it is used quite literally, 
and not only amongst positivists. 
Functionalism is perhaps the purest form of positivist 
sociology and is, of course, a determinist sociology (Parsons 
1960; 1966,6). It presupposes the objective status of the 
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world-out-there, and proceeds to investigate this world with the 
atheoretical tools of a methodology borrowed from natural science. 
Mills' criticisms of "abstracted empiricism" might be recalled 
here: the criticisms of a method which generates details in 
great number, the rationale being that quantity at some point 
becomes transformed into sociology: and explanation. It is a 
method without any obvious theoretical foundation (Mills 1970, 
65). 
As for symbolic interactionism, elements of this potentially 
radical school have been vulgarised and assimilated into main- 
stream positivism, while its original philosophical base in 
G. H. Mead's work has largely been neglected or misinterpreted. 
In essence, Mead's interpretation of self and society is not 
compatible with the static and determinist model of society 
inherent in positivism (Strauss 1964: XII - XIII). 
Mead conceptualised the self as follows: 
..... an individual who affects himself as he affects 
another; who takes the attitude of the other insofar 
as he affects the other, insofar as he is using what 
we term "intelligible speech"; who knows what he 
himself is saying, insofar as he is directing his 
indications by these significant symbols to others 
with the recognition that they have the same meaning 
for them as for him; such an individual is, of 
course, a phase in the development of the social 
form (Strauss 1964,40). 
The emphasis here on 'taking the attitude of the other', 
on meaning, on language and, implicitly, on intersubjectivity 
% 
suggests that Mead's thought may have more in common with the 
phenomenological position than with the conventional image of 
interactionism. For Mead, self was constituted (made real) 
3E The term intersubjective is used to describe some aspects of 
our mutual interrelatedness ...; intersubjectivity points to the inherent sociality of consciousness and to the experience 
of the world by self and others as a world in common. (Phillipson, 1972,125)" 
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socially: and not only was human communication seen as symbolic 
(which is obvious enough) but social life and the social world 
'itself' were seen as symbolic processes of interaction. 
Natanson, in examining the philosophical bases of Mead's thought, 
finds a parallel between Mead, Husserl and Schutz: and 
explicitly rejects the view of Mead as a "social behaviourist" 
(Natanson 1973,3-4). 
Mead, social psychologist and philosopher, gave an impetus 
to the pure sociological work at Chicago by his emphasis on the 
construction of self by social processes. Following Mead, it 
can be said that meanings in the world are constructed, not pre- 
existent, nor irrelevant.., " Men ha)e meanings, using symbols as 
convenient shorthand: l4ýnge is central here. The self is 
socially constructed, yet renders itself, for practical purposes, 
'objective' and acts to define social life: in terms of shared 
meanings and symbols. 
There may not, of course, be agreement about supposedly 
'shared' meanings. Interactionists within the sociology of 
deviance emphasised that 'self' may effectively, and perhaps 
coercively, be defined by others (Becker 1973; Scheff 1974). 
Also, the act of interpretation, of making sense and generating 
order from pre-existing disorganisation, necessarily involves 
the individual in the process of giving meaning to others' actions. 
That the self can 'itself' be the object of individual action 
makes interpretation of others' action practically possible. 
Methodologically, the task for the interactionist is to 'catch' 
the process of interpretation as it happens: to 'take the role' 
of the other (Blumer 1962,188). Role-taking has parallels with 
both Weber's verstehen, and the phenomenological method of 
description, though it is synonomous with neither. 
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Phenomenology is neither a theory nor a mode of explanation. 
It is, in sociology, a method of describing and understanding 
the processes whereby individuals constitute the social world. 
There is no reality-out-there to be measured or explained: 
social reality is a configuration of meanings, made (for 
practical purposes) 'real' only by these meanings and by human 
activity. This reality - which we might calla practical facticity 
- is an achievement of members of society. Their methods of 
achieving this reality are objects of sociological inquiry: in 
the present study, coroners' methods of creating the practical 
reality of sudden death are the focus of attention. 
Berger and Luckmann's re-formulation of the sociology of 
knowledge revealed some of the elements of a broadly phenomeno- 
logical sociology (1967). In the task of describing reality- 
construction, a central problem is to first describe how 
subjective meanings are transformed into 'objective' facticities. 
Signs, and in particular language, are key elements. Language 
allows logic to be imposed on the "objectivated social world" 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967,82). 
The social world, then, is available for experience as an 
objective 'thing': which is not, of course, to say (with the 
positivists) that it is'in fact' an objective thing. The 
experienced reality of the social world derives from the sense 
of its objectivity. 
Filmer accepts the phenomenological framework, yet believes 
it provides few clues as to how the social construction of the 
world might be investigated (Filmer 1972,203-205). He sees 
ethnomethodology as an operationalisation of the phenomenological 
perspective and, it seems, is not alone in this view. For 
instance, Wiles and Wiles (in a guide to criminological literature) 
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write: 
Garfinkel has added to the terminological confusion 
by introducing the word 'ethnomethodology', but 
all he means by it is the methodology necessary 
for a phenomenolo ical sociology (Wiles 
and Wiles 1974,35). 
This is a rather shaky position to adopt, as phenomenology 
is itself a method: not a theory in search of a method. More- 
over, it is increasingly the case that ethnomethodology is 
something rather different from phenomenology. This is most 
clear in the work of the conversation analysts in ethnomethod- 
ology (e. g. Atkinson and Drew1979). It is much less the case in 
early ethnomethodological work. 
Society, then, acquires its apparently objective status 
because members continually define it as real (Walsh 1972,19). 
The phenomenologist suspends belief in this apparent objectivity 
in order to study as closely as possible the phenomenon at 
hand. The positivist accepts the objectivity of what appears to 
be. 
Walsh, in his discussion of Durkheim's study of suicide, 
notes that Durkheim is obliged to introduce his own meanings 
about suicide into his data, for otherwise no sense could be made 
of it-(Walsh, 1972). The meanings of marriage, education, social 
isolation, and so on, are necessarily pre-supposed by Durkheim. 
Where such factors do not correlate in the expected way with the 
data (e. g. that Jews have a high level of education but a low, 
not high, suicide rate) Durkheim must assert that education 
has a different significance, another meaning, for Jews (Walsh 
1972,44). Walsh also notes the problematic nature of official 
statistics as used by Durkheim, adding that the meanings, 
intentions and motives imputed in the creation of a category 
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called suicide vary between societies: as, of course, does 
the method of record-keeping (Walsh 1972,46). 
To restate the position taken in the present study, suicide 
rates, and other rates of sudden death, are seen as the products 
of coroners' activities: as reliable records of what coroners 
do. To investigate the relation between these rates and 'actual' 
rates-out-there, in order to test the accuracy of official rates, 
is, in terms of the theoretical position adopted in the study, 
an irrelevant enterprise. A study aimed, for instance, at 
investigating the relative accuracy of English and Scottish 
suicide rates (Barraclough 1972) is therefore outside the area 
of our concern. 
The essential task of everyday life is to define situations 
as real, and thus to constitute order, and maintain the social 
world while managing this task as a routine unproblematic 
activity. An aim of the research is to describe and understand 
how coroners carry out this task in relation to sudden death. 
1 (3) Situating Research Methodology 
The broad theoretical stance of the research having been 
outlined, it is now of use to situate the research more precisely 
alongside existing studies of coroners' work. It is also 
necessary to situate methodology in its wider theoretical context. 
Atkinson (1978), in his study of the social organisation of 
sudden death, moves from positivism, through interactionism, 
and finally to ethnomethodology. The central research question 
emerged as: "how do deaths get categorized as suicides? " 
(Atkinson 1978,7). Atkinson's own answer is that 
... deaths get categorized as suicides in much the same way as anything else gets categorized. 
(Atkinson 1978,196). 
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Hence, nothing particularly useful can be said about coroners' 
categorisations: the task is to create a sociology without the 
accepted sub-divisions (sociology of deviance, sociology of the 
family, and so on) and to investigate members' methods of 
producing categories. 
Nevertheless, Atkinson produces a study of coroners' 
activities: comparisons between this study, and the seminal work 
of Douglas (1967) are inevitable. Atkinson suggests that Douglas 
..... can be faulted first on the grounds that 
what he does is not so very different from what 
previous researchers have done, and second that 
his demonstration is inconsistent with his own 
programmatics. (Atkinson 1978,83). 
It is possible of course that the second criticism, 
especially, can be made of Atkinson's own study. 
Atkinson produces a description of how some deaths reported 
to coroners became categorised as suicides. Using interviews and 
participant observation, Atkinson draws up a list of factors 
typically sought by coroners and their officers in arriving at a 
suicide verdict: suicide notes, threats, previous attempts, 
mode and location of death, personal history of the deceased 
(Atkinson 1978,110-140). The factors are not discrete clues: 
they interconnect within practical theories of suicide (Atkinson 
1978,141). 
When coroners categorise a death as suicide, says Atkinson, 
they not only 'pin a label' upon that death: they explain that 
death, theorise about it, impute a motive (1978,143). This 
process of theorising may be akin to the theorising about suicide 
traditionally done by sociologists. It may also be akin to 
theorising by the Press (Atkinson 1978,156-165). In Atkinson's 
words, coroners make "order out of chaos" in achieving plausible 
accounts of how and why death occurred: sense is made out of 
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disorganisation (1978,172). 
Atkinson's leap into ethnomethodology is a theoretical and 
methodological 'solution' to the 'problems' that (given his 
premises) sociological accounts resemble common-sense accounts 
and that coroners' categorisations resemble members' categorisa- 
tions. Atkinson's sole recommendation for research and his own, 
final, programme is a focus on members' methods for repairing 
indexical expressions. * (1978,182). He distinguishes this task 
from Douglas' mere interest in collecting more and more 'indexical 
particulars' or details. Perhaps Baechler's study (1979) would 
be seen by Atkinson as yet more 'indexical particulars'. 
How categorisations are made (by coroners or anyone) is, 
then, a matter of 'repairing indexical expressions' i. e. consti- 
tuting indexical expressions as objective expressions and thus 
creating a practical and (for members) unproblematic social 
order. The empirical task is an investigation of how this is 
done: which Atkinson does not actually do, ending as he does on 
a programmatic note. 
Atkinson's work will be discussed again in more detail. It 
is sufficient at this point to say that Atkinson's formulation 
of the problem is interpreted in"the present study as follows: 
how does society, or social phenomena, acquire objective facticity; 
how are coroners' categorisations about what-really-happened 
possible, and how are they achieved; how are suicides, or other 
Despite the obscurity with which it is usually associated, 
the notion of "indexicality" appears to be fairly straight- forward. "Indexical" denotes the particular, the context- bound, the not-yet-ordered potential strands of social life. 
"Members" (people) render the "indexical" as "objective": they "repair" or "remedy" the "indexical" for the purpose of normal 
social life. Ethnomethodology concentrates upon this achieve- 
ment of rendering the "indexical" as "objective". This has 
some parallel with reification, although perhaps not for 
ethnomethodologists. 
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'sorts of death' constituted as practical facts; how are 
objective context-free statements by coroners about their work 
made, and what relation do these statements have to the partic- 
ularities of death? 
Douglas (1967) will be discussed below at more than one 
point. For the moment, it is enough to briefly summarise his 
approach, particularly in relation to that of Durkheim (1970). 
Douglas argues that Durkheim was not engaged in a monolithic 
positivist exercise: Durkheim's study of suicide was a synthesis 
of the methods of nineteenth century moral statisticians and the 
methods of (what Durkheim saw as) science, the result being far 
from systematic. (Douglas 1967,15-22). Further, Douglas argues 
that an emphasis on social meanings is in fact to be found in 
Durkheim's study: 
..... Suicide remains 
the best sociological work on 
suicide, primarily because of the ideal of 
scientific investigation of social phenomena which 
it is built on and because in the final analysis 
it broke with the positivistic tradition of 
research on suicide, the tradition which was so 
antithetical to the treatment of suicide as actions 
caused by social meanings. 
(Douglas 1967,76 emphasis in original) 
Douglas' reading of Durkheim, as this passage suggests, does 
seem to be widely misunderstood. Indeed, it is a puzzling 
reading. Durkheim's break with the "positivist tradition" is 
by no means self-evident and it is not clear where his explicit 
interest in social meanings is to be located. Yet Douglas saw 
shared values, sentiments and morals as "social meanings" in 
Durkheim's work, and suggested that Durkheim saw these as causes 
of suicide (Douglas 1967,41-42). The term 'causes' seems 
unfortunate. Douglas talks of Durkheim moving toward a theory 
"in which the social meanings of behaviour are the ultimate 
determinants of suicide. " (Douglas 1967,42). 
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To postulate with Douglas (and, according to Douglas, with 
Durkheim) that social meanings cause or determine suicide is an 
extremely abstract notion which at most can be expressed as an 
ultimately trivial statement (that the meaning of suicide defines 
what suicide is). 
Douglas so far seems to be another Durkheimian sociologist 
of suicide. Yet he is not. Douglas' criticisms of "official 
statistics" are of course highly important. So too are Douglas' 
comments on the status of Durkheim's theory: 
Certainly there is the greatest attention to 
statistical data in Suicide, but this careful 
consideration of data came after the general 
ideas about society and suicide and, in his 
argumentative approach to the data, Durkheim bends 
the data to fit his preconceived theory. 
(Douglas 1967,25). 
Durkheim took for granted the meaning-of-meanings, and used 
this assumed knowledge to support generalisations about suicide 
and society. He 
..... relied upon his own common-sense 
knowledge 
of social action in European societies to provide 
most of the superficial meanings of the assoc- 
iations. (Douglas 1967,68) 
a point consistent with the comments of Walsh (1972). 
Moving on from Douglas' comments on Durkheim, it is useful 
to identify Douglas' prescriptions for empirical sociological 
work. These, however, are not altogether clear. 
Douglas acknowledges a debt to Weber, noting in passing that 
empathy, interpretative understanding and subjective meaning remain 
sociologically heretical notions (1967,235-237). The relation 
between language and meaning is noted, and the important point 
made that there is no single social meaning of suicide: the 
meanings involved in constructing a 'suicidal situation' are 
numerous. However, Douglas maintains that members involved in 
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some way with suicide tend to agree on the appropriate meanings, 
constructing a "structure of meanings" drawn from the wider 
culture and past interactions (Douglas 1967,253). 
The implication may be that for coroners, police officers, 
doctors, relatives and sociologists the meaning of suicide is 
non-problematic. It is obvious, both to the officials concerned, 
and to the positivist sociologist. Yet for the non-positivist 
sociologist, meanings are problematic, and Douglas gives no clear 
indication as to how they can be investigated, beyond an abstract 
programme: 
..... we must work 
from the clearly observable, 
concrete phenomena upward to abstractions about 
meanings in any culture ....., and the abstractions 
must be the results of comparisons made by 
sociologists of the concrete meanings of these 
phenomena defined as similar by the members of 
the culture (Douglas 1967,253-4, emphasis in original) 
Possibly this vague recommendation has some relation to 
Atkinson's prescription for research. It has been interpreted 
and practised in a different way by Baechler (1979), with some 
success (although with a relevance for sociology as yet undeter- 
mined). Indeed, Douglas' programme is open to any number of 
interpretations. 
It is fair to say that neither Atkinson nor Douglas proceed 
with the sociological work that they prescribe. It is also 
reasonable to say that their prescriptions are vague. More 
importantly, the point can be made that their extensive criticisms 
of positivist research can be turned back to some extent upon their 
own studies. 
it It is, of course, necessary to distinguish the socially 
problematic from the sociologically problematic. 
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In the present study, an attempt is made to adhere to the 
stated theoretical and methodological framework: internal 
consistency is seen as an important factor. The sources from 
which the research material has been derived have already been 
briefly mentioned, and are listed in more detail in the Appendix. 
Some preliminary discussion of these sources can usefully be 
conducted, however, before proceeding with the study. 
The sources were: 
observation of fifty inquests, with and without 
juries, at a single coroner's court; 
additional observation at other inquests; 
semi-structured interviews with the coroners of five 
Northern counties; 
additional informal interviews with certain coroners, 
police officers, and anyone who had an interesting 
account to offer; 
analysis of records, over a fifty-year period, in a 
single coroner's office; 
analysis of national statistics derived from coroners' 
returns to the Home Office, obtained from both published 
and unpublished sources, and with particular attention 
to the fifty-year period (1926-75) covered in the local 
statistical search, plus suicide statistics up to 1980; 
published research, largely, although not exclusively, 
in sociology; 
the informal observations, conversations and note-taking 
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which necessarily accompany research fieldwork e. g. 
observations made before and after inquests, conver- 
sations with coroners' officers while studying 
coroners' records, and so on. 
All these sources yielded substantial qualitative material. 
The positivist might not be happy about the nature of the material: 
interviews with coroners, for instance, although based on pre-set 
questions, were allowed to follow the course of natural conver- 
sation, rather than being limited by a multiple-choice answer 
system or a coding framework. Equally, ethnomethodologists would 
be perhaps unhappy that the interviews were not recorded on tape: 
they were recorded by personal notes only, in the interest of 
encouraging a frank expression of views. There was no interest 
in examining the structure of the language used by coroners in 
answering a question. The particular research methods adopted 
were chosen on several grounds. Firstly, they were designed to 
yield as much material as possible relating to an unresearched 
area of activity. Secondly, they were designed to be as unob- 
trusive and unstructured as possible, while still retaining 
rigour and form. Thirdly, and most important, they were designed 
to be consistent with the stated tasks of the research and the 
explicit theoretical orientation. Large-scale survey methods 
were not used: nor were any methods which might have distorted 
the object of study. 
Any methodology presupposes and embodies a theoretical base, 
a world-view, a conception of the task at hand, and a notion of 
how to achieve it. Objections to any methodology cannot be based 
on whether its presuppositions match those of the reader, but only 
on grounds such as whether the theoretical base can be established 
to be misconceived; whether the methodology is non-coherent or 
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inconsistent; whether the research objective is unrealistic; 
whether the methods are unrelated to the aims; or whether there 
are hidden presuppositions which are never made explicit. In 
the present study, the research process is made as visible as 
possible. 
Inquests attended, coroners interviewed, and the period of 
time studied, are taken to be representative. A sociologist, 
necessarily, does not study the entire social world. Nor does 
the sociologist study his small part of the social world in 
order only to draw conclusions about that small part. Sociolo- 
gists of every theoretical hue necessarily assume, provided that 
their work is reasonably carefully done (and often even when it 
isn't), that their conclusions have an application wider than 
their specific study literally allows. This might be clearly the 
case in macroscopic positivist or Marxist sociology, but is 
equally a feature of ethnomethodological studies of the minutae 
of everyday life. The permissibility of endowing particular 
research material with general significance must be judged in 
terms of the internal dynamic of the particular research. In the 
present study, an attempt is made to form conclusions as part of 
a visible process open to view. 
An underlying methodological problem is the extent to which 
the practice of research itself constitutes the 'object of study'. 
The sociologist who rejects the idea of an externa objective 
world to be explained must be aware that his own a tivities may 
'create' what is the object of study. 
Blum's comment is highly pertinent: 
..... it is easy to see that the methodical 
character of marriage, war, and suicide is only 
seen, recognized, and made possible through the 
organized practices of sociology. These 
regularities do not exist 'gout there'? in 
- 22 - 
pristine form to which sociologists functionally 
respond, but rather they acquire their character 
as regularities ..... only through the grace of 
sociological imputation. Thus, it is not an 
objectively discernible, purely existing external 
world which accounts for sociology: it is the 
methods and procedures of sociology which create 
and sustain that world. (Blum 1970b 336). 
On one level, Blum has indicated the problem of reification: 
an avoidable problem. More fundamentally, Blum has posed the 
question of whether sociologists not only record, but also 
generate, their data. A reflexive sociology can, by turning its 
analysis back upon itself, transform the problem of the generation 
of data into a resource: but a reflexive sociology can also 
develop into an unproductive sociology-of-sociology where, 
narcissistically, its only data is itself. This is a difficult 
issue. It is one, inevitably, to be reintroduced at a later 
point in the discussion. 
So far, the theoretical, and methodological, features of the 
study have been outlined, and situated in relation to some 
existing sociological studies and issues. Something can usefully 
be said at this point about the problem of "official statistics". 
1() The Problem of Official Statistics 
A discussion of official statistics clarifies some general 
methodological problems. It is also a necessary preliminary 
to our later detailed discussion of the statistics of coroners' 
work. 
Bradshaw examined the "ongoing social organization" of 
suicide by considering the links between the structure of the 
rate-producing agency (the coroner's office) and the data 
produced by that agency (1973,4). Bradshaw's hypothesis is that 
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official statistics about suicide are systematically "biased", 
and therefore of no use in testing sociological theories which 
posit a relation between suicide and, for instance, social 
integration or anomie (1973,32). Bradshaw appears to postulate 
that the statistics of suicide are "biased" when measured against 
some real, or true, rate of suicide. Our first observation, of 
course, must be that this is a speculative assumption. Against 
which absolute yardstick is bias to be measured? Bradshaw pre- 
supposes an agreed concrete definition of suicide, yet surely 
there are many levels, not one, on which the alleged real rate of 
suicide is to be discerned: the commonsense level of meaning; 
the coroner's level of meaning; the reclassifications of deaths 
in the work of psychiatric researchers like Barraclough (1974); 
or the level, say, upon which a Catholic clergyman would estimate 
the prevalence of suicide. Bradshaw adds another reclassification, 
and thus performs, essentially, the coroner's task. To attempt 
'better' coroners' categorisations seems to be a sociologically 
rather dubious enterprise. In any event, it is not one which 
concerns us in the present study. 
In expressing extreme scepticism about the existence of one 
real suicide rate (on practical as well'as philosophical grounds) { 
it should not of course be suggested that coroners indulge in a 
process of capricious labelling, or that any guess about suicide 
rates is as good as any other. For specific practical purposes, 
some classifications of suicide are 'better than others'. For 
our purposes, the question is entirely open: suicide exists, as 
experiential fact, as organisational product, as practical, 
statistical, fact, but if one, real, suicide rate somewhere exists, 
it is both in practice and in principle unknowable. Insofar as 
it exists on a level of 'unknowable truth', it does not interest 
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us here. In terms of studying what coroners do, suicide can be 
assumed to be what coroners say it is. 
Bradshaw, incidentally, failed to prove his hypothesis in his 
own terms. He reclassified accidental, natural or undetermined 
deaths which could ('really') have been suicide (Bradshaw 1973, 
155). Further, for Bradshaw social meanings were unproblematic: 
they were shared and understood in relation to suicide (1973, 
189). Thus the researcher, we gather, need not be delayed by 
even Douglas' moderate critique. 
In the present study, bias and error are not regarded as 
sensible topics of interest. Kitsuse and Cicourel's early 
statement of the difficulties inherent in using official 
statistics in sociology (1963) is seen as having continued 
relevance. For Kitsuse and Cicourel, sociologists' reservations 
about official statistics have been of a superficial kind: 
That is, the 'unreliability' is viewed as a 
technical and organizational problem, not a 
matter of differences concerning the definition 
of deviant behaviour. 
(Kitsuse & Cicourel 1963,134: emphasis added) 
Kitsuse and Cicourel's objections were more fundamental: 
.... insofar as the definitions of deviant behaviour incorporated in the official statistics 
are not "sociologically relevant", such 
statistics are in principle ttinappropriatett for 
sociological research. 
(Kitsuse and Cicourel 1963,134: emphasis in original) 
Thus, the sociologist can be concerned with the production 
of rates, or he can continue to be concerned with the aetiology 
of whatever behaviour he is studying. However, if he is studying 
the latter, 'rates' cannot be assumed to tell him anything useful 
about it. 
Of course, within the sociology of deviance, this early 
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statement of the problem has been influential. Cicourel's own 
study of juvenile justice in the U. S. A. is an outstanding example 
of a rate-producing agency in operation (1968). Yet Kitsuse and 
Cicourel)s argument has not been universally accepted. Hindess, 
for instance, engages in a polemical defence of official 
statistics, via a critique of ethnomethodology which he takes, 
puzzlingly, to be represented by Douglas and Cicourel (Hindess 
1973) 
Hindess' central argument is that ethnomethodology renders 
official statistics unusable and, moreover, renders the social 
world absolutely unknowable. The logical necessity for a back- 
ground account of the sociologist's account, and an account of 
that account, ad infinitum, makes the ethnomethodological position 
absurd. The implication is that official statistics may as well 
be used, as no 'facts' are otherwise available. In short, 
ethnomethodolgical criticisms: 
..... may be directed against the objectivity of 
official statistics but they would dispose of 
the objectivity of all knowled e. 
(Hindess 1973,125. 
Yet it is not clear that Hindess understands either positivism 
or ethnomethodology when he asserts that both 
..... are united 
in the complicity of a common 
conception of knowledge as reducible to experience. 
(1973,10). 
Miles and Irvine present a further Marxist critique of 
official statistics (1979). They point to the "monopoly power" 
of the State in both the "production and dissemination" of 
statistical information, this monopoly having the consequences 
that, firstly, certain sorts of data appear in official statistics, 
reflecting the needs and justifying the programmes of State 
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agencies and, secondly, that the concepts and categories embodied 
in the statistics are ideologically specific. (Miles and Irvine 
1979,113). Miles and Irvine are critical of the view that the 
only limitations of official statistics are technical ones (1979, 
114): a similar point, it seems, to that of Kitsuse and Cicourel 
(1963), but with rather different implications, i. e. 
We shall argue that official statistics present 
not a neutral picture of British society, but 
one developed in support of the system of power 
and domination that is modern capitalism ..... (Miles and Irvine, 1979,114-115). 
Miles and Irvine comment on the value of the phenomenological 
critique of official statistics, but imply that a sociological 
critique, notwithstanding its value in effectively challenging 
empiricism, does not amount to the necessary socialist critique: 
For while the phenomenologists have demonstrated 
the social nature of official data, they often 
allow the flourishes with which they have pro- 
nounced their views to be the finale of their 
analysis. They have tended to replace the 
empiricist view of official statistics as 
objective facts by a perspective treating them 
solely as subjective judgements reflecting the 
social reality of individual and organisational 
decisions and definitions. But individual 
experience is constituted within social structures - 
structures that themselves make possible and 
delimit individual and organisational ractices. (Miles and Irvine, 1979,117). 
It is difficult to take issue with this. Organisational 
decisions indeed occur in a structural context. The coroner 
does not work in a political or social vacuum. Certainly, ideology 
is of relevance in understanding the production of sudden death. * 
Yet the coroner is not concerned with social control in the same 
wa s as police, judges or legislators. His concern is with 
control of a different order. Further, ideologies of medicine 
if See Chapter Six 
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and death are related to social structure, and the demands of the 
State, but not in a way which permits the sensible application of 
a straightforwardly Marxist analysis. Although Miles and Irvine 
make a plausible case in their analysis of unemployment statistics 
(1979,120-121), it is not easy to see how exactly the same analysis 
might be applied to sudden death statistics - unless the aim was 
to focus on, say, industrial deaths, or deaths in police or 
prison custody, in an explicitly macropolitical way. However, 
when the aim is to analyse the production of sudden death as a 
whole, the perspective must be wider. 
As official statistics have been so thoroughly criticised 
from a number of different directions, one might wonder why 
Durkheim appeared to regard them as fairly unproblematic. Douglas 
suggested six principal reasons: (1967,165-166): 
a) Durkheim held that the stability of suicide rates denoted 
an underlying social law; 
b) The laws governing suicide could be revealed by inter- or 
intra-national comparisons of suicide rates; 
c) The analysis of statistical rates was a necessary element 
of the macroscopic theory of suicide which sociology 
offered as an alternative to individualist (psychological/ 
moral) theories; 
d) As suicide is statistically rare, the sociologist interest- 
ed in a general theory must turn to the records of large 
numbers of suicides i. e. suicide rates; 
e) The use of official statistics in the formative period of 
sociology became the general example of how to practise 
sociology; 
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f) Official statistics are readily available: they remove 
the need to collect material in the field. 
The factors which account for Durkheim's use of the official 
statistics of suicide are of course quite compatible with the 
epistemological and practical concerns of a positivist sociology. 
Douglas' critique of official statistics in sociology remains 
important. He notes that the definitions of suicide used by 
those who compile the rates may have no relation to the definitions 
and categories which interest the sociologist: the sociologist 
who uses official statistics to build theories implicitly accepts 
the definitions used by officials (Douglas 1967,169). Moreover, 
even where the sociologist is aware of definitional problems, 
the background assumption might still be retained that suicide 
is a 'thing', more-or-less easily recognisable as being 'a 
suicide', and that the statistics form a more-or-less reliable 
source of information about this feature of the world called 
suicide (Douglas 1967,170). 
The crux of Douglas' argument is that "systematic variations 
in the meanings of suicide" exist, that these undermine any 
conception of the suicide-rate as an indicator of how-many- 
suicides-happen, and that the sociology of suicide, traditionally 
conceived, has neglected these problems (1967,178). Suicide is 
not a phenomenon withonediscoverable meaning, it is a term 
applied to a range of phenomena and meanings. Douglas is worth 
quoting at length here: 
..... the meaning of suicide changed throughout the 
nineteenth century among the psychiatrists..... 
it went from being a form of insanity to being a 
form of irrational behaviour and, to some, even a 
form of rational behaviour. It went from being 
an act that could not possibly be intended .... to being one that was intended. It went from being 
an act of whose consequences the victim could not 
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possibly have knowledge to an act that involved a clear 
idea of the consequences involved ..... If the formal definitions of suicide among the intellectuals were 
so complex, so varied, so inconsistent, so changing, 
what were the meanings of suicide among the many 
different subcultures of Europe on the common-sense 
level of thought at which most of the doctors, 
coroners, official statisticians, families of victims, 
etc. worked in deciding whether or not a death was 
a suicide? (1967,178-179) 
Douglas adds that to locate a death within the category 
'suicide' is not only to describe that death: it is to explain it 
(1967,189). Atkinson makes a similar point (1971,183). The 
coroner is engaged in the same enterprise as Durkheim: to explain 
suicide, to account for why-it-happened. The sociologist who uses 
the official statistics to construct theories of suicide, however, 
is theorising about theorisings: his is a second-hand enterprise. 
It was suggested above that Douglas' characterisation of 
Durkheim's theoretical position was rather curious. Douglas' 
attitude to official statistics is also somewhat curious, for 
although his arguments might imply that the statistics of suicide 
cannot be used as a basis of sociological theorising, he proceeds 
to list sources of 'unreliability' in the statistics - which 
produce 'bias' in the 'testing' of sociological theories - thus 
implying the possibility of removing 'unreliability' (1967,203). 
The issue is whether official statistics are characterised by 
technical problems of reliability and unreliability: or whether 
official statistics are inherently inappropriate for the purpose of 
constructing (causal) sociological theories. Douglas never 
successfully distinguishes these two positions. 
Atkinson pointed to this weakness in Douglas' analysis, and 
made the point that, for Douglas, a 'real' rate of suicide 'out 
there' does, after all, exist (Atkinson 1978,65). Yet the point 
must also be made that Douglas' work was of central value in 
helping to establish the critical perspective on official 
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statistics in sociology. It is important to remember this, for 
an entirely uncritical approach to official statistics still 
flourishes. 
Gibbs, for instance, discusses 'unreported' suicide, 
'overestimation' of the 'incidence' of suicide, and so on, 
eventually concluding that although it is a "virtual certainty" 
that the suicide rate is not "absolutely reliable", it is to be 
regarded as "relatively reliable" (Gibbs 1968,14). Gibbs points 
to no theoretical issue which precludes the use of official 
statistics in sociological grand theorising. Even Hindess claims 
that, in evaluating the work of Douglas and Cicourel, "..... no 
theoretical problems of any substance are raised by their 
arguments". (1973,10). Goudsblom points to the "firm empirical 
basis" in Durkheim's study of suicide, deriving from his use of 
official statistics: "These were the facts which he tried to 
analyze without moral or emotional bias" (Goudsblom, 1977,41). 
Goudsblom concludes that: 
In many ways Durkheimts study is still a para- 
digmatic example of sociological research based 
on officially-documented facts. (1977,42) 
The critical perspective on official statistics in sociology 
is by no means universally accepted. The issue, of course, is 
complicated for one may be 'critical' in different ways. * The 
present study as a whole attempts, amongst other things, a 
critique of the statistics of sudden death. Connerton's character- 
isation of the Frankfurt School's notion of 'critique' is useful 
here, i. e. critique as "oppositional thinking, as an activity of 
unveiling or debunking" (1976,16-17); critique as an investi- 
Taylor summarises four distinct positions adopted by sociologists 
in relation to the use of official statistics (Taylor, 1982,50). 
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gation of the conditions of possible knowledge; and critique as 
an investigation of constraints, distortions, and illusions 
(1976,17-18). 
The first choice is whether or not to use official statistics 
at all. If they are to be used, the choice is between using them 
as more-or-less reliable measurements of whatever they supposedly 
measure (e. g. 'incidence of types of sudden death') or using them 
as reliable records of the activities of rate-producing agencies. 
The important choice is in deciding for what sociological 
purposes official statistics are to be used. 
The choices have theoretical and methodological underpinnings: 
and consequences. An attempt is made throughout the present 
study to render these explicit, visible, and open to discussion. 
The present section of the study has been confined to an 
introduction to the topic of official statistics, not to a final 
resolution of the problems. In Chapter Five, specific statistics 
produced by coroners are examined, and the discussion resumed. 
The discussion of official statistics is concluded in Chapter 
Seven. 
The final substantive section of the present chapter 
introduces some basic problems of sociological description and 
discusses, in particular, the contrasting nature of sociological 
understanding and sociological explanation. 
1(5) The Problems of Sociological Description and Understanding 
Sociological description, interpretation and understanding 
are all problematic terms. The aim of the present section of the 
discussion is to briefly explore some of the more problematic 
issues. An excellent starting point is Sacks' early paper (1963) 
on sociological description, itself inspired by a reading of 
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Durkheimts study of suicide. 
If sociology is a science, this implies that literal 
scientific descriptions are being produced by sociologists. 
Sociology, however, uses a language to describe its subject- 
matter, and this language (as a tool of description) must itself 
be described (Sacks 1963,2). Further, the sociologist (usually) 
knows the language of the members he studies, selecting the 
categories of his proposed description from this familiar 
language and the familiar things it describes. Sacks wished to 
render this taken for granted process of sociological description 
"strange" (1963,1). 
Language embodies descriptions. Sociological descriptions 
can be seen as descriptions-of-descriptions, akin to the second- 
hand theorisings-upon-theorisings which we noted above as a 
characteristic of positivist uses of official statistics. Yet 
Sacks' problem is not so easy to resolve, for if language is 
problematic, the object of study and the apparatus required for 
its study become identical. The solution lies not in an attempt 
to transcend natural language, but in a transformation of the 
problem into an imperative i. e. to view sociology's task as the 
production of descriptions of members' descriptions of what is 
taken to be the social world (Sacks 1963,7): 
That persons describe social life (if they can be 
conceived as doing so) is a happening of the 
subject quite as any other happening of any other 
subject in the sense that it poses the job of 
sociology, and in contrast with it providing a 
solution to sociology's problem of describing the 
activities of its subject matter. (Sacks 1963,7). 
Importantly, descriptions cannot be complete, as a limit- 
less number of "indexical details" might be elaborated. Thus 
the sociologist is obliged to add an "etcetera clause" to "permit 
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the description to be brought to a close". (Sacks 1963,10). 
Possibly Sacks' concern with the "etcetera" problem was 
excessive: after all, incomplete descriptions may nevertheless 
be adequate, sufficient and, for all necessary purposes, com- 
prehensive. This is the view taken in the present study. This 
does not imply, of course, that generalised descriptions should 
then be immediately constructed, and the description reified 
into what it is describing. 
The distinction between the correspondence and congruence 
models of reality is relevant at this point. * The correspondence 
model assumes a differentiation between experience/perception of 
the world and what is really there: objects-in-the-world, then, 
have an objective, independent existence. Descriptions get 
'better' as they correspond more closely to the thing-out- 
there: a literal, complete description would be the best 
description of all. 
In contrast, the congruence model treats the 'perceived' 
object and the 'real' object as synonomous. A complete description 
would literally be endless. The congruence model clearly offers 
more, in terms of the aims of the present study, than the 
correspondence model. It does, however, imply problems for the 
possibility of description. 
A stated aim of the research is a general description of 
coroners' work. This description can be adequate for present 
purposes, if necessarily incomplete. The latter-day ethnomethod- 
ologists' solution to the problem (turning to the microscopics 
of everyday life) has been rejected. Yet the status of the sought- 
for general description must be clarified, if it is to be 
Deriving from Garfinkel, this distinction is usefully 
summarised by Atkinson (1978,176-180). 
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distinguished from the generalised descriptions produced by 
positivism. 
The general and the generalised description must be 
differentiated. The latter embodies reification, abstraction 
and objectivication absent from the general description. More- 
over, the generalised description necessarily also 'explains', 
and imputes causality, in the context of a correspondence model 
of reality. Further, generalised descriptions are produced from 
theoretical and methodological bases left unexamined. More must 
be said of the nature of 'sociological explanation'. 
It must however first be made clear that the status of 
descriptions remains problematic. So do most of the terms in 
common use. * The problem of language means that pre-descriptive 
'descriptions' occur. ** 
To what extent descriptions are related to understanding 
and explanation is also contentious. However, the bases of 
sociological understanding, and how this might diverge from 
attempts at explanation, can profitably be explored. 
Dallmayr and McCarthy (1977) discuss the development of 
verstehen, or interpretative understanding, in sociology, as 
a concept which throws light upon understanding and explanation. 
The latter two approaches came into conflict during the 
Enlightenment (Dallmayr and McCarthy 1977,2). Positivism 
Ford (1975) lightheartedly placed all problematic sociological 
terms within question marks, thus, 2, social world? Lreality? 
'suicide?, highlighting their unresolved nature, their con- 
ditional status. Sudden death, the social world, etc. in the 
present study would ideally occur as 'sudden death', 'the 
social world', etc. throughout. But this continued use would be untidy and ultimately trivial. 
Conversation analysts in ethnomethodology seem to suppose that 
language is transcended, by being both subject and apparatus. 
This is most unsatisfactory. 
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subsequently reinforced the attack of 'scientific explanation' 
in place of 'understanding': all disciplines were obliged to 
adopt a natural-scientific method, or face "extinction" 
(Dallmayr and McCarthy 1977,2). Dallmayr and McCarthy talk of 
"the claim of empirical science to absolute supremacy" (1977,3), 
with implications for psychology and philosophy as well as 
sociology. One might add that the positivists in sociology mis- 
understood the 'natural science method' they assumed they were 
adopting (Keat, 1979,80). 
Weber re-emphasised understanding in social inquiry. Natural 
and cultural sciences were for Weber quite separate (Dallmayr and 
McCarthy 1977,4). Although Weber's work is open to numerous 
conflicting readings, the ideal of verstehen remains of lasting 
importance in sociology. 
Positivist sociology has, of course, incorporated Weber's 
'types of authority', 'social action', and so on, into its social 
systems, just as it has reduced Marx to a 'conflict theorist' 
who has given us 'social class', or Mead as a social psychologist 
who contributed the 'I' and 'me'. 
Linguistic analysis and phenomenology challenged positivist 
modes of explanation. 'Understanding' was re-cast. Linguistic 
analysts emphasised the social nature of human action, the 
transformation of meanings into expressions through shared 
language, the understanding of action in terms of language. 
Winch drew from both Wittgenstein and Weber, approaching meaning 
through language, if criticising what he saw as Weber's over- 
subjective perspective (Dalimayr and McCarthy 1977,7; Winch 1958). 
Husserl's phenomenology, as a rejection of empiricism, 
focussed upon the epoch; of phenomenological description and 
understanding i. e. the suspension, the grasp of the essence (eidos) 
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of the phenomenon. Thus eidetic understanding. Schutz adapted 
Husserl in the attempt to create a phenomenological sociology and, 
importantly, incorporated a non-positivist reading of Weber. 
..... Schutz tried 
to effect a merger of Weberian 
sociology and Husserl's teachings by tracing the 
notion of meaningful social action to an under- 
lying stratum or stream of constitutive con- 
sciousness. (Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1977,10). 
This occurs within the natural attitude. Schutz tended to 
devote more attention to the elaboration of Husserl's 'mundane' 
understanding than to teidetic' understanding proper: an 
emphasis even more readily developed by ethnomethodologists. 
A more detailed discussion of Schutz's sociology, and its 
philosophical inspiration in Husserl, is useful in tackling the 
problems of description and understanding. 
As a philosophical method, phenomenology arose as a challenge 
to the hegemony of empiricism, and the claim of positivism to be 
the mode of scientific inquiry. Husserl's work was also a 
challenge to nascent psychology and its attempt to render 
intellect the product of virtually mechanical processes (Dallmayr 
and McCarthy 1977,219). Husserl was concerned with how the 
world is known. To 'get close' to the nature of knowledge, Husserl 
propounded the suspension, the bracketing-away of presuppositions 
to do with causation or explanation. Husserl referred to 
? universal essences', taking account of the fluidity of the social 
world, he introduced 'mundane "descriptive psychology' too: 
hence the mundane and eidetic levels of description and under- 
standing. 
Husserl was not interested in creating a sociology. Yet any 
discussion of a phenomenological sociology must refer to Husserl, 
to its philosophical roots. The question arises of whether a 
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phenomenological sociology is possible. It is assumed that 
polemical writings on the impossibility of such a sociology may 
legitimately be dismissed (e. g. Bauman, 1973,1976). However, 
such critics may be correct to suggest that sociologists often 
crudely misunderstand phenomenology. Hence, we briefly return 
to Husserl. 
Experience is objectified only by the intentional acts 
(including thought) of individuals. Objects are objects 'only' 
insofar as they have been constituted as objects by individuals. 
The social world is a shorthand term for experiences and patterns 
of meanings constituted as 'the social world'. Phenomenology 
aims to describe this world without the presuppositions of 
empiricism. Koestenbaum (in the introduction to his translation 
of Husserl's Paris Lectures' (1964))picks out five key elements 
of Husserl's phenomenology: 
a) The epoche: an attitude, aimed toward a pre-suppositionless 
description of experience. Theories (including the theory that 
the 'object' has some objective, independent existence) are 
suspended, bracketed-off. At the crudest level, this translates 
into a sociologically sceptical attitude. 
b) Intentionality: the non-abstract nature of consciousness 
and experience. Consciousness is 'of': experience is 'of': 
consciousness and experience without this link of intentionality 
are meaningless. Further, the object of (my) consciousness is 
constituted by me: 11 ..... objectivity is a function and project 
of the subject. " (Koestenbaum, 1964, XXVII). 
c) The transcendental ego and the 'reduction': by the 
'reduction' (crudely, another form of the epochs), the 'trans- 
dental ego', the pure subject, the 'I', is made visible. The 
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transcendental reduction brackets away everything, leaving the 
ego. 
d) Intersubjectivity_ by bracketing the apparent objectivity of 
the other, the other takes on meaning as experience, not as object. 
Empathy in an extreme form (the interaction of subjectivities) is 
central here, and of major sociological significance. 
e) Essences: logic is the science of objects, seen as essences: 
"eidetic science" (Koestenbaum 1964, LXIII). Logic refers to 
experience, not signs or symbols. 
The summary above may place in context talk of a phenomeno- 
logical sociology. It is only a partial summary. It is simple 
enough to refer further to Husserl (1970) or to some of the more 
interesting elaborations (e. g. Elliston and McCormick 1977). 
In Schutz's sociology, intentionality and intersubjectivity 
remain crucial elements. However, Schutz was more concerned with 
the way in which the social world might be investigated than with 
pure descriptive logic. 
Schutz noted that sociologists who rejected the received 
version of natural science as a model for sociology largely 
floundered in over-generalisation and an insubstantial theoretical 
base (1954,258). His programme was to develop an alternative 
sociology (drawn from Husserl and Weber) which did not collapse 
in this way. Schutz put forward the following propositions: 
a) The aim of sociology 't..... is to obtain organized knowledge 
of social reality" (Schutz 1954,261). Social reality denotes 
the experiential sum of interacting individuals: a shared, 
experienced world. 
b) Empiricism, naturalism and positivism take for granted 
precisely those elements of social reality which, for Schutz, 
are problematic. 
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Intersubjectivity, interaction, intercommun- 
ication, and language are simply presupposed 
as the unclarified foundation of these /empiricist_7 
theories. (1954,261) 
c) Experience, in Schutz's terms, cannot be equated solely with 
sensory observation (Schutz 1954,262-263). 
For the normal purposes of everyday life, commonsense 
knowledge of social reality is adequate, and is a reality ex- 
perienced as having meaning. Moreover, others are experienced not 
as objects, but as action and experience (Schutz 1954,263-264). 
Interactional social reality is necessarily inter-subjective, 
organised by the routine application of empathic understanding. 
Schutz talks of the "common-sense experience of the inter- 
subjective world in daily life" as understanding - as verstehen - 
constituting the "first level construct" of social life upon which 
sociology builds "second level constructs" (1954,2695. Just as 
first-level constructs refer to the subjective meanings of 
actions, so too must the sociologist's second-level constructs. 
This is the point at which Schutz's thought particularly resembles 
that of Weber (Schutz 1954,269-270) and sociology's second-level 
constructs can also be seen to resemble the descriptions-of- 
descriptions of Sacks (1963). 
Upon this basis Schutz maintains (with Husserl) that general 
patterns, principles or forms may be identifiable, revealed in 
the particular. Further, this may be verified: phenomenology 
is not an esoteric form of guesswork. The broadly phenomenological 
method is internally rigorous. 
In this section of the discussion, then, some problems of 
sociological description have been outlined, and it has been 
argued that general descriptions are defensible and possible. 
The aim of (adequate, if incomplete) description - i. e. under- 
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standing - has been distinguished from explanation as convention- 
ally understood in sociology. Finally, the elements of phenomen- 
ological sociology have been briefly outlined, together with a 
review of its philosophical base. The discussion as a whole 
provides the foundation for proceeding with the research study. 
1 (6) Summary and General Points 
In sum, the aim of the study is to describe, and provide 
the basis for understanding, the work of coroners. More 
specifically, the processes whereby deaths are reported to 
coroners, dealt with organisationally, categorised, and finally 
'settled' as statistical records, are studied, using material 
derived from interviews, observation and statistical analysis. 
Crudely, it is a study of what coroners do. The present 
chapter has situated the study in relation to the major existing 
sociological work in this area, and also situated the study in 
its methodological and theoretical context. An attempt has been 
made to render the methodological choices and the theoretical 
framework 'visible': open to inspection. The theoretical 
inspiration is phenomenological although it cannot be judged, 
at this point, whether the research constitutes'a phenomenological 
study'. Schutz, Husserl, Weber and Mead are regarded as central 
figures in the attempt to produce any heuristic descriptive 
sociology. A brief explication of the positivist enterprise in 
sociology has been provided, together with some criticisms, but 
the present study would not claim to be anti-positivist. It is 
simply not interested in the questions traditionally asked within 
positivist sociology, nor in its methods. 
It has been argued that descriptions based upon the present 
research can legitimately have the status of general descriptions. 
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It is possible that such general descriptions can be located 
within a structural or ideological context. The 'sociology of 
suicide', and criticisms of official statistics in suicide 
research, will be frequently referred to, but the study is not 
a study of suicide, nor a study of coroners' decisions about 
suicide in particular. It is a study of how coroners produce 
the available facts of sudden death. 
The theoretical label that is attached to any piece of 
research is ultimately of minor importance. Curious muddles 
can arise from the indiscriminate use of ostensibly informative 
terms. Douglas' adventures into 'everyday life' are an example 
of a muddle (1973). Elsewhere, Douglas variously presents 
himself as an interactionist, phenomenologist, ethnomethodologist, 
existential sociologist, humanistic sociologist and, possibly, 
more. More important than the label is the theoretical base 
and its relation to methodology and the objectives of the research. 
The present chapter has aimed only to introduce issues, not 
to finally resolve them. Theoretical issues and problems underly 
the whole study. For instance, Cicourel (borrowing inspiration 
from Schutz) noted that interviews must be based in a necessary 
community, the common scheme of reference (1964,79). Every 
interview is a unqiue event in which the sociologist generates 
the patterns he 'finds' (Cicourel 1964,81). For the present 
purposes of the study, this does not imply that interviews are 
without value. It means simply that interviews are not what they 
are assumed to be by the positivist and that they yield material 
about sociology itself in their 'results'. 
Problems of meaning also arise in the observational area of 
research. Decisions about what to observe; how to conduct 
observations; how (and when) to record observations; how to 
- 42 - 
properly draw conclusions; and so on, can all be regarded as 
problematic. To be engaged in observation is also to be involved 
in interaction. Becker's point that the results of essentially 
qualitative field research tend to be accepted as a matter of 
faith in the sociologist concerned must be remembered (1971,26). 
The solution in the present study is to make observation, argu- 
ment, rationale, theoretical perspective and conclusions as 
visible as possible. This must be done in such a way as to 
accommodate the reader who disagrees with the conclusions 
reached. Enough reliable clues about how-it-was-done (which is 
not simply a technical recital of research methods) must be 
provided to allow another sociologist to do a similar study. This 
is not a reference to the repeatability of natural-science 
experiments. No sociological study can be repeated: the same 
observation, for instance, can never be done again. Provision 
can be made, however, for any practical attempt to carry out a 
similar study. 
Statistics are used as descriptive records of coroners' 
decisions. Historical or regional variations in the statistics 
of sudden death are assumed to denote variations in coroners' 
practice. The use of statistics is perhaps the least contentious 
area of field research, provided it is understood that they are 
used as a qualitative resource. Statistics indicate features of 
the assembly of sudden death as a meaningful category. Cicourel 
pointed out that even apparently straightforward demographic 
facts, like birth or death, 
..... assume relevance within the context of the 
everyday and organizational terms under which 
they were assembled, and the sociologist must 
often be prepared to study these everyday and 
organizational conditions. (1964,140). 
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The present study examines some established problems in 
sociology, such as the problems of description, official statistics 
the processes of rate-production, and attempts to contribute to 
their understanding. The more specific rationale of the study 
has several elements. Firstly, although birth and death could be 
regarded as the most crucial sociological events, little is 
known of the sociological processes involved in the handling of 
sudden deaths: about one-fifth of all deaths in England and 
Wales. Secondly, the unqiue legal-medical office of coroner, 
and the considerable power associated with the post, has not been 
subject to any serious sociological attention. Thirdly, little 
is known on the most basic level of what the coroner is and 
does. Fourthly, an understanding of the coroner's work is central 
to any understanding of the routine and bureaucratic handling 
of death in industrial death. Fifthly, a range of other 
'rationales' could be listed: the inquest (as a court of law) 
bears interesting comparison to its better known fellow insti- 
tutions in the legal system proper; changes in the 'suicide 
rate' may be accounted for by changes in coroners' practice in 
recording suicide verdicts; and the informal, practical pattern 
of coroners' work may diverge from the formal procedural model. 
Chapter One has been concerned with laying the foundations 
for presenting and discussing the material collected in the course 
of research. Chapter Two is concerned with providing another 
sort of foundation, by tracing the historical development of the 
office of coroner from its origin to the present day. Major 
legislation, and major formal changes in coroners' responsibilit- 
ies, will also be outlined. An understanding of the history of 
the work of the coroner is a necessary precondition for an 
understanding of his present role. 
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A final reminder of our theoretical perspective can be taken 
from Sacks (1963,10-11): 
The emergence of sociology will take a different 
course (when it emerges) from that of other 
sciences, because sociology, to emerge, must free 
itself not from philosophy but from the common- 
sense perspective. Its predecessors are not such 
as Galileo had to deal with, but persons con- 
cerned with practical problems, like maintaining 
peace or reducing crime. The 'discovery' of 
the common-sense world is important as the 
discovery of a problem only, and not as the 
discovery of a sociological resource. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
OFFICE OF CORONER 
2(1) The History of the Coroner 
The title of coroner, and the original duties associated 
with the post, were devised in 1194 by Hubert Walter, Archbishop 
of Canterbury, who had remained in England, in a position of 
considerable authority, when King Richard joined the Third 
Crusade. The coroner was 'keeper of the King's pleas', the Latin 
form of which became vulgarised into 'coroner', or 'crowner' 
(Williams, 1967,1). Prior to 1194, the duties newly attached 
to the office of coroner had been the responsibility of county 
justiciars, sergeants and bailiffs (Hunnisett, 1961,1). Indeed, 
some historians (e. g. Gross, 1892,656-658) have argued that the 
coroner existed before 1194, and this is still an issue permitting 
some debate. Nevertheless, it appears to be certain that the 
title of coroner formally came into being in this year. It is 
also the case that when the ancient records are reviewed as, for 
instance, by Waldo (1911), the evidence for the coroner's 
existence prior to the late twelfth century is obscure. The 
issue can, for our purposes, be settled by Forbes, in his thorough 
survey of the early "crowner's quest": "The coronership was 
established in England in September, 1194. " (1978,5). 
The instigation of the office of coroner had some essentially 
financial elements, for wars were costly, and local administrations 
in England were somewhat inefficient and corrupt. The coroner 
did not only arrange inquests: he was also a county court judge 
and law-enforcement officer. "He was, in fact, a revenue gatherer 
for the Crown. " (Mendoza, 1976,8). The Report of the Committee 
on Death Certification and Coroners (hereafter referred to by its 
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common title of the Brodrick Report) notes that the most important 
reason for the creation of the office of coroner 
.. was the need for an official whose primary duty it would be to protect the financial interest 
of the Crown in criminal proceedings. (1971,107) 
The Brodrick Report adds that the early coroner's judicial role 
was subsidiary to his interest in financial matters and, 
moreover, that his concern for medical causes of death "was 
virtually non-existent. " (1971,108). 
The medieval coroner's responsibilities were wideranging. 
He was enpowered to investigate housebreaking, wounding and rape, 
to hold inquests on the deceased, to hear pleas for sanctuary 
and to hear appeals and confessions, and to take part in the 
business of the county court (Hunnisett, 1961,4-5). The coroner 
also had powers to levy fines. However, Hunnisett points out 
that the formal, statutory, model of the early coroner's work is 
misleading (1961,5). In practise, the everyday task of the 
medieval coroner was to hold inquests on dead bodies, and the 
felonies with which he was concerned were homicide and suicide 
(Hunnisett, 1961,5,9). 
Medieval coroners tended to be knights and landowners, but 
the post was generally regarded as inferior in status ( and 
possibly in terms of material advantage) to that of sheriff 
(Hunnisett, 1961,188). The coroner was a direct delegate of 
the king (Williams, 1967,2). The coroner was also, however, 
elected to office (Hunnisett, 1961,151-157). 
There is no agreement amongst historians about the exact 
nature of the early coroner's work. His duties were undoubtedly 
far wider in their scope than they are today. In many ways, they 
were different in kind. "With half his mind he had to pursue the 
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work of a detective, with the other half that ofatax-collector. " 
(Williams, 1967,2). 
After Ophelia's suicide in 'Hamlet', two rustics discuss 
the arrangements for he 
pronouncing her fit for 
"crowner's quest law. "# 
dates from around 1600, 
declined considerably. 
rise of justices of the 
r burial. They talk of the "crowner" 
Christian burial: on the basis of 
Shakespeare's reference to the coroner 
when the coroner's importance had already 
This decline was associated with the 
peace, who took over many of the coroner's 
judicial functions, the decline of appeals, and the abolition of 
certain fines (Hunnisett 1961,197). The Brodrick Report notes 
that by 1500 
..... almost the sole remaining function of any importance performed by the coroner was the holding 
of inquests into violent death, but even these 
no longer had the same importance as in the 13th 
century. (1971,111) 
To render the post of coroner more attractive, wider groups of 
people had been made eligible, the "knighthood" qualification 
was abolished, yet, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
..... extortion had become firmly established, was 
consistently practised and only rarely punished. 
The office therefore appealed increasingly to 
families which were struggling to rise and to the 
unscrupulous. (Hunnisett, 1961,189). 
More fundamentally (and of continuing relevance) it was 
becoming clear that the inquisitorial nature of the coroner's 
court conflicted with the accusatorial nature of other courts of 
law. In law, no-one is accused at the inquest; there is no 
prosecution or defence; and the coroner (or his jury) is not 
interested in matters of guilt or civil or criminal liability. 
The inquest is formally a 'court of record', and its structure 
is different from that of other courts. The dangers of conducting 
3f Hamlet, Act 5, Scene 1 
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a de facto trial at the inquest are therefore quite evident. 
More will be said of this below. It is of relevance to an 
understanding of the twentieth-century inquest. 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, underlying 
confusion about the proper scope of coroners' work continued. 
The coroner's independent existence (separate from medical, 
legal, judicial and administrative systems) led to practical 
problems about status and salary, although this independence 
later became emphasised as a virtue in the investigation of 
sudden (and possibly suspicious) deaths. 
In 1751, an Act of Parliament designed to improve coroners' 
pay provoked a bitter dispute between coroners and the judiciary 
about the rightful limits of coroners' influence. The Brodrick 
Report sums up the matter. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth century justices on 
the whole took the view that the coroner was never 
intended to enquire into sudden deaths unless 
there was manifest evidence of violence, whilst 
the coroners contended that their jurisdiction 
was to include all sudden and unexplained deaths. (1971,112). 
Havard interprets this as the obstruction of coroners by the 
judiciary (1960,57). Whatever view is taken of this period, it 
was evident that the duties of coroners had never been codified 
into any document, statutory or otherwise. Indeed, this remains 
the case today. It will be seen in Chapter Three below that 
coroners' practices owe as much to common law, and moreover, to 
convention, tradition and opinion, as they do to statute. 
To some extent matters were clarified by the Births and 
Deaths Registration Act 1836 with its stipulation that all deaths 
(in England and Wales) must henceforth be registered. The Act 
forms the basis of certification and registration procedures 
today and also marks the beginning of the I'medicalisation"of 
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coroners' work. 
The report of a Select Committee in 1860 formed the basis 
of the Coroners Act 1887, a key piece of legislation. Coroners' 
duties were clarified, and the ancient emphasis on defence of the 
Crown's financial interests was replaced by an emphasis on 
investigation of the cause and circumstances of sudden deaths, 
in the interests of society as a whole (Brodrick Report, 1971, 
114). 
The value also increasingly became recognised (explicitly 
in the Report of the Select Committee on Coroners, 1910) of 
coroners' inquiries without inquest. Historically, a coroner's 
investigation and an inquest had been synonomous. Today, inquests 
are held on only a minority of coroners' cases (See Table 2(1) 1). 
The figures indicate that while both the total number of deaths 
in England and Wales, and the number of deaths reported to 
coroners, have increased substantially between the years 1920 and 
1975, the number of inquests held has fallen, both absolutely and 
in percentage terms. This is not only a matter of legal changes. 
It is also related to the changing medical environment and to 
changes in the sorts of death dealt with by coroners. The 
specifics of coroners' work have been subject not only to changes 
in quantity, but also, and more significantly, to changes in kind. 
A crucial change arose from the Coroners (Amendment) Act 
1926. The Act represented a major curtailment of coroners' powers 
in matters of criminal law: specifically, in dealing with 
suspected cases of homicide. Section 20 (1) reads: 
If on an inquest touching a death the coroner is 
informed before the jury have given their verdict 
that some person has been charged before examining 
justices with the murder, manslaughter or 
infanticide of the deceased, he shall, in the 
absence of reason to the contrary, adjourn the 
inquest until after the conclusion of the criminal 
proceedings and may if he thinks fit discharge the jury. 
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TABLE 2 (1) 1: DEATHS REPORTED TO CORONERS 
AND INQUESTS HELD 1920-753 
Year Total Number Total Number Total Number 
Deaths England Deaths Reported Inquests Held 
and Wales to Coroners 
(a) (b) % of (c) % of 
(a) (b) 
1 1920 466,130 53,714 11.5 31,496 58.6 
2 1930 455,427 63,238 13.9 31.659 50.0 
3 1950 510,301 83,571 16.4 25,784 30.8 
4 1960 526,268 101,079 19.2 26,305 26.0 
5 1970 575,194 133,356 23.2 24,870 18.6 
6 1975 582,700 153,366 26.3 23,455 15.3 
In practice, inquests adjourned in cases of possible homicide 
are rarely resumed: the matter is transferred to the criminal 
courts. However, this situation did not always obtain. 
The limitation of the powers of coroners and their juries under 
the 1926 Act arose, in Williams' words, 
.... from a number of cases in the nineteen- twenties where inquests had turned into virtual 
murder trials. (1967,53). 
The ancient jurisdiction of the inquest in matters of criminal 
law had come to conflict with the ethos of criminal justice in 
the legal system as a whole. This is an important point, reveal- 
ing the long-standing tension between the inquest and other 
courts of law, and a basic ambiguity associated with coroners' 
powers. 
The Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926 and the Coroners Rules 
1953 (S. I. 205) prescribe the essential elements of the contemp- 
If Columns 1-4 derived from appendices to Brodrick Report (1971, 
370-373), columns 5-6 derived from unpublished Home Office 
statistics based on coroners' annual returns. War-time 
figures unavailable. 
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orary coroner's role although, as argued below, much is still 
left to convention and accepted practice. The Criminal Law Act 
1977 is also of importance, finally removing the coroner's 
power of commital (except in cases of contempt), reducing the 
number of inquests to which juries are called, and replacing the 
verdicts of murder, manslaughter and infanticide by the verdict 
of unlawful killing. The Coroners' Act 1980, like the 1977 Act, 
seeks to implement some of the recommendations of the Brodrick 
Report (1971), principally those connected with the coroner's 
obligation to view the body, the rules governing exhumation, 
and the transfer of jurisdiction over a body from one coroner to 
another. The Coroners' Rules are also amended from time to time 
by statutory instrument. Amongst the provisions of the Coroners, 
(Amendment) Rules 1980 (S. I. 557) are the removal of the inquest 
jury's ability to supplement its verdict with a rider, and the 
replacement of the verdict of "justifiable or excusable homicide" 
by the verdict of "lawful killing". Table 2(1)2 indicates the 
range of verdicts currently available to the coroner or, in 
certain circumstances, his jury. 
The role of the inquest, as one element of coroners' 
work as a whole, is discussed in detail in Section Three of the 
present chapter, and a sociological account of the inquest 
structure is presented in Chapter Four. At this point, it is 
sufficient to note that not all verdicts are of the same order: 
crudely, some are legal categories, some medical, and others 
social. A "killed himself" verdict had legal implications prior 
to the Suicide Act 1961 but nowadays does not. Coroners' returns 
to the Home Office (Brodrick Report, 1971,386) indicate that up 
until 1938 two separate suicide verdicts existed: "suicide while 
insane" and "felo de se", the latter denoting self-murder. 
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TABLE 2 (1) 2: INQUEST VERDICTS AVAILABLE 
TO THE CORONER OR JURY 
(1) Unlawful killing 
(2) Killed himself/herself 
(3) Attempted/self-induced abortion 
(4) Accident/misadventure 
(5) Execution of sentence of death 
(6) Lawful killing 
(7) Natural causes 
(8) Industrial disease 
(9) Want of attention at birth 
(10) Chronic alcoholism/addiction to drugs 
(11) Lack of care/self-neglect 
(12) Open verdict 
"Accident" and "misadventure" verdicts are synomous: yet coroners 
(as will become clear in Chapter Three) tend to make a practical 
distinction between the two. Similarly, an open verdict may 
have various meanings, signifying different perceived "sorts of 
event. " 
In the preceding discussion, the origins and development of 
coroners' work have been briefly traced. Legal, social and 
medical changes have been highly significant, and the actual 
genesis of coroners' investigations cannot be separated from the 
political environment of the twelfth century. A qualitative change 
in coroners' work, and a source of continuing controversy, 
originated in the nineteenth century when the process of medical- 
isation began. It is worth remembering that as recently as the 
seventeenth century discussions of witchcraft and devilry were 
a part of investigations into sudden deaths (Havard, 1960,5-6). 
Havard indeed asserts that 
..... for centuries coroners and their juries 
were reaching their verdicts on cases of sudden 
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death almost entirely unencumbered by medical 
evidence of the cause of death. (1960,2). 
Current procedures for certifying and registering deaths as 
a whole are discussed in the following section. The deaths which 
became the particular responsibility of the coroner are outlined, 
together with the procedural choices open to the coroner. The 
legal and procedural bases of coroners' work must, however, be 
seen in an historical context, and in the context of conventional 
and informal rules. The procedures described apply to England 
and Wales: the Irish systems (North and South) are rather 
different, and the Scottish system is substantially different. 
2 (2) The Contemporary System of Death Certification and 
Registration in England and Wales. 
The first step taken by the coroner, after the reporting 
of a death, is to decide whether he has, in law, any right or 
duty to enquire into its cause and circumstances (Brodrick Report, 
1971,155). If so, the death enters his jurisdiction. The 
coroner may decide that no post-mortem examination* is necessary, 
and that an inquest is neither required by law, nor considered, 
at his discretion, to be appropriate. In this case, the 
coroner completes a certificate known as "pink form All which 
he sends to the local Registrar of Births and Deaths. The cause 
of death certified by the doctor originally attending the 
deceased may in such circumstances prevail without any additional 
active investigation by the coroner. Informal processes of 
consultation between doctor and coroner are of particular 
importance in "pink form All cases. It might be added that 
"post-mortem examination", "post-mortem" and '"autopsy"" are, 
throughout the present study, regarded as synonomous terms. 
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"death certification" properly refers to certification of cause 
of death: not to the registration of that death, which is a 
separate process. 
Alternatively, the coroner may order a post-mortem, or hold 
an inquest, or both. If the coroner is satisfied with the 
results of the post-mortem examination, and an inquest is not 
statutorily required, then 'pink form B" is completed, sent to 
the Registrar, and the coroner's involvement is at an end. 
The issuing of either pink form "Alt or ""B" (i. e. without, or 
with a post-mortem) is limited to natural deaths. The meaning 
of "natural death" is by no means self-evident, and involves the 
coroner in the exercise of judgement. An "unnatural" death, 
moreover, is not necessarily a suspicious death. Road traffic 
deaths are "unnatural". A lengthy illness resulting in death 
which was originally caused by, for instance, a mishap such as 
a fall, would also be ""unnatural". 
An inquest is held on deaths not dealt with by either pink 
form procedure. Inquests are mandatory in certain circumstances: 
centrally, on violent and/or unnatural deaths (including sus- 
pected suicide): deaths on the road or railways; deaths in 
factories and certain deaths on farms; deaths in prison. 
Additionally, the coroner may at his discretion hold an inquest 
on any other death: if the results of the post-mortem are not 
conclusive or, perhaps more usually, if there is strong public 
interest in a particular death or if suspicion would linger were 
the circums.. nces not made public. Inquest verdicts of "natural 
causes", for instance, would tend to fall into the latter category. 
In short, approximately one-fifth of all deaths in England 
and Wales are reported to coroners. Coroners have three basic 
choices in dealing with a death: form A, form B, or inquest. 
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(The inquest is usually preceded by a post-mortem examination, 
although exceptionally it may not be). Table 2(2)1 illustrates 
the use of the available procedures. It can be seen that, in 
1975, coroners dealt with almost 13% of reported deaths by "form 
All, 72% of reported deaths by "form B", and over 15% of reported 
deaths by holding an inquest. An autopsy is, then, held on 
approximately 87% of all deaths reported to coroners: perhaps 
amongst the most significant developments in medico-legal 
investigation over the last century. The choice of procedure made 
by particular coroners is however subject to considerable 
variation. Both these points will be seen to be of continuing 
relevance. 
TABLE 2(2)1: USE OF PINK FORM A, PINK FORM B 
1. Total No. Deaths, 
England and Wales 
2. Total No. Deaths, 
Reported to Coroners 
2 (a) Male 
2 (b) Female 
582,700 
153,366 (26.3% of total 1) 
89,010 
64,356 
3. Form A 
Form B 
5. Inquests 
5 (a) with post-mortem 
5 (b) without post-mortem 
5 (c) inquests completed 
5 (d) verdicts returned 
19,526 (12.7% of total 2) 
110,385 (72% of total 2) 
23,455 (15.3% of total 2) 
23,014 
441 
23,411 
22,352 
iý derived from unpublished Home Office statistics based on 
coroners' annual returns. The difference between figures at 5, 
5(c) and 5 (d) is accounted for by the adjournment of some 
inquests opened in 1975, either indefinitely or until 1976, 
and the conclusion of some inquests opened in 1974. 
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Juries may or may not be summoned to coroners' inquests. 
However, the inclusion of a jury renders it (not the coroner) 
the sovereign body. All inquests included juries until the 
Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926 became law. Thereafter, juries 
continued to be statutorily required only in certain circum- 
stances, although the coroner retained (and retains) the dis- 
cretionary power to summon juries in any other case. The 
Criminal Law Act 1977 further reduced the mandatory requirement 
to summon juries. Most obvious was the jury's disappearance from 
inquests concerned with road traffic deaths although also of 
importance under the 1977 Act was the removal of the jury from 
inquests opened in connection with suspected homicide. Today, 
inquests must include juries in three, relatively infrequent, 
sorts of circumstance: where the death is statutorily reportable 
to a government official (including deaths in factories, mines 
or on the railway); where the death occurred in prison; or 
where, in the words of the 1926 Act (Section 13), 
..... the death occurred in circumstances the 
continuance or possible recurrence of which is 
prejudicial to the health or safety of the public 
or any section of the public. 
The third category is open to a variety of interpretations: a 
coroner's decision not to sit with a jury may be challenged, as 
it was successfully in the controversial case of Blair Peach. 
" 
for the purpose of summoning a jury 'prison' did not include 'police custody' until the Administration of Justice Act 1982 (section 62) became operational in January 1983. 
Mr. Peach died following injuries received in a political demonstration in Southall, London, in April 1979. The inquest, 
opened originally in October 1979, was halted after the family 
of Mr. Peach was given permission by the Lord Chief Justice to 
apply for an order reversing the decision of the coroner not to include a jury. 
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The role of the inquest jury today tends to be a passive one, 
and certainly the decline of the jury cannot be seen in isolation 
from the decline of the inquest itself or the changes (specific- 
ally, the "decriminalisation") in coroners' work as a whole. 
More will be said of the inquest, and jury, in Section Three of 
the present chapter, and in Chapters Three and Four. 
Figure 2(2)1 illustrates the process of death certification 
and registration in this country, and the various "routes" which 
might be taken by a death following referral to the coroner. 
The bulk of deaths are reported to coroners by doctors: although 
there is in fact no legal obligation upon a doctor to inform 
the coroner (or the police) of any death which he cannot certify. 
Members of the public are not obliged to inform any death to the 
police. However, there is a common-law duty upon any citizen 
who comes across a body to inform the coroner, if that death 
legally warrants an inquest: an obligation dating from the time 
when the "first finder" of a body was expected (literally) to 
raise a hue and cry (Brodrick Report 1971,132; Hunnisett, 1961, 
10-11). Those in charge of prisons and penal institutions are 
required by law to inform the coroner of deaths of those 
contained within the institution (Brodrick Report, 1971,132). 
The Registrar is also obliged to refer back to coroners certain 
sorts of death: e. g. the death may have been certified by a 
doctor but cannot be registered because the doctor did not attend 
the patient within the fortnight preceding death; or because 
the death has not been properly certified, whether it has come 
to the Registrar from the coroner or direct from a doctor. 
In practice, the bulk of cases are reported to the coroner 
by a doctor. Some are reported by the Registrar. Additionally, 
particular coroners may have informal rules of their own e. g. 
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Figure 2(2)1: The Process of Death Certification 
and Registration in England and Wales 
DEATHS Not given death certificate, 
or given endorsed certificate 
by doctor. I 
Given death 
certificate 
by dc 
Registrar of14' Pink 
Births and Form 
Deaths 
CORONER 
A 
Post-mortem 
Inquest 
B 
. 
I. 
VerTict and 
I 
REGISTRATION 
Certification 
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that all hospital deaths in their area, occurring within twenty- 
four hours of admission, be reported. The "endorsed certificate? 
in Figure 2(2)1 refers to a case where death has been certified 
by a doctor, but for some reason the coroner is notified: this 
might normally be dealt with as a "form All case. Figure 2(2)1 
also illustrates the path taken by the bulk of "routine" 
deaths: direct from doctor to Registrar. The relatively rare 
event of an inquest without post-mortem is also indicated. 
The exercise of coroners' discretion in the processes 
illustrated is a topic of continuing importance. It must also 
be added that other officials exercise similar powers of 
discretion and judgement: centrally, the doctor, but also the 
Registrar, the police officer (whether or not acting as coroner's 
officer), the hospital pathologist and, indeed, the undertaker. 
The investigation of any sudden death involves a network of 
interaction where the coroner retains central, and formal, 
authority. 
Coroners' powers are clearly subject to changes via 
specific Acts of Parliament and, much more frequently, minor 
alterations through statutory instruments. Case law may also 
provide major changes to which the coroner has to accommodate. In 
the well-publicised Helen Smith case, the Divisional Court of the 
Queen's Bench Division originally turned down the deceased's 
father's petition to instruct the coroner to arrange an inquest. * 
It was held that, having occurred abroad, the death, irrespective 
of its possible circumstances, was outside the coroner's 
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision. " 
*RV West Yorkshire Coroner Ex Parte Smith (1982) 
** Halsbury's Laws, 1982, paragraph 609. 
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The coroner was thus required to hold an inquest, and a new duty 
was established - for all coroners - to hold an inquest, even 
where death occurred abroad, in circumstances where there is 
"reasonable cause" to suspect violent or unnatural death, and 
where the body has been returned to the coroner's jurisdiction. 
Finally, there are two quite different circumstances where 
the body of the deceased is. not required at all before an inquest 
may proceed. Firstly, coroners may open - and complete - an 
inquest where the death of a named individual is assumed. In 
December 1983, for instance, an inquest was opened on Home Office 
instructions concerning the disappearance of a soldier, on 
training exercises, four years previously. A verdict of accid- 
ental death was recorded. Secondly, the coroner retains ancient 
powers in the matter of treasure trove, which is unrelated to 
any death. Individuals who discover treasure trove have a duty 
to inform the coroner. If the goods were deliberately hidden 
(rather than lost) and consist of gold or silver (rather than any 
other valuable material) then they constitute treasure trove. 
The inquest is held to determine ownership and, normally, 
any such treasure trove becomes Crown property. In medieval 
times, this was doubtless a valuable source of income, consistent 
with the coroner's other revenue - gathering duties. Today, 
treasure-trove might well find its way into a museum, and the 
finder given a reward. Only seventeen inquests on treasure-trove 
were held in 1975. Coroners' comments on this remnant of their 
medieval duties are to be found below in Chapter Three. 
2 (3) The Role of the Inquest 
Circumstances in which a coroner must hold an inquest, 
situations in which he may judge that an inquest is desirable, 
the use of the inquest in comparison to the other available 
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procedures, and the use of the inquest jury, have already been 
outlined. The purpose of the present section of the discussion 
is expansion and clarification of some issues relating to the 
inquest, in order to provide a foundation for the substantive 
discussion of research material in the following chapters. 
The coroner's task of ensuring adequate certification of 
death is routinely performed by ordering a post-mortem exam- 
ination. Table 2(2)1 indicated that post-mortems are held on 
87% of deaths reported to coroners: and that in the bulk of 
such cases (almost 83%) no further action is taken. Pink Form B 
is completed, and no inquest held. The post-mortem alone is 
sufficient to draw conclusions about cause of death where cir- 
cumstances of death remain relatively unproblematic. 
Given that the role of the inquest in detecting criminality 
has now so substantially declined, the question arises of why 
inquests are held at all: for what reason are post-mortem 
examinations sometimes supplemented by a formal inquest? Three 
sorts of answer can be given. 
Firstly, the inquest allows an examination of circumstances 
of death where cause of death may already, for practical purposes, 
be unproblematic. Secondly, the inquest allows a public recital 
(unlike form "A" and "B" cases) of the facts-of-the-matter. 
Thirdly, and centrally, inquests take place simply because the 
law stipulates that they must take place. Coroners' comments at 
interview (Chapter Three) suggest that if the statutory require- 
ments to hold inquests were less rigorous, inquests would be 
held less often. 
However, given that the statutory requirements exist, the 
question of immediate interest is why they exist. For what 
reason are formal inquests statutorily required? An adequate 
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answer must refer to the history of coroners' work, the history 
of law, the development of medicine and medico-legal practice 
and the contradictions which characterise coroners' work. 
The early inquest was centrally concerned with crime. The 
mandatory inquest in cases of sudden, violent and unnatural 
death was, at least to some extent, necessary in the detection 
of homicide. The modern inquest, however, while still statutorily 
required, rarely has any "criminal" role. Most immediately, 
this change derived from legal developments, such as the 
obligation upon the coroner to adjourn inquests in cases where 
a charge of murder, manslaughter or infanticide was to be made 
in another court (Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926), the removal of 
the coroner's power of commital and the introduction of the 
verdict of unlawful killing (Criminal Law Act 1977) and other 
less central developments such as the decriminalisation of 
suicide (Suicide Act 1961). However, legal changes can themselves 
be accounted for by identifiable underlying forces. The criminal 
role of the inquest in this sense has declined in the context 
of the rise of an organised police force, the development of 
medical and, in particular, pathological knowledge, and the 
establishment of an adversary system of justice in which the 
inquest became an inappropriate institution. The original 
reasons for the legal obligation to hold an inquest have to some 
degree withered away, while the legal obligation itself remains, 
and the functions of the inquest have qualitatively changed. 
The contemporary inquest can be regarded as a supplement to 
the normal processes of death certification, whether that certi- 
fication is made by a doctor alone, a coroner by"form "A", or 
a coroner by "form B". In the latter case, although the post- 
mortem may have established cause of death conclusively, if that 
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death is "unnatural" an inquest is required by law. However, an 
unnatural death today is not necessarily, nor usually, equivalent 
to a suspicious death. 
Of course the inquest does continue to deal with some 
suspicious and possibly criminal cases. However, it is in exactly 
such cases that the powers attaching to the coroner's inquest 
have been removed. Herein lies a contradiction of the inquest, 
for its structure remains essentially unchanged whilst its 
functions have undergone substantial alteration. 
The Brodrick Report noted that 
..... the coroner is now a part of the ordinary 
process of certifying the medical cause of 
death and not simply an agent for enquiring into 
violent or suspicious deaths. (1971,4). 
In this routine practice of certifying cause of death, the post- 
mortem is of central importance. Yet the inquest retains a 
supplementary importance: an importance left undefined, and 
subject to different interpretations. 
The inquest is a court of law. The quasi-medical task 
performed by this court is unique in that it necessarily involves 
a reconstitution of what-happened, a structuring of real- 
circumstances and, thus, a verdict and a categorisation of the 
death. The rationale of the contemporary inquest is uncodified, 
fluid, and spans law and medicine in an undefined way. 
The Brodrick Report recommended a basic change in the inquest 
in the following terms (1971,190): 
We consider it essential that a change be effected 
in what the public expect of an inquest, away from 
the attribution of blame and towards a merely 
fact-finding inquiry. In the long term, we can 
think of no more effective means of achieving this 
change than to abolish the ttverdicttt in its 
popular sense ..... We recommend that the term 
"verdict" should be abandoned and replaced by 
"findings". 
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It is not a concern of the present study to make policy 
recommendations: it is sufficient to note that the inquest may 
invite controversy. Further, although the powers of the inquest 
in matters of criminal law have declined since the passage 
above was written, the inquest remains an inquisitorial court 
of law concerned with constructing a discrete verdict, and is 
not a fact-finding enquiry along the lines of, say, a Department 
of the Environment public enquiry. One may wish to note that 
the inquest's "public" status is not absolute. Where the 
coroner considers national security is involved, all or part of 
an inquest may be held in private. * In early 1984, a national 
newspaper obtained a High Court injunction preventing the 
coroner from proceeding with such a "secret" inquest until a 
full hearing took place in the High Court. It was also re- 
established in 1982 that the High Court has power to "interfere" 
with the findings of a coroner's court under the authority of 
common law, judicial review, and the Coroners' Act 1887 
section 6.1131 Finally, one might note that judges in fact 
retain a common law power to act as coroners (although no cases 
of this are evident) and this common law power appeared to be 
recognised by the Coroners' Act 1887 section 34. In all these 
ways, the inquest is far from "separate" from the judicial 
system as a whole. 
Police personnel and medical personnel are key members of 
the coroner's organisational system. The present chapter con- 
cludes with a brief consideration of the role of the police 
and of the medical profession in relation to coroners' work. 
Coroners' Rules 1953, S1 1953 No. 205 r. 14. 
3ý3ý Haisbury's Laws 1982, paragraph 611. 
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2 (4) The Coroner's Officer and the Police 
The coroner is assisted in his everyday activities by the 
coroner's officer, generally a serving police officer. In a 
large jurisdiction, presided over by a full-time coroner, there 
may be one or more policemen seconded to full-time work with 
the 
coroner, while in small rural jurisdictions, police personnel 
may act as coroners' officers where the need arises, and otherwise 
go about their normal duties. Coroners' officers themselves 
depend upon the services of other police officers, ranging from 
C. I. D. staff to patrolmen and police photographers. Coroners' 
investigations, in short, are routinely carried out by the police. 
Relations between coroners and the police, the autonomy given to 
coroners' officers, and the practical advantages and disadvan- 
tages of a police-manned system of medico-legal investigation 
(as articulated by coroners during interview) are discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
The institutional links between coroners and the police 
have clear historical origins. Local constables have assisted 
coroners since medieval times. Policemen have formally acted as 
coroners' officers since the instigation of modern police forces 
in the Nineteenth Century (Brodrick Report, 1971,248). The 
links between police and coroners can not only be accounted for 
by the suspicious or criminal nature of some deaths, but also by 
the traditional role of the coroner as a law-enforcement officer 
concerned with many matters other than sudden death. 
The attitudes and practices of coroners themselves are subject 
to variation: not surprisingly, the work of the coroner's 
officer also permits some flexibility. It is worth emphasising 
that not only do coroners routinely delegate the work of 
investigation to their officers, but also that such officers 
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effectively delegate tasks to other police personnel. This has 
implications for the focus of the present study on "coroners' 
decisions". It also poses the question of how far routine police 
work is an element of coroners' work itself. 
A Home Office study of the work of coroners' officers was 
appended to the Brodrick Report (1971,256-259). It seems to 
be the only official consideration of their position. It 
noted: 
The formal position of the police officer seconded 
for duty with the coroner is a curious one. As 
a member of a police force, he is nominally 
subject to the direction and control of his Chief 
Constable ...... The coroner's officer enjoys the same conditions of pay, discipline and nominal 
hours of duty as his police colleagues ; ..... Nevertheless, insofar as he acts as the represent- 
ative of the coroner, it is the coroner who is 
really responsible for his actions and who is in 
effective control of his working day ..... (1971,256). 
The everyday delegation of authority to the coroner's 
officer was also examined in the Home Office study: 
..... most coroners do not expect to see anything in writing about a case at least until a decision 
is required about its disposal, i. e. a decision 
as to whether a Pink Form A or B should be issued 
or whether an inquest should be held. Supplies 
of pink forms are normally held in the coroner's 
office, to be released individually to his 
officer for use in a particular case, but in 
some jurisdictions the coroners' officers hold a 
supply of blank pink forms which may even be 
already signed, and which they complete on the. 
verbal authorisation of the coroner. 
(1971,257) 
The historical connections between coroners, work and police 
work may be identifiable but, as one might expect, the necessity 
for the modern-day coroner's officer to be drawn from the ranks 
of the police (and, indeed, to formally remain a serving constable 
or sergeant) is from time to time called into question. For. 
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instance, it may be that hospital staff see the interest of the 
police in a sudden death as pointless or intrusive; or that the 
family of the deceased resent the presence of a uniformed officer; 
or that police authorities would prefer to devote available 
manpower to what is perceived as "police work" proper. The 
Brodrick Report concluded that the essential duties of a 
coroner's officer could indeed be carried out by a trained 
civilian, and recommended that police officers should cease to 
serve as coroner's officers (1971,251). All coroners inter- 
viewed in the present study rejected this conclusion, but in 
November 1980 the Home Secretary announced that consideration was 
being given to the introduction of civilian coroners' officers 
initially in the Metropolitan Police Force area. Some police 
forces have indeed since started to employ non-police personnel 
in this capacity ( where the size of the workload justifies 
a full-time appointment) often under "civilianisation" programmes 
affecting a range of staff. The police or civilian status of the 
coroners' officer is another area of coroners' work currently 
undergoing change and, to some degree, controversy. 
It might finally be added that a coroner's officer is not 
in any sense a deputy coroner. The deputy, like the coroner, 
must be trained in law or medicine, or both, and be of five 
years' experience in his profession. The deputy exists to carry 
out all the coroner's functions in the absence of the coroner 
himself. All coroners nominate one or more deputy and it is 
quite possible for the coroner in one area to serve as deputy 
in another jurisdiction. 
Relations between coroners and the police are close and long- 
established. Such relations are of relevance in the emergence 
of coroners' categorisations about particular deaths. So too 
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are the relations between coroners and doctors, considered below. 
Indeed, "coroners' work" is not solely the work of coroners at 
all. A number of personnel interact within a structured setting 
defined, primarily, by the coroner, but subject to operational 
definitions by a variety of staff at several levels. The 
culmination of the process in the coroner's own formal categori- 
cation must be considered alongside the work of other key 
participants. 
2 (5) The Doctor and the Pathologist 
Relations between coroners and medical staff occur on 
several different levels. While links between coroners and the 
police are institutional, links between coroners and doctors are 
informal: but nonetheless of central importance. 
The reporting of a death to the local coroner provides 
the first contact with the doctor. Informal consultations at 
this point may determine the procedure (pink form A, B, or inquest) 
to be used: or the procedure may be statutorily defined. If 
a post-mortem examination is to occur, it is likely that the 
coroner will contact a particular pathologist with whom a 
practical working relationship has been established. (It is 
not unknown for doctors untrained in pathological medicine to 
carry out post-mortems). It may be that a specialist in some 
area of pathology is called upon: or it may be that a police 
surgeon, or a Home. Office pathologist, is used. The coroner 
(or his officer, or the reporting doctor) is engaged in making 
choices prior to the post-mortem being carried out. The 
reporting doctor may, of course, be a general practitioner or a 
hospital doctor. 
Should an inquest be held, specifically medical evidence is 
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of crucial importance. It is worth noting that this has not 
always been the case. Post-mortems, medical evidence and 
medicine in general are (viewed historically), relatively recent 
additions to the 'proper work' of the coroner. The I'medicalisa- 
tion" of coroners' work dating from the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 1836 has been noted above. The use of post- 
mortem examinations has waited not only upon developments in 
medical knowledge during the last hundred years, but also upon 
moral and legal developments. Williams noted that in the 1930s, 
and before, post-mortem examinations were a "rare and last 
resort" (1967,33). The continuing expansion of medical com- 
petence, and the use of sophisticated techniques and equipment, 
have a bearing on the prevailing profile of coroners' work: 
a state of affairs not without its problems, such as in the 
controversial and delicate decisions required in the case of a 
patient who might be kept alive indefinitely on a life-support 
system. 
In short, it might be said that medicine, per se, is an 
increasingly important part of, or adjunct 
that this has implications for the nature 
and that this change is relatively recent. 
is worth noting the contemporary coroner's 
of death is in a sense different from that 
previous centuries. 
to, coroners' work; 
of "coroners' work"; 
In particular, it 
concern with cause 
of coroners over 
The abandonment of the office of coroner in favour of the 
medical-examiner in parts of the U. S. A. and elsewhere represents 
an explicit recognition of, and a particular response to, the 
nature of medico-legal investigation today. However, the 
comments of the coroners interviewed in the present study reveal 
a large measure of disagreement on the subject of medicine as a 
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whole. It will be seen in the next chapter that one of the first 
interview questions, designed to discover whether particular 
coroners perceived their work as part of the legal system, judicial 
system, medical system - or as something separate from all these - 
produced a wide range of views: views which lend support to the 
thesis that different coroners define their work in different ways. 
Historical factors can also be taken as relevant to the 
study of medicine and coroners. The bureaucratisation of 
medicine associated with the post-war National Health Service in 
Britain formalised coroners' access to medical facilities in 
general. More abstractly, the growth of medical ideology in 
Western societies has influenced the ways in which birth, death 
and illness are regarded and dealt with. The extent to which 
bureaucracy and ideology are of relevance to the task of the 
present study is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
Doctors and policemen are not the only personnel with whom 
the coroner interacts in the course of his work. However, they 
are key personnel, and represent the tension in coroners' work 
between, on the one hand, social control and law enforcement 
and, on the other, the pursuit of the "neutral" medico-scientific 
facts-of-the-matter. 
An adequate framework appears, at this point in the dis- 
cussion, to have been provided for the presentation and evaluation 
of the research material. For the sake of clarity, Part Two of 
the study is divided into three chapters, following the 
"natural" division between the three main methods of collecting 
information, i. e. interview, observation, and documentary/ 
statistical search. Thus, Chapter Three presents the information 
collected during interviews with the coroners of five counties 
in the North of England. 
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PART TWO 
CHAPTER THREE: CORONERS' ACCOUNTS: AN EXPLORATION 
OF THE PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF CORONERS 
IN FIVE COUNTIES. 
3 (1) Introduction 
The boundaries of coroners' areas were, along with those of 
local authorities in England and Wales, redrawn in 1974. Five 
counties, containing fifteen coroners' jurisdictions, were 
chosen as the target areas for research interviews; the coroners 
were approached and interviews were carried out in 1978 and 1979. 
Although reference will be made to the "fifteen coroners" of 
these Northern counties, two qualifications should be noted. 
One coroner's district had, between reorganisation and the time 
of interview, been absorbed into its neighbours. The ex-coroner 
thus interviewed has been included amongst the sample. In 
another district, the interview had to be conducted with a 
full-time coroner's officer rather than with the coroner himself. 
In the latter case, certain information could still be collected 
(e. g. the full-time/part-time or legal/medical status of the 
coroner) but other information (e. g. the coroner's own subjective 
views or informal modes of practice) could not be gathered. 
The interviews used pre-set questions permitting any reply 
the coroner might wish to make (see Appendix I). The overriding 
concern was to allow a largely unstructured interview which still 
remained rigorous enough to collect detailed information about: 
coroners' accounts of their own work; coroners' perceptions of 
their role; and coroners' attitudes to and theories about sudden 
death. 
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As will be seen below, considerable variations were found 
to exist between coroners, in many senses. The variation between 
coroners in terms of part-time/full-time status, urban/rural area, 
and scale of work, was a deliberate feature of the research 
design, and is briefly summarised in the form of Table 3 (1)1. 
The variations which subsequently emerged in coroners' views 
and perceptions are a major concern of the present chapter. 
TABLE 3 (1)1. CHARACTERISTICS OF CORONERS' 
JURISDICTIONS IN THE INTERVIEW SAMPLE 
COUNTY CORONER'S FULL/PART-TIME NO. OF DEATHS* 
DISTRICT JURISDICTION REPORTED 1975 
1 A FULL 1527 
2 A PART 418 
2 B PART 388 
3 A PART 513 
3 B PART 140 
3 C PART 1 80 
3 D PART 132 
3 E PART 192 
3 F PART 169 
3 G PART 580 
4 A FULL 1745 
4 B FULL 1961 
5 A FULL 2356 
5 B FULL 2622 
5 C FULL 3003 
# derived from unpublished Home Office statistics based on 
coroners' annual returns. 
Jurisdictions in the area of study ranged from a rural area 
handling approximately 130 deaths each year to a largely urban 
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area dealing with 3000 such cases. Table 3 (1)1 also indicates 
that six coroners interviewed hold full-time appointments, the 
remaining nine being part-time. The ratio of full-time to part- 
time coroners amongst those interviewed (2: 3) is thus rather 
different from the ratio throughout England and Wales. 
* This 
imbalance has the advantage of making available the views of 
those coroners who deal with the largest number and widest range 
of cases each year. 
Amongst those interviewed, the longest-serving coroner 
(including periods as deputy or assistant deputy) was appointed 
in 1946: the most recently appointed started work in 1971. 
Against the general pattern, the latter was not a deputy prior 
to his appointment as coroner. Thirteen of the fifteen coroners 
are qualified in law but not in medicine; nine of these thirteen 
are the part-time coroners in the sample; and most (but not all) 
of these nine are still practising solicitors. 
Two of the sample, both full-timers, are medically qualified 
and although, significantly, both also have legal qualifications, 
it remains true, as one of them put it, that they "came in 
through medicine". The medical or legal bases of coroners' work 
formed the initial substantive issue in the interviews. 
Coroners were asked whether they saw their job as part of 
the legal system, the judicial system, the medical system, or as 
none/several of these. 
Four coroners defined their office as "judicial", and two 
as "medical". One of the latter expressed the view that coroners' 
work is "gradually becoming an extension of community medicine. " 
The remaining nine coroners either broadly defined their job as 
In 1976 only 22 of the total 180 coroners in England and 
Wales were full-time (Thurston, 1976). 
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"legal" or suggested that it cannot be said to fall into any 
single category. For instance, one coroner saw his job as 
"a bit of a hybrid" and suggested that while the inquest is 
a judicial inquiry, the bulk of his work is administrative and 
medical in character. Another coroner saw his job as having a 
"strong medical element" but a "judicial function". A distinct, 
and significant, point of view amongst some coroners was 
suggested by one part-timer: the coroner's task is to represent 
the public in cases of sudden or unexplained death, to "prevent 
a police state", and to conduct investigations independent of 
both police and medical personnel. As such, the office of coroner 
cannot be said to be simply "legal" or "medical". 
A related perspective was offered by another part-timer. 
The coroner's job, while being part of the "overall" legal 
system is also part of the "body politic", including Parliament 
and courts of law. Moreover, the coroner's job is "political" 
insofar as it involves decision-making (most importantly at 
inquests) and insofar as the decisions may have social and 
political consequences. 
A full-time coroner with a legal background did not see 
his job as part of the legal system in the "ordinary sense': 
rather, it is part of the system. of "civil administration", the 
process of accounting for births, deaths and marriage. 
In sum, while the two medically-qualified coroners saw 
their job as being, essentially, "medical", the remaining 
coroners expressed a range of views, some highly elaborate. All 
coroners emphasised the independence of their office and their 
investigations: examples of independence from doctors, police 
officers, central government and public pressure were cited. 
Yet organisationally "coroners' work" is not an independent area 
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of activity. This is a topic of relevance throughout. 
3(2) The Coroner's Officer and the Police 
In Chapter Two, the links between coroners and the police 
were briefly outlined. A number of questions upon this matter 
were included at interview, starting with the questions of how 
far coroners' officers act on their own initiative and how 
far they are responsible for the practical everyday work of the 
coroner's office. 
A full-time coroner replied that "ninety-per-cent of the 
work" is done by the coroner's officer who acts "entirely" on 
his own initiative. All coroners gave similar sorts of answer: 
a part-timer said that, as coroner, he "never goes out of this 
office" and that "it's not my job to be the investigating 
officer"; another part-timer reported that his officers do "a 
great deal of the running about. " A general view seemed to be 
that, as the greater proportion of coroners' work is perceived 
as unproblematic, coroners' officers do not need to refer to 
coroners before proceeding with enquiries. The bulk of deaths 
handled by the coroner are thus being seen as "normal" (following 
Sudnow's (1965) usage) even given the fact that they are "non- 
normal" insofar as they have been reported to the coroner at all. 
However, particular sorts of case were regarded as requiring the 
coroner's own personal sanction: two coroners gave the example 
of organ transplants following death in hospital. One of these 
coroners added that his officers occasionally "overstep the mark" 
and have to be "brought back into line. " Furthermore, police 
officers who are familiar with the normal practice of one coroner 
At the time of interview, all coroners' officers were members 
of the police force. 
- 76 - 
may, it seems, be required to adopt rather different procedures 
when carrying out investigations for another coroner. This would 
especially apply where the "beat" of the rural policeman straddles 
the jurisdictions of more than one coroner. 
Indeed, the geographical peculiarities of a particular 
coroner's area often accounted for variations in practice. A 
coroner may have several, regular, full-time officers; or he may 
rely when necessary on the regular use of officers otherwise 
engaged in normal police work; or he may rely solely on the 
policeman on-the-spot, who may or may not have dealt with 
coroners' cases before. Even where police officers are seconded 
full-time to coroners' work, they may work from the same building 
as the coroner and keep in daily touch with him, or be based 
elsewhere in the jurisdiction with little or no direct contact 
with the coroner. A full-time coroner went into a little more 
detail: with several officers based in different towns within 
his large jurisdiction, he defined his officers as means of 
liaison between the policeman on the scene and the coroner him- 
self. He emphasised that his officers had no part in the day-to- 
day running of the coroner's office: the "secretarial" functions 
of the office (carried out by civilian staff) and the "police 
work" functions of the office (carried out by the coroner's 
officers) were clearly distinguished. This distinction did not 
seem to have any general applicability. 
The same police officers may or may not regularly act as 
coroners' officers: the important factors would be the full- 
time/part-time status of the coroner, the geographical size and 
characteristics of the jurisdiction, and the scale of work 
involved. The extent to which police officers do regularly work 
for the coroner would seem to be important, given the suggestion 
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made above that coroners' officers are in fact responsible for 
a considerable amount of "coroners' work". It seems reasonable 
to suppose that continuity amongst coroners' officers bears some 
relation to the continuity of particular coroners' practices. 
The six full-time coroners interviewed all had full-time 
officers. One coroner had three sergeants and two constables 
at three different locations within his area, while another had 
three full-time officers at two towns. The coroner in an 
adjoining jurisdiction could rely upon a full-time officer in 
his own urban area, but in the rural parts of his jurisdiction 
tended to rely upon the local police force. Two further coroners 
had four and two full-time officers respectively, while the 
remaining full-time coroner had two full-time officers plus a 
retired police officer responsible for office administration. 
The nine part-time coroners presented quite a different 
picture. Two tended to rely on particular officers, but in 
neither case were these officers seconded full-time to coroners' 
work. The majority of the part-timers, being responsible for 
geographically large but almost entirely rural areas, made use 
of the local policeman in the place where death occurred. In 
one such case, the coroner supplied his own handbook to members 
of the police force who might be involved in an investigation 
of sudden death. 
Two part-time coroners, whose jurisdictions included 
significant urban centres, did to some degree have the regular 
In informal conversation, a coroner's officer recounted the 
story of one coroner (subsequently interviewed) who, after his 
appointment, proceeded to replace his officers fairly fre- 
quently. Informal pressures appeared to modify this practice, 
leaving the work to officers who "knew the job". This has 
implications for the regularity of everyday decision-making 
in bureaucratic organisations. 
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services of particular officers. One coroner reported that he 
is "allowed" a full-time officer in the urban area where most of 
his workload originates: the officer has a substantial degree 
of delegated authority and "probably does ninety per-cent of the 
work" before the coroner himself becomes involved. However, in 
the southern, rural, edges of this coroner's jurisdiction, local 
policemen act as the coroner's officer when the need arises. 
The remaining part-timer interviewed similarly has regular officers 
in the urban area where he is based himself, but relies on the 
local police officer outside this immediate area. 
Thus coroners' officers may or may not be seconded full-time 
to coroners' work, and may or may not have regular experience of 
this work. The full-time regular officer has learned (and perhaps 
helped to establish) local rules of how things are done. He may 
have been at his job in the area longer than the coroner himself. 
This continuity (akin perhaps to the continuity associated with 
a constant civil service in government departments irrespective 
of particular political control) is rather difficult to ensure 
in areas without full-time or regular coroners' officers. The 
coroner who issued his own handbook to police officers was 
essentially making available a standardised interpretation of 
how things are done. 
In Chapter Two attention was drawn to the recommendation 
of the Brodrick Report that the work of the coroner's officer 
be henceforth a civilian responsibility (1971,251). This 
recommendation has to some extent been enacted, but the comments 
of coroners interviewed signify that to coroners it was an 
unpopular idea. The "police approach" to investigations, the 
network of intra-police contacts and, in the words of one coroner, 
the fact that "it is part of any policeman's training to act as 
3ý see Chapter Two above 
- 79 - 
a coroner's officer if necessary" were mentioned as virtues of 
the present system. The nature of police training and the 
"police approach" were not only consistent with the work of the 
coroner's officer, but were also a necessary qualification for 
the job. Doubts were also expressed about a civilian's ability 
to secure the necessary co-operation from doctors, relatives and 
the police force itself, posing the issue of what sort of 
authority would be accorded a civilian coroner's officer. 
The part-time coroners tended to emphasise that there would 
not be enough coroner's work in their areas to keep a civilian 
fully occupied. More fundamental objections came from a full- 
time coroner. It would be "the greatest tactical mistake" to 
have civilians in the job, for several reasons: the coroner's 
officer is the link between police and coroner and the civilian 
could not exercise sufficient authority in this role; police 
officers are aware that "anything" is possible in the case of a 
sudden death and coroners' officers, as policemen, can be relied 
upon to work in a typical police way; and police time is saved, 
not wasted, under present arrangements, for if the officer were 
to be a civilian, much "coroner's work" would have to be referred 
back to the regular police anyway. 
Four coroners expressed rather more mixed opinions: although 
none were in favour of the proposal. One coroner considered it 
desirable that all police contact with the family and friends of 
the deceased, in the course of a coroner's investigation, be 
carried out by non-uniformed officers: a practice not currently 
universal. Another (full-time) coroner would prefer coroners' 
officers to be members of the C. I. D.: because 'tin this job", one 
needs "a high index of suspicion. " The two remaining coroners 
could see no objections in principle to the employment of 
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civilians, but saw practical disadvantages. The part-time 
coroner considered a civilian coroner's officer would have to be 
given a quasi-police authority to be able to do his job: much 
as a traffic-warden enjoys in his strictly-defined area of 
concern. His full-time colleague anticipated that retired police 
officers would still be the most common entrants to any civilian 
coroner's officer system, and that other civilians would meet 
resistance in their work from the police as a whole. He thought 
it desirable that any coroner's officer be given legal training 
(as distinct from the legal elements of routine police training) 
and concluded that good coroners' officers have special character- 
istics not possessed by all policemen. 
The employment of police officers in coroners' work can be 
seen to ensure smooth access to the skills and resources of an 
organised, trained and bureaucratic network: the police force 
as a whole. Thus "police work" and "coroners' work" shade into 
common areas and the routine handling of sudden deaths is 
accelerated. The boundaries between "coroners' work" and 
"police work" overlap: just as do the boundaries between 
"coroners' work" and "medical work". In terms of the organ- 
isational requirement to despatch sudden deaths into appropriate 
categories, this situation has practical advantages. That 
coroners' officers work in a "police way" lends smoothness, 
speed and predictability to coroners' work. The possibility 
of introducing non-police into the pivotal role of coroner's 
officer was perceived by coroners as potentially disruptive: 
organisational practices would have to be reformulated. 
The interviews were finally (in this section) directed to 
the role of the police in general. Coroners were asked simply 
to make any comments they wished upon the police. A full-time 
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coroner summed up the attitude of the majority of coroners: 
We're intimately wrapped up with the police, we 
depend on them. 
The police do all the investigation for us. 
Two part-time coroners added the comments that "we should 
be in a mess without them" and the police play a 'vital" role in 
any coroner's investigation. A full-timer added that the police, 
in the nature of their general work, become familiar with 
emergencies and situations regarded as trying, unpleasant or 
distasteful: hence, they are particularly suited to work with 
cases of sudden death. The typical pattern of normal police work 
is, again, being perceived as an essential part of coroners' 
work. 
Other coroners offered more specific comments on the role 
of the police. A part-time coroner had experienced difficulty 
in having the police make the kind of extensive enquiries he 
would have preferred and suggested that their initial judgement 
of the facts-of-the-matter may influence or limit the scope of 
their subsequent investigations. This is consistent with the 
comments of another coroner that the police aim for a definite 
conclusion of the case as soon as possible: and thus tend to 
dislike open verdicts, as these leave the case open for police 
purposes. Such comments are unsurprising, given the bureaucratic 
emphasis (in police work as a whole) on the clear-up rate. 
Another part-time coroner cited certain instances of conflict 
with the police authorities, adding that smooth police-coroner 
relations are important and possible provided the coroner is 
recognised as the ultimate authority in sudden death cases: 
a point restated by several coroners. 
Authority and independence emerge as important issues. A 
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full-time coroner saw his work as "almost an extension" of police 
work but, importantly, the coroner is an independent official, and 
the "separation of powers" is crucial. The coroner's authority 
was a topic perceived as important by another full-timer: the 
police are there to assist in the investigation under the charge. 
of the coroner. This coroner also pointed out that all police 
officers involved in homicide enquiries are acting for the coroner 
and, in this capacity, assume powers attaching to the coroner 
which they would not normally possess qua police officers: for 
instance, a common-law right to enter property without a warrant 
and the power to charge persons, in certain circumstances, with 
preventing the coroner from holding an inquest. 
Coroners are on-call twenty-four hours a day. As one part- 
time coroner pointed out, the police exercise discretion in the 
degree to which they choose to use their power to call the 
coroner at all times: good co-operative relations between police 
and coroner make "everyone's jobs easier. " However, coroners' 
comments suggest that the smooth organisational fit between 
coroners and police is coupled with the fact of the coroner's 
overall authority and (in particular examples given) the 
occasional need to explicitly draw attention to this'authority. 
A part-time coroner perceived "two faces" of the police. 
The sympathetic attitude of police officers toward the relatives 
of the victim of a sudden death was characterised as being 
strikingly different from normal police attitudes to suspects in 
the course of normal police work. Finally, a full-time coroner, 
noting the co-operative nature of his work and the reliance 
upon police efforts, nevertheless suggested that the police may 
"cut corners" in investigations, and the coroner himself must 
look more closely. (Again, some characteristics of 
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police clear-up practice are here perceived as over-hasty for 
coroners' purposes). Although the true-story for the police 
almost invariably corresponds to the true-story for the coroner, 
it was suggested that the coroner is more thorough: and this 
was regarded as important in the small number of cases where it 
would make a difference to the eventual categorisation. This 
coroner cited a particular case. A man died after leaving a 
suicide note. The police formed an initial working categorisa- 
tion of suicide and would, said the coroner, have "stuck with 
suicide" as the true story had not the coroner's insistence on 
extensive pathological tests revealed death through "natural 
causes" (the final categorisation) following a heart attack. 
It should be added that the case above is not cited here 
to suggest that coroners' true stories are truer than police 
true stories. The point is simply that, notwithstanding the 
considerable (and, for our purposes, highly interesting) 
organisational overlap between coroners' work and police work, 
the fit is not perfect. It should also be made clear that 
coroners' accounts of the role of the police have been presented 
here to draw out and identify points of relevance and critical 
interest. All coroners emphasised that, in short, they needed 
the police: the part-time coroner's comment that "we should 
be in a mess without them" can be taken as a general sentiment. 
Coroners' relations with the police are not confined to 
the coroner's officer. At points, coroners' work and general 
police work are indistinguishable. Furthermore, at points 
coroners' work and medical work are indistinguishable. Medicine 
in general is explored in the following section of the discussion 
and, while parallels are found with coroner/police interaction, 
the issues are complicated by the re-emergence of the question 
- 84 - 
of whether coroners themselves are legal or medical officials. 
3 (3) The Doctor and the Pathologist 
Coroners' work and medical work merge at two points: in 
the reporting of any death to a coroner(usually, although far 
from exclusively, by a doctor in general practice) and in the 
ordering of a post-mortem examination in form 'B' and 
(the bulk 
of) inquest cases. Post-mortem examinations are usually 
conducted by local hospital pathologists. 
Initial interview questions on the topic of medicine 
referred to the post-mortem examination. In particular, if 
smooth organisational continuity is sought in coroners' "medical 
work", it might be expected that coroners establish working 
relationships and interact informally with particular pathologists. 
If this is so, it might also be the case that coroners can 
expect unproblematic access to the facility for a post-mortem: 
something which, in formal terms, coroners cannot take for 
granted, as the institutional links which exist between coroners 
and the police do not exist between coroners and doctors. 
The full-time coroners, whether from legal or medical 
backgrounds, had indeed established working relationships with 
individual pathologists. "You get to know the ones you can rely 
on" said one such coroner, adding that he also acquired practical 
knowledge of how to call upon particular specialists in, say, 
toxicology or histology. Two other full-time coroners indicated 
a similar working pattern of regular use of local hospital 
pathologists supplemented by specialists in certain circumstances 
e. g., forensic pathologists or, in one case, the pathologist at 
a local hospital for infectious diseases who would carry out 
post-mortems on deaths in that particular hospital. A further 
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full-time coroner was unique in having at his disposal a purpose- 
built medico-legal centre, containing immediate facilities for 
post-mortems in addition to the coroner's office and coroner's 
court. 
A pattern of organisational interaction, characterised by 
relations with individual pathologists and relatively easy access 
to the post-mortem examination (and hence, of course, the post- 
mortem report, a key artefact in coroners' work) was a general 
feature of the work of the full-time coroners. This was not so 
amongst part-time coroners, dealing with comparatively few deaths 
and tending to be responsible for geographically large but 
sparsely-populated areas. The mundane fact of physical distance 
between coroner and pathologist, in the areas covered by part- 
time coroners, assumes a significance for the prevailing pattern 
of interaction in coroners' work. 
Thus, while two part-timers endeavoured to use their "own" 
pathologist at the nearest hospital, and another part-timer 
tended to use several pathologists with which he had worked 
before, none of these pathologists was based within the coroners' 
own areas. The jurisdiction of one part-time coroner included 
neither a mortuary nor a National Health Service hospital within 
its boundaries. Further, the tendency, in common with full-time 
coroners, to use specialist pathologists in certain cases 
increased the element of physical distance. One part-time coroner 
indicated that if there was the possibility of criticism or 
controversy surrounding a death in hospital, he would not use a 
pathologist from that particular hospital. 
Despite variations in coroners' relations with pathologists, 
no coroners explicitly reported any difficulty in getting a post- 
mortem examination carried out. However, some reported delay. 
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Smooth working relationships between coroners and pathologists 
appear to be less problematic in an urban than in a rural area 
and the urban/rural distinction tends also to correspond with the 
full-time/part-time position of the coroner himself. 
The post-mortem report has been referred to above as a 
"key artefact". Its meaning, however, is not self-evident, and 
depends upon the process of interpretation. Coroners were thus 
asked whether the task of interpretation of the report is seen 
as difficult. A medically-qualified coroner expressed the view 
that a coroner has "got to be trained in medicine to understand 
what he (the pathologist) is talking about. " This view was 
atypical amongst those interviewed. None of the solely legally 
qualified coroners interviewed (thirteen of the fifteen) reported 
difficulties in interpretation: one such coroner said that 
although post-mortem reports were at first "a different language 
altogether", in the course of time "we get used to it. " Another 
indicated that he frequently telephones the relevant pathologist 
to clarify specific parts of a report but, equally, the necessary 
language is learned very quickly. 
Thus the consensus of opinion amongst those coroners 
interviewed (having no medical qualifications) is that a practical 
working knowledge of the necessary elements of pathological 
medicine is acquired by the coroner in the course of his own 
practical work. One coroner emphatically added that he encountered 
no problems in interpreting post-mortem reports having delib- 
erately (but informally) "trained" himself, in his early years 
as a coroner, by attending post-mortem examinations, observing, 
and asking questions. 
The coroners with. no medical training thus perceived no 
problems in interpreting and using pathologists' reports on post- 
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mortem examinations. This in itself is an unremarkable conclusion 
given that any professional occupation would tend to draw from 
informally-derived stocks of practical knowledge as well as from 
the body of formally-acquired knowledge which was, in the case 
of most coroners interviewed, purely legal knowledge. However, 
it is sociologically interesting that this process of inter- 
pretation was seen by all coroners in the sample as being un- 
problematic. The practical (coroners') problem of using the post- 
mortem report in order to come up with the "right answer" is of 
course wholly separate from the sociological problem of inter- 
pretation and understanding, and we do not attempt here to blur 
the distinction, nor to suggest that "unproblematic" post-mortem 
reports are "really" more of a problem than they seem to coroners. 
To restate, it is not the concern of this study to make 
observations about the reliability of coroners' practices. 
Nevertheless, the point remains that an individual coroner does 
not necessarily interpret a post-mortem report in the same way 
as one of his colleagues might do and, indeed, given the 
differences in coroners' backgrounds and the varying type and 
scope of "typical work" in particular coroner's areas, it seems 
likely that the interpretive process does vary from one coroner 
to another: especially, as we have noted, as methods of 
"picking up" a working knowledge of pathology tend to be rather 
haphazard. 
The interpretation of. post-mortem reports is an important 
element in the process of classification of sudden deaths. Thus 
coroners' attitudes toward the post-mortem report again influence 
the officially-recorded facts-of-the-matter. The interpretive 
process can be seen as a further element in the construction of 
the facts of sudden death. 
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It would now seem appropriate to examine the more general 
issue of relations between coroners and medicine and, in 
particular, the boundaries of "coroners' work" and "medical work". 
Before doing so, however, let us briefly note that it is not 
only coroners who are engaged in the processes of interpretation 
and construction. Coroners' officers, in their investigations, 
are involved in similar processes and so too (to refer to our 
previous topic of discussion) are pathologists who themselves 
use their own particular knowledge and experience in both carrying 
out and reporting their examinations. (The pathologist, giving 
evidence at an inquest, tends to refer to his opinion as to 
cause of death). The extent to which coroners' constructions 
interconnect with the constructions of other officials - all of 
which are elements in creating the true story - has considerable 
importance for the study as a whole. 
The full-time coroners interviewed tended to agree that 
medicine, broadly speaking, figures increasingly largely in 
coroners' work. Indeed, historically, this is patently so. 
However, coroners' interpretations of the significance of medicine 
varied. One full-time coroner, noting that the bulk of his time 
is occupied by form 'B' cases (requiring a post-mortem examination 
but no inquest) drew the conclusion that medically-qualified 
coroners might appropriately learn the necessary elements of law 
as the norm: rather than vice-versa. Another full-time 
colleague (with a legal background) agreed that medicine is today 
more precise, but considered that this very precision creates 
more work for the coroner, not less, as doctors become less. 
willing to certify deaths in the less rigorous way that obtained 
in the past. A further full-time coroner agreed that medicine 
plays an increasingly important part in coroners' work but this 
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does not alter the need for a "legally minded" coroner who can 
evaluate all evidence independently. 
Part-time coroners' views varied too: one echoed the 
argument above that the coroner is properly a legally-qualified 
man who can assess all evidence, not giving undue weight to the 
specifically "medical" evidence. The assumption here appears to 
be that the solicitor-as-coroner is an arbiter (if need be) 
between the conflicting (or, more usually, simply untidy or 
unformed) facts-of-the-matter, whereas the doctor-as-coroner 
remains more of a doctor than a coroner. One coroner indeed saw 
medicine as becoming increasingly imprecise: that as the limits 
of knowledge are pushed back, the areas of ignorance are more 
visible, and the sphere of medical opinion, rather than fact, is 
entered. Thus, he argued, the coroner, as a legal officer, should 
define the boundaries of his investigation and decide what weight 
is to be given to medical evidence as a part of the total stock 
of available evidence. 
A part-time coroner went even further from the position 
taken by his medically-qualified colleagues. He did not feel 
that medicine was of increasing importance - he "hasn't experienced 
this" - and would, in any case, refer and defer to the specialist 
knowledge of the pathologist when appropriate. Finally, one 
coroner drew attention to his "preventative" function: to a 
public role in amplifying the origins and nature of a disease 
like asbestosis. This "public health" role is, then, yet another 
stated aspect of the coroner's routine work. 
Differing attitudes toward the use of Pink Forms 'A' and 'B' 
cast further light on attitudes toward coroners' work and medical 
work. Largely, the use of the post-mortem examination is regarded 
as uncontentious: the necessity, or lack of necessity, is seen 
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as straightforward. However, there is discretion, a topic which 
is discussed more fully below. The discretion involved in using 
Form 'A' and 'B' can be illustrated here by taking two extremes. 
One coroner indicated that he never uses Form 'A': that is, 
a post-mortem examination is invariably held. However, one of 
his colleagues did not accept the principle or practice of 
universal post-mortems: amongst the reasons were humane consid- 
erations for the family of the. deceased who would be spared the 
distress of the post-mortem. Interestingly, this coroner accepted 
that some deaths must "slip through the net" when post-mortems 
are not held but he maintained that post-mortems were frequently 
unnecessary. To find two coroners taking opposite points of 
view on a specific issue is not confined to the post-mortem 
examination. Nor is it especially surprising that individual 
coroners, much like individual teachers or other members of a 
profession, have varying views. What is of importance - and 
consistent with the general strand of our argument here - is 
that the varying views of'individual coroners have significant 
and major implications for the individual coroner's work and the 
facts-of-the-matter that are ultimately produced. 
Finally, in this section of the interview, reference was 
made to systems of medico-legal investigation outside England 
and Wales and, in particular, the medical examiner, who has 
replaced the coroner in some states of the U. S. A. (see Brodrick 
Report, 1971,99-102). Practice varies, but medical-examiners 
tend to be trained in medicine, specifically as pathologists. 
The medical-examiner investigates broadly the same range of 
deaths as the British coroner, but has no power to hold a public 
hearing such as the inquest. If he suspects that the death 
warrants judicial or further police investigation, he refers it to 
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the District Attorney. The medical-examiner can thus be said to 
be concerned with the 'fact' and 'cause' of the death as the 
coroner is, but not with its 'circumstances? in the same sense 
as the British coroner. Another significant difference between 
British and American systems is that the medical-examiner tends 
to be a local political appointment and, hence, is subject to 
some degree to the vagaries of the American political scene. 
(For early descriptions of the medical-examiner in the United 
States, see Turkel 1953,1086-1092; Gradwohl 1950,491-494; 
Brinkhous, 1956,253-259). Enthusiasm for the medical-examiner 
system has been based in its seemingly skilled and precise nature 
providing, one Chief Medical Examiner said, "a much better 
overall investigative service" than the coroner (Curphey, 1951, 
132) and, to some extent in the United States as in Britain 
earlier this century, the feeling that the coroner's court was 
open to inappropriate uses of power. Curphey relates the 
"distinct abuses and corrupt practices under the existing coroner's 
system" in New York City in 1914 to its replacement by the office 
of medical-examiner the following year (Curphey 1951,130). 
Available literature tends to assume that the medical-examiner 
has proven a worthy successor to the coroner: another Chief 
Medical Examiner claiming it is "conceded generally" that the 
nature of the medical-examiner's investigation of sudden death, 
"which recognises its essentially medical character from the very 
outset", is superior to the "old quasi-judicial coroner's 
system. " (Helpern, 1965,1267). These assertions are interesting 
in the light of coroners' comments on the nature of their work 
It is worth noting that the American coroner may be similarly 
appointed, so the distinction between 'American system' and 
'British system' does not necessarily correspond to the distinctic 
between 'medical examiner' and 'coroner', but we use the 
American/British dichotomy as a useful shorthand here. 
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and, during interview, coroners were asked their opinion of the 
medical-examiner system. Amongst those coroners who were familiar 
with the American system, there was a marked lack of enthusiasm 
for it. One coroner felt that, unlike the British coroner, the 
medical-examiner would not be able to allay suspicion or gossip 
by bringing a death "into the open. " Another coroner felt the 
medical-examiner shared the disadvantage of the Scottish 
Procurator-Fiscal in lacking the facility for a thorough public 
consideration of the death. A full-time coroner who had some 
professional contact with medical-examiners in one part of the 
United States felt the system could work satisfactorily but, 
again, thought the medical-examiner's role was rather restricted 
and lacked a public dimension. 
The second disadvantage of the American system referred to 
by coroners was the medical-examiner's alleged lack of indepen- 
dence. A full-time coroner summed this up in saying that the 
medical-examiner faces a basic difficulty in being both the 
pathologist concerned with the case, and the ostensibly indepen- 
dent arbiter of the facts-of-the-matter. In England and Wales, 
these are two distinct roles. Another coroner considered that 
this concentration of responsibility upon one person leads to the 
possibility of abuse as well as inaccuracy, and emphasised what 
he saw as the "separation of powers! " i. e. the checks and balances 
arising from the co-operative nature of sudden death investigations 
in Britain. A part-time coroner made the point that the British 
coroner cannot (except in very exceptional circumstances) be 
dismissed: the implication being that he therefore can have-no 
reason to produce other than the objective, correct result. 
Only one coroner approved, strongly, of the medical examiner 
and, in particular, the explicit emphasis on pathology and 
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specialised medical investigation. However, his views were plainly 
not shared by his colleagues. 
From medicine, in the widest sense, the interview moved on 
to a consideration of the coroners' inquest: the legal- 
procedural outline of the inquest presented in the preceding 
chapter may now be examined in the light of coroners' perceptions 
of the inquest today. 
3 (4) The Role of the Inquest 
In Chapter Two above, we discussed the historical development 
of the inquest or, rather, its decline, if decline is defined in 
terms of frequency of use and in terms of powers within criminal 
law. We noted that "the coroner's task of ensuring adequate 
certification of death is routinely performed by ordering a 
post-mortem examination", and that the inquest's centrality 
has gradually withered away. Yet the inquest remains the key 
public forum for formal resolution of the unformed, potential, 
facts-of-the- matter. Many coroners will never experience the 
controversy and divergence of views which have characterised some 
inquests in recent years but all coroners face the task, however 
routinely, of imposing order, in a public forum, on the various 
strands of potential evidence and, from those, of producing a 
verdict. In short, notwithstanding changes in the formal 
significance of the inquest, changes in its frequency and manner 
of use, and what might be viewed as its decline, its role as a 
formal structure for the construction of categorisations remains 
of central interest in the present study. 
During interview, the initial focus on the inquest was as an 
unique court of law. In particular, its status as a court of 
record appeared to be a productive basis for discussion. Indeed, 
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it became clear that the term "court of record" may be used in 
widely differing ways and is open to many interpretations. 
One coroner contrasted the court of record and the court of 
trial, defining the inquest as a court of record insofar as it 
cannot apportion blame, nor name those individuals who, in 
another court, might be found to be liable. Another coroner 
similarly commented that no questions of blame are to be decided 
at an inquest, thus it is a court of record in being "an inquiry 
into how someone came by their death. " 
Thus the "neutrale status of the inquest proceedings (in 
matters of blame, liability etc) is being emphasised, and the 
inquest's standing as a "court of record" is being defined in 
terms of this neutrality. However, several coroners noted that 
although the inquest itself may not arbitrate in matters of guilt 
or innocence, the evidence obtained (and recorded) at an inquest 
can be, and is, used in subsequent prosecutions in the criminal 
courts. Although the unique institutional position of the 
inquest vis-a-vis other courts need not be discussed again at 
this stage, one can conclude that the inquest's unique, 'separate', 
location does not denote a complete break from the ordinary 
processes of criminal courts. Indeed, one full-time coroner 
suggested that the inquest may be used as a "dummy run" for a 
subsequent prosecution. It might be suggested that the relation 
between the inquest and other courts remains an uneasy one: 
but that this is unsurprising in the context of key historical 
factors, discussed above. 
Some coroners, then, see "court of record" in terms of 
"neutrality". A part-time coroner did not wish to make the 
distinction between court of record and court of trial but 
instead referred to the inquest's legal status as an "inferior 
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court of record", pointing out that many other courts are also 
"courts of record" even where they are criminal courts: another 
coroner made precisely the same point, substituting "petty" 
for "inferior". So here "record" is not being defined in contrast 
to "trial", but is being defined in a formal legal sense. 
Again, a full-time coroner saw "court of record" referring 
to the inquest, as records are permanently kept of its delib- 
erations, and are admissible in law as facts-of-the-matter. He 
also, in making the point that the coroner retains a power of 
commital in cases of contempt, not possessed by the chairman of 
a public inquiry, seemed to be emphasising court-of-record as 
well as court of record. Finally, a coroner agreed that inquests 
are indeed courts of record, but he personally prefers to "go 
beyond" a mere recording of the facts: another interpretation. 
It is reasonable to suggest that a seemingly straightforward 
term like "court of record" is open to different interpretations 
and can be given different shades of meaning: the comments 
above are illustrative of this. Thirteen of the fifteen coroners 
interviewed agreed that an inquest is such a court, but it is 
important to emphasise that this agreement is not necessarily 
based on shared meanings. 
The point is made in the present study that coroners' 
professional activities and the very nature of the "office of 
coroner", practically understood, are based to a much larger 
degree than is routinely supposed on individual coroner's 
particular perceptions and attitudes, and definitions of their 
own job. (Coroner's background, training, geographical location 
etc. may be relevant factors in the development of these per- 
ceptions, and historical factors have a general relevance in 
creating the conditions for diversity). Our aim, in discussing 
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the "court of record", is to suggest that the range of varying 
perceptions and meanings is not confined to the "looser", more 
manifestly "discretionary", areas of coroners' work but also 
influences discussion of ostensibly straightforward clear-cut 
legal terms such as court-of-record. Our developing thesis can 
be applied even to areas of coroners' work thought to be "given", 
or patently non-arguable. 
Coroners had more to say on the general subject of inquests 
and, again, the "formal" outline of the inquest can usefully be 
compared to coroners' own definitions of the situation. 
In addition to identification of the deceased and establish- 
went of cause of death, what might be seen as the purpose of the 
inquest? Coroners' views can be summarised as follows. 
1) The inquest has a key public element: allowing public 
"ventilation" of circumstances of death as one coroner put 
it, or as another said, placing a public forum where a private 
inquiry, or trial by press or television, might otherwise exist. 
2) The inquest has a role in detecting criminal involvement: 
here coroners' views diverged. One point of view was that 
the modern coroner has only a marginal criminal role and that 
routine police investigations prior to the inquest would 
already have detected criminal factors. 
3) The inquest allows the coroner to make public recommendations 
about, for instance, a general health hazard: a public 
advocate role. 
The, inquest publicly clears suspicion and removes misinformed 
gossip e. g., demonstrates that standards of medical treatment 
have been satisfactory in the case of a death in hospital; or 
establishes whether a death in prison or police custody was 
influenced by the fact of containment. 
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It can be seen that the perceived usefulness of an inquest - 
what we might call its practical purpose - is closely connected 
to its public status, and this 'usefulness' manifests itself in 
more than one way. Alongside the powers of the inquest decreasing 
in matters of criminal law, the coroners interviewed tended to 
emphasise the inquest's continued importance in removing unwarranted 
suspicion: as one coroner put it, "letting the public see that 
justice is being done. " 
It can fairly be said that the English court of law as a 
public arena is (like the use of the jury) in general terms part 
of an ancient tradition that is constitutionally and culturally 
respected. The privacy accorded to those participating in a 
juvenile court, or, latterly, to the male accused in a. rape 
case, while seen as desirable, is exceptional. Edward Thompson 
(1980) draws attention from a civil libertarian perspective, 
to what he sees as curtailment of this ancient principle. Not- 
withstanding Thompson's general argument, it seems that in coroners' 
courts in particular, the public dimension has remained sur- 
prisingly constant, and the jury's disappearance from road traffic 
inquests tends not to be mourned. In passing, however, it is to 
be noted that, in controversial cases, the inquest may, far from 
removing blame and suspicion, in fact do the opposite, for 
participants may define a role for the inquest which it is 
structurally incapable of fulfilling. An elaboration of this 
point appears elsewhere (Fenwick, 1980). It should again be 
added here that inquests in general are, despite these comments, 
very uncontroversial: and their 'ordinary' nature was a starting 
point for our consideration of coroners' categorisations. To 
echo Chapter One, early ethnomethodology at least gave sociology 
the clue that it is in the unexceptional, rather than the 
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dramatic, that attempts at description and understanding are to 
be located. 
To return from our digression, coroners defined the purpose 
of the inquest as being (in addition to its formal task of 
identification etc. ) connected to its public nature. One coroner, 
however, saw the inquest as no more than "a categorisation of 
the slot the death fits into" and that its verdict tends to be 
clear from the start. Another coroner characterised the inquest 
as an inexpensive automatic form of inquiry, saving the 
authorities the trouble of calling numerous different sorts of 
inquiry into all manner of deaths. Finally, a third coroner saw 
the inquest as a "public recitaltt, as a "resume", of part of the 
investigation, largely for the benefit of the. public and interested 
parties. "I have now reached the stage where in 90% of inquests 
the only statement made in open court is the verdict", said one 
coroner in subsequent correspondence. 
Of course, it is not any dramatic revelation that the out- 
come of an inquest might typically be unsurprising, nor need it 
be read as any attack upon its legitimacy that this might be so. 
Indeed, the same might be true of other courts of law, as Carlen 
found in her description of magistrates' constructions of 
justice (Carlen 1976). It is reasonable to conclude, however, 
that inquest verdicts routinely have the character of foregone 
conclusions. Let us also note that the inquest is seen by 
coroners as having more than one purpose, that the purposes of 
the inquest extend beyond formal and ostensible purposes, and 
that recording the verdict may not be the sole, nor even the main, 
point of the exercise so far as coroners themselves are concerned. 
Asking coroners directly whether they considered the inquest 
should be a public or a private inquiry produced an emphatic 
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majority response: "most definitely" and 'vital" that the 
inquest remain public. Two coroners reserved their judgements 
to a limited extent. One, while agreeing that inquests should 
remain public, nevertheless regretted the public discussion of 
personal tragedy and the distress frequently involved for the 
family of the deceased; the other felt that, in some circum- 
stances, the inquest may be a "tremendous source of damage" and 
the English system "too rigid" in its insistence on public 
hearings when compared to the Scottish system. The example of 
suicide was given. Notwithstanding these particular opinions, 
the preference of coroners was clear in favouring the present 
'public' system. 
Members of the public do not routinely learn about coroners' 
courts by attending them in person. In this sense, the courts' 
public status has an abstract meaning based, in practice, on 
public reporting in the press. Indeed, no members of the public 
other than family members, witnesses, jury and press reporters 
were present at any of the inquests attended during the present 
study. It seemed useful, therefore, to ask coroners their views 
of press reports of inquest proceedings: or, in our terms, what 
are coroners' perceptions of press constructions? 
There was a tendency to evaluate press reports according to 
their local, regional or national coverage. Local newspapers were 
seen as having some positive functions (e. g., in a highly rural 
area, providing information which would otherwise be provided by 
gossip or speculation) by some of the coroners: another coroner 
The absence of local reports of inquests involving "public 
interest" stories of suicide or mystery in Scottish newspapers 
distinguishes them from their English equivalents. 
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made himself "approachable" to local reporters. One coroner, 
who saw little of value in the city newspaper - "bloody awful" - 
saw more balanced coverage in the county newspaper. Indeed, 
more than one coroner suggested a lack of balance in newspaper 
reporting: particular facts might be given greater emphasis than 
they warrant, while important facts are understated: a problem 
of balance, rather than accuracy. This problem (of re-construct- 
ing the inquest's structured assembly of the facts within a 
newspaper) is touched on in Chapter Four below. Finally, coroners 
interviewed tended to see the national press as being more 
sensational than the local press. It might be added here, 
however, that national newspapers will tend only to attend (and 
hence report) inquests which are seen as controversial or non- 
routine. Such inquests necessarily lend themselves to sensational 
reporting more than the inquests typically reported locally could 
do. 
Although the Criminal Law Act 1977 rendered the appearance 
of the inquest jury even less frequent than before (most 
noticeably in road traffic deaths) the comments of coroners on. 
the value of the jury were collected. Views were diverse. One 
coroner suggested that juries, in diffusing the decision making 
process, demonstrate that the verdict is not the conclusion of 
one man, the coroner, alone, and a more general feeling was 
perhaps summed up by the coroner who said that the jury ""occas- 
ionally latch onto something. " Three coroners added specific 
positive comments. The jury is of use, said one coroner, where 
the identity of the deceased is in doubt -a reference to a formal 
property of the inquest's range of functions, and interesting 
*lTerhaps the Press have a vested interest in ignorance as it is 
a ripe source of controversy and therefore news" said one 
coroner, in subsequent correspondence. 
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for that reason - and because the jury provides "someone outside 
of the establishment" with an opportunity to ask questions. A 
further coroner referred to the usefulness of jurors' local 
knowledge, and the most favourable comment came from a part-time 
coroner who recalled "many cases where I have been indebted to 
the intelligence of the jury. " One might balance against this 
the coroner who commented that "coroners' juries are a dubious 
advantage to anyone" and three other colleagues who thought the 
jury did not have a very useful role. 
The discussion of juries and their purpose, if any, leads 
back to a topic discussed above: that is, the extent to which 
verdicts may be clear-cut from the start of the proceedings. 
Some relevant comments are as follows: that only rarely is 
anything hitherto unknown discovered during the inquest; that 
(the coroner) tries to keep an open mind and has occasionally 
encountered "surprises"; that coroner, coroners' officers and 
attendant solicitors would have a "fair idea" of the likely 
result; that "we go into the inquest with some preconceived 
ideas from the file ..... but nothing is final until the 
recording of the verdict; and that, by the time an inquest is 
held (i. e. some time after the death), relevant evidence has 
been collected, and few contentious matters are still to be 
decided. 
The final comment above is consistent with the view that the 
process of arriving at the recorded facts-of-the-matter is a 
structured, organisational process; that the sorting and con- 
struction of an organised account takes place in the routine 
activities of coronerst officers, pathologists, etc; and that it 
is unsurprising that the verdict tends, itself, to be unsurprising. 
The role of the jury is, from an organisational point of view, 
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undoubtedly a peripheral one: although one might care to offer 
various other reasons why the jury "should be there". That, of 
course, is a separate question, and not one which concerns us. 
A related issue, touched on in interview with some, but 
not all, coroners, was the extent to which any of the participants 
in the process of constructing the facts of the matter might seek 
to impose their particular definition of the situation: in other 
words, had coroners ever experienced any pressure? In reply, 
the attitude of the family was most often mentioned. 
* The family 
of the deceased may object to the idea of a public hearing, to 
the carrying out of a post-mortem, and to a suicide verdict. 
One coroner said that clergymen may also express an antipathy 
to suicide verdicts. Two further, contradictory, pressures had 
been experienced by two other coroners. One reported that the 
Home Office "exerts some pressure": it tIencourages! t the use of 
the open verdict rather than a definite verdict of suicide. His 
colleague indicated that "great pressure is brought on us by the 
police to arrive at a definite verdict" rather than an open 
verdict, explaining that, for the police, an open verdict 
constitutes an unresolved case with the possibility of further 
investigation, while other verdicts effectively close the matter. 
Mention of suicide might remind us that, although it is a 
statistically minor part of coroners' work, it occupies an 
important position within received public knowledge (and within 
sociology). Its significance was therefore examined in a little 
more detail in interview with coroners. 
Adding the phrase "while the balance of mind was disturbed" 
The Brodrick Report (1971,229) indicates that dissatisfaction 
with inquest verdicts of suicide, by relatives of the deceased, accounts for almost all of the few High Court 
appeals against coroners' decisions. 
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to suicide verdicts recalls the legal and moral environment of 
coroners' work over the centuries. Is the phrase still used, 
despite its contemporary. lack of any legal meaning? Three 
coroners said they used the terminology; nine did not; and three 
gave mixed answers. Those who used the phrase explained this in 
terms of: tradition; the coroner's own religious standpoint; 
compassion for relatives; and, historically, the distinction 
between "deliberate" suicide (a crime against God, and a matter 
affecting insurance premiums) and suicide as above - the dis- 
turbed nature of the mind apparently softening the blow. 
Those coroners who did not use the phrase referred to the 
same distinction between felo-de-se (self murder) and the 
perhaps less censorious "suicide while insane": a distinction 
formerly recorded on coroners' returns, and having legal con- 
sequences, but nowadays obsolete. Two coroners, elaborating on 
their reasons for not using the phrase today, also expressed 
reservations about the supposed link between suicide and health 
or ill-healthof "the mind", and about the wisdom of speculating 
on this at an inquest. Another coroner said he would not use 
the phrase because of consideration for the family's feelings: 
an interesting contrast to the coroner above who did use the 
phrase for precisely the same reason, and an excellent example 
of how coroners' own reasoning can lead to opposite points of 
view about the same aspect of their work. The remaining coroners 
took a pragmatic view of whether reference to the deceased's 
mental health or state of mind might be appropriate in the light 
Published statistics indicate separate colums for t! felo-de- 
se" and "suicide-while-insane" on coroners' returns to the Home 
Office up to 1938. When the published figures resume in 1957, there is only one column for suicide as-a-whole (Brodrick Report, 
1971,386). As a legal category, ""felo-de-se's disappeared 
formally when the Suicide Act 1961 became law. 
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of circumstances. 
Moving on, it became clear in interview that it is standard 
practice not to actually use the word "suicide" at an inquest. 
Now, purely semantic arguments are of little relevance here, but, 
clearly, language is a key element in the construction and 
reconstruction of reality. In this sense, whether or not coroners 
use a particular phrase, or say the word "suicide", is important. 
Rather than "suicide", the majority of coroners interviewed 
(consistent with the wording of their returns) used "killed 
himself/herself" although two coroners would not even say this 
- they might simply refer to the method used, e. g. death was 
self-administered. Against the general pattern, one coroner 
said that he continues to use the word "suicide" at inquests 
and in his verdicts, despite Home Office advice to the contrary. 
In law, of course, the different words a coroner may choose 
have no significance whatsoever: in legal terms, suicide is a 
single category, irrespective of what one may call it. In 
sociological terms, however, it is of interest to recall, from 
Chapter One, the importance of language in constructing realityl 
and constituting the world as-it-is-known, and to consider our 
discussion of the sociology of death in Chapter Six below. 
Following Atkinson (1973,1978), and ground that is now [ 
familiar, the next area of consideration was the kind of 
evidence looked for in arriving at a verdict of suicide. As 
one would expect, the presence of a note, a history of ill- 
health, evidence of depression, and previous suicide attempts 
were indeed mentioned by coroners. Additionally, it was of 
interest that many of those interviewed emphasised that suicide 
must today be proven before the verdict is recorded - not merely 
suspected, however strongly. 
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Let us not discuss in detail the "cues" used by coroners 
in reaching suicide verdicts, but note that the matter can be 
seen in terms of key events as well as in terms of isolated cues. 
For instance, one coroner picked out the importance of the 
initial police investigation -a preliminary key event - within 
which were sub-events (the collection of statements; finding a 
piece of tangible evidence such as a bottle of tablets). A 
further key event would be the post-mortem examination. Thus 
there are points of significance within the developing process 
of reconstructing the facts-of-the-matter. To pick out 
individual cues tells us relatively little about this process. 
Isolated cues, furthermore, can point in the "wrong" direction: 
as we have seen, a coroner indicated one case where a note had 
been left, and death indeed occurred, but was eventually found 
to be due to "natural causes", intervening between the expressed 
intention and "the act". Such a case recalls our ever-present 
philosophical and definitional problems, for although something 
called "the fact of intention" and something else called "the 
fact of death" were present, fortuitous circumstances removed 
something else called "suicide" from having taken place. 
Previous suicide attempts were often seen as a pointer 
toward a suicide verdict although, again, the widely differing 
perspectives of different coroners were illustrated by the 
coroner who saw previous suicide attempts as a negative piece of 
evidence: i. e., if previous "attempts" have failed, how do we 
know this successful attempt was not also meant to fail - but 
accidently succeeded? Such reasoning, of course, depends on the 
theory one holds about suicide attempts and their typical meaning 
(are they 'meant to fail', and so on). 
Consistent with Atkinson (1978) once more, interviews 
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confirmed that methods of death in themselves pointed toward, 
or away from, verdicts of suicide: crudely, a hanging is probably 
suicide; a road-traffic death probably is not; a drowning is 
more contentious. Again, one need not elaborate the well- 
established point that the "method of suicide" is itself part of 
the evidence. However, overall changes in method are of 
interest. It is nowadays, in most parts of the country, not 
possible to use domestic gas as an agent of poisoning (although 
strictly speaking it can still be an agent of suffocation and, 
of course, an explosive). Self-poisoning with prescribed and 
commercially-available drugs is now the primary means of suicide. 
Some coroners noted that this change has made their task more 
difficult for the circumstances and nature of drug overdoses are 
less "obviously" cases of suicide than were the circumstances 
of death by domestic gas: intention to die is less readily 
inferred. One can reasonably suppose that suicide is, for 
coroners' purposes, also more difficult to prove. This may 
ultimately bear on changes in the "suicide rate", as may the 
shift in the burden of proof. 
Views of suicide (whether held by coroner, layman, socio- 
logist, psychiatrist or whoever) embody theories about it. For 
instance, in looking for evidence of depression in deducing that 
suicide is an appropriate verdict, one implicitly accepts a theory 
that people who commit suicide tend to have been depressed, and 
that people who are depressed are more likely to commit suicide 
than those who are not. It was of interest to ask coroners 
to make some of their theories explicit, especially if this 
revealed more than one sort of theory, which indeed it did. 
One coroner distinguished an impulsive act of suicide (e. g., 
while depressed) from a conscious act (e. g. committed by those in 
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pain, chronically sick or lonely) of suicide. Another coroner 
suggested that those committing suicide are often under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs. (This latter point is highly 
interesting, for one can speculate upon how far the intoxicated 
can properly be said to have intention to die, and the conseq- 
uences for one's definition of suicide if it must, indeed, 
include intention). Many coroners saw suicide as falling into 
one of several possible categories (as in 'impulsive' and 
'conscious' above) and one coroner listed these in terms of 
motives: an incurable illness or disease; a wish not to burden 
relatives; mental disorder; a financial crisis; an emotional 
upheaval; an act of courage to save others; a biological 
imbalance. This sort of typology is as subtle and extensive as 
any derived from standard psychiatric and other classifications, 
but is derived from practical activity and, in turn, influences 
that practical activity. Finally, it is instructive to note 
the coroner who had given reflective thought to the nature of 
suicide, seeing it as an act which almost everyone has considered, 
however vaguely, and as an idea which fundamentally provokes 
fear. He did not necessarily link it to mental disorder. So 
coroners' theories about suicide are as varied as academic or 
commonsense theories. It is a mistake to suppose that coroners 
are collectively engaged in a monolithic enterprise, using the 
same sorts of theory as one another in the same sorts of way. 
The interviews clearly indicate this is not so. 
Discussions with coroners (within the general area of 
suicide) touched upon the role of the Samaritans and the nature 
of attempted suicide, but the final specific aspect to consider 
here is the suicide rate and, in particular, coroners' views 
(in the late 1970s)of why the suicide rate in England and Wales 
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was falling, at a time of international increase. We need not, 
at this point in the discussion, return to our consideration of 
the problem of social reality, but it can be suggested that an 
account of changes in the suicide rate is in principle possible 
purely in terms of changes in the rate-producing process. No 
judgement need then be made about assumed changes in the 
'natural' category of ? suicidal behaviour' or about economic 
changes such as unemployment. Changes in the rate-producing 
process plausibly include the newly-introduced burden of proof 
together with the typical characteristics of self-poisoning which 
make that proof less readily accessible. Other things being 
equal, those two factors might rule out a suicide verdict where 
one would hitherto have been recorded. Such an account, then, 
needs to make no mention of behaviour-out-there: that question 
is left open. 
Coroners' comments lent considerable support to a 'rate- 
producing' account. This in itself is interesting, given that 
sociologists (e. g. Bagley 1972), psychiatrists(e. g. Barraclough, 
Jennings and Moss 1977) and the press* can, without apparent 
difficulty, produce positivist explanations of 'why fewer people 
are committing suicide': or, latterly, of 'why more people are 
committing suicide' in the light of the often assumed link with 
#* 
unemployment. 
# May 1977: "Life's Good When Times Are Hard. Remember that 
favourite saying that we British are at our best when we've 
got our backs to the wall? Well, there are statistics to 
prove it. Since Britain was first swamped by the current 
economic storms, our suicide rate has dropped by a third, 
according to World Health Organisation figures. Everywhere 
else, more people have killed themselves than ever before ... This frequently heard thesis from the late 1970s was not so often articulated during the subsequent recession. 
For a sceptical discussion, see Platt (1982). 
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Several coroners did not offer those sorts of explanation. 
Indeed, their accounts were similar to our own developing 
perspective. For instance, a part-time coroner said that "suicide 
is not decreasing" - rather, verdicts are changing. He also said 
that, in his experience, open verdicts were being recorded more 
often. Another coroner explicitly referred to the "false 
impression" given by a declining suicide rate: it is, he said, 
a matter of how suicide is defined, and where the statistics 
came from. Reference was made to the High Court appeal case 
in the early 70s when, in overturning a verdict of suicide, it 
was established that suicide must be proven.; A full-time coroner 
made the same point, adding that he had searched his own records, 
and drew the conclusion that by adding together those open 
verdicts he privately thought to be suicide, with actual suicide 
verdicts, there had been no change. Such comments are illumin- 
ating, although we do not wish here to commence 'recalculations' 
of the rates. 
The differences between coroners were not absent in dis- 
cussing the question of proof. One coroner said the law expects 
him to "sit in judgement", looking for a "reasonable probability" 
of suicide: those who say suicide must be proven are, he said, 
wrong. As always, the differing perceptions of individual 
coroners - and the differing nature of their particular work - 
were quite clear . 
Finally, open verdicts were discussed. Their status as a 
repository for uncertain or unproven suicides will not be pursued 
but it is of interest that open verdicts can be seen as verdicts 
with specific uses and meanings, and not only as a shorthand term 
for the absence of a definite verdict. For instance, one full- 
time coroner said that he returned an open verdict "whenever I'm 
3ý See Chapter Seven 
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not convinced it's one thing or another. " He added, however, 
that an open verdict might be recorded where there is an impasse, 
or conflict, between two possible, but definite, verdicts - e. g. 
suicide and misadventure - which is rather different from being 
unconvinced by either one. The same verdict might also be 
recorded, he said, where there is simply, quantitively, not enough 
evidence: or where it might do harm of some sort to be more 
precise. Here, then, from a single coroner, are four sorts of 
basis for an open verdict: unconvincing nature of the evidence; 
difficulty of choice between possible verdicts; lack of 
evidence; instrument of prudent caution. In a preliminary way, 
it can perhaps be seen that an open verdict - like much else in 
coroners' work - may carry various, different, meanings. 
Other coroners referred to the familiar area of borderline 
suicide/accident in discussing the open verdict: in particular, 
to lack of evidence of intention. Within this category of 
'borderline' cases, a particular means of death was referred to 
i. e., drowning. Drug-overdose cases were also mentioned. 
However, to elaborate our point above, the open verdict may 
be seen to have more than one meaning and, indeed, to have specific 
functions. A part-time coroner suggested that the open verdict 
may be useful in certain circumstances, as it allows the police 
to continue their investigations without the matter being formally 
concluded by the coroner. Another coroner saw the open verdict 
as a valuable "standby", and another saw it as indicating in all 
cases that "some essential element is missing. " 
Uniquely, a part-time coroner suggested yet another instance 
where the open verdict might be used. He cited an inquest where 
he did not believe the evidence given on oath by the family of 
the deceased. It was at variance with their original statements. 
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An open verdict was therefore recorded. 
It is fairly clear that the open verdict, an apparently 
inconclusive column on coroners' returns, can have a multiplicity 
of meanings. It can function not only as "lack of verdict" but 
also as an implicitly meaningful verdict (in more than one way) 
in its own right. Again, coroners had different attitudes towards 
the verdict: one said he would like to see the open verdict 
recorded more often - "the lawyer in me speaking" - another said 
that the open verdict is "not a verdict one encourages. " The 
diversity of coroners' attitudes and perceptions is, again, clear: 
ultimately, these attitudinal differences become qualitative 
differences of meaning. 
Finally, using one coroner's account and a newspaper report, 
it is of interest to consider the emergence of an open verdict 
from disparate strands of evidence, and the reasoning which lies 
behind the emergence of this verdict. 
An inquest recently held by the coroner's deputy was 
elaborated. The deceased had drowned. The post-mortem examination 
ruled out the presence of alcohol or poison. Evidence suggested 
that the individual's social life had been normal. There was 
held to be some indication of depression, but not of intention 
to die, particularly as there was no note. The individual could 
have been trying to jump over the waterway. There were seen to 
be sufficient tablets and commercially available drugs in the 
deceased's flat for him to have taken his life that way: had he 
wished to. 
In such a case, the strands of evidence, and the implicit 
meaning they are held to contain, do not lend themselves to 
immediate reconstruction as an obvious verdict. In this sense, 
it is a 'typical' open verdict, not because open verdicts are 
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characteristically similar (we have seen that they are not) but 
because it 'typically' indicates a construction not akin to the 
more immediately coherent, cohesive sorts of evidence found in 
non-open verdicts. 
In this particular case, the press reported the coroner's 
deputy as follows: 
..... there is nobody who can say whether he was 
pushed, fell, slipped, jumped or intended to take 
his own life. 
3 (5) Discretionary Authority 
There are many areas in which coroners exercise discretionary 
authority. There are many areas in which judges, policemen, 
lawyers and Governments exercise discretion too, of course, but 
before examining this more general topic, the particular views of 
coroners will be briefly discussed. 
Discretion may be a misleading term: it is easy, but wrong, 
to suppose that a discretionary decision is an arbitrary one. 
It is useful to remember that the law itself embodies discretion 
and that statutes relating to coroners' duties do not invariably 
prescribe inflexible, or even fairly exact, procedures. Further- 
more, beyond the area covered by statute, within the province 
of convention and tradition, discretion operates more freely. 
Not surprisingly there were differences of opinion amongst 
coroners interviewed: one said he had "every discretion", another 
that he had very little. However, the general view was that 
discretion is exercised at several points in the investigation. 
At the initial stage, the coroner has to decide whether or 
not a case properly falls within his jurisdiction: judgement is 
central. Moreover, this initial decision is based - in part - 
on informal processes e. g. on liaison with the doctor who referred 
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the case. Here, the law can be interpreted in various ways. 
Frequently a doctor might informally discuss the circumstances 
of a death before making a referral. In some cases, the decision 
might be clear-cut. As one coroner pointed out, where a death 
certificate is referred back to the coroner from the Registrar 
(see Figure 2(2)1), the decision to accept has "nothing to do" 
with the coroner: he must accept responsibility. Violent deaths 
are also clearly the coroner's responsibility in this sense. 
Yet the statutory responsibilities are hardly precise: 
Under section 3 of the Coroners' Act 1887, a 
coroner has a duty to make enquiries whenever 
he is informed that there is lying within his 
jurisdiction the body of a person who there is 
reason to believe may have died a violent or 
unnatural death the cause of which is unknown or 
has died in prison or in any place or circum- 
stances which, under another Act, require an 
inquest to be held. 
(Brodrick Report, 1971,50). 
The ambiguity of the law - at the very first stage of the 
process - was well illustrated by the ultimate judgement in the 
Helen Smith case. 
Although the Registrar of Births and Deaths has a statutory 
duty to report certain deaths to the coroner, the only obligation 
on anyone else, including doctors, to report any death to the 
coroner rests in common law: 
.... the 
deaths into which a coroner has a duty 
to enquire are nowhere set out in clear and 
unmistakable terms. (Brodrick Report, 1971,51). 
As we have seen, the coroner's initial decision not to accept 
that the death was within his jurisdiction, and hence an 
inquest would not be held (because death occurred abroad) was 
upheld by the Queen's Bench Division but then revised by the 
Court of Appeal. Amongst the many ournalistic accounts of the 
Smith case are Wilson and Harrison 
j1983). 
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After the initial decision to accept, the next step in the 
process where discretion is exercised is in deciding whether to 
use pink form 'A' or 'B'. The nature of the death, the geo- 
graphical area, and the coroner's attitude are crucial here. In 
terms of attitude, as we have already. noted, one coroner saw 
post-mortems as generally unnecessary, while another said he never 
used pink form 'A', reasoning that if a death is properly a matter 
for the coroner at all, then a post-mortem is desirable. 
Coroners' geographical areas revealed some interesting differences 
too. A coroner in a large rural jurisdiction commented that 
many people, living in relative isolation in the country, rarely 
see their G. P. In the event of death, the doctor would therefore 
be obliged to notify the coroner (if he did not, the Registrar 
would in any case refer the death back) even in apparent cases 
of natural causes. This inflates the coroner's workload by 
producing a number of form 'A' cases which might never reach the 
urban coroner. Here, the physical area in which the coroner works 
produces 'extra' coroners' cases, which adds another dimension 
to our consideration of the rate-producing processes, and has 
implications for geographical statistical comparisons. 
Returning to the subject of discretion, we find that although 
the law specifies the circumstances in which an inquest is to be 
held (although even this has been the object of appeal), the 
coroner retains an absolute discretionary power to hold inquests 
on any other death, with or without a jury. Further, as one 
coroner pointed out, he also has the authority to decide what 
constitutes admissible evidence. 
We have already noted that there is no logical conflict 
between law and discretion, for law itself embodies, and structures, 
discretion. One coroner's remarks provided a further interpre- 
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tation of this: while coroners are obliged to hold an inquest 
on all unnatural deaths, the category of 'unnatural death' is open 
to argument - or to discretion. Even a fairly clear-cut statutory 
requirement, like the 14-day rule, is certainly interpreted more 
or less strictly. And within common law, as we have noted, 
discretionary authority can clearly be exercised more freely. 
A coroner reiterated the words of the Brodrick Report in 
saying that no single document codifies the law and practice of 
coroners' work. This coroner added that circumstances often 
force the coroner to exercise his personal judgement, giving the 
example of a doctor believing he can certify, where the coroner 
has to decide whether the proposed "cause of death" is directly 
related to what the doctor has been treating the patient for. 
If the doctor were to say "it must have been a heart attack" is 
he making a clinical judgement, or repeating the words of 
relatives who knew the individual had a history of heart trouble, 
and thus, as the coroner put it, "carrying out his own private 
inquest? " Here, then, the coroner exercises his discretionary 
authority and, as the title of this section of the discussion 
suggests, 'authority' is as significant as 'discretion' for, to 
put it simply, what the coroner says 'goes', for most practical 
purposes. This is important, and we have already noted that the 
historical development of coroners' work has left a substantial 
authority vested in the office of coroner today: greater, for 
instance, than that of a chief constable of police. It is not 
surprising that the development of coroners' work over such a 
long period, without any one point at which the nature of the 
office of coroner was systematically evaluated or codified by 
the state, has led, on the one hand, to a large 'quantity' of 
authority and, on the other, to a large degree of discretion and 
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flexibility in the use of that authority. 
A coroner pointed to his own wide discretion in law and also 
to that of the doctor, police officer, and so on: indeed it 
would be possible, as this coroner had done, to construct a 
flow-chart of all the possible "paths" a death might take, to 
the point of eventual registration, and identifying the points at 
which the discretionary decisions of coroners and others influence 
the eventual "destination" of the death. Several coroners indica- 
ted, as we have. noted, that statutory duties - especially to 
view the body, which was mentioned by three coroners - contain 
the possibility of discretionary decisions. 
The coroner's authority is not exercised in isolation: 
other officials exercise judgment and discretion too. For the 
moment, let us note that, in the important historical and legal 
context, the individual coroner determines - to a significant 
degree - the nature of his work, the way investigations are 
carried out, special local procedures to be followed (e. g. that 
all deaths in hospital within 24 hours of admission be notified 
to the coroner), and the way his authority is exercised. These 
processes influence the final result: i. e. the verdict, the 
officially-recognised construction of events, the facts-of-the- 
matter. Coroners' own perceptions and opinions, as recorded here, 
are a relevant part of this process. There is also an 
interesting sense in which individual coroners' opinions can be 
regarded as being as authoritative as the medical or legal 
opinions which constitute coroners' handbooks. It was often 
pointed out during interviews that reference books such as 
'Jervis' (Purchase and Wollaston (ed), 1957) or Thurston (1976) 
essentially reflect opinions and accepted practice, not any 
definitive statement of the law. One coroner interviewed had, 
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as we noted, prepared his own booklet on procedures. 
Finally, our conclusions about coroners' discretionary 
authority can briefly be considered in terms of what "discretion" 
means. 
The practice of police discretion has been recognised within 
sociology for some time (e. g. Lambert, 1969; Box 1971) and could 
be said to operate on two levels: firstly, the discretionary 
power of a Chief Constable in deciding priorities within his 
force (e. g. a rigorous pursuit of drinking-drivers or a 'crusade' 
against prostitution) and, secondly, the practical discretion of 
the individual policeman at work. In the latter sense, "dis- 
cretion" refers to the straightforward fact that the police 
officer cannot investigate every suspicious situation he comes 
across or hears about, nor can he arrest, or even speak to, 
every single person who might possibly have infringed a law of some 
kind. So, "discretion", in both this practical sense and at a 
higher policy level, essentially means choice. To say that 
discretion is to be defined in terms of choice does not imply that 
choices are arbitrary or random. They may have a systematic 
pattern. As Cain found in her study of urban and rural policing 
(Cain, 1973) these patterns may refer to the values of the 
particular community. (We might also recall some of the comments 
made by coroners from urban and rural areas). Such a systematic 
pattern in the exercise of discretion may properly be seen as a 
'typical' pattern, and 'typical' patterns of police discretion 
would have a relation to police training among other things. 
"Typical discretion" also includes stereotyping of situations, 
events or people as falling into some pattern already recognised, 
or perceived as being typical, routine, or normal, as in Sudnow's 
"normal crimes" (1965). We can recall here the "emergence" of 
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inquest verdicts and the process of "routine" construction from 
the disorganised unstructured (potential) facts-of-the-matter. 
Baldwin and McConville (1977), in a study which concluded 
that the organisational end-product (justice) in the Crown Court 
may be seen as the result of negotiation between the parties, 
(within a structure which defines the power of the negotiators) 
and which suggested that informal processes be recognised as 
crucial influences on the end-product were essentially discussing 
the exercise of discretion. So too was Carlen (1976) in her 
study of the justice produced in Magistrates' Courts. Baldwin 
and McConville, of course, make further conclusions (1977,101- 
116) about the propriety and the desirability of the system they 
describe and its alternatives. These need not concern us here, 
nor would we wish to draw a parallel between that study and our 
present project, except to point out that discretionary power 
and negotiated reality are not confined solely to coroners' work 
but are to be found in other parts of the legal, judicial and 
law-enforcement systems. 
In conclusion, it can be said of coroners' discretionary 
authority that: 
(a) it is to be defined in terms of choices (i. e. discretion); 
(b) choices are exercised within the context of the considerable 
powers of the office of coroner (i. e. authority); 
(c) discretionary authority is not arbitrary or unstructured, 
but tends to be characterised by patterns, and these broad, 
general, patterns and processes can, largely, be understood 
in terms of historical factors; 
(d) coroners' discretionary decisions are not made in isolation, 
as the coroner interacts with others who are themselves 
responsible for choices; 
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(e) 
3 (6) 
notwithstanding the broad processes which characterise 
coroners' constructions in general, a very considerable 
individual discretion rests with the particular coroner, 
whose own attitudes and perceptions influence the nature of 
his own work. 
Conclusions: Coroners' Accounts 
We have considered perceptions of coroners' work as articu- 
lated by coroners themselves. Table 3 (1)1 indicated the character- 
istics of the jurisdictions chosen for study and to these should 
be added some features discussed above: the urban or. rural 
nature of a particular jurisdiction, the medical or legal nature 
of an individual coroner's training, and so on. Even at this 
mundane level (training, geography etc. ) we began to identify 
differences in coroners' perceptions and the way these differences 
contribute to the definition of what "coroners work" means for 
particular coroners - and how this influences what that, 
particular, coroner does in the course of investigating and 
classifying a sudden death. Against this pattern of individualised 
definition of their own activity and role by coroners, we 
contrasted general features of the rate-producing process and the 
tyiý cal processes which characterise the construction of the true 
story. This discussion, read in conjunction with the details of 
the formal legal model of coroners' work and its historical 
development serves as a description of what coroners at the time 
of interview were doing in the course of their work. The three 
standard reference sources (Purchase and Wollaston 1957; 
Brodrick Report 1971; Thurston 1976) are necessarily limited in 
providing such a description in their concentration on the formal 
model, which is itself open to interpretation and debate. 
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Arising from the description, then, of what-coroners-do, the 
following conclusions can be suggested. 
1) The 'coroner system' is not a discrete set of activities/ 
institutions: that is, the activities and institutions 
associated with what-coroners-do are not separate from the 
legal/judicial system, the medical system, or the police 
system. This is so in some obvious organisational ways: for 
instance, that police officers have generally been responsible 
for collecting evidence, interviewing witnesses or, ýwhere an 
inquest is held, organising the proceedings; or that doctors 
are bound to be involved at the stages of reporting a death, 
carrying out a post-mortem, or in pronouncing when death 
occurred. A study of the organisation of coroners' work has, 
then, at the very least, to make reference to the location of 
that work vis-a-vis other organisations. To put it another 
way, the use of a term such as 'coroner system' as a convenient 
shorthand must be recognised as precisely that, for it is an 
abstraction, referring to something which, although structured, 
is highly diffuse. Finally, it remains more appropriate to 
see the 'coroner system' as not discrete, rather than as not 
independent. (The coroner system is independent in a sense, 
insofar as the coroner himself has ultimate authority over 
any investigation: and, of course, to conclude that the 
coroner system is 'not independent' may carry an implication 
which is not intended). It is the lack of 'separateness' 
which is of interest. 
2) The points of overlap between coroners' work and police work, 
medical work, or legal/judicial work add to the routineness, 
the predictability, of the bulk of the work that comes before a 
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coroner. With overlapping "systems", and working practices 
built up between different officials, deaths can be processed, 
categorised, in an organisationally smooth way. So the links 
between coroners' work and other sorts of work have practical 
advantages for the coroner in fulfilling his responsibility in 
each particular case. Nonetheless, coroners find it prudent 
to assert their formal independence from - and authority over - 
all other officials involved. 
3) If there is any tension within the process of categorising a 
particular death, it is likely to exist at the points of over- 
lap with the work of other officials. Any such tensions or 
differing definitions-of-the-situation are, however, likely to 
be absorbed into the emerging construction of the true story, 
rather than being left as explicit conflicts. 
The precise boundaries of coroners' work are not obvious in 
practise, nor are they rigidly defined. The boundaries have 
certainly changed over the centuries, and continue to change 
with new legislation, statutory instruments and Home Office 
advice, but the end result of this process of change (i. e. 
the boundaries of coroners' work today) is not clear-cut. 
This refers both to coroners' work as distinct from other sorts 
of work, and to coroners' work as practised by particular 
coroners in their own jurisdictions. 
5) What constitutes coroners wi 
substantially influenced by 
ceptions and attitudes. It 
anyone) may interpret their 
moreover, that coroners may 
nature of what 'their work' 
)rk for a particular coroner is 
that coroner's individual per- 
is not only that coroners (like 
work in rather different ways but, 
define or help to determine the 
actually is. 
- 122 - 
6) We can refer to the organisationally-produced end-product of 
any coroners' investigation as the true-story of that death. 
The true-story is the formal result of a process which may 
itself be both formal and informal: and it is recognised, 
legally and publicly, as the record of the facts-of-the-matter. 
Without wishing to adopt a position of total relativism, it 
can still be maintained that studies which aim to re-classify 
coroners' decisions (e. g. to render suicide statistics 'more 
reliable') are of extremely limited value, resting on the 
questionable philosophical assumption that real numbers of a 
naturally-occurring type-of-death are knowable and the 
questionable practical assumption that a researcher can some- 
how carry out a coroner's work better than a coroner can. In 
the present study we have termed the end-result of coroners' 
investigations 'true stories' because, in practise, this is 
what they are. The way in which true stories are constructed 
has been illuminated. Whether one might wish to challenge 
the plausibility of particular true-stories from some stock 
of knowledge (psychiatry, medicine, sociology) is altogether 
a separate issue, and one we leave open. 
7) The inquest is not separate from other courts of law. Aside 
from cases, up to recent times, when inquests were treated as 
criminal courts in, for instance, naming the individual said 
to be guilty of murder, there remain less spectacular ways in 
which the inquest is linked to other courts. The notes of 
proceedings of the inquest may be used in other courts. The 
inquest may be used as a 'dummy-run' for a subsequent 
prosecution in another court. More superficially, inquests 
where witnesses are legally represented may certainly look 
like other courts even though their function is not the same. 
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The presence of an inquest jury creates a similar image. The 
inquest is unique, its origins are ancient, and as an 
inquisitorial forum it is a singular part of the courts system 
of England and Wales. Nonetheless, it does not exist in a 
vacuum, and its proceedings as well as its verdict may have 
implications beyond the issues which concernthe coroner. 
8) The inquest is the most visible and most formally-structured 
layer of a process which, in its entirety, covers far more 
than the inquest proceedings themselves. Included in this 
process are medical reports, the results of the post-mortem 
examination, statements to the police, and so on. From these 
elements, an emergent true story is forming before the case 
reaches the stage of the inquest: "order" is being established 
from unformed pieces of potential evidence and structure is 
being imposed. If form 'A' and 'B' cases are added too - 
where no inquest is held - it becomes clear that the inquest, 
although the most formal and most public element of coroners' 
work, is a relatively small part of the total process. There 
are several grounds on which it can sensibly be argued that 
'inquests are important' (not least because they are public) 
but it does not therefore follow that inquests are at all 
important in establishing 'cause of death', 'identity of 
deceased', etc: such matters are almost invariably already 
'known'. The inquest is important, structurally, not for 
what it discovers, but for what it does: i. e. formally 
conclude the matter by providing the binding definition-of- 
the situation. 
9) The inquest must be considered, also, in historical terms. 
The structure and functions of the inquest have been subject to 
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considerable change but some structural features still refer 
to functions which no longer exist, especially in former 
areas of criminal jurisdiction. 
10) Very little of coroners' work is contentious, and it is 
remarkably uncontroversial. The 'reclassification' of 
verdicts to provide 'better suicide statistics' for instance - 
or the controversial nature of some deaths in prison or 
police custody - refer to an extremely small part of coroners' 
work. Insofar as coroners' work as a whole is the focus of 
the present study, it is important to note that the processes 
described refer to this whole range of work. Similarly, in 
Chapter Four below, the discussion of observation at a 
coroner's court will refer not only to suicide verdicts, but 
to other verdicts and their construction. In short, what 
can be taken as of sociological importance in the work of 
the coroner may bear no resemblance at all to particular policy 
or political matters of assumed importance in the work of 
the coroner. 
11) The press do not necessarily present inquest reports in line 
with what coroners perceive as the significant elements. The 
press can be seen as undertaking a reconstruction of the 
coroner's construction of the facts-of-the-matter. This 
reconstruction is interesting as a'subject for sociological 
study - one might wish to look for characteristic features 
of press reconstruction - but the press report does not 
provide substantive information about 'what coroners do'. 
The press report provides information about how the press 
reconstruct constructions: in this sense, the press can be 
seen as object of study in its own right. 
- 125 - 
12) The assembly of a verdict of suicide is not based on isolated 
cues, or separate, specific", pieces of evidence. The 
construction of any verdict can be seen as a process within 
which there are key events: these events, together with 
other stages in the investigation process such as the post- 
mortem examination, can be termed 'points of significance'. 
At these points of significance, the profile of the eventual 
construction is considerably influenced. 
13) The open verdict is not (only) a term for absence-of-verdict. 
It is used as a construction in itself, as denoting one of 
several true stories which are not otherwise accommodated 
within the range of available verdicts. 
14) Within coroners' work, discretionary choices are available 
and this discretion is not capricious, but tends to be 
exercised along lines which typify routine coroners' 
investigations. Discretion characterises coroners' work in 
general, and discretionary decisions of a particular kind may 
also be made by individual coroners. 
15) Discretion, and the whole process of construction whether at 
an inquest or by one of the non-inquest procedures, is 
exercised within the context of the individual coroner's 
considerable authority. Reference, again, can usefully be made 
to historical factors. The final significant feature of 
coroners' true stories is that they are, generally, binding. 
The coroner is entrusted by the state with the formal 
responsibility of accounting for approximately one-fifth of 
the deaths in England and Wales. 
The conclusions above are based upon field interviews with 
coroners: the next step in our discussion of how unexpected 
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deaths are 'accounted for' is to consider the results of 
systematic observation at a coroner's court. Conclusions so far 
can thus be evaluated in terms of an ethnographic study of the 
inquest. 
- 127 - 
CHAPTER FOUR: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE CORONER'S INQUEST. 
4 (1) Introduction 
The three empirical sources for our conclusions about 
coroners' work are: what coroners say; observation of what 
coroners do; and analysis of the statistical products of coroners' 
activity. The present chapter discusses the results of obser- 
vation at coroners' inquests and, in a much more limited way, 
observation of non-inquest work-(e. g. visiting the scene of a 
death) in the rare instance of such work becoming observable. 
Informal observation, itself contributing to empirical material, 
was also possible at many, perhaps unexpected, points (e. g. during 
the many weeks in a coroner's office collecting and copying 
statistical material - see Chapter Five below). However, obser- 
vation in its rigorous form was observation of the formal, public, 
coroner's inquest. 
Fifty inquests were attended, over a period of eight months, 
in the urban centre. where a full-time coroner was based. Tape 
recordings are not permitted in open courts of law: very 
detailed written notes were made during inquests and re-written as 
soon as possible afterwards. Observation, in terms of numbers of 
inquests attended, detail collected, and what is intended to be 
a rigorous consideration of the material produced, can be 
regarded as systematic. In addition to this central period of 
systematic observation, two further inquests were attended (in 
the same jurisdiction as before) at a later date, purely to 
provide an informal, impressionistic, element in considering the 
conclusions reached during the observation period proper. 
Further - in the jurisdiction of another full-time coroner - it 
proved possible to visit the scene of a road traffic incident 
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and, three months after the deaths, to attend the inquest. This 
was an invaluable and unique opportunity to 'follow through' the 
process of construction from the beginning of a coroner's 
involvement to the end. 
Thus, the empirical basis of the present chapter is systematic 
observation of fifty inquests: supplemented by additional, 
observed, inquests and other, normally non-observable, parts of 
coroners' work. The period of systematic observation took place 
prior to the interviews discussed in Chdpter Three above. 
It was decided to concentrate upon only one coroner in order 
to observe the range of verdicts and the range of circumstances 
in which constructions take place. It was felt that this was 
more appropriately done within a single jurisdiction. Observation 
of inquests in several jurisdictions would have permitted com- 
parisons of how individual coroners conduct inquestsin their 
particular ways, but this sort of comparison between coroners 
was covered by interview rather than by observation. By focussing 
upon fifty inquests in a single court, the detailed social 
organisation of that court became visible. Thus we are less 
interested here in individual coroners' particular perceptions: 
the aim, instead, is to approach an ethnographic study of a 
single coroner's public, formal, domain, a detailed and intensive 
study of that particular 'society'. It might be said that other 
coroners might conduct their inquests rather differently. That, 
without doubt, is to some degree so, but is not of relevance 
insofar as comparative material is not being sought in this part 
of the study. 
To briefly review the position already outlined, a methodology 
presupposes a theoretical stance (whether or not the researcher 
makes this explicit) and a practical framework for research 
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practice. The perspective adopted in the present study has 
already been made clear. The elements of the empirical activity 
have been outlined. It remains only to restate the visibility 
of the research process, i. e., that its assumptions (including 
theoretical stance) are open to inspection, its practice (as 
well as its results) are clearly described and, thus, it can 
be judged by its internal logic, irrespective of whether 
another researcher might have chosen a different path. 
Observation at inquests potentially involves an ethical 
problem not raised by individual interviews with coroners or 
by a private statistical search: attending inquests might be 
seen as an intrusion into private grief. This was considered 
before commencing this part of the study. It was decided that 
the inquest is a public forum and does not require the special 
permission to attend which would be required to observe, say, a 
juvenile court. Coroners' courts typically involve attendance 
by witnesses, police, medical staff, press reporters and, in some 
cases, jurors. It was not felt that the presence of another 
added to the distress of relatives. In practice, all inquests 
were attended with the prior knowledge of the coroner or his 
officer. Seating and note-taking were arranged with care: 
often, the least obtrusive solution was to sit with newspaper 
reporters. On completion of the period of systematic observation, 
it was quite clear that no problems of an ethical kind, or in 
terms of personal contact with participants, had arisen. 
The discussion of the results of this part of the study are 
prefaced by procedural notes and details of verdicts reached at 
inquests attended. 
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4 (z) Procedural Outline 
The formal properties of the inquest were discussed in 
Chapter Two above: let us briefly restate that in Chapter Two, 
Section Three, it was suggested that inquests are conducted for 
three sorts of reason. Firstly, an examination of "circumstances" 
of death is permitted even where the immediate, medical, "cause 
of death" is already, for practical purposes, established. 
Secondly, a public forum is established. Thirdly, inquests are 
held simply because the law stipulates that they must be. 
Tables 4(2) 1&2 indicate some of the descriptive features 
of the fifty inquests attended during the period of systematic 
observation. 
TABLE 4(2)1: VERDICTS RECORDED AT INQUESTS ATTENDED 
Misadventure 36 
Suicide 10 
Open Verdict 3 
Adjourned* 1 
Total 50 
Inquest adjourned indefinitely under 1926 Coroners 
(Amendment) Act, s. 20(1), i. e. where a person has 
already been charged with murder, manslaughter or 
infanticide. 
TABLE 4(2)2: JURIES AT INQUESTS ATTENDED 
Inquests with Jury** 21 
Inquests without Jury 29 
Total 50 
A considerable number of these inquests would today 
not be held with a jury: observation took place 
before the 1977 Criminal Law Act was fully im- 
plemented. This might be considered fortunate 
insofar as a sociological resource was "captured" 
before becoming, if not extinct, rather rare. 
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Tables 4(2)1 and 4(2)2 can be linked together by noting, 
firstly, that all twenty-one inquests to which a jury was summoned 
were concluded by verdicts of misadventure and, secondly, that no 
juries were present at any of the thirteen inquests where open 
verdicts or verdicts of suicide were recorded. Inquests with 
juries tended to be held in a larger, and more formal courtroom 
than the smaller-scale non-jury inquests: the apparatus and 
ritual of the courtroom, expected by conventional wisdom to be 
normal features of courts of law, were much more visible at jury- 
inquests. Yet the similarities between even the jury-inquest 
and other courts of law should not be taken too far: the 
differences are equally striking. The unique nature of the 
inquest must be remembered. 
Carlen talks of the magistrate entering the court as follows: 
His entrance to the courtroom is both staged and 
heralded. The opening of the court is signalled 
by an usher calling 'All Stand' and 'Silence in 
Court. ' When everybody in the courtroom is standing 
in silence the magistrate enters, his appearance 
being staged via the door of which he has the 
exclusive use and which appears to seal off those 
innermost areas of the court to which the public 
never has access. (Carlen 1976,31). 
This passage almost exactly describes the entrance of the 
coroner to the jury-inquests attended, if "coroner's officer" is 
substituted for "usher". An account of magistrates' courts and 
some coroners' courts can indeed include common elements of ritual 
and formal procedure, pointing to underlying meanings about the 
role of law and those who personify it and, in the widest sense, 
to social control. Yet two sorts of reservation about this 
comparison must be made. Firstly, the observation, of ritual and 
formal practice can imply more significance than is warranted: 
for instance, in discussing "innermost areas ..... to which the 
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public never has access" one could refer to a library, a University, 
a railway station or a shop as readily as one might refer to 
(any) court of law, and with no more significance. This is 
certainly not to say that ritual and procedure are unimportant 
(they are discussed below) but they are areas to which a spurious 
importance can be attached. Secondly, other features of 
Carlen's description of the magistrate's court are not applicable 
to the inquests attended, the difference hinging on the degree 
of formality. On a mundane level, for instance, witnesses at an 
inquest tend to sit beside or near the coroner, rather than 
standing in the 'dock', and they might often be addressed by 
their forenames. More generally, what we might call the 
"deprivation of information" so often revealed in Carlen's 
study - for instance, the client arriving at 10.00a. m. as 
instructed, but not appearing until 12.30 without being offered 
an explanation (Carlen 1976,27) - is far less obviously the case 
in a coroner's court. 
The structure and procedure of the inquest is highly important 
but similarities with other courts of law must be treated with 
caution. The status of the inquest as an inquisitorial, not an 
adversary, forum is again of relevance. 
In 4(3) below, a detailed account of the process of cate- 
gorisation, based on observation and drawing from specific 
inquests, is given. It may be useful to preface such an account 
by a simple descriptive sketch of inquest procedure. Let us 
suppose that a jury is present at this particular inquest. The 
description is drawn from fieldnotes. 
At this inquest, eight jurors, all male, have been summoned. 
Two solicitors are in attendance, together with civilian and 
police witnesses. A senior police officer is also present: he 
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does not participate in the proceedings. Prior to the start of the 
inquest, the coroner's officer has been meeting jurors individually, 
checking details and, in appropriate cases, paying expenses. 
The coroner's officer opens the inquest formally with the 
words "all rise"; the coroner enters; and 
(as this is the first 
of three inquests held at one session), the coroner's officer 
briefly addresses each juror, telling them that they are required 
to determine the causes and circumstances of three deaths. The 
names of the deceased are given. The coroner himself calls each 
juror by name. The coroner's officer asks the jury as a whole to 
stand, and the oath is taken. The jury is asked to return a true 
and just verdict. 
The coroner addresses the jury: it is reminded that the 
inquest is a court of record, not a court of trial, and the jurors 
are told they have two duties: to return a true verdict, and to 
decide whether criminal negligence has been proven to exist. It 
is pointed out that the inquest does not apportion blame, nor 
seek compensation. The central concern is said by the coroner 
to be to discover "when, where and by what means the deceased 
came to his or her death. " 
The inquest is now in progress. As witnesses in turn give 
their evidence, they individually take the oath. First witness: 
a relation of the deceased; general and biographical information 
is presented. Second witness: a police officer; photographs 
and plans of the scene of death are presented. Third witness: 
a member of the public who was near to the scene of the death. 
Fourth witness: another member of the public; a witness to the 
incident. Fifth witness: another police officer; detailed 
questions about the scene of the death are given. Sixth witness: 
a pathologist; the results of the post-mortem examination are 
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read out to the court and an opinion of cause of death is given. 
In this sample case of an inquest-with-jury, no further 
witnesses are called. Witnesses, individually, may or may not have 
been asked questions by the solicitors or other properly "interested 
parties. " The coroner is likely to exercise a close control over 
the propriety of particular questions. The coroner's own 
questions to witnesses may be quite informal and conversational, 
amounting to what would, in other circumstances, be leading 
questions. 
Finally, the coroner sums up. A verdict may be suggested 
to the jury, or a range of possible verdicts may be suggested. 
It may be that the coroner advises the jury-hat a particular 
verdict is not appropriate, but otherwise makes no suggestion. 
The jury may not necessarily retire to consider the verdict: 
it may be decided and expressed. in open court after brief 
consultation between jurors. The coroner formally records the 
verdict and would tend to add comments, especially if the family 
of the deceased are present. 
At this inquest, the coroner's officer formally concludes 
the proceedings by "all rise". 
An inquest conducted without a jury is less formal than the 
above account suggests. In the absence of the jurors, those 
present may comprise: the coroner; his secretary; the coroner's 
officer; police and civilian witnesses. Those present may number 
only six or seven in total. A newspaper reporter may or may not 
be present. The most formal elements of such an inquest are 
simply to rise when the coroner enters and leaves and, of course, 
for witnesses to take the oath before giving evidence. Such an 
inquest may be quite brief in duration. 
The inquest described above is not meant to represent all 
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inquests, nor are particular details meant to have any large 
degree of precision. The "procedural outline" above is a sketch 
of a coroner's court: it assists in the understanding of the 
detailed "process of construction" presented below. 
4 (3) Observing the Process of Construction 
It was stated in Chapter One above that society (and phenomena 
within 'it') acquire apparent objectivity because members of 
society define (and continually redefine) phenomena as real (Walsh 
1972,19). What coroners do, and produce, at an inquest also has 
this ostensible objectivity, this facticity, precisely because 
coroners, and other interacting participants at the inquest, 
similarly define and redefine the reality of their particular 
world by their activities: the reality of the circumstances of 
the death; the true story; the facts-of-the-matter; the 
procedures and structure of the coroner system itself. Attending 
inquests is a means of getting close to this production of 
reality. The material collected by observation complements that 
collected at interview and in statistical searches toward the 
same objective of making visible the process of construction. 
In her study of magistrates' courts, Carlen was centrally 
interested in the operation of rules: in both their "abstract" 
and their "situated" meanings, and in the performance of "rule 
users" (Carlen 1976,5). An inspiration here is Schutz, who, in 
Carlen's words, directed himself to 11..... the taken-for-granted 
nature of the implicit rules of social interaction. " (Carlen 1976, 
8). Rules are perhaps unrecognised in those everyday situations 
where meanings are unproblematic, shared, and obvious, but when 
meanings become more problematic - as in the coroners' task - 
then rules become significant. Some of the rules in coroners' 
work have been discussed already and, it might be noted, 
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in a mundane sense formal rules are invoked generally in 
situations where dispute or unclear meaning exist, whether in a 
court of law, a football match or a traffic system. At the 
inquest, the implicit rules (and the activities of those using 
them) are just as important as the formal rules. 
To summarise: observation of the inquest begins with a focus 
upon the production and reproduction of reality and upon the 
importance of rules. It also includes an initial recognition 
that coroners' work is, for coroners, largely normal and routine. 
Sudnow's description of a 'normal crime' (1965) can be easily 
translated into the coroner's 'normal death' and its subordinate 
categories: normal suicide, normal accident, and so on. Sudnow, 
conducting research in an American Public Defender office, saw 
normal crime as the routine classification by court officials of 
diverse unformed instances of law breaking into manageable, 
stereotypical, categories: normal crimes are phenomena seen as 
having typical features, typically happening in certain places 
in typical circumstances, and typically being carried out by 
certain people, being offences for which the Public Defender can 
ýý..... provide some form of proverbial characterisation. " 
(Sudnow 1965,260). 
In the context of the normalisation of deaths at the inquest, 
there ceases to be any need to search for characteristics of the 
death or the deceased other than those consistent with the emergent 
true story: a 
. 
similar point to that made above in discussing 
coroners' comments at interview. Sudnow saw the construction of 
the normal crime as a practical way of organising the world in 
the Public Defender office: a form of "practically tested 
criminological wisdom. " (Sudnow 1965,275). 
It might be said that Carlen and Sudnow were concerned with 
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institutions and relations referring to explicit social control 
and that coroners, at their inquests, do not have the same 
interest. It might then be said that, as coroners are not agents 
of social control, conclusions about the nature of the inquest 
need not bear any resemblance to conclusions one might wish to 
make about other courts of law. However, such a view of the 
inquest would be sociologically quite naive. The coroner is, 
in conducting his inquest, concerned with social control. This 
need not imply control in any overt or quasi-political sense, of 
course, but it is clear that the inquest is indeed a mechanism 
of control in several specific ways: there are residual powers 
in matters of criminal law; discretionary powers over the 
admissibility of evidence and conduct of the inquest; the 
symbolic authority represented by the formal characteristics of 
the inquest; the central responsibility for providing the 
officially sanctioned definition of the true story. Despite the 
withering away of many of the coroner's former powers, the 
inquest retains the shell of a control apparatus: it could, in 
the working lifetime of at least one of the coroners interviewed, 
despatch individuals undefended, and not present, as murderers. 
The separate issue of participants' perceptions of the modern 
inquest might also be considered: a study by Barraclough and 
Shepherd of spouses' reactions to the inquest found one 
remarking: 
You feel up for trial, you feel as if you might be 
had up for prison for something you've done. 
(Barraclough and Shepherd 1976,110) 
The question of social control is complex and can usefully 
be reconsidered in our concluding comments. Let us consider 
whether Cicourel's early work (1968) may be of use in drawing 
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together our preliminary remarks. It was suggested in Chapter 
One that Cicourel's work still has much to offer in terms of 
theory and method. Cicourel's work on the "negotiation of dis- 
positions" in the courtroom (1968,292 ff) predates later socio- 
logical work on the negotiation of justice in general: the 
ethnographic style of this section of his study also informs the 
presentation of inquest material below. 
Cicourel, in looking at the practical arrangements for the 
product known as juvenile justice, suggested that members' 
(here, the police officers') "background expectancies" and "sense 
of social structure" provide the means for transforming dis- 
organised objects into "recognizable and intelligent displays 
making up everyday social organisation. " (1968,328). The 
parallel with coroners' (and coroners' officers' and other 
officials') translation of "disorder" into "order" is quite clear, 
and it might also be remembered that Cicourel described such 
"background expectancies" as invariant (1968,328). This charac- 
terisation, of course, is open to misunderstanding. Invariant can 
simply be taken to mean systematic and non-arbitrary: having 
structure. Again, the parallel with the coroner's officers' 
initial categorisation of a death is apparent when Cicourel 
describes the arrival of the police at the scene of an alleged 
infraction of the law: 
..... their sense of social structure and memory 
of past events in the neighbourhood provide 
initial interpretations as to what happened. 
(1968,328) 
Cicourel's conclusions as a whole also draw attention to 
the methods by which conversational interchanges or accounts are 
transformed into documentary records (1968,332). Cicourel's 
concerns here have since influenced the development of microscopic 
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ethnomethodology. The relevance to the present study is in terms 
not only of witnesses' accounts being assimilated by the coroner 
into the emergent facts-of-the-matter (to be officially recorded) 
but in terms of witnesses', and relatives', verbal accounts 
being transformed into written evidence - tangible versions of 
potential true stories - at very early stages of the investigation 
of a death. Amongst such tangible documents, the pathologist's 
report of the post-mortem examination expresses not even a 
structuring of a conversation, but what is explicitly referred 
to by the pathologist as his opinion as to cause of death. 
The post-mortem report, indeed, becomes a "key document", as we 
have already noted. 
If, in the following passage the term "sudden death" is 
substituted for "delinquent", the proper concerns of an ethno- 
graphy of the coroner's inquest are perhaps made rather more 
clear: 
the "delinquent" is an emergent product, trans- 
formed over time according to a sequence of 
encounters, oral and written reports, prospective 
readings, retrospective readings of "what 
happened", and the practical circumstances of 
11sett2ing" matters in everyday agency business. 
(Cicourel, 1968,333). 
Insofar as the coroner is engaged, at his inquest, in a 
practical task of "settling matters', the question arises: what 
is the status of an ethnographic approach to the description of 
such a task? Perhaps the resolution of such a question is in 
a consideration of alternatives to ethnographic interview/ 
observation. One alternative to an ethnographic approach at the 
inquest is a purely formal-legal description: and that has 
already been offered above. Another alternative is to go further 
than ethnography into a sociolinguistic analysis of verbal 
interaction: that, however, would involve practical difficulties 
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(for instance, inquest proceedings cannot be recorded on tape) 
as well as a shift in the stated interests of the present study. 
In terms of our present concerns and overall aims, an ethnographic 
account provides a practically-adequate description, i. e. a basis 
for understanding. Fabian comments that "ethnographic knowledge" 
is valid not in terms of adherence to a "scientific code" of some 
kind, but in terms of "communicative processes. " (Fabian 1979,1). 
Indeed, Fabian asserts that ethnography becomes less "objective" 
in adopting a supposedly "analytical" stance, rather than an 
"interpretive" perspective (1979,1). 
Fabian's comments are consistent with the approach to the 
inquest adopted here, although the separate issue of objectivity 
can, for now, be bracketed away as an unnecessary digression. 
Fabian's central point is quite simple: 
The point is not that we should rather communicate 
than formalize when doing ethnography, but that 
we should realize that all aspects of the production 
of ethnographic knowledge, including formalizations, 
occur in communication. 
(1979,23). 
In sum, the following ethnographic account derives from work 
in more than one area of sociology, but owes some inspiration to 
the body of work carried out in both British and American 
judicial settings. Carlen's concern (1976) with the operation of 
rules and the problem of meaning remains important, and her 
comments on the physical structuring of the courtroom and the 
tangible manifestations of institutional authority remain 
important too, although the applicability to a coroner's court 
should not be overstated. Other sociologists - such as Parker, 
Casburn and Turnbull (1980,240) - have also discussed the 
relevance of the court proceedings themselves, even the "atmosphere" 
(1980,240), in the production of justice. This requires cautious 
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consideration. Sudnow's concept of normal crime (1965), aside 
from affording a simple translation to 'normal death', can also 
inform a discussion of the creation of true stories, and of the 
'practical wisdom' underlying true stories about sudden deaths. 
Cicourel's early study (1968) of the negotiation of reality and 
typifications involved in the production of something called 
juvenile justice also forms part of the basis on which descriptions 
are to be offered. 
Two further points, although simple, can, finally, be restated. 
Firstly, death and dying are social affairs (Sudnow, 1967) and 
as De Vries has pointed out, the management of information about 
death is itself a subject for sociological study (De Vries, 1981, 
1082). Clearly, the coroner's role in the management of such 
information is a central one. Secondly, a constant and underlying 
concern throughout the following account of the coroner's 
inquest is Berger and Luckmann's depiction of the social con- 
struction of reality (1967). Sociologists, of course, have looked 
at this process of construction in a number of settings, such as 
in Homan's account of "old-time pentecostal" believers (1981) 
or Cashmore's account of Rastafarians (1979). The process of 
construction at the inquest may now be illustrated. The following 
accounts are based upon fieldnotes recorded at specific inquests 
attended during the observation period. The material collected 
at each inquest is, first of all, presented in detailed note form: 
the setting is described, the participants are listed, and the 
evidence of each witness is then presented. Footnotes are kept 
to a minimum, but at certain points are included for the sake of 
clarity. The inquest is then discussed, where appropriate 
referring back to the numbered notes of each piece of evidence. 
Newspaper reports of the specific inquests discussed are then 
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presented, which allows consideration both of the characteristics 
of press reporting and of the means by which coroners' work is 
publicly "known". Finally, discussion of the inquests presented 
below moves to a general level, differences and similarities in 
inquest procedure are identified, and provisional conclusions 
drawn out. 
Inquest A 
Al. The setting is a large courtroom in police headquarters. 
Present: eight male jurors, two solicitors, several civilian 
and police witnesses. A police officer of rank - described by 
the coroner as a "police chief" - is also in attendance, 
apparently as an observer with a potential interest in any sub- 
sequent criminal proceedings. A reporter from the local newspaper 
is also present. 
A2. The coroner's officer has been meeting jurors individually, 
prior to the start of the inquest, to check identity and details, 
and to pay them if they have taken time from their normal 
employment. 
A3. The coroner's officer formally announces the entrance of the 
coroner with the words "all rise". As inquest A is the first 
of three consecutive inquests to be held this morning, the 
coroner's officer addresses the. jurors, telling them they are here 
to discover the causes and circumstances of the three deaths to 
be dealt with today. The deceased are named individually. The 
coroner interrupts to call each juror by name too. The coroner's 
officer then asks the jurors to stand, at which they repeat an 
oath (which again includes the names of the deceased) and are 
The number, and gender, were unchanging features of all jury- 
inquestsattended. 
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asked by the officer to return a verdict "true and just". 
A4. The coroner addresses the jury, announcing that three fatal 
road accidents are to be considered - the word "accident" is 
used at this stage - and reminding the jury that this is not a 
court of trial, but a court of record. The jury is told that it 
has two duties: to return a true verdict; and to decide whether 
criminal negligence has been prove n to exist. The coroner points 
out that the inquest is not a means of apportioning blame nor of 
seeking compensation. The central task is to discover "..... 
when, where and by what means the deceased came to his or her 
death. " 
A5. The preamble to the morning's programme of inquests has 
merged without formal break into the specific proceedings of 
'inquest At. Mr. Crompton, the son of the deceased, is called 
## 
to take the oath. The coroner asks a very general opening 
question about the health of the deceased. The witness replies 
that his father took a considerable amount of sickness leave from 
work as he suffered from bronchitis: he was not at work at the 
time of death. The coroner asks specifically about the eyesight 
of the deceased. The witness replies that his father wore glasses 
only for reading. Brief questions upon the location of death, 
and upon identification by the witness, follow. The coroner 
invites questions from solicitors and jurors. No questions. 
A6. The second witness - Police Constable Oakley - is called. 
He will be called again later to give his own evidence, but at 
this stage he is required only to read out to the court the 
statement of the police photographer who attended the scene of 
The jury returns a verdict: the coroner, in formal terms, 
merely records it. 
** All names are, of course, fictitious. 
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the incident, to make the photographs available to the court, and 
to produce his own plan of the scene, including road markings, 
measurements, and position of vehicles. There are no questions 
from solicitors, police chief, or jurors. 
A7. The third witness - Mrs. O'Malley - is called. The first 
witness was called because of his blood relationship to the de- 
ceased and because he could be assumed to possess biographical 
information - and also, importantly, because he identified the body 
and can therefore make a statement, on oath, to that effect at the 
inquest. The second witness was called because of "professional 
competence", attendance at the scene, and presentation of tangible 
documents to the inquest; crudely, it was his job to be there. 
The third witness, however, is called to give evidence at the inquest 
only because of capricious circumstances: she happened to be there 
at the time. The coroner asks Mrs. O'Malley for a general, develop- 
ing account of what happened. Mrs. O'Malley says that she was 
waiting at a bus-stop and saw Mr. Crompton senior step from the 
pavement on the other side of the road. So far as she could tell, 
he didn't look before crossing the road. He took two or three 
steps, then fell backwards, losing his balance before being hit by 
the car. (After setting the scene thus, Mrs. O'Malley is asked about 
the speed of the vehicle and weather conditions). Mrs. O'Malley 
continues that she didn't think the car was going very fast as it 
only carried Mr. Crompton a few yards along the road as it hit him. 
She thought the car's headlamps were illuminated. She adds that the 
road was wet and "greasy" but it was not raining at the time. The 
coroner invites questions from the properly "interested parties" 
as before. For the first time, solicitor 1 asks a question: What 
was Mr. Crompton wearing? Mrs. O'Malley replies that he was wearing 
a "darkish" grey coat. She adds that the road lighting was not very 
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good and that Mr. Crompton seemed to "shield himself" before being 
hit. Solicitor 2 also asks a question: did Mr. Crompton fall to 
the ground before the car hit him? Yes, he lost his balance. 
There are no questions from the jury. 
A8. The fourth witness, Mrs. Fowler, was also waiting at the bus- 
stop. Questions cover the same ground as the questions asked of 
Mrs. O'Malley: an account of what happened, road conditions, the 
sequence of movements and events. In Mrs. Fowler's construction of 
the day's incident, there is a consistency with Mrs. O'Malley's 
account, although Mrs. Fowler is more demonstrative, less hesitant. 
Mrs. Fowler says that Mr. Crompton only took two steps, then fell, 
adding that he could have lost his balance. He "staggered" before 
falling backwards. As-he hit the road, the car struck him. Mrs. 
Fowler had not seen the car until this point. The car pushed Mr. 
Crompton "a couple of yards" along the road. It had its headlights 
on. As for the weather, it was an "awful night", and it's "ever so 
dark on that road. " At the coroner's invitation for questions once 
more, solicitor 1 again asked about the fall. Was Mr. Crompton 
actually on the ground, or still falling, as the car struck him? 
In answer to this direct question, Mrs. Fowler could not be sure. 
Did she hear a car horn, or a sound of brakes? No. Nor were there 
any nearby stationary vehicles. There are no questions from 
solicitor 2, the jury, or the police chief. 
A9. P. C. Oakley is called again. He is reminded by the coroner 
that heis still on oath. He gives very detailed evidence, in dis- 
tinct segments. First of all, P. C. Oakley reads out a statement he 
has prepared detailing the incident as a whole. The car (model is 
stated) was driven by Mr. Parrish (address stated) who was alone in 
the vehicle. Mr. Crompton had been walking to a bus-stop and Mr. 
Parrish had been driving home. Mr. Parrish "braked hard" to avoid 
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Mr. Crompton. Mrs. O'Malley and Mrs. Fowler were the only eye-wit- 
nesses but neither saw the car before impact. The coroner asks 
what was the significance of the car pushing the deceased (only) 
a few yards forward. P. C. Oakley replies that this indicates the 
car was not travelling at high speed. P. C. Oakley attended to 
Mr. Crompton's injuries - not thought to be serious at the time - 
until the arrival of an ambulance. He adds that all streetlights 
were found to be working, but were nonetheless not very effective. 
(Starting with the report on the brightness of the streetlights, 
the second segment of P. C. Oakley's statement continues with 
similarly 'technical' points). The road was constructed of separate 
concrete blocks, which become slippery in wet conditions. The car 
was found to be roadworthy. (The final part of P. C. Oakley's 
evidence appears as an evaluation -a drawing together of the 
existing drift of his account). Mr. Parrish had told P. C. Oakley 
that he was travelling at about 30 m. p. h.; P. C. Oakley now adds, 
at this stage, that he is satisfied that the driver did not act 
recklessly and that Mr. Cormpton stepped into the road without 
looking. The coroner then asks P. C. Oakley to read out in full 
Mr. Parrish's statement: he does so, and the speed of the car (now 
28 m. p. h. ) the gear it was in at the time, the use of dipped head- 
lights, and the emphasis on not being able to avoid Mr. Crompton 
are again mentioned. (Thus, the final segment of P. C. Oakley's 
evidence has again been a formal statement, this time from the driver 
of the vehicle). The coroner invites questions. Solicitor 1 
moves to explicit theorising in his question to P. C. Oakley: was 
there any mud on Mr. Crompton's shoes? (solicitor 1 amplifies 
his question by saying that the deceased would have crossed a grass 
verge to get to the road, and could therefore have slipped, 
especially as it had earlier been raining). The witness replies 
that no traces of mud were found on the shoes, nor were any 
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obstacles likely to have caused a fall found. Solicitor 1 also 
asks if there was any conversation with Mr. Crompton en route to 
hospital: the reply is 'no'. Solicitor 1 finally asks about 
contact between P. C. Oakley and Mr. Crompton's family since the 
incident. Solicitor 2 asks if Mr. Crompton was going to catch 
a bus on the same side of the road as he had been walking: 'yes'. 
Why then was he crossing the road at all, asks Solicitor 2? 
P. C. Oakley replies that there was no obvious reason for this. 
Evidence from this witness thus concludes on an indefinite note. 
A10. The only medical witness, Dr. French, consultant pathologist 
to the local Health Authority, is called. After an opening, 
facilitating, question from the coroner, Dr. French's evidence 
is given in short, precise pieces, with no elaborated speculative 
reasoning. The deceased was admitted to (the local hospital) 
with sustained multiple injuries, an operation was performed, 
but Mr. Crompton's condition deteriorated and he died on (date). 
Following a post-mortem examination, Dr. French found abrasions, 
blood in the lungs, old fractures of some ribs, recent fractures 
of other ribs, together with fractures of the collar bone and 
pelvis. The skull was intact and the brain "normal'. Death was 
said to be due to "..... acute broncho-pneumonia following 
multiple injuries. " Solicitor 1 is again the only source of 
questions. Would Mr. Crompton have been capable of a short dash, 
despite his breathing troubles? Dr. French "would have thought 
so. " Did he hit the ground before the car hit him? "I wouldn't 
like to commit myself. " 
All. The final witness, Mr. Parrish, the driver of the vehicle 
involved, is called. He takes the oath, but the coroner 
immediately asks the jury to excuse him from giving evidence. The 
coroner adds that he is sure the jury has already reached its 
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verdict. The jury assents to this request and statement. 
A12. The coroner sums up. Basic details (e. g. those involved) 
are combined with elements of the emerging explanation: the road 
was wet but in good repair; the deceased appeared to fall before 
impact; the car was not travelling very fast; the driver had 
no chance of avoiding collision. " The evidence of the two 
eyewitnesses that Mr. Crompton appeared to be looking downwards, 
rather than at the car, was mentioned. The coroner concludes that 
from the "limited evidence", no blame can attach to the driver, 
and the coroner suggests a verdict of misadventure. 
A13. The jury (without withdrawing to another room) return a 
verdict of misadventure. The coroner records this verdict 
formally, and each juror signs the inquisition sheet. The 
coroner, and solicitors, express sympathies to the family of the 
deceased, who are in court. "All rise. " 
Inquest A lasted one hour. Several features of this particular 
inquest were found at all inquests attended. The most immediately 
striking feature, to a casual observer, is the contrast between 
the formality of the inquest 'structure' (the opening of the 
proceedings; the seating arrangements) and the informality of 
its 'content' (the conversational nature of the coroner's 
questions and the civilian witnesses' replies; the fact that the 
coroner's questions would certainly be 'leading questions' in 
other courts). It would not be inaccurate to suggest that, after 
the commencement of a formal procedure and the erection of a 
strictly-defined structure around the proceedings, the coroner 
minimises the significance of precisely this formality, and 
maximises the impression of an informal, almost intimate, occasion. 
Inquest A was also of some general applicability in demon- 
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strating the inactive role of the jury. Of course, the jury 
participated in the proceedings in the legal sense that it 
returned a verdict, and was there to ask questions or seek 
clarification: and, importantly, inactivity is not in itself 
synonomous with superfluity. Nonetheless, the jury's role was - 
at all inquests attended - passive. As we have already noted, 
juries would today not (normally) be summoned to a road traffic 
death. 
To find the coroner suggesting a particular verdict to a 
jury is normal practice. It was particularly interesting, however, 
to find the coroner at Inquest A referring to the death in 
question as an "accident" at the very start of proceedings. 3* 
The word "accident" may have a very general meaning in everyday 
usage. However, it has a specific meaning in terms of coroners' 
work, and although at Inquest A the accidental nature of the 
death was never (so far as the participants were concerned) in 
question, it remains of interest to hear its use at the commence- 
ment of the inquest. 
The appearance of the police witness on two separate 
occasions during the inquest was also a general feature of inquest 
procedure. Equally, it was normal for drivers of vehicles involved 
in some way with the death to be excused evidence. This latter 
feature of the inquest is in part to avoid the appearance of a 
trial. The coroner in this particular case made it clear, at 
interview, that he seeks to protect the driver in such cases from 
incriminating himself, especially in response to solicitors' 
questions. In such cases, the witness' earlier formal statement 
*There is no significance in contrasting the suggested "accident" 
with the verdict of "misadventure" here. Accidental death and 
misadventure have the same formal meaning. 
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remains available to the court, and may be read out by the coroner. 
It was stated at the beginning of Inquest A, as it normally 
is, that the inquest is not concerned with matters of blame or 
liability. Indeed, at none of the inquests attended were any 
attributions of blame made or implied. One might note, however, 
that the coroner is concerned with the absence of blame: with the 
de facto 'aquittal' of someone around whom suspicion might other- 
wise fall. It is quite normal to hear the coroner comment that 
"the driver was not in any way to blame" or even "one cannot 
find fault with anyone except the deceased. " 
At Inquest A, the first public indication of the likely 
true story to emerge came in the coroner's introductory comments 
(A4), and the evidence of the first witness (A5) serves to 
sketch in the biographical details. The evidence of the first 
bystander (A7) provides the first coherent practical explanation 
for what happened: the deceased didn't seem to look before 
crossing the road; the car wasn't going very fast; the road 
was wet; the deceased had been wearing a dark coat; and so on. 
The evidence of the second bystander (A8) reinforces this 
emerging account. The evidence of the police witness (A9) provides 
more detail, consistent with what has already been heard, and 
the explicit suggestions that the driver had not been reckless, 
and that the deceased stepped into the road without looking, 
carry an authoritative note of skilled and professional evaluation. 
After hearing the medical evidence, it is thus, in the case of 
Inquest A, a straightforward matter for the coroner to recommend 
the'obvious'verdict to the jury. 
Before moving on to consider another - rather different - 
inquest, a further dimension can be examined. The way in which 
coroners' work is routinely 'known' is by reading newspaper 
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reports of coroners' inquests. Inquests may attract national or 
regional press coverage if there is an expectation of controversy. 
It is quite normal, at other inquests, for a local press reporter 
to'attend. Let us consider the report of Inquest A from the 
local evening newspaper. 
The report is headed: 'Riddle of Why Man Crossed City 
Road'. Thus the concluding words of P. C. Oakley's evidence (A9) 
have been selected as the 'lead' for this particular story 
because of their unresolved, indefinite, nature. Of course, this 
'riddle' formed only a passing element in the evidence as a whole 
and, in any event, was not a matter which would have materially 
affected the coroner's or jury's conclusions. Nevertheless, the 
heading of the report indicates how one element from an accumu- 
lation of generally consistent and, to the participants, 
unsurprising information, is selected in terms of its assumed 
newsworthiness. 
The first paragraph of the inquest report concentrates on 
descriptive scene-setting and exoneration of the driver: 
A 61-year-old City man who slipped when crossing 
City road and fell on his back was hit by a car 
which did not have a chance to avoid him, a 
City inquest was told yesterday. 
Thus, in these opening words the matters of potential con- 
tention at Inquest A have become straightforward descriptive 
details (he slipped; he 'fell on his back'; he was then, 
implicitly, hit by the car), and the driver's 'innocence' is also 
established at the start. 
The report then states the verdict, followed by the patholo- 
gist's evidence of cause of death. The evidence of Mrs. O'Malley 
(A7) and Mrs. Fowler (A8) is then briefly merged. The evidence 
* 'City' is here substituted for place and street names. 
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of P. C. Oakley is also given in reported speech, other than one 
direct quotation. "I am satisfied the driver was not driving 
carelessly and had no chance of avoiding the accident. " The 
report concludes with a brief summary of the driver's written 
statement to the court, which had been read aloud by the coroner, 
and a final direct quotation from the driver's statement: "He 
seemed to hesitate and fall back on the road. I braked but could 
not avoid hitting him.! ' 
Further discussion of the nature of reporting by the media 
of mass communication appears elsewhere in the study. At this 
point, it is interesting to consider the similarities between 
the process of construction at the inquest itself, where order 
is imposed upon diverse strands of information, and the newspaper's 
process of construction, where the stock of information and 
emergent true story publicly revealed at the inquest are further 
compressed into a self-contained, miniature, account of 'what- 
really-happened'. The differences between the coroner's and 
the newspaper's management of information can also be examined. 
The most obvious difference, in the case of Inquest A, is the 
coroner's minimisation of unresolved or inconsistent elements, 
and the newspapers emphasis on some small area of mystery and 
continuing puzzlement. This has sociological relevance in terms 
of account - production, and commonsense notions of coroners' 
work gleaned from newspapers. 
Having examined in some detail an inquest-with-jury, let us 
consider an inquest where the verdict was returned by the coroner 
himself, in the absence of jury or the legal profession. 
No other sorts of relevance interest us here, if indeed there 
are any: it seems neither surprising nor sinister that news- 
papers would wish to select elements calculated to catch the 
reader's eye. 
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Inquest B. 
B1. The setting is a room, no larger than the sitting room of a 
private house, in the coroner's office. Present are two newspaper 
reporters, a pathologist, the coroner and his officer, a police 
constable and the 'police chief', and four civilian witnesses. 
B2. Inquest B is the third of three no-jury inquests held on this 
particular morning. The coroner has given no general formal 
address. Each inquest today lastsapproximately half-an-hour. 
All witnesses at Inquest B take the oath before giving evidence 
and 'all rise' as the coroner enters or leaves. Aside from this, 
the setting is informal. The coroner and some participants sit 
at the table in the centre of the room. Others sit on loosely 
arranged chairs around the room. 
B3. The first witness - Di 
for most local post-mortem 
reads from his post-mortem 
37, was due to cardiac and 
Mr. Roberts showed no sign 
is given some emphasis. 
. French, the pathologist responsible 
examinations - gives evidence. He 
report: the death of Mr. Roberts, aged 
respiratory failure caused by drowning. 
of previous ill-health - the point 
The coroner asks no questions, but adds that an analyst's 
report indicates 260 mg alcohol present per 100 ml blood, more 
than threetimes the legal limit for driving. (Dr. French leaves 
the inquest). 
B4. The second witness - Mr. Roberts senior, father of the 
deceased - is asked to give an opening, biographical account (see 
A5)" His son moved to a village outside City six years ago, where 
he had also lived in his younger years. Mr. Roberts junior had 
always been of good health. The coroner asks if the deceased had 
any troubles. Mr. Roberts replies that his son had been divorced 
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in January (five months earlier). 
B5. The third witness, Susan Jones, is called. The coroner asks 
how long she had known Mr. Roberts junior (about nine months). 
The coroner asks about his general health: Miss Jones replies that 
he was in "good health, always cheerful. " The witness is asked 
to give an account of events on the evening in question (see A7). 
Miss Jones and Mr. Roberts went together to the Village Motel, 
where he drank three pints of lager. They were joined by two 
friends, and went on to a disco, after Mr. Roberts had changed 
into lighter clothing: it was a hot summer's evening. Mr. 
Roberts continued to drink at the disco, and repeatedly said he 
would go for a swim, as it was "so hot". As the disco drew to 
a close in the early hours, Mr. Roberts went swimming: Miss 
Jones saw him enter the water, and splash about. One of their 
friends said he could no longer see the deceased in the water; 
others came to help; someone called out that he had been found, 
and an ambulance was called. The coroner invites questions. 
The police chief asks Miss Jones how the deceased had entered 
the water. She replies that he dived in - there is a suggestion 
that he may have been entangled in his own clothing. 
B6. The fourth witness, Edward Arkin, had been a member of the 
group of four who that evening went first to the Village Motel 
and then to the disco. He is asked about the alcohol consumption 
of the deceased that night: he replies that he estimates Mr. 
Robert's consumption as approximately three pints in the motel 
and a further five pints at the disco. Mr. Robert's expressed an 
intention to go swimming. Mr. Arkin saw him dive in after removing 
some of his clothing and then saw him at the water's edge removing 
the rest of his clothes and remarking upon the coolness of the 
water. The two men chatted intermittently as Mr. Roberts swam 
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around. Mr. Roberts then made to swim to a buoy, but appeared 
to turn sharply away, and Mr. Arkin lost sight of him. After 
shouting, and receiving no reply, Mr. Arkin ran to the clubhouse 
for help. Lights were illuminated on the water, and then a boat 
launched. Mr. Roberts was picked up by the boat, and a doctor 
present in the group tried to revive him. The coroner asks a 
final question about the weather that night. It was fine, warm 
and clear, and the moon was shining. There are no questions. 
B7. The fifth witness is Dr. Smith, a G. P. who happened upon 
the scene, as he had been involved in organising the disco and was 
still in the clubhouse. He found the body of Mr. Roberts in a few 
feet of water, and an examination Dr. Smith describes as "cursory" 
led to the conclusion that Mr. Roberts was dead. The time of 
death is given. Attempts at revival are reported to have been 
futile. No questions. 
B8. The final witness is P. C. 3476 from the local police station 
(outside City). He attended the scene, and reads from his 
prepared statement (see A9). No questions. 
B9. The coroner sums up, drawing together three elements: 
Mr. Robert's previous health, a sketch of the evening's progress, 
and the presence of alcohol. The coroner says that the deceased 
had been in "apparently perfect health. " After visiting the motel 
and arriving at the disco, he announced his intention to go for 
a swim several times. He appeared to have drunk approximately 
eight pints of lager. After taking a swim, he could not be seen. 
A boat was launched. After finding him, a doctor present found 
resuscitation impossible. The coroner then re-emphasises the 
alcohol level: 80mg alcohol per 100ml blood is said to be the 
legal limit for driving a motor vehicle, and the deceased's blood 
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contained 260mg alcohol per 100 ml blood. The coroner adds 
that 
the deceased's ability to swim was negated by the alcohol 
consumed. The coroner concludes that Paul Anthony Roberts died 
from cardiac-respiratory failure after drowning in Pool Waters 
while in a state of alcoholic intoxication. The coroner returns 
and records a verdict of misadventure. 'All rise'. 
The most obvious differences between Inquests A and B are 
ones of scale and formality. The absence of a jury at Inquest B 
also meant a different setting. Verdicts of misadventure were 
produced at both inquests. 
A closer examination of Inquests A and B suggests that an 
underlying similarity of processes of construction is more 
significant than surface differences of ritual and formality. 
In both cases, a relative of the deceased is invited to give a 
general opening biographical account (A5, B4). (The pathologist's 
evidence (B3) at Inquest B is, unusually, given first, so that 
the pathologist can leave to keep another appointment). The health 
of the deceased is a factor at both inquests, and at Inquest B 
the good health of the deceased is emphasised several times 
(B3, B4, B5). Furthermore, his characterisation by a witness 
as "always cheerful" (B5) counterbalances any significance which 
might (against the grain of other evidence) have been attached to 
any troubles he had (BO). In both cases, despite different 
settings, circumstances and characteristics of the deceased, there 
is a similarity in the structuring of the emerging overall account 
of what happened. Again, similarities of 'location' (as part of the 
total evidence) and of 'scope' can be seen in the witnesses' 
replies (A7, B5)to the coroner's general 'tell me what happened 
that evening' question. 
A point of contrast between the two inquests is the degree to 
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which the coroner implies a public safety role for the inquest. 
It was noted in Chapter Three above that coroners may make 
recommendations or express views at an inquest with the object of 
removing some general source of danger: a coroner might, for 
instance, comment on safety procedures in a case involving death 
at work. At Inquest A, although evidence was given about matters 
such as the effectiveness of street lighting and the composition 
of the road itself (A9), the coroner and jury did not suggest 
any connection between these conditions and the death. At 
Inquest B, however, there was an implicit 'public warning' 
element in the emphasis given by the coroner to the presence and 
amount of alcohol (B9). Indeed, the fact of alcohol was held 
responsible, explicitly, for undermining the deceased's normal 
swimming ability. At other inquests, the 'public safety' element 
may be more, or less, clear-cut than at Inquest B. 
The report of Inquest B in the local evening newspaper is 
headed, in blunt terms, as follows: "Gallon of Lager - Then 
Drowned. " The complete report is only four paragraphs long. 
The first paragraph brings together the amount of alcohol, the 
disco, the swim, and the subsequent drowning. The second 
paragraph reports the verdict and the cause of death, the latter 
including a reference to alcoholic intoxication. The third 
paragraph reports the level of alcohol to blood. The fourth 
paragraph runs as follows: 
He (the coroner) said there could be no doubt it 
was a large amount alcohol (sic) that caused Mr. Roberts, a healthy man and good swimmer to drown. 
The report of Inquest B thus refers in its headline and in its 
text only to alcohol. This is a stark example of a newspaper 
report selecting one theme from the evidence presented at the 
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inquest and offering that theme as a total explanation for events. 
As in the newspaper report of Inquest A, this report is a 
miniature and simplified construction of the facts-of-the-matter, 
deriving from part of the ordered and structured construction 
already produced at the inquest. The newspaper report of Inquest 
B is less complex than the report of Inquest A. While the 'A' 
report lays a (simplified) pattern of different strands, combined 
with the element of mystery, before the reader, the TBT report 
offers a short but, within its terms, complete explanation. It 
can perhaps already be seen that reports of inquests in newspapers 
do not proceed in a uniform way - the 'A' report leads with 
mystery; the 'B' report with bluntness and, implicitly, 
censure - but do possess a structure and characteristics which 
denote that they are indeed newspaper accounts, not the accounts 
of coroners, policemen, sociologists or whoever. 
Two inquests have now been considered, one with a jury, 
one without. Verdicts of 
inquests. It has been sui 
between the two inquests, 
and the production of the 
could be identified. Let 
an inquest which produced 
Inquest C. 
misadventure were returned at both 
ggested that despite formal differences 
in terms of the structuring of accounts 
true story essentially similar processes 
us now consider whether this is so at 
a different verdict. 
C1. The setting, as at Inquest B, is a small room in the coroner's 
office. Present are: the coroner, his secretary, the coroner's 
officer, a police chief and police constable, the husband and 
daughter of the deceased, and the family's lodger. There is no 
jury. There is no newspaper reporter. As at Inquest B, all 
witnesses take the oath, and all rise at the entrance and departure 
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of the coroner, but otherwise formality is at a minimum. 
C2. The first witness is Mrs. Jacobs, daughter of the deceased, 
Mrs. Hart, aged 80. Mrs. Jacobs and her mother lived together. 
The coroner's questions begin by referring to events thirty years 
ago, when Mrs. Hart's other daughter had died, of natural causes, 
at an early age. The coroner asks Mrs. Jacobs whether this event 
caused her mother "much disquiet and depression. " "Yes. " In 
fact, says the coroner, Mrs. Hart "never really recovered? ": 
"No. " The coroner's questions move to matters of Mrs. Hart's 
health. Mrs. Hart's daughter indicates that the deceased suffered 
from arthritis, and was "quick tempered". The coroner's questions 
now refer to time and place of death. Mrs. Jacobs replies that 
her mother seemed "all right's when she last saw her alive on the 
evening in question. When Mrs. Jacobs brought her mother a cup 
of tea the next morning, she found a letter, pills strewn around, 
and her mother's handbag on the floor. Mrs. Jacobs immediately 
presumed her mother dead, and called an ambulance. The coroner 
asks whether Mrs. Hart ever talked about taking her life: Yes. 
Mrs. Jacobs adds that Mrs. Hart's father used to talk about it too. 
(Mrs. Jacobs is about to move back to her seat when the coroner, 
as an afterthought, asks about identification). Was Mrs. Jacobs 
quite sure that the deceased was her mother? "Yes". No questions 
from the police chief. 
C3. The second witness, Miss Southern, a lodger with the family, 
and friends for over 30 years, is. asked by the coroner whether 
she is aware of the death of Mrs. Hart's daughter in the 1940s: 
"Yes". The coroner asks Miss Southern's opinion of the "lasting 
effect" of this upon Mrs. Hart, again enquiring about the existence 
of depression. The witness replies that Mrs. Hart "never got over 
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it. " (Consistent with the sequence in C2, the coroner asks about 
Mrs. Hart's health). Did the deceased ever complain about 
arthritis? Yes: "all the time". She had also recently developed 
pains in the arm. The coroner finally asks whether Mrs. Hart 
seemed depressed on the night of the death. Miss Southern replies 
that on the contrary, she seemed in "good heart". No questions. 
C4. The third witness is the police constable who attended at 
the scene of death. (Consistent with Inquests A and B, he reads 
from his prepared statement). He went to the house on the morning 
after the death. He found Mrs. Hart lying in bed, and yellow 
tablets on the floor. He also found a box, empty, with an 
indication that the pills had been prescribed three years earlier. 
He also found "the letter". There are no questions from the 
police chief, but he mentions that he too visited the scene of 
death, and is therefore familiar with it. He appears to be the 
police constable's superior officer. 
C5. (The fourth witness, Dr. Cohen, a pathologist at a hospital 
outside City, is not in attendance. The coroner reads out his 
statement). Details are brief. Following a post-mortem examin- 
ation, Dr. Cohen found pento-barbitone in the stomach and liver 
of the deceased, rigor mortis had set in, and there was evidence 
that the deceased had suffered from high blood pressure. In Dr. 
Cohen's opinion, the cause of death was cardiac and respiratory 
failure due to barbiturate poisoning. 
C6. The coroner sums up. His first point, consistent with the 
questions addressed to the witnesses (02, C3), refers to the 
deceased's depression, explicitly linked to the death of her 
daughter over 30 years ago. This event had a "profound effect"; 
she was "grief stricken"; and suffered a "reactive depression 
from which she never recovered. " Again following the line of his 
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questions, the coroner includes the health of the deceased in his 
summing up. Mrs. Hart "was in much pain" from her arthritis. It 
would appear that "..... while in a mood of depression she took 
her own life. " The letter left by Mrs. Hart is not read out. 
The coroner says that it includes the words "God forgive me. " The 
coroner returns and records a verdict that Mrs. Hart "killed 
herself while the balance of her mind was disturbed. " The coroner 
also expresses sympathy toward the family. 'All rise'. 
Inquest C was the subject of a detailed post-inquest dis- 
Gussion with the coroner which sheds considerable light upon the 
publicly-presented construction of background circumstances and 
the overall account of the facts-of-the-matter. In particular, 
it is clear that, at this particular inquest, the depiction of 
relevant factors was exceptionally selective. Inquest C as a 
whole will be discussed after briefly presenting a further inquest 
which resulted in the same verdict. 
There is no press report of Inquest C as no newspaper reporters 
were present. 
Inquest D 
D1. The location 
office. There is 
traffic holdup in 
start despite the 
(Personnel presen 
of the inquest is, once again, in the coroner's 
some delay in starting because of a major 
the area. The coroner eventually decides to 
non-arrival of the deceased's father. 
t: see inquests B and C). 
D2. Dr. French, pathologist at City hospital, reads out his 
post-mortem report on the deceased, Michael Grant, aged 19, who 
was found dead in his car by the banks of City river. Dr. French 
indicates that Mr. Grant had seemed to have been in normal health. 
Alcohol revealed 66 mg alcohol per 100 ml blood and 77% saturation 
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by carbon monoxide. Dr. French gives the cause of death as 
asphyxia due to carbon monoxide poisoning. There are no questions 
from any of the 'interested parties'. (Further delay: deceased's 
father not present: the coroner decides to take the police 
evidence in the meantime). 
D3. The second witness is P. C. 9026 from the police station near 
to City river. Reading from his report, the witness indicates 
that at 7.30 a. m. on (date) he came across the car parked by the 
river. The driver appeared to be asleep and the engine was 
running. The police officer found a hose running from the exhaust 
pipe into the car. Empty spirit and soft-drink bottles were 
beside the deceased. (The witness then details the arrival of 
the doctor, and subsequent identification of the body by the 
deceased's father). The coroner asks a question about the exact 
way in which the hose was placed in order to lead back into the 
car. (Arrival of the deceased's father). 
D4. Mr. Grant senior gives evidence immediately upon his arrival. 
He is asked by the coroner for details of his son's age and 
address. The coroner then asks Mr. Grant to talk generally about 
his son. Mr. Grant - "you appreciate this is difficult" - 
begins by saying that he is separated from his wife, and that 
they have two sons, who are twins. The two boys went to the 
same school, but were graded differently. The deceased did well 
at G. C. E. '0' level but "went to pieces" at 'A' level. His twin 
brother, by contrast, secured a place in higher education. Mr. 
Grant senior tried to re-assure his son about his seeming failure, 
and he did not pressure him to succeed, but the deceased just 
wanted to be alone. Mr. Grant senior adds that many people, 
like his son, spend time alone, and do not wish to socialise. 
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Mr. Grant continues that his son had consulted a doctor (although 
not telling his father at the time) and, although his son was 
depressed, there were no physical problems. (The coroner asks 
when the deceased left school). The witness replies that his 
son left school last summer and had applied for jobs without 
success. "Most of these firms don't even bother to reply. " The 
deceased had stayed with his mother for a while. The coroner 
then moves on to what he calls the deceased's "withdrawal", and 
the coroner (not the father) continues that the deceased "just 
withdrew" and his state of mind was reinforced by not finding a 
job. Mr. Grant continues his evidence: on the evening prior to 
the discovery of the body, Mr. Grant senior came home after having 
had a drink, and went straight to bed, leaving his car keys on 
the table. His other son had gone away to fix up accommodation 
before starting his degree course. Next morning, Mr. Grant 
found one note on the table addressed to himself, another to his 
wife. It was Mr. Grant's birthday and initially he took the 
letter to be a greeting card. The coroner now explicitly asks 
Mr. Grant for "his theory". Mr. Grant replies that he thought 
his son's disappointment at not passing his examinations had 
affected him, together with the general "pace of living", and 
being unemployed. When the deceased had passed his '0' levels 
two years' earlier, everything seemed fine: but "the world isn't 
like that": it isn't fine. The coroner concludes by checking 
details of identification with the witness and by showing him 
the note left by his son: the father confirms that it is his 
son's handwriting. (There are no questions). 
D5. The coroner sums up. He very briefly gives a verbal summary 
of the post-mortem report to the father (who says that he was 
pleased to have missed the pathologist's evidence). The coroner 
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then mentions the note left by the deceased, adding that he does 
not intend to read it out but can confirm the personal nature of 
the note and the warm feelings expressed toward Mr. Grant senior 
in the letter. The coroner also says that the note gives an 
indication of the deceased's state of mind. The cause of 
death - asphyxia due to carbon monoxide poisoning - is restated 
by the coroner, and he then returns and records a verdict that 
Mr. Grant killed himself while the balance of his mind was 
disturbed. Mr. Grant senior asks if he may retain the note. 
'All rise'. Inquest D lasted for twenty-five minutes. 
Having presented four separate inquests, we are now in a 
position to, firstly, discuss the structure of Inquests C and D 
resulting, as they did, in the same verdict; secondly, briefly 
consider the newspaper report of Inquest D; thirdly, compare 
provisional conclusions about Inquests C and D with the comments 
made above about the first two inquests; fourthly, briefly 
consider the discussion of Inquest C held afterwards with the 
coroner. 
The verdicts returned at Inquest C and D were that the 
deceased "killed him/herself while the balance of his/her mind 
was disturbed. " It can be noted, first of all, that the word 
suicide was nowhere used at either inquest. It can also be 
noted, of course, that the coroner chooses to add a reference to 
"balance of mind" in returning his verdict, although this has no 
legal significance. It is known from the interview programme 
that this particular coroner invariably uses the phrase. It can 
therefore be assumed that the reference to balance of mind has 
nothing to do with individual assessment of the mental health of 
the subjects of Inquest 0 and D: it is a general phrase, always 
used by this coroner. 
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At Inquest C, the coroner's initial questioning immediately 
refers to events more than thirty years earlier (C2). The written 
statement of the witness has already pointed the coroner in this 
direction and thus, at the inquest, he is able to make the first 
substantive step in the construction of the true story by referring 
to historical factors. Also contained within this historical 
reference is the first element of explanation and of a possible 
verdict of suicide: at an inquest concerned with an emerging 
'misadventure' verdict, the coroner would not concern himself with 
events so long ago. So at Inquest Ca probable true story begins 
to emerge almost immediately. The questioning of the next witness 
(C3) similarly refers to the events of thirty years ago, and the 
coroner's reference to their "lasting effect" is to be noted. It 
might also be noted that at Inquest C the husband of the deceased 
was not called to give evidence. (The coroner and coroner's 
officer had decided not to call the husband to give evidence 
before the inquest started, and throughout the inquest he appeared, 
seemingly through age and ill-health, oblivious of the proceedings). 
Inquest C is a self-contained, brief, resume of some of the 
evidence surrounding the death, where one factor is established 
at the beginning of the proceedings as the basic explanation for 
all that followed, reinforced by subsidiary elements such as ill- 
health. The causal factor in the true story was - in terms of 
the inquest's public portrayal of the facts-of-the-matter - 
quite clear. 
Inquest D was also about suicide. It was more disjointed 
than Inquest C, through capricious circumstances and the hasty 
re-arrangement of the planned sequence of witnesses, and concen- 
trated almost exclusively upon the evidence of one witness, the 
father of the deceased (D4). Within the evidence of this sole 
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witness lie all the elements of the coroner's explanation/ 
verdict: marital separation; academic failure; social isolation; 
unfavourable comparison not only with a sibling but with a twin; 
the occasion of the father's birthday; unemployment; withdrawal; 
the existence (as in Inquest C) of a note. Inquest D contains so 
many of the factors which a coroner will use in the assembly of a 
suicide verdict that, once more, the verdict is clearly implicit 
at a very early stage of the inquest and, as at Inquest C, 
evidence is assembled in a structured manner, consistent with the 
projected categorisation. It might be noted that witnesses' 
comments (D4) sometimes did not reinforce the developing account: 
e. g. lots of people like to be alone; most firms don't bother 
replying to applicants for jobs; and the general 'pace of 
living" for everyone. More subtle, or more general, points of 
this kind tend, however, to be not included in a summing-up, 
where a uniformity of evidence is summarised. 
No newspaper account of Inquest C is available as no reporter 
was in attendance. It might, in passing, be of interest to 
speculate on the basis for selecting which inquests should be 
attended: at Inquest C the card (detailing name and address of 
the deceased and all witnesses) made available for the Press 
remained on the table in front of an empty chair. Leaving this 
aside, a newspaper report of Inquest D is available, and this 
may usefully be examined. 
The report of Inquest D is headed: "City Twin Was Found 
Dead in Car. " Like the reports of Inquest A and B, this newspaper 
report is only single-column width, but it is rather longer 
Except at an open verdict, where there may be an explicit 
emphasis in the coroner's summing-up on an unresolved set of circumstances, a balanced or inconclusive assortment of potential true stories. 
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(eleven paragraphs) than the two reports already discussed. The 
report opens by stating that the deceased ..... became quiet and 
withdrawn after failing his A-Levels and finding himself unable 
to get a job. " So here, on one level, is a descriptive account 
of what might be seen as salient parts of the evidence, or, on 
another level, an explanatory, causal, theory: exam failure and 
unemployment together caused this condition of being "quiet 
and withdrawn. " The second paragraph adds to this (already 
'explained') condition of withdrawal the fact of death, and the 
third paragraph completes the explanation by reporting the cause 
of death and the coroner's verdict. 
The remainder of the report serves to embellish the 
essentially 'complete' account given in the first three paragraphs. 
Paragraphs four to six condense the evidence of P. C. 9026 (D3). 
Paragraphs seven to eleven summarise the evidence of the 
deceased's father (D4), amplifying the opening themes of exam 
failure and unemployment. The newspaper report of Inquest D 
rather resembles that of Inquest B: there are no rough edges, 
the facts-of-the-matter are clear, and the explanation in both 
cases is presented as simple and straightforward. At Inquest D, 
the twin factors of exam failure and unemployment are all- 
important; at Inquest B, the single factor of alcohol is all- 
important. The only substantial difference is that the Inquest 
D report is given rather more space to illustrate and adorn its 
characterisation of the inquest proceedings. In neither case is 
there any of the mystery of the Inquest A report. 
It will be recalled that Inquest A and B concluded with 
verdicts of misadventure. Inquest C and D concluded with verdicts 
of suicide. It may now be suggested that the particular verdict 
# It might be objected that in Chapter Three, some importance 
was given to the terminology of the verdict, yet here 'killed 
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of suicide or misadventure is not centrally important in examining 
the structure of evidence at the inquest: the typical methods 
of constructing a true story tend to obtain, in a systematic form, 
at the coroner's inquest, whether the verdict is suicide or mis- 
adventure, and whether or not a jury is present. 
At all inquests attended, police evidence and pathological 
evidence was given in a standard form, taking its place within 
the accumulating structure of evidence and the projected verdict. 
This projected verdict was clear, so far as the coroner and his 
staff were concerned, at the beginning of the proceedings. There 
tended to be a normal sequence for the giving of evidence by 
the various witnesses, except when capricious circumstances (as 
at Inquest D)intervened. A relative tended to give a general 
biographical account of the deceased, the coroner asking about 
specific aspects (in all cases health; in some cases, a specific 
incident in the past). Other witnesses (such as eyewitnesses 
otherwise uninvolved, or witnesses who had been with the deceased 
prior to, or at, the time of death) were asked for general scene- 
setting accounts. The coroner's summing up can also be seen to 
have a structured nature, generally applicable. The degree of 
formality at an inquest where jurors have been summoned is 
considerably greater'than at inquests without jury, and the 
projected verdict of misadventure or suicide certainly involves 
a particular emphasis in the coroner's questions to witnesses: 
but the prevailing method of constructing the true story is 
constant, whether the verdict is suicide or misadventure, and 
whether or not a jury is present. 
himself/herself' is casually being substituted by 'suicide'. 
The point here, however, is that a comparison is being made 
between inquests resulting in different verdicts. The practice 
of this coroner in not using the word (suicide' is beside the 
point: or, more accurately, it is beside this particular point. 
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The period of systematic observation of fifty inquests, 
upon which the present part of the discussion is based, included 
attendance at three inquests in which open verdicts were returned. 
The open verdict explicitly leaves the matter unresolved and it 
might initially be thought that here at least there must be no 
obvious true story and no structured organisation of evidence 
toward a projected verdict. To examine these issues, it will 
therefore be appropriate to consider Inquest E, an open verdict. 
Before doing so, it may be useful to discuss the post- 
inquest interview held with the coroner after Inquest C above, 
for in this case there was a considerable divergence between public 
and private accounts. 
It will be recalled that Inquest C concerned the death of 
Mrs. Hart, aged 80. The coroner returned a verdict that the 
deceased killed herself while the balance of her mind was dis- 
turbed. In his summing-up, the coroner accounted for (explained, 
gave meaning to) the death by referring to the death of the 
deceased's daughter thirty years previously and pain caused by 
physical illness. Publicly, then, this was the complete account. 
Discussing Inquest C with the coroner, and examining the 
note left by the deceased, indicated interpersonal relations within 
the family to be quite unlike those presented at the inquest. 
The note refers to disposal of money and expresses feelings not 
included as relevant at the inquest. No further details need 
to be elaborated, as our point is not about the particular 
circumstances or apparent emotional background in a specific 
case: nor are additional details introduced here to suggest that 
the coroner's true story can or should be replaced by a "truer" 
story. The point is that the coroner's account and the accounts 
presented at this inquest by witnesses are highly partial. 
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Partial is not contrasted here to impartial: partial is to be 
contrasted to complete. A number of important issues are raised 
by this in terms of the nature of the accounts presented at the 
inquest. 
No description or account can be complete (see Chapter One). 
It may, however, be adequate, and 'adequacy' may be evaluated in 
terms of the purpose of the account. So, is the account produced 
at Inquest C adequate: and, if so, adequate for what purposes? 
In absolute terms, of course, the account produced was neither 
complete nor adequate, because known details were excluded from 
the proceedings, perhaps on apparently ethical grounds. However, 
adequacy is not judged absolutely. It may be suggested: firstly, 
that the inquest, both in law and in the context of the practical 
task of producing a verdict, is not required to construct a 
complete account; and, secondly, that in order to assume the 
status of an adequate account, both in law and in the context of 
the practical task, of recording a verdict, the inquest may 
cover very little of the available stock of potential facts-of- 
the-matter. 
In short, the scope of the inquest is far from being 
extensive: yet it may be quite adequate for the practical purpose 
of providing a true story (verdict/explanation). 
Examination of inquests selected from the period of systematic 
observation is concluded by considering an'inquest where an open 
verdict was returned. Thus an example of all three verdicts 
recorded at inquests during the observation period has been 
considered. 
Inquest E. 
El. The setting, once more, is the coroner's office. There is 
no jury. 
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E2. The first witness in this case is Dr. French, pathologist at 
City hospital, by now a familiar figure at City coroner's court. 
Dr. French reads his prepared report to the court. The deceased, 
Mr. Bacon, was aged 75. Upon admission to City hospital, he was 
found to be bleeding profusely, and Dr. French estimated that Mr. 
Bacon had fallen from a height of approximately twenty feet. 
The pathologist continues by reporting details of the deceased's 
abrasions, fractured ribs, and enlarged heart. Dr. French states 
- "in my opinion" - that death was due to cerebral haemhorrage and 
laceration, caused by fractures of the skull, contributed to by 
fractures of the ribs. There are no questions. 
E3. Mr. Bacon's son gives evidence, very briefly. The only 
question from the coroner refers to identification of the body. 
E4. The third witness is another son of Mr. Bacon. His evidence 
is much more extensive. He indicates that Mr. Bacon senior lived 
with the witness and his wife. The coroner's first question 
concerns the deceased's health. The witness describes this as 
"deteriorating", as it had been for the preceding few years. 
(Details of surgical operations and specific illness are given). 
The witness then reports that he and the rest of the family - 
excluding his father - had been told by a doctor that the deceased 
had cancer. (At this point, the coroner reads from the patholo- 
gist's report, where there was no indication of cancer). The 
coroner's next question concerns the deceased's personality. The 
witness replies that Mr. Bacon hardly ever spoke, "you could see 
that he was suffering. " Mr. Bacon went for a daily walk, but 
little more. On one occasion, Mr. Bacon complained of "not getting 
his breath. " His son offered to call an ambulance, but Mr. Bacon 
said not to bother, he would "do himself in". He did subsequently 
go to hospital, and returned home in due course. The witness 
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continues that on the morning of the death, Mr. Bacon had arisen 
very early, made his son a cup of tea, and then gone out: his 
son assumed it was simply a visit to the local shop. Shortly 
afterwards, Mr. Bacon was found at the bottom of a disused rail- 
way embankment. The coroner asks whether Mr. Bacon went to the 
embankment often. (Yes: sometimes to watch the children fishing). 
The witness then suggests that his father may have had a "dizzy 
spell". The hour of the day (7 a. m. ) was then commented upon by 
the coroner, together with the frequency ("occasional") of Mr. 
Bacon's visits to the embankment. 
E5. The fourth witness is Mr. Dent. He was driving along Pool 
Street when he saw "something fall" from the gap across the road 
where the railway bridge used to be. He stopped the car, briefly 
looked at Mr. Bacon, then drove to a nearby filling station 
where he called an ambulance. He went back to Mr. Bacon, and 
found him to be bleeding. He rolled him over, (explaining to the 
court that his wife is a nurse) and the police and ambulance 
staff then arrived. The coroner asks about the weather: it was 
very good that day. The coroner then returns to a specific point: 
did Mr. Dent see the deceased start to fall? No: he only saw 
him in the process of falling. 
E6. The final witness is City police officer 4242 who attended 
the scene. An account is given of the physical setting: the 
bridge which formerly linked the two sides of the railway 
embankment had been demolished, leaving a twenty-five-feet sheer 
drop at either side of the road. P. C. 4242 then continues by 
detailing the journey by ambulance to hospital. 
E7. The coroner sums up. Factors initially mentioned by the 
coroner are the age of the deceased; his medical history and, 
in particular, surgical history; and the general deterioration 
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of physical health. The coroner characterises the key question as: 
why did he fall? "Was he pushed, did he have a dizzy attack .... 
or had he done it deliberately? " The coroner continues that, 
because "no-one is certain", the "only verdict" is an open verdict. 
The coroner seeks assent from the police chief present that the 
verdict is appropriate, and this is given. An open verdict is 
returned and recorded. 'All rise'. The inquest was thirty-five 
minutes in duration. 
Superficially, it might appear that Inquest E was different 
from the other inquests discussed above, as the proceedings 
concluded with an open verdict, and thus the matter was, formally, 
unresolved. Alternatively, but equally superficially, it might be 
said that Inquest E resembled other non-jury inquests- there were 
no obvious procedural differences - and the verdict is therefore 
irrelevant. Let us consider this problem a little further. 
Inquest E opened with the pathologist's report, and his view 
(" in my opinion ..... 't) of the cause of death (E2). This 
element of the total evidence was no more, or less, precise than 
any other inquests already discussed. Identification details are 
given, as normal, by a relative (E3). The third witness provides 
the coroner with the opportunity to create a true story, as the 
coroner goes through a list of factors, familiar from inquests 
considered above: health ("deterioratingi! ); personality; a 
previous suicide threat; dizziness; the general events-of-the- 
day account (Eh. ). The coroner asked whether the deceased went to 
the place of death often. As the answer was 'yes', it became 
established that it was unsurprising for the deceased to be found 
there. It is clear that a "balancing" account is being drawn out 
by the coroner: a true story is being constructed, in terms of 
the opposition between different strands of evidence. An open 
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verdict is emerging from this in precisely the same way as a 
"definite" verdict(of misadventure or suicide) emerged from the 
other inquests through the structuring of different strands of 
evidence. The process is the same. 
The balanced, self-evidently-inconclusive, nature of the 
construction is reinforced by the handling of the chance witness 
(E5) where the coroner places emphasis on the witness seeing the 
deceased in the process of falling only: he did not see the 
deceased begin to fall, and hence the key causal factor is 
rendered unknown and, indeed, unknowable. 
As in the other inquests considered, the verdict in the case 
of Inquest E is, in, practical terms, known at the commencement 
of the proceedings. Evidence is built up consistent with the 
emergent verdict. In the case of the open verdict, this con- 
sistency (between projected verdict and evidence) is built upon the 
opposition, or seeming inconsistency, of particular pieces of 
evidence. Elements routinely consistent with a projected suicide 
verdict (a previous threat; some withdrawal; physical pain) 
are opposed to elements routinely consistent with a projected 
misadventure/accident verdict (dizziness; the steep slope; 
the normal nature of the deceased being at the place of death). 
"No-one is certain", said the coroner, hence the "only verdict" 
is an open verdict (E7). 
Inquest E did not resemble the other inquests in every 
respect. It was, for instance, interesting to note that the 
coroner, at Inquest E, sought the assent of the police chief before 
recording the verdict. Indeed, it might be remembered (see 
Chapter Three) that an open verdict leaves the matter "open", 
potentially, for further police investigation. The open verdict 
also leaves the matter "open" in a , 
formal sense, because in law, 
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and in the coroner's annual returns to the Home Office, it is 
signified that the evidence has not fully disclosed the facts-of- 
the- matter. Yet in practical terms; in terms of effectively 
concluding the matter by constructing a true story; in terms of 
creating an adequate level of order from the unorganised, 
potential, facts-of-the-matter, the open verdict stands as a 
normal, typical, conclusion to some inquests. It is produced in 
the same way as any other verdict. In sociological terms, it 
stands as a 'definite' verdict like any other, in spite of its 
formerly unresolved nature. It might also be remembered (see 
Chapter Three) that some coroners use the open verdict to 
accomodate different, specific, sorts-of-death. 
So it can be concluded that, for all practical purposes, 
and for sociological purposes, that the open verdict can be. 
examined in precisely the same way as any other verdict, and that 
the essential processes of construction at the inquest operate 
irrespective of verdict. 
A newspaper reporter was present at Inquest E. The report, 
again from the City evening newspaper, was eleven paragraphs 
long, occupying single column width. It was headed: "DEATH FALL 
FROM BANK". The result of the inquest is made clear at the very 
beginning of the report, which opens with the following paragraph: 
"AN OPEN VERDICT was recorded at a City inquest on 
a 75-year-old man who fell from an old railway 
embankment in Pool Street. " 
The report continues by saying that the coroner suggested 
ºº..... there were a number of possibilities" concerning the death 
but "a lack of evidence to show what had actually happened. " 
(The quotations are from the newspaper report, not from the 
coroner). The next two paragraphs are devoted to a condensed 
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summary of the pathologist's evidence. The next three paragraphs 
report the evidence of the deceased's son, making three separate 
points: the deceased's poor health; the normal events of the 
day of the death; and the normal visits the deceased made to 
the railway embankment where "it was quite possible" he had a 
"dizzy spell". The next three paragraphs concern the evidence of 
Mr. Dent, the car driver. The final paragraph is as follows: 
Coroner A. B. said that Mr. Dent should be publicly 
complimented and thanked for the action he had 
taken. 
This press report has some similarities and some differences 
in comparison to the press reports examined above. It is not 
simply a condensed account of the coroner's account, as the 
balancing process present at Inquest E, the reconciliation between 
opposing factors into an open verdict, is not presented: all the 
evidence summarised in the newspaper report would have been 
quite consistent with a verdict of misadventure/accident, rather 
than an open verdict. There is no indication of why an open 
verdict might in this case have been recorded, other than in the 
passing reference to a lack of evidence. Also of interest in 
this report is that the verdict is stated in the first three words 
of the first paragraph. Unlike other inquest reports considered, 
there is no emphasis on the key "explanatory" factors and, 
perhaps more surprisingly, there is no emphasis on mystery or the 
unresolved nature of events. The style of the report of Inquest 
E is considerably latter' - one piece of information after 
another - than other reports. Similarities between all the 
newspaper reports considered lie in the overall form, location 
within the newspaper itself, and in the characteristics of 
composition which denote that they are indeed newspaper reports. 
It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that there is no 
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single uniform newspaper-report-of-an-inquest: the angle from 
which the inquest is approached by the reporter and sub-editor 
varies according to the particular inquest under consideration. 
General conclusions, based upon the period of observation 
at coroners' inquest, are presented below in section 4(4). To 
conclude the main section of the current discussion, an account is 
presented of a case from outside the programme of observation. 
During formal interview with the coroner from another area, he was 
called out to the scene of a road-traffic incident. It was possible 
on this unique occasion to accompany the coroner on his visit to 
the scene, and the formal interview was concluded on another date. 
Some time later, it was also possible to attend the inquest held 
as a result of the road-traffic incident. Thus, outside the 
planned research programme of interviews with coroners, systematic 
attendance at inquests, and statistical searches, the opportunity 
arose to follow one example of coroners' work from beginning to end: 
from the time of the incident, to eventual formal categorisation. 
The account can begin at the point where formal interview 
with a full-time coroner, serving an urban and rural area some 
seventy miles from City, was interrupted by a call from the 
coroner's secretary that a coach had overturned on a moorland road. 
The scene of the incident was visited immediately. 
The coroner had an expectation of a serious case, as three 
years earlier thirty people had died in apparently similar cir- 
cumstances on the same stretch of road. On arrival at the scene 
of the present incident, all the injured had already been taken 
to hospital. Two people had died. The police presence was both 
numerous and senior, including a chief superintendant and the 
deputy chief constable. The coroner said that the police would 
start taking statements from the injured as soon as they could 
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be interviewed. At this time - thirty minutes 
the coach driver had already been interviewed. 
that a car had forced the coach off the road. 
narrow, and although the coach had overturned, 
all the way down a long, and steep, hillside. 
was that it could "all have been much worse". 
after 'the event' 
It was suggested 
The road was 
it had not rolled 
Police consensus 
Police vehicle-inspectors were busy atop the upturned coach. 
Comparisons were being drawn with the superficially similar case 
three years before, when brakes had been found to be defective. 
The mechanics were saying, however, that this particular coach 
seemed to be "brand new", that nothing seemed to be "wrong" with 
it. Police photographers and numerous newspaper reporters were 
also very busy. 
The roof of the coach had been crushed. No doubt, said the 
coroner and police, this would lead to renewed demands for design 
modifications, as happened "last time". 
The coroner and a senior police officer inspected the 
interior of the coach through the broken windows. They exchanged 
comments. A reporter asked for a photograph of them "just 
looking inside". 
Clearly the investigation was already very much in progress 
when the coroner arrived. The police were busy and the coroner 
gave no instructions. The question arises of why the coroner 
visits the scene of the incident at all. The coroner replied that 
he is responsible for leading the investigation, that the 
evidence presented at the inquest will now make more sense, and 
that he is required to view the bodies in hospital. 
In addition to inspecting the coach, the coroner inspected 
the road. Police pointed out tyre marks where' the coach had 
travelled on the edge of the road before leaving it altogether. 
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The coach driver's account of what-happened was already being put 
together in a preliminary way, and evaluated in the context of 
physical features, the position of the coach, and so on. Details 
of where the coach had come from, and its destination, were 
discussed. 
The coroner's stated reason for visiting the scene is of 
interest. In law the coroner indeed leads the investigation when 
death has occurred, and any police personnel, of whatever rank, 
are subject to his authority. It is also of interest to note 
the coroner's comment that the evidence presented at the inquest 
will make more sense as a result of visiting the scene of death. 
The meaning of events is already being constructed thirty minutes 
after they occurred. Accounts are already being constructed. 
Some versions of the reality of what-happened such a short time 
ago are being rejected, and others are being assimilated into 
the emerging, overall, account. 
The coroner left for the local hospital to view the bodies 
and to discuss the case with the pathologist. An invitation 
to accompany the coroner on this stage of his investigation was 
of declined. 
Several points can be made about the visit to the scene of 
death in this case. Accounts are already emerging, meanings are 
being ascribed to events. The present event is being evaluated 
by the reference-point of an apparently similar event in the past. 
The possible moral implications of attending inquests have 
already been discussed. Visiting the scene of death did not 
present any moral problems, as all passengers were already at the hospital, no relatives were present, and numerous personnel 
were already on site. An invitation to visit the hospital, 
however, seemed to be of limited value in terms of a socio- logical study of the work of coroners and, moreover, of 
questionable moral status, as both the injured and their families would have been present. 
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The reasons for the coroners' presence are of interest in terms 
of authority relations, and 'making sense' at the subsequent 
inquest. Additionally, it is instructive to see police photo- 
graphers, vehicle inspectors and other personnel in the act of 
creating the photographs, plans and technical details which are 
such familiar features of a road-traffic inquest. The extent of 
police activity at the scene of this incident was very considerable: 
police photographers, vehicle inspectors, senior staff, patrol 
officers. The immediate investigation is for all practical 
purposes a police investigation, an aspect of police work, not- 
withstanding the coroner's ultimate authority and personal visit. 
A more general issue is raised by attending, in this case, 
the scene of death, as well as by attending the inquests dis- 
cussed above. It has become, by this stage, quite clear that 
sociologists who define their interest in the rate-producing 
process purely in terms of suicide verdicts, and the coroner's 
role in producing suicide rates, may fail to notice that coroners? 
work in general and inquest verdicts in general are very rich 
areas for the sociologist to explore. There is no sociological 
work on coroners' constructions of a 'misadventure' or an 'open 
verdict': except in so far as these verdicts are to be 
differentiated from suicide. There is no sociological work on 
coroners' work per se_ The opportunity presented to visit the 
scene of death, and to follow this through by subsequently 
attending the inquest, reinforced the central concern of this 
study with the totality of coroners' work. 
Following the incident in which the coach left the moorland 
road, leading to two deaths, the coroner within a few days 
formally opened, and then immediately adjourned, the inquest. 
The resumed inquest, that is to say, the 'inquest proper', 
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followed three months after the original incident. It was 
possible to attend this inquest, and detailed fieldnotes were 
taken. It should be noted that this inquest occurred after the 
period of 'systematic observation' from which InquestsA to E 
above were drawn. The Criminal Law Act 1977 had now come into 
force. Thus, although the coroner is considering a road-traffic 
incident, a jury is no longer required by law. This is to be 
contrasted with Inquest A. 
Inquest F 
Fl. This single inquest is concerned with two deaths. Approxi- 
mately thirty-five people are present. There is no jury. The 
jurors' box is occupied by County Council observers, representatives 
from traffic authorities, and others. Solicitors, newspaper 
reporters, police, the pathologist and a Department of Transport 
vehicle inspector are also present. 
F2. 'All stand'. There is an opening address by the coroner, 
who points out that evidence of identification was taken at the 
previous, adjourned, session. No "conflict of evidence" is 
expected. The coroner places explicit emphasis on making 
"recommendations" at today's inquest. Attention is drawn to a 
map, on display, and to two alternative routes which would have 
been available to the coach driver. The coroner notes that these 
alternative routes are of importance to today's proceedings. The 
coroner states that a single inquest is being held on two deaths 
as he is satisfied they had a common origin. 
F3. The first witness is called by the coroner himself - not by 
the coroner's officer. This witness, a pathologist, takes the 
oath. The coroner asks: "are you Doctor Brown? "; "did you 
perform a post-mortem examination at my request on (name of first 
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deceased)? " The pathologist gives his opinion of cause of death. 
The coroner refers to photograph No. 1, from a sheaf of photo- 
graphs in the possession of all solicitors and police officers 
present. The coroner asks whether the injuries received by the 
deceased are consistent with having been involved in (points to 
photograph of overturned coach). "Yes". The same procedure and 
structure of questioning is followed by the coroner for the 
second deceased. The pathologist then leaves the courtroom. 
F4. The second witness is an elderly male, the driver of a car 
travelling along the same road as the coach, but in the opposite 
direction, shortly before it left the road. The coroner refers 
to photograph No. 10. "was this coach coming toward you? ": yes. 
The coroner then asks the witness, "in your own words", to 
describe what happened. The witness replies that he saw the 
coach "looming up" toward him: "a strange place to find a coach". 
The coroner asks why. "Such a narrow road". The witness, who 
used the road "very often", knew the vehicles could not pass. 
The coroner asks the witness whether he was satisfied there was 
insufficient room to pass. "Yes". After the two vehicles 
nevertheless edged past, the witness' wife saw the coach "about 
to topple". They drove to summon an ambulance. The coroner 
refers to photograph No. 12. The positions of the vehicles' 
wheels are discussed. Both vehicles were said to be travelling 
at walking-pace. Questions from a solicitor. 
F5. The third witness was parked in a lay-by on the road in 
question, having a picnic. (The moorland area concerned is of 
historic/tourist interest). He turned his head to look at the 
back of the coach, to see where it had come from. He then saw it 
fall, and went to give assistance. He considered the coach had 
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been entirely on the road until it fell. He had only ever seen 
two coaches using the road in the past. 
F6. Fourth witness: an elderly female passenger on the coach. 
She was sitting on the front seat. She could not remember 
whether she had ever travelled along the stretch of road before. 
She thought the coach was on the road (not the grass verge) until 
it fell. She could not recall any "trouble" with the coach until 
the point where it left the road. She mentioned the "good, 
sensible driver".. 
F7. Fifth witness: another elderly female passenger. She could 
not add to the evidence already given, except to comment on the 
steep hill, as well as the narrowness of the road. It was a 
"steep pull". 
F8. The sixth witness is an elderly male passenger. He was 
sitting, with his wife, behind the coach driver. He saw the car 
coming in the opposite direction, down the hill, as the coach was 
climbing. He thought the car would stop, but it did not. A 
solicitor asks why the witness expected the car to stop. "Well, 
always if there's a big vehicle coming up hill, you give way, 
don't you? " 
F9. The seventh witness: police constable. He gives details 
of the width of the road and of the two vehicles. (He has also 
been pointing out details on the map throughout the inquest so 
far). The coroner asks him, summing up at the same time: "For all 
practical purposes, if both vehicles remained on the metalled 
surface C of the road7 there simply wasn't room to pass? " Yes, 
replies the P. C., that is so. 
F10. Another police officer, who attended the scene and inter- 
viewed "someone who identified himself as the driver of the coach"". ) 
- 184 - 
The driver made a statement under caution, which the P. C. now 
reads to the coroner and the court. In his statement, the driver 
indicated that he was not driving his usual coach but another, 
brand-new, vehicle. He also indicated that, before leaving the 
road, he realised his nearside front wheel was on the verge. He 
braked but could not avert continuing movement to the left. 
Detailed interchanges follow between the coroner and the P. C. 
on the relative position of the two vehicles. A solicitor asks 
about signposting of roads in the area. 
F11. The ninth witness is the coach driver. He is told by the 
coroner that he need not answer incriminating questions, but is 
not excused from questioning altogether. The coroner asks the 
coach driver about the exact position of his vehicle: the coach 
driver's solicitor gives his permission for the witness to answer 
the coroner's question. 
F12. The tenth witness is a police vehicle inspector. No fault 
found with the coach. The car was undamaged. The coach became 
"irretrievable" once it touched the grass verge. 
F13. Department of Transport vehicle inspector. Further details 
are given of mechanical examination of the coach. 
F14. Adjournment: twenty minutes. This adjournment appears to 
serve the purpose only of refreshment: there do not seem to be 
any unexpected developments or new evidence to consider. 
Witnesses, police, technical 'expert' witnesses alike retreat to 
a canteen in the same building. Passengers from the coach talk 
amongst themselves ("and I tell you something else that was 
wrong ..... "). The coach driver chats to his employer and a 
fellow-driver. The police sit together. Back in the courtroom, 
solicitors discuss various possible outcomes of today's pro- 
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ceedings. A female newspaper reporter charmingly elicits 
information from the solicitors which is "not for publication". 
F15. The eleventh witness (the government vehicle inspector) 
returns to discuss, in general terms, research work into ways 
of strengthening coaches, particularly the roof. The coroner 
refers to the "increasing" number of incidents involving coaches 
turning over, and alludes, without naming it, to the "similar 
incident" so much on the minds of those who attended the scene of 
death (see above). A general discussion follows. It is suggested 
that if the roof of the coach in question had indeed been 
strengthened, more deaths could have resulted, as the coach would 
have been heavier. If the roof had not been crushed, the coach 
would have rolled for eighty-feet down a steep hill, instead of 
coming to rest. The loss of life could then have been considerable. 
The coroner suggests that the collapse of the roof in the case 
in question may indeed have saved lives: so it is not a matter 
of "strengthening everything in sight". (Anticipated commonsense 
reasoning is thus dismissed). 
F16. The twelfth witness is the owner of the coach and the 
employer of the driver. He "usually" specifies the route to be 
followed by his drivers, but not in this case. He only specified 
the destination. He adds that the coach was only being used to 
assist a fellow coach-operator who would otherwise have been 
without a vehicle. 
F17. The "fellow coach operator" gives evidence. He reports 
that the two coach owners often assist each other when one of 
their vehicles is off the road. He specified a route as far as 
Milltown, but says that he was unaware the coach would go on to 
Moor Bridge, and thence along the narrow moorland road. 
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F18. The fourteenth witness is the driver of another coach, 
forming one half of the two coachloads of predominantly elderly 
people on the day's excursion. His vehicle was travelling a 
"few hundred yards ahead" of the coach involved in the incident. 
He did not turn off along the narrow moorland road, however. He 
continued along the main road, to reach the destination "as I 
normally go in". This witness had never driven along the road 
in question. Detailed questions follow from the solicitors present. 
The questions focus upon the divergent routes taken by the coaches. 
The witness avoids any suggestion that the moorland road may have 
been known to be unsuitable. 
F19" The fifteenth witness is the County Council's highways 
spokesman. He visited the site and prepared a report on the road 
itself, which he reported to be an unclassified road, twelve 
feet and ten inches wide. The coroner asks "Clearly not suitable 
for a coach? " The witness replies that "it would be difficult 
with any wide vehicle. " The lay-byes on the road are said to be 
designed for sightsee-ers, and are not meant to be passing 
places for vehicles. (Any implication that the third witness 
- see F5 - was improperly parked is thus removed from further 
consideration). The witness describes the road as a "typical 
moorland narrow road". The coroner then asks: "Can I make any 
recommendations which could help? " The witness replies that the 
road could be signposted, but that it is not possible to signpost 
every such road to warn drivers of large or heavy vehicles. 
A general, informal, discussion follows, the coroner asking, 
rhetorically, if anything can be done about cases such as the 
present one, or whether incidents of this kind are inevitable. 
A solicitor argues that any driver could make the mistake of 
turning down this particular road. Both the coroner and the witness 
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remain sceptical: the unsuitability of the road is taken to be 
self-evident. 
F20. The final witness is the clerk to the local traffic 
commissioners. He is responsible for licencing vehicles which 
carry passengers. He indicates that the commissioners do not 
specify routes for coach operators: it is the responsibility of 
owners to check the suitability of roads used. 
F21. The coroner sums up. This occurs in an informal manner. 
The coroner rhetorically asks whether some cases of this sort are 
an inevitable feature of coach tours of "beauty spots", as such 
places of natural beauty tend to be served by old, narrow, 
unsuitable roads. The coroner then restates the names of the two 
deceased, adding that he is satisfied with details of identifi- 
cation, satisifed that the cause of death was as given by the 
pathologist, and satisfied that death occurred as a result of the 
coach leaving the road and overturning. "To deal with formal 
matters first, I shall record that these ladies died as a result 
of misadventure. " The coroner then details the circumstances in 
which the coach driver lost control, before again discussing in 
general terms current research into coach construction, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of strengthening the coach's bodywork 
and roof. He then reflects that there are considerable practical 
difficulties in excluding coaches altogether from certain roads. 
No specific recommendations are made by the coroner. He concldues: 
Though the driver might have had an error of 
judgement - and this may be decided by another 
court - he exercised very great care. The road 
was simply not wide enough. 
Perhaps, adds the coroner, the Press can help to give other 
drivers a warning of the dangers discussed today. 'All stand'. 
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Inquest F concludes our detailed consideration of inquest 
proceedings. It will be recalled that Inquest F was not part of 
the systematic inquest-observation programme. It has been 
included here, firstly, because it offered a unique opportunity 
to consider a coroner's categorisation of a sudden death from the 
point of death through to eventual formal disposal and, secondly, 
because, unlike any of the inquests otherwise attended, this 
particular case was perceived as a major "public safety" issue. 
The latter point has several implications. 
It can be noted, first of all, that the verdict itself at 
Inquest F is almost incidental. The coroner (F21) refers to 
dealing with the "formal matter" of the verdict, before he goes on 
to consider other and, by implication, over-riding, public-safety 
matters. It may also be noted that the characteristics and 
details of the two deceased were barely referred to at any point 
throughout the inquest. Only in the pathologist's evidence (F3) 
and the coroner's summing-up (F21) were the deceased mentioned 
at all. The verdict itself was wholly unproblematic. This 
emphasis at the inquest can be accounted for in terms of its 
concern with general issues, such as the construction of vehicles 
and the suitability of roads. 
In this particular case, the coroner had shifted the primary 
function of the inquest to that of a de facto public inquiry. 
Expert witnesses and photographic/diagrammatic evidence were a 
major feature of the proceedings. At the start of the inquest, 
the coroner makes explicit reference to making general recommen- 
dations (F2). The coroner later offers his authority to one of 
the witnesses to make a public recommendation (F19). 
The issue of authority is indeed highly relevant to an 
understanding of Inquest F. It will be recalled that the coroner's 
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authority over the overall investigation was one of his stated 
reasons for attending the scene of death. At the subsequent 
inquest, the coroner's authority is used only incidentally to 
examine the cause and circumstances of two specific deaths or to 
record a verdict: the coroner's principal role at Inquest F was 
as an ultimate authority over all other participants, with the 
power to make public observations and recommendations, in the 
context of an inquest functioning as a public inquiry. 
The provisional conclusions made above about Inquests A to 
E also apply to Inquest F. The coroner is still engaged in 
providing a structured account of what-really-happened at the time 
of death. The projected verdict is unproblematic, and evidence 
is structured toward a total account, a comprehensive explanation, 
of hitherto unsorted events. A true story "emerged", as it 
routinely does, from an initial identifiable point, through a 
structured construction, to final explanation and disposal. 
Inquest F was different from other inquests attended, however, in 
that the coroner placed the process of construction itself to one 
side, while a more general function was defined for this particular 
inquest. 
It is now possible to draw together our discussion of the 
inquest-observed into the form of concluding comments. 
4 (4) Conclusions 
The preceding discussion of the coroner's inquest was con- 
ducted on the empirical base of observation at fifty inquestsin 
the jurisdiction of a full-time coroner. Five inquests were 
selected for detailed analysis. Additionally, material was drawn 
from subsidiary informal observation, and from one case where it 
was possible to observe the entire process from the coroner's 
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visit to the scene of death through to the ultimate inquest. 
Overall conclusions can now be outlined in summary form: 
1) Taylor has restated that what laymen or sociologists might see 
as problematic in coroners' work may not, to coroners them- 
selves, be problematic at all (1982,71). Taylor was referring 
specifically to the imputing of suicidal intent, but the point 
has a general applicability. Coroners routinely perceive 
their work as unproblematic. The progress of any particular 
inquest follows a predictable course. 
2) The inquest verdict tends to be "recognised" within the 
strands of evidence: it tends to be "known" from the start of 
the proceedings. This need not imply a deliberate conspiracy 
to prejudge the results. The point, simply, is that by 
considering, for example, Inquest A above, an explicit example 
is provided of a typical feature of inquests. The projected 
true story appears at an early point in the structuring of 
evidence and the coroner's questions. The verdict itself is 
unsurprising. 
3) The sequence in which evidence is presented at the inquest 
tends to fall into a recognisable pattern. Accounts of the 
deceased's health; recent general history; age; worries and 
troubles; and the "scene-setting" account of the day in 
question are arranged in a predictable form, within a 
structure. Particular factors may be accentuated or under- 
played in the light of the projected verdict: e. g., "worries" 
may be amplified in the case of a projected suicide verdict, 
while similar worries are minimised or denied in the case of a 
projected misadventure verdict. All evidence presented at the 
inquest already exists in the form of written statements. 
These permit pre-inquest construction of the projected true- 
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story. 
The pattern of structured evidence includes certain key- 
documents. The clearest example of a key-document is the 
pathologist's report: it is invariably an important initial 
piece of evidence. The existence of a note in cases of 
suicide also stands as a key-document. The evidence of other 
witnesses - in the form of written statements - may also 
become key-documents. This may especially apply to expert 
witnesses. More generally, the transformation of witnesses' 
verbal accounts into tangible documents, and vice-versa, 
mediated by the coroner, is a topic of sociological interest. 
5) The formality of the physical structure of the coroner's 
inquest, when compared to other courts of law, reveals certain 
parallels; and it is in any event interesting to consider 
the physical structure and ritual of the inquest. However, a 
comparison of the entrance of the coroner with Carlen's 
description of the entrance of the magistrate (1976,31) takes 
us only so far: and there is no basis for drawing a con- 
clusion about overt social control from the ritual aspects of 
the inquest. It is perhaps more productive to compare the 
relative formality of the setting to the informality of 
typical exchanges between the coroner and witnesses. There is 
a disjunction between setting and mood. 
6) Juries at coroners' inquests tend to be inactive and passive 
elements in the structure. 
7) There are no substantive differences between jury inquests 
and non-jury inquests: there may be lesser or greater degrees 
of surrounding ritual. The process of constructing a true 
story through an initial projected verdict and the structured 
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accumulation of evidence has a typical, general character, 
irrespective of the presence of a jury. 
8) The particular verdict recorded at an inquest does not 
substantially affect such typical processes of construction. 
Such processes obtain generally, although emphasis will vary 
according to the projected verdict. 
9) Verdicts are ways of giving meaning and explaining. Causal 
factors are sought. Theories are used (Inquest D). A large 
leap may be made in the direction of a single, key, causal 
factor (Inquest C): more usually, the process is piecemeal, 
although systematic. 
10) The inquest may have a role, a "reason", other than its formal 
purpose of recording the identity of the deceased and the 
cause and circumstances of death. Such an additional role 
may be to allay suspicion, gossip, or controversy. A common 
additional role is to perform a "public safety" function. 
This was the case at Inquest B. The process went further at 
Inquest F. where the "additional" public-safety role became 
its principal role, and the formal function was regarded 
as subsidiary. 
11) An open verdict may have the practical status of a definite 
verdict, despite its formally unresolved character. As 
noted above, the inquest is characterised by typical processes 
of construction, irrespective of verdict. The true story in 
the case of an open verdict emerges either through the 
balanced opposition of contrary strands of evidence, or 
through the absence of an immediate causal explanation which 
itself is recognised as a typical open verdict. 
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12) The attribution of meaning and the creation of a projected 
verdict begins, as noted above, before the start of inquest 
proceedings. Inquest F indicates that this process may 
indeed begin at the scene of death where potential true 
stories are immediately sought. Inquest F's pre-organisation 
at the scene of death also reveals the process of evaluation 
in terms of past events. 
13) The coroner does not attempt to produce a complete account. 
This is not because of the impossibility of a complete 
account (that is relevant to the sociologist, not the coroner): 
it is because the coroner is not required to produce a 
complete account. The coroner is required to produce an 
adequate account: adequate for the practical purposes for 
which he was appointed and for which he holds inquests. 
An adequate account, for coroners' purposes, may be quite 
limited, in terms of the total stock of potential facts- 
of-the-matter. 
1) Formally, the inquest is not concerned with blame or liability. 
Observation at inquests suggests this is indeed so. However, 
coroners typically refer to the absence of blame. While 
the inquest may no longer return de facto 'convictionsI, 
it does enable de facto 'acquittals'. 
15) The police role: Cicourel's depiction of "..... their sense 
of social structure and memory of past events ..... " in 
providing initial interpretations of what-really-happened 
might be recalled (1968,328). In terms of manpower and 
day-to-day direction the coroner's investigation is a police 
investigation, notwithstanding the transfer of the coroner's 
officer's 'social work' role to civilian staff in some areas. 
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The explicit request for police assent for the verdict at 
Inquest E is not typical. However, the coronerTs investigation 
in general and the emphasis placed on police evidence at 
particular inquests indicates a major police role in the 
process of construction. 
16) The inquest ordinarily is no longer concerned with overt 
social control. (This is partly why analysis of the formal, 
ritual structure of the. inquest should not be taken too far 
in drawing comparisons with other courts of law). The 
inquest, however, is concerned with social control insofar 
as it produces an officially-sanctioned, generally binding, 
account of reality. The question of social control and the 
inquest is appropriately examined on the level of knowledge- 
about-the-world. 
17)a) Inquests which produce verdicts of suicide are similar to 
inquests which produce any other verdict. The question arises 
of why sociologists, insofar as they have considered coroners' 
inquests at all, have only been concerned with suicide 
verdicts (Douglas 1967; Atkinson 1978). As suicide verdicts 
are produced by the same processes as other verdicts, and as 
'suicide' occupies so small a part of any coroner's time, it 
is not within coroner's work itself that the reason for the 
lack of sociological interest in coroners' work as a whole 
is to be found. 
b) Although Douglas (1967) takes an interactionist position 
and Atkinson (1978) takes, eventually, an ethnomethodological 
position, their interest in suicide (as distinct from other 
inquest verdicts) arises from the same bases: firstly, that an 
established, although theoretically diverse, "sociology 
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of suicide" already exists; and, secondly, that they employ 
a commonsense notion of which "kinds of death" are "interest- 
ing". Atkinson does conclude by widening his focus, but this 
is toward Anyman's categorisations about anything-in-the- 
world, not towards coroners' categorisations irrespective 
of verdict (1978,196). A very narrow interest gives way 
to a nebulous interest in all social life. 
c)Taylor (1982), although centrally interested in suicide, 
does give some consideration, briefly, to coroners' pro- 
cedure as a whole. He observed that two sources of evidence 
are used by coroners at any inquest: "immediate circum- 
stances of death" and "biography of the deceased" . 
(Taylor 
1982,76). The emphasis then returns to suicide in 
particular. In part, Taylor's project was to examine the 
quality of suicide rates. He took this direction because 
both Douglas - in his "hard thesis" (Taylor 1982,55) - 
and Atkinson, in rejecting any evaluation of the reliability 
of suicide rates, are quite unlikely to affect the course of 
traditionalist (positivist) studies. Therefore, Taylor, as 
it were, adopts the mantle of the positivist in order to 
tackle the question of the reliability of suicide rates in 
studies such as those of Gibbs and Martin (1964). This is a 
logically coherent position to take, but it is taking us some 
way from our current concern with coroners' categorisations 
in general. Taylor's approach will therefore be considered 
in more detail in the concluding chapter below. 
d) The central questions about official statistics are what they 
are conceived as and what they are used for. Taylor saw 
those ethnomethodologists who took a "rejectionistlt view of 
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official (suicide) statistics as precluding the possibility 
1'..... of any rational knowledge of the world. " (Taylor 1982, 
56). This is reminiscent of Hindess' argument (1973). To 
restate the position adopted in the present study: coroners' 
statistics (including suicide statistics) are seen as wholly 
reliable records of what coroners do and the verdictsthey 
record. Difficulties with official statistics arise from 
arguable notions of their supposed (reliable or unreliable) 
relation to events-in-the-world. Official statistics are 
treated below as reliable records of coroners' categorisations: 
the preceding discussion, based on observation at inquests, 
has considered how coroners make such categorisations. 
18) Newspaper reports of coroners' inquests tend to be charac- 
terised by a further compression of the categorisation 
produced by the coroner. However, there is no typical news- 
paper report of an inquest. The reports of inquests attended 
yield, variously, a simplified account based on one or two 
key causal factors in the form of a short, self-contained 
explanation; a concern with mystery and continuing non- 
resolution; a bland summation of pieces of evidence. It may 
be that study of a sufficient number of newspaper reports of 
inquests would lead to the emergence of identifiable 'types 
of report'. However, the value of such an exercise, in 
terms of understanding coroners' work, is limited. 
19) The coroner's considerable formal authority is of relevance 
in understanding the inquest and the production of the true- 
story. It was concluded in Chapter Three above that 
authority is appropriately seen in the context of historical 
factors, discretion, and the officially-produced version of 
what-really-happened. Coroners' authority is also part of 
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the formal physical structure of the inquest, the structuring 
of evidence around the projected verdict, and is of importance 
in considering the police and medical roles at the inquest. 
The most senior police officer involved in an investigation 
remains subject to the coroner's authority. 
20) The composition of juries was not considered in detail 
during observation of inquests. There appear to be no 
studies of coroners' juries. Baldwin and McConville (1979; 
1980) have examined the composition of "other. juries, con- 
cluding that "..... the jury is broadly representative of 
the community in terms of age and social class, but unrep- 
resentative in terms of sex and race. " (1979,126). The 
material does not exist for drawing conclusions about the 
composition of coroners' juries. Historically, the rules 
governing selection of inquest juries have certainly been more 
casual than the rules governing selection of other juries. 
The position, however, is subject to change. 
21) It has been said above that the true story presented at the 
inquest may, while fulfilling the grounds of "adequacy"" so 
far as the coroner is concerned, remain limited. The evidence 
(potential strands of the true story) which is excluded from 
the inquest may be quite considerable. Perhaps more needs to 
be said of this. Inquest C resulted in a specific verdict, 
and involved the construction of a coherent true story of 
events. Yet a separate discussion with the coroner, and a 
brief consideration of documentary material, revealed not 
The Coroners' Juries Act 1983, together with changes embodied in the Coroners' (Amendment) Rules 1983 (S1 83/1539) which became 
operational in January 1984, codify practice relating to the 
summoning of jurors to an inquest, and lay down reasons for being 
excused service. 
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only additional elements, but strands of "explanation" quite 
different from those which were made public at the inquest. 
One may need to consider the possibility that there exists 
an "undercover" true story (known to the coroner, his staff, 
and the family) at odds with the "official" true story. In 
this particular case, it might be said that the verdict would 
not have been materially affected. The point is, however, that 
there may be an unwritten understanding that if no purpose 
is perceived to be served by the revelation of known strands 
of evidence, then such evidence, considerable though it may be, 
is not made public. This has implications for what is meant 
by a public inquest and also brings us back to the limited 
nature of an "adequate" inquest account. 
22) To sum up, typical methods of constructing a true story obtain 
at inquests, in a systematic form, irrespective of whether a 
jury is in attendance, and irrespective of verdict. The 
initial point of the process of construction may be as early as 
the first police visit to the scene of death. At the start 
of the inquest itself, the projected verdict is, for the 
coroner's purposes of an adequate account, already "straight- 
forward", already "known". The verdict is immanent in the 
unfolding account. Evidence is structured according to the 
projected verdict, and typical features of the "kind of death" 
under consideration are recognised. In general terms of course 
examination of the inquest is examination of only a part of the 
coroner's total work. It is now clear that even consideration 
of a particular inquest is consideration of only a part of the 
total process of categorising that particular death. 
Through the processes described above, formal tangible records 
are produced. These comprise coroners' annual statistical returns 
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to the Home Office. Parts of such statistics are published, to 
become the available "facts". Parts remain unpublished. The 
next part of the study considers, in a number of different ways, 
the statistics of coroners' work. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CORONERS' ACCOUNTS: A CONSIDERATION 
OF STATISTICAL RECORDS 
5(1) Introduction 
This final section of Part Two consists of a discussion of 
the statistical records produced by coroners. The statistical 
product of coroners' work will be approached from more than one 
direction, building upon the empirical material collected and 
discussed so far. It might be recalled that Chapter Three 
considered the perceptions of different coroners, yielding 
comparative material about both the particularities of individual 
coroner's activities and possible generalities within coroners' 
work as a whole and that the information thus collected at 
interview was evaluated partly in terms of the preceding 
historical discussion. Chapter Four considered in detail the 
systematic methods used at a coroner's inquest to generate 
categorisations, or true-stories, relating to the death at 
hand. The formal product of the processes discussed above is 
the statistical record. 
The first area of contention concerns the status or nature 
of such statistical records. For the layman, journalist or 
epidemiologist, coroners' statistics are records of types of 
deaths and numbers of deaths occurring, perhaps in absolute 
terms or, more usually, expressed in relation to population or 
some other factor. Whether sociologist or not, the epidemiologist 
will tend to see an 'increasing' or 'decreasing' rate of 
suicide, for instance, as a direct indication of changed events 
out-there in the world, and might proceed, from this point, to 
seek explanations. Such a researcher might also be more 
interested in inquest verdicts than in coroners' work as a whole. 
- 201 - 
In the present section of the study, statistical aspects 
of the totality of coroners' work are considered. The statistics 
of coroners' work are not treated as evidence of types-of- 
death-occurring. (The overall theoretical orientation of the 
study and the nature of official statistics were discussed in 
Chapter One above). The statistic is seen as the point at which 
the true-story or coroners' categorisation becomes the binding 
'fact of the matter'. Thus, statistics are treated in the 
following discussion as (accurate) records of what coroners do: 
as the tangible products of coroners' activities. 
Statistics, then, are to be used in an essentially 
`\"ý descriptive manner, or, to put it another way, quantitative 
material is to be used qualitatively. Adoption of a different 
theoretical stance might, of course, involve an objection that 
'mere' description limits the uses to which a substantial 
quantity of statistical material might be put. However, the 
position taken in the present study, as outlined already, is 
that sociological description is in itself an aim of central 
importance. If the descriptive significance of coroners' 
statistics is elucidated - not, of course, in isolation from 
material presented elsewhere in the study - then the bases for 
understanding coroners' work may be provided. 
Notwithstanding this specific attitude toward coroners' 
statistics, some difficulties may remain. Firstly, it remains 
easy to lapse into a view of statistics as evidence about deaths- 
out-there, and the usage is so common that the very presentation 
of statistical material is routinely perceived as presentation 
of facts-about-deaths-occurring. It is to be emphasised that 
judgement about this is suspended. Secondly, familiar difficulties 
in discussing 'absolute numbers' and 'rates' cannot be avoided. 
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A simple example of the latter point is in contemplating a 
simultaneously increasing number and decreasing rate. For 
instance, 'parasuicide' in Edinburgh has been conventionally 
measured during the late 1970s and early 1980s as increasing 
amongst the 'young unemployed'. Over the same period, the 'rate 
of parasuicide' amongst the 'young unemployed' has continued to 
fall, simply because the total number in the group 'young 
unemployed' has increased so much more than the numbers in the 
group 'parasuicide' (Platt 1983). 
The approach toward coroners' statistics adopted below is 
not, then, totally unproblematic. It is, however, an approach 
consistent with the overall aims of the study and with the chosen 
theoretical and methodological position. The well-rehearsed 
debates within sociology about the uses of official statistics 
(Chapter One above) may perhaps now be reduced to the questions 
of what official statistics are used as and what official 
statistics are used for. Their use below may be evaluated in 
terms of the choices made about the sociological use of official 
statistics in general. 
I 
Firstly, the national statistics of coroners' work over the 
period 1926 to 1975 will be discussed. (Throughout this chapter, 
'national' denotes England and Wales, not the United Kingdom). 
Consideration of this fifty-year period allows discussion of the 
changing patterns of coroners' work as a whole, changes in 
specific categorisations represented by the coroner's verdict, 
and the significance of the many legal changes instituted during 
this time. The focus is upon the changing facts of sudden death, 
studied comparatively over a period of fifty-years. 
Secondly, the national statistics for the year 1975 are 
considered in rather more detail. A geographically comparative 
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element is introduced. The differences between individual 
coroners' verdicts and the use of, for instance, the post- 
mortem examination may suggest different routes to a true story. 
The perceptions and attitudes of the interview sample of coroners 
(Chapter Three above) and their varying approaches to coroners' 
work might. usefully be recalled. 
Thirdly, the statistics produced in one coroner's juris- 
diction - 'City' - over the period 1926 to 1975 are discussed. 
Consideration may thus be given to any relevant changes in the 
pattern of categorisations in this particular area. Statistical 
totals are supplemented by reference to comments and notes 
found in the City coroner's registers. 
The three complementary approaches to the statistics of 
coroners' work are designed to yield descriptive and qualitative 
material about what coroners do. The necessary expression of 
statistical material in quantitative form does not alter this 
emphasis, nor introduce matters which detract from this 
emphasis, such as general age or sex breakdowns of those upon 
whom a particular verdict has been pronounced. In short, the 
biographical characteristics of the deceased are not seen as 
relevant. The emphasis is upon the use of statistical material 
insofar as it assists in the task of understanding the work of 
the coroner. It is to be considered alongside the conclusions 
drawn from the interview and observation elements of field 
research. 
The choice of the year 1975 as the end-point of the national 
and local statistical surveys, and the focus of the single-year 
study of individual jurisdictions, was made for a number of 
reasons: the availability of statistical information; the 
wish to apply the local and national statistical surveys to 
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the same period; the timing of the different parts of the 
field research (see Appendix I); and because it reflected a 
full-year of operation of the revised coroners' boundaries 
following local government re-organisation. Some further 
statistics, covering the period from 1976, are appended to the 
study (see Appendix II). 
The final part of the consideration of coroners' statistics 
briefly examines one verdict - suicide - up to the year 1980. 
Apparent changes in the numbers of suicides occurring during 
the 1970s have to some degree been a subject of public debate. 
In terms of this study's interest in coroners' categorisations, 
the question of whether anything can be said about 'trends in 
suicide' over recent years will be considered. The issue again 
arises of whether suicide is simply one verdict amongst many, 
so far as coroners' processes of construction are concerned, 
or whether it is in some sense a 'special case'. 
The comment of a coroner during the interview programme 
that a verdict is essentially "a categorisation of the slot 
the death fits into" might be kept in mind during this discussion 
of the statistical products of coroners' activity. 
5(2) Fifty Years: the Statistics of Coroners' Work in England 
and Wales 1926-75. 
Coroners' verdicts are only one part of the statistical 
pattern of coroners' work as a whole. It is helpful to examine 
inquest verdicts in relation to the total number of deaths 
reported to coroners, the number of inquests held, and so on. 
Table 5(2)1 illustrates broad changes in coroners' work over the 
fifty-year period 1926 to 1975 
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Between 1926 and 1975, it can readily be seen that the 
total number of deaths in England and Wales has steadily 
increased from approximately 450,000 in the early 1920s to 
approximately 500,000 in the late 1930s and 1940s, continuing 
to increase during the 1950s until the figure reaches approx- 
imately 550,000 in 1965. The total number has again risen 
during the period 1965-75. Table 5(2)1 indicates the precise 
details of this generally continuing increase in total numbers 
of deaths. It is not remarkable that the number of deaths has 
risen over the fifty-year period in question: total population 
has also risen. However, it is of interest to note (Table 5(2)1, 
column three) that the proportion of deaths reported to coroners 
has risen dramatically. In 1926,11.9% of total deaths were 
reported to coroners; in 1936,14% of deaths were reported; 
in 1946,14.8% were reported; in 1956,18.6% were reported; 
in 1966,20.8% were reported. By 1975,26.3% of all deaths 
in England and Wales were reported to coroners. There are 
legal and procedural factors which might help to account for 
this increase, and the historical discussion in Chapter Two 
above might usefully be consulted. The salient point, 
however, is that over the fifty-year period coroners' work has 
moved from the position of an activity concerned with a 
relatively small proportion of deaths to that of an activity 
concerned with well over one quarter of all deaths. Coroners' 
work has become an increasing feature of the system for 
dealing with death in general. 
The content and boundaries of what constitutes "coroners' 
work" have also changed between 1926-75. In 1926, a coroners' 
investigation typically meant an inquest. In 1975, a coroners? 
investigation typically meant a form 'B' procedure i. e. post 
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TABLE 5(2)1: CORONERS' WORK 1926-75: PART ONE* 
YEAR TOTAL NO. TOTAL NO. TOTAL NO. TOTAL NO. POST- 
DEATHS, DEATHS CORONERS' MORTEM EXAMINATIONS 
ENGLAND REPORTED INQUIRIES ORDERED BY CORONERS 
AND WALES TO CORONERS NOT FOLLOWED 
BY INQUEST INQUEST NON-INQUEST 
CASES CASES 
(col. 1)l (col. 2) I (col-3) , (col. 4) I (col-5) (col. 6) 
1926 453,804 54,177 14,506 14, 463 
1927 484,609 60,511 20,808 12,904 3,616 
1928 460,389 62,501 23,542 11,127 6,791 
1929 532,492 67,259 26,581 11,468 7,906 
1930 455,427 63,238 24,983 11,306 7,875 
1931 491,630 65,082 27,358 11,069 8,458 
1932 484,129 65,979 28,455 10,796 8,873 
1933 496,465 67,458 29,277 11,561 9,647 
1934 476,810 67,044 29,175 12,054 10,745 
1935 477,401 67,646 30,178 11,728 11,058 
1936 495,764 69,687 31,828 111,972 12,269 
1937 509,574 71,628 33,069 12,771 13,212 
1938 478,996 70,635 32,381 13,180 13,764 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 PINK FORM A 
1946 492,090 72,664 23,219 13,655 22,895 
1947 517,615 81,316 25,426 14,854 27,881 
1948 469,898 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1949 510,736 75,844 22,538 13,897 28,865 
1950 510,301 83,571 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1951 549,380 89,587 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1952 497,484 85,929 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1953 503,529 88,128 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1954 501,896 90,797 23,250 17,304*** 41,564 
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TABLE 5(2)1 Continued 
(col. 1) (col. 2) (col. 3) (col-4) (col. 5) (col. 6) 
1955 518,864 94,914 24,761 17,442 44,042 
1956 521,331 96,977 31,388 15,086 39,399 
1957 514,870 n. a. 28,654 18,902 50,665 
1958 526,843 100,901 21,934 19,759 53,031 
1959 527,651 102,182 21,012 20,982 54,788 
1960 526,268 101,079 16,933 21,496 57,841 
1961 551,752 101,667 13,162 22,229- 62,329 
1962 557,836 106,786 13,314 23,417 66,589 
1963 572,868 113,001 13,245 24,179 72,443 
1964 534,737 109,844 11,924 24,639 70,826 
1965 549,379 116,267 12,639 24,914 76,604 
1966 563,624 117,438 12,754 24,893 77,826 
1967 542,519 117,935 12,964 23,918 79,364 
1968 576,754 124,420 13,927 23,407 85,870 
1969 579,378 131,639 14,506 24,101 92,003 
1970 575,194 133,356 15,053 23,959 93,433 
1971 567,262 134,405 16,220 23,748 93,295 
1972 591,889 143,983 16,506 23,621 103,175 
1973 587,478 145,658 17,104 23,971 103,959 
1974 585,292 149,309 18,055 23,228 107,363 
1975 582,700 153,366 19,526 23,014 110,385 
iý Source: Brodrick Report (1971,370-373), years 1926-1969; 
Unpublished Home Office statistics, years 1970-1975. 
ýF Wartime figures are unavailable. From 1946, column 4 
(inquiries not followed by inquest) is re-titled 'Pink Form A' 
***The figures in columns 5 and 6, years 1954 to 1958 inclusive, 
are estimates from the Coroners' Society: see Brodrick Report 
(1971,365-369) for details of this and other irregularities 
in tables 5(2)1 and 5(2)2. 
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mortem examination and no inquest. This can be presented in 
more precise terms. In 1926, it can be seen (column 4, table 
5(2)1 ) that 14,506 deaths reported to coroners did not involve 
an inquest i. e. 26.8% of all deaths reported to coroners. By 
1946,23,219 deaths were being dealt with by the 'form A' 
procedure (no inquest, no post-mortem) but another 22,895 deaths 
were now being disposed of by the 'form B' procedure (post- 
mortem, no inquest) i. e. 63.5% of deaths reported to coroners in 
1946 did not involve in inquest. The trend has continued, and 
by 1975 it can be seen that 19,526 deaths were being dealt with 
via 'form A', and another 110,385 deaths via 'form B': thus 
in 1975 almost 85% of deaths reported to coroners did not 
involve an inquest. 
It has already been suggested above that the inquest is 
a relatively minor part of the day-to-day work of the modern 
coroner. The descriptive statistics presented in table 5(2)1 
reinforce this view. It can now be suggested that, alongside 
coroners' work as a whole becoming an increasing feature of 
the social/bureaucratic system for dealing with death in British 
society, (i. e. ever-more deaths are being reported to coroners), 
there has been an important change in the coroner's typical 
manner of disposing of the deaths reported to him, i. e. the 
post-mortem, not the inquest, is the typical 'instrument' of 
the coroner. 
Before proceeding further, attention might briefly be drawn 
to some of the irregularities within table 5(2)1. The 
Brodrick Report (1971,365-369), accounts for some apparent 
inconsistencies. It will be seen, for instance, that columns 4, 
5 and 6 of table 5(2)1 do not correspond, in total, to column 3 
("total number deaths reported to coroners"). This is because 
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in a small number of cases inquests are held without first 
conducting a post-mortem examination, and these are not included 
at table 5(2)1. It will also become clear that the total 
annual verdicts returned is less than the total number of 
inquests held, because some inquests are opened and never 
completed (S. 20, Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926), or not completed 
until the next calendar year. When the discussion below comes 
to focus upon the year 1975 in detail, for instance, it will be 
seen that 22,352 verdicts were returned; 23,411 inquests were 
'held' i. e. completed; but 23,455 deaths were reported upon 
which inquests were opened . Clearly, caution is necessary in 
drawing out conclusions. Nevertheless, on the basis of the 
material presented in table 5(2)1, there appears to have been a 
considerable change between 1926 and 1975 in both the quantity 
of coroners' work and the typical manner in which that work is 
performed. 
Table 5(2)2 completes the initial profile of coroners' work 
as a whole over a fifty-year period. For ease of reference and 
clarity, columns 2 and 3 are reproduced from the previous table. 
It can be seen that the total number of inquests, as a pro- 
portion of total deaths reported to coroners, has continually 
fallen during the relevant period: in 1926 60.8% of deaths 
reported to coroners involved an inquest; in 1946,36.5%; in 
1975,15.3%. Of course, this is only to express in another form 
one of the conclusions drawn from the previous table. What might 
also be noted, however, is that table 5(2)2 indicates that during 
the fifty-year period the total number of verdicts began to 
diverge from the total number of inquests. From 1926 to 1928, 
the number of inquests and the number of verdicts are identical. 
From 1930 through to 1975, however, the annual number of verdicts 
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TABLE 5(2)2 CORONERS' WORK 1926-75: -PART TWO* 
YEAR 
(col. 1) 
TOTAL NO. 
DEATHS 
ENGLAND 
AND WALES 
(col. 2) 
TOTAL NO. 
DEATHS 
REPORTED TO 
CORONERS 
(col-3) 
TOTAL 
NO. 
INQUESTS 
(col.. ) 
TOTAL 
NO. 
VERDICTS 
RETURNED 
(col-5) 
TOTAL 
NO. 
CORONERS' 
JURISDICTIONS 
(col. 6) 
1926 453,804 54,177 32,924 32,924 363 
1927 484,609 60,511 32,438 32,438 
1928 460,389 62,501 31,553 31,553 
1929 532,492 67,259 32,612 32,610 
1930 455,427 63,238 31,659 31,521 
1931 491,630 65,082 30,801 30,638 
1932 484,129 65,979 30,512 30,357 
1933 496,465 67,458 31,669 31,476 
1934 476,810 67,044 31,562 31,374 
1935 477,401 67,646 31,032 30,850 
1936 495,764 69,687 30,963 30,737 353 
1937 509,574 71,628 31,575 31,358 348 
1938 478,996 70,635 31,505 31,292 345 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 492,090 72,664 26,550 3EiEiE 333 
1947 517 , 615 81 , 316 28,009 332 
1948 469,898 n. a. n. a. 331 
1949 510,736 75,844 24,441 330 
1950 510,301 83,571 25,784 329 
1951 549,380 89,587 27,256 327 
1952 497,484 85,929 25,361 324 
1953 503,529 88,128 25,521 321 
1954 501,896 90,797 25,983 316 
1955 518,864 94,914 26,111 313 
1956 521,331 96,977 26,240 310 
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TABLE 5(2)2 Continued 
(col. 1) (col. 2) (col. 3) (col-4) (col-5) (col. 6) 
1957 514,870 n. a. 25,752 25,294 309 
1958 526,843 100,901 25,936 25,499 304 
1959 527,651 102,182 26,382 26,005 303 
1960 526,268 101,079 26,305 25,785 300 
1961 551 , 752 101 , 
667 26,176 25 , 620 300 
1962 557,836 106,786 26,883 297 
1963 572,868 113,001 27,313 26,627 299 
1964 534,737 109,844 27,094 26,425 291 
1965 549,379 116,267 27,024 26,053 286 
1966. 563,624 117,438 26,858 25,940 282 
1967 542,519 117,935 25,607 24,680 270 
1968 576,754 124,420 24,623 23,759 270 
1969 579,378 131,639 25,130 24,172 264 
1970 575,194 133,356 24,870 23,900 262 
1971 567,262 134,405 24,890 23,777 256 
1972 591,889 143,983 24,302 23,053 255 
1973 587,478 145,658 24,595 23,412 255 
1974 585,292 149,309 23,891 22,663 251/186*iE*** 
1975 582,700 153,366 23,455 22,352 183 
Source: Brodrick Report (1971,370-373) and(386-387), years 
1926-1969. Unpublished Home Office statistics, 
years 1970-1975. 
3ý3ý See Note table 5(2)1 
*** Total number verdicts returned not available 1946-56. 
3f 3ý This figure, given as 16,347 (Brodrick Report, 1971,386) 
apparently erroneous. 
***** Denotes local government re-organisation 
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is invariably smaller than the annual number of inquests: by 
1975, the difference in the two figures is more than 100. This 
divergence in total numbers between inquests and verdicts is an 
example of a legal change, i. e., Section 20 of the Coroners' 
(Amendment) Act 1926, altering the profile of what-it-is that 
coroners are doing. The 1926 Act required that coroners hence- 
forth adjourn inquests where proceedings are to be taken in 
another court for homicide: the Act represented one of a series 
of measures designed to limit the coroner's powers in matters of 
criminal law. The 1926 Act, as we noted in Chapter Two, was by 
virtue of this particular section, aimed at preventing the 
inquest becoming, de facto, a court of trial in cases of murder 
or manslaughter. From 1956, adjournments were also required 
where an individual faced a charge, in another court, of causing 
death by dangerous driving. 
Table 5(2)2 indicates that between 1926 and 1975 the number 
of inquests, in absolute terms, fell from 32,924 to 23,455. 
The number of inquests as a proportion of all deaths in England 
and Wales fell from 7.25% in 1926 to 4% in 1975. Both figures 
are less striking than the fall in inquests as a proportion of 
deaths reported to coroners. To put it another way, it is the 
increased number of deaths reported to coroners and the 
decreasing use of the inquest by coroners on such deaths that 
are of sociological interest. The first phenomenon tell us 
something of the more central role being occupied by coroners' 
work within the societal framework for dealing with death; the 
second phenomenon tell us something of the less central role 
being occupied by the inquest within coroners' work. 
The final point of interest to be drawn from table 5(2)2 
is that the number of coroners' jurisdictions in England and 
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Wales has steadily fallen. In 1926, there were 363 jurisdictions; 
by 1946,333 jurisdictions; by 1960,300 jurisdictions; and 
in 1973,255 jurisdictions. At the time of local government 
reorganisation in 1974, coroners' jurisdictions were further 
enlarged (and therefore reduced in number) to correspond to the 
new county boundaries. Thus in 1974 there were initially 
251 jurisdictions; in April 1974 there were 186 jurisdictions; 
and in 1975 the total number fell further to 183. Quite clearly, 
the change from 363 jurisdictions in 1926 to 183 jurisdictions 
in 1975 indicates that coroners' areas have tended to become 
ever larger. It would not be possible, however, to draw 
conclusions about the concentration of coroners' authority in 
fewer hands until analysis was also made of the total numbers of 
coroners, deputies and assistants, and the relative numbers 
of full-time and part-time coroners. What can be said is that 
coroners' areas have become more uniform, and more consistent 
with the boundaries of other vehicles of classification and 
State involvement, e. g. health, social services, education. 
Coroners' jurisdictions have increasingly corresponded to the 
bureaucratic framework of a modern industrial society. For the 
sake of completeness, it should finally be noted that there are 
invariably fewer coroners than there are coroners' jurisdictions, 
as some coroners-cover more than one area, even on a temporary 
basis (Brodrick Report, 1971,368). 
Table 5(2)3 is an illustrative table, covering the period 
1969 - 1975 only. It has already been noted that the total 
number of inquests has continued to decrease. It is of interest 
here to note that inquests being held where a post-mortem 
examination has not first been conducted are, by 1975, few in 
number: the 441 inquests-without-post mortem held in 1975 
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represent less than 0.3% of all deaths reported to coroners in 
that year. The centrality of the post-mortem examination (and 
its concomitant "key document", the post-mortem report) is 
again evident. 
Table 5(2)4 provides a descriptive statistical summary of 
all inquest verdicts over the fifty year period where statistics 
are available: unfortunately, figures for the years 1939 to 
1956 are not included in the published source (Brodrick Report 
1971,386-387). Despite this gap, table 5(2)4 provides the 
basis for a descriptive overview of the products of coroners' 
activity, and permits some tentative interpretations of develop- 
ments. 
The verdicts of murder, manslaughter and infanticide can 
be seen to have steadily been recorded less often, with the 
partial exception of manslaughter verdicts which numbered 30 in 
1974 and 49 in 1975. Of course, a decreased number of a particular 
verdict would be initially unsurprising, given that the total 
number of all verdicts fell during the fifty-year period. 
Nevertheless, the decrease in these three verdicts is propor- 
tionally greater than the general decrease in total verdicts 
recorded. Since the implementation of the Criminal Law Act 1977, 
the verdicts of murder, manslaughter and infanticide have been 
replaced (as verdicts available to the coroner or jury) by the 
single verdict of "unlawful killing". Thus, matters which were 
once the province of the coroner's inquest have passed, again, 
to the criminal courts, although it is perhaps interesting that 
a finding of unlawful killing still falls within the jurisdiction 
of an inquisitorial court. 
Table 5(2)4 indicates that verdicts of justifiable or 
excusable homicide have been, numerically, a very small element 
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of coroners' inquest work over the fifty-year period, the highest 
annual total being 5 in 1938. Despite small numbers, the 
verdict of justifiable homicide implied questions (akin to those 
previously relating to inquest verdicts of murder, manslaughter 
and infanticide) about the boundaries of coroners' categorisations 
and the relation to criminal law: matters which have charac- 
terised coroners' work over the centuries. During the 1970s, 
the verdict of justifiable homicide also raised social and 
quasi-political issues within the realms of public debate, 
and in 1980 an amendment to the Coroners' Rules replaced 
justifiable homicide by the verdict of "lawful killing". Thus, 
the first four verdicts listed in table 5(2)4 no longer 
exist as formal or legal categorisations available to the coroner 
at an inquest. The fifth verdict listed - execution of sentence 
of death - has de facto been abolished by the removal of the 
death penalty. 
The verdict of suicide was, in 1926, available in two forms. 
It can be seen from table 5(2)4 that in the overwhelming number 
of cases suicide "while insane? was recorded, but in a residual 
number of cases prior to the Second World War, "felo-de-se", 
or "self-murder", was recorded. The practice of some coroners 
today in adding the phrase "while the balance of mind was 
disturbed" to suicide verdicts without doubt originates from a 
period when the phrase had legal meaning, setting the deceased 
aside from those who committed acts of "self-murder". The 
dual verdicts of suicide are interesting on a conceptual level, 
and indeed had a practical significance for surviving relatives 
in matters such as life insurance, religious burial, and moral 
condemnation. The disappearance of "self-murder" is consistent 
with the disappearance of other formal categorisations open to 
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the coroner in earlier times but gradually perceived as outmoded: 
the framework within which the coroner can categorise is subject 
to change. The disappearance of "self-murder" is also 
consistent with the medicalisation of coroners' work: in this 
case, medicalisation in the sense of the emergent psychiatric 
ethos and. ideology as an explanation of areas of. human behaviour 
formerly considered evil. The twin processes of medicalisation 
and de-criminalisation are evident in an examination of 
coroners' verdicts over the fifty-year period. 
More will be said of suicide in the final section of 
Chapter Five. Returning to table 5(2)4, the verdict of death 
through attempted or self-induced abortion can be seen to have 
had its greatest significance during the mid to late 1930s. 
In the post-war period, the verdict was recorded only 17 times 
in 1962, and thereafter was recorded even less often. There 
were only 9 verdicts of death through attempted/self-induced 
abortion, in total, during the period 1970 to 1975 inclusive. 
It is not unreasonable to make some association with abortion 
law reform. It is yet another example of events in the legal/ 
normative/moral areas 'leaving behind' the available formal 
framework within which coroners make their categorisations: 
until such time as the formal structure 'catches up' via such 
statutes as the Criminal Law Act 1977 or the periodic revisions 
to the Coroners' Rules. 
The verdict of death through lack of care or self-neglect 
has gradually diminished in frequency over the fifty-year 
period. It might be noted that separate statistics within this 
category. were recorded until 1938, distinguishing "lack of care" 
from "want, exposure etc": the two, however, are totalled on 
table 5(2)4. The verdict of death through "excessive drinking" 
%- 224 - 
and, as it subsequently became, "chronic alcoholism" has been 
recorded progressively more often over the course of the 
relevant fifty-years: 86 such verdicts in 1926; 142 in 1936; 
109 in 1966; 371 in 1975. Aside from the increasing number 
of such verdicts, it is of interest to consider the meaning of 
the change from "excessive drinking" to "chronic alcoholism". 
Firstly, the change in terminology reflects a clear medical- 
isation of the phenomenon it ostensibly describes, the emphasis 
shifting from personal excess to a distinct medical condition: 
just as the emphasis has shifted from sin to mental illness in 
the case of suicide verdicts. Secondly, the change in 
terminology indicates a difference of meaning: excessive 
drinking may be 'chosen' (invoking responsibility for behaviour) 
whereas alcoholism might denote a 'disease-state' (invoking 
the sick-role and a determinist explanation). The shift in 
meaning is clear when one considers that excessive drinking 
does not logically imply alcoholism at all. Verdicts of death 
through addiction to drugs have tended to be statistically of 
minor significance until the late 1960s and the 1970s. The 
issue of meaning is again relevant. The formal category of 
addiction to drugs existed, for instance, throughout the 1930s, 
when coroners made little use of it. The phenomenon of 
"addiction to drugs" changed its meaning in the 1960s when it 
became associated with a perceived sub-culture held to exist 
amongst young people. It is possible to speculate upon the 
manner in which the moral solidarity of a society or even, as 
in this case, a moral panic (Cohen, 1980) within society, may 
serve to influence the categorisations made by coroners. 
The verdict of death through "want of attention at birth" 
decreased in frequency dramatically over the period 1926-1975. 
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295 such verdicts were recorded in 1926; 25 in 1975. This 
appears to be a case where, as an available categorisation, 
"want of attention at birth" is no longer adequate in the sense 
discussed in Chapter Four above. It is not-adequate insofar as 
it is unspecific. Increased medical knowledge, more frequent 
use of the post-mortem examination and more rigorous registration 
procedures are amongst the possible relevant background factors, 
but the salient point is that the criteriaof adequacy, so far 
as coroners' categorisations are concerned, change over time. 
There has been little change in the number of deaths 
categorised as due to industrial diseases since the figure 
appeared for the first time in 1957. The emergence of this 
verdict can reasonably be linked to the emergence of health and 
safety legislation, compensation regulations, and the increased 
perception of industrially-related illness. Viewed historically, 
it is also, of course, linked to the phenomenon of industrial- 
isation itself. 
Verdicts of death through accident or misadventure (the 
formal meanings are synonomous, although coroners may and do 
make a practical distinction) are, throughout the fifty-year 
period, recorded far more often than any other verdict. The 
number of accident/misadventure verdicts recorded in 1926 
(13,851) is remarkably similar to the number recorded in 1975 
(13,644). The total number of inquest verdicts (all verdicts) 
recorded during the fifty-year period, however, decreased, as 
we have noted above. Thus the 13,851 accident/misadventure 
verdicts in 1926 represented 42% of all inquest verdicts, 
whereas the 13,644 accident/misadventure verdicts in 1975 
represented 61% of all inquest verdicts. This verdict, then, 
has not fallen into disuse, nor has its "adequacy" diminished: 
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indeed, it is being recorded more than ever before. 
The continuing use of the accident/misadventure verdict 
can be accounted for on the level of meaning. Its meaning is 
sufficiently loose to accomodate changing mores and changing 
legal stipulations. The true story which constitutes a mis- 
adventure verdict can vary widely. It will be recalled from 
Chapter Four that a road traffic death was selected for consid- 
eration, and resulted in a misadventure verdict. Indeed, for 
coroners, road traffic deaths typically result in misadventure 
verdicts. This was not so in 1926: road traffic deaths were 
not then so significant. Events which are, commensically, 
"accidental" and events which, literally, involve mis-adventure 
are routine features of the constructed social world. Their 
typical form for coroners changes over time (as in the case of 
road traffic deaths) but the pool of unconstructed true stories 
which might, potentially, become verdicts of misadventure is 
large. By this wide sweep of meaning, the verdict (unlike some 
discussed above) continues to be in general and frequent use. 
Verdicts of death by "natural causes", as may be seen at 
table 5(2)4, have declined in number from 12,117 in 1926 
(second only to accident/misadventure verdicts in that year) to 
approximately 6,000 in 1938, falling further to approximately 
1,500 in 1963 and continuing at approximately that level until 
1975. The emergence of the form 'A' and 'B' procedures would 
seem to account for this striking drop in the numbers of inquest 
verdicts of natural causes. It may be that the total category 
of cases of "natural causes" has not fallen so dramatically, but 
simply that the bulk of such cases are now dealt with by non- 
inquest procedures. Hence, far fewer inquest verdicts of natural 
causes are recorded. Aside from the development of non-inquest 
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procedures, increasing medicalisation may be of relevance. 
"Natural causes" has perhaps increasingly become a matter for 
the referring doctor to categorise followed by the coroner's 
use of form A; or use of form B if a post-mortem is required; 
but rarely by use of the inquest. So categorisations of "natural 
causes" do not generally appear at inquests today, because 
the relevant deaths have already been disposed of at the form A 
or form B stage. A reminder of the growth in the number of 
deaths not involving an inquest can be found at table 5(2)1. 
The verdict of still-born is perhaps unique. Let us note, 
first of all, that verdicts of still-born decreased in number 
from 262 in 1926 to 32 in 1969: table 5(2)4. The Brodrick 
Report ascribes this fall in the number of still-born verdicts 
to "..... a real drop in infant mortality" (1971,385). Now, 
while one may wish to be sceptical about notions of a "real drop" 
in numbers in discussing other verdicts (for reasons made plain 
throughout this study), the verdict that a child was still-born 
is, conceptually, quite different. To declare a child still-born 
is, in its meaning, comparable to declaring that an adult has 
died: it contains per se no elements of explanation, reasoning 
or theorising. To refer to, and record, the fact of death 
at or before birth is to refer to a natural event-in-the-world 
not a construction. Even here reservations are necessary, as 
a verdict of still-born would become a construction (comparable 
conceptually to other coroners' verdicts) if it were to be the 
eventual true-story in a case of, for instance, hitherto 
suspected homicide. So it may be that verdicts of still-born 
can be described and understood in the same terms as all other 
verdicts. Equally, the verdict of still-born may refer to the 
fact of death, presented without explanation and containing no 
- 228 - 
theory, which is no more a construction than, for instance, the 
nineteenth-century coroner's verdict that a man was "found dead 
in bed" (see table 5(4)2). Thus it may be suggested that it is 
tenable in principle to posit a relation between verdicts of 
still-born and a real incidence of infant mortality. In 
practise, other accounts may need to be examined but, in principle, 
there need be no difficulties in accepting a link between this 
particular verdict and the real incidence of the fact-in-the- 
world to which it refers. 
Insofar as the verdict of still-born is (in the senses 
outlined above) unique, it is a remnant of an earlier period of 
coroners' work when levels of adequacy were essentially 
different from today, i. e. when an elaborated causal theory 
or explanatory account was not necessarily contained in a 
verdict. Obsolete verdicts such as 'dead in bed' or simply 
'found dead' might be considered. The 'still-born' verdict is 
perhaps the only coroners' verdict which today might be seen in 
such terms. 
Open verdicts have been recorded with a degree of regularity 
over the years: 1,486 in 1926; 1,601 in 1936; 1,491 in 1966; 
1,861 in 1975. As with accident/misadventure verdicts, this 
element of apparent continuity must be considered in the context 
of the total reduction in all inquest verdicts over the fifty- 
year period. In 1926, open verdicts represented 4.5% of all 
verdicts recorded: in 1975, however, open verdicts represented 
8.3% of all inquest verdicts. The continuing use of the open 
verdict as a major element of coronerst work lies partly (as 
with accident/misadventure verdicts) on the level of meaning: 
many true-stories, varying between time or place and taking into 
consideration legal changes, may still continue to be accomodated 
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within the categorisation called 'open verdict'. It might also 
be recalled that in interviews with coroners (above) the open 
verdict was perceived as "useful", an adjective not normally 
applied to other verdicts. 
Having considered the broad profile of inquest verdicts 
available to coroners during the period 1926 to 1975, it might 
finally be noted that table 5(2)4 records - for the years 1957 
to 1969, plus 1975, only - the numbers of inquests where 
indefinite adjournments were made and where, of course, no 
verdict was recorded. The provision, indeed the requirement, to 
adjourn inquests was (like the later removal of the verdicts of 
murder, manslaughter, infanticide and justifiable homicide from 
the coroner's available stock of categorisations) a direct 
curtailment of the coroner's powers in matters of criminal law 
and liability, and a means of preventing the pre-empting of the 
decision of another court. 
Originally confined to cases of suspected homicide, 
adjournments have become most frequently used in cases where 
an individual faces proceedings in a criminal court for causing 
death in circumstances involving a motor vehicle. (See also 
table 5(3)5 below). The power of the coroner (or inquest jury) 
to make any categorisation in such cases has thus been removed. 
It was a development consistent with many other changes over 
the years in the formal scope of coroners' work. Such changes 
have had the overall consequence of more closely circumscribing 
the formal authority of the coroner. However, as we have seen, 
in the very substantial number of cases where the coroner does 
retain the authority to produce the true-facts-of-the matter 
at the inquest, his powers remain considerable. 
Having illustrated the pattern of inquest verdicts over a 
fifty-year period, the discussion of coroners' statistics 
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continues with a consideration of the detailed statistics for 
a single year - 1975 - throughout England and Wales. 
5(3) One Year: Detailed Consideration of Coroners' Work in 
England and Wales in 1975 
In this section of the discussion, the year 1975 is 
considered. It represents the most recent year of the fifty- 
year survey discussed above and also, importantly, reflects 
post-reorganisation coroners' areas. 
Inquest verdicts recorded during 1975 have already been 
included in the final column of table 5(2)4 above. Little more 
need be said here about specific verdicts. It is useful, 
however, to consider in a little more detail the proportion of 
cases, in 1975, in which coroners were using the form A 
procedure, the form B procedure, and the inquest. Table 5(3)1 
indicates that in 72% of all deaths reported to coroners in 
1975, 'form Bt was used, that is, a post-mortem examination was 
conducted but no inquest was held. Ordering a post-mortem 
examination and then statistically disposing of the case is thus 
the typical procedure adopted in almost three-quarters of cases 
dealt with by coroners. It can also be seen from table 5(3)1 
that in 12.7% of cases reported to coroners in 1975 form A was 
used and in 15.3% of cases an inquest was held. (Additionally, 
table 5(3)2 breaks down the figure of 'inquests held' by 
detailing the small number of cases in which an inquest is held 
without first conducting a post-mortem examination). 
Throughout. England and Wales in 1975, -, therefore, coroners' 
work comprised 72% 'form B'; 12.7% 'form A'; and 153% 'inquest'. 
It might be recalled from Chapter Three above that individual 
coroners may have rather different perceptions of and attitudes 
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TABLE 5(3)1: USE OF PROCEDURES 197531 
Total number, form A cases 19,526 (12.7%) 
Total number, form B cases 110,385 (72.0%) 
Total number, inquests held 23,455 (15.3%) 
Total number, 
reported to 
deaths, 
coroners 153,366 
* Source: unpublished Home Office statistics 
TABLE 5(3)2: INQUESTS 1975* 
Total number, inquests held 23,014 (98.1%) 
after post-mortem 
Total number, inquests held 441 (1.9%) 
without post-mortem 
Total number, inquests held 23,455 
(Total number, inquest (22,352) 
verdicts returned) 
* Source: unpublished Home Office statistics 
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toward their work. It is interesting to examine how far statistics 
from individual coroner's jurisdictions depart from the average 
1975 figures for form A, form B, and inquest, outlined above. 
There were 183 coroners' jurisdictions in England and 
Wales in 1975" (For reasons already given, this does not 
necessarily mean that there were 183 coroners). The size of 
coroners' areas and the number of deaths reported during the 
year in individual areas varied to a very considerable degree. 
During 1975, the smallest number of deaths reported was in 
the Meirionnydd district of Gwynedd and in the Sleaford district 
of Lincolnshire where, in both cases, only 55 deaths were 
reported during the year. (If the Scilly Isles are included in 
this consideration of 'England and Wales', an even smaller 
figure is apparent, as a mere 5 deaths were reported to the 
coroner in the Scilly Isles in 1975). The quantity of coroners' 
work in some city jurisdictions stands in contrast to the 
rural coroners' areas. The largest number of deaths reported 
in a single coroner's jurisdiction in 1975 was 4,795, in the 
Inner-South district of Greater London: this was followed by 
two other London districts with totals of 4,386 and 4,374, and 
the Birmingham district of West Midlands with 4,261 deaths 
reported during the year. 
In considering the great differences in quantity of work 
between individual jurisdictions, it might be noted that the 
average number of deaths reported in a coroner's jurisdiction 
in 1975, i. e., 838, reveals very little about the scale of work 
in, say, the Isles of Scilly or Greater London. Nor is this 
only a matter of quantity. The proportion of form A, form B 
The sources for this and following figures are unpublished Home Office statistics. 
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and inquest cases within coroners' work as a whole throughout 
England and Wales (table 5(3)1 ) may give no indication of the 
particular practices of individual coroners in their own areas. 
A coroner, for instance, might never use form A.. It is of 
interest, then, to consider some totals and proportionate 
figures from selected jurisdictions, again referring to 1975. 
Breakdowns by jurisdiction are presented in table 5(3)3, 
together with a reminder of the national percentage breakdown 
for the different procedures. 
The jurisdictions included at table 5(3)3 were selected 
for illustrative purposes: that is, the jurisdictions illustrate 
the actual use of different procedures in their widely varying 
proportions. Coroners' comments at interview suggested that 
they may perceive their work in rather different ways. A 
brief summary of statistics from selected jurisdictions 
'describes' the actual use of different procedures by different 
coroners: it illustrates a developing theme of the study, that 
is, that the nature of 'coroners' work' is in some considerable 
part defined, in use, by the individual coroner. 
The first jurisdiction listed at table 5(3)3, West 
Berkshire, indicates a use of form A, form B and inquest 
procedures broadly comparable to the overall national breakdown 
for 1975. The second jurisdiction, however, reveals quite a 
different profile of coroners' work, for in Mid Buckinghamshire 
form A was used in a substantial 46% of all cases reported to 
the coroner, form B was used less often (34% of cases reported) 
than form A, (and far less often than the national average for 
form B cases) and the inquest was used somewhat more often 
(19% of cases reported) than the national average for use of the 
inquest. It may be, of course, that (unknown) geographical 
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features or medical facilities for this particular jurisdiction 
are of relevance. The point is, however, that in this 
particular jurisdiction the constituent parts of 'coroners' work' 
are quite dissimilar from what would have been suggested by a 
national, average, statistical portrayal of coroners' work. 
The procedural routes to the true story are many and varied. 
It is also of interest to note that the neighbouring 
jurisdiction of North Buckinghamshire suggests a üse of pro- 
cedures not only at variance from those of the adjacent area, 
but also at variance (in a different way) from the national 
averages. North Buckinghamshire reveals an exaggeration rather 
than a reversal of the total national average, for in this 
jurisdiction form A was used in only 1% of cases reported in 
1975, form B was used in 84% of cases reported in that year, 
1 
while the inquest was used marginally less often (14% of cases 
reported) than in average figures for England and Wales as a 
whole. The fourth jurisdiction listed at table 5(3)3, 
Pembrokeshire, indicates proportionally more form A cases (30%) 
and more inquests (24%) than in total national figures, together, 
of course, with fewer form B cases (45%). The different ways 
in which the procedural content of individual coroner's work 
varies from the national overall averages are clear in these 
illustrations. 
The next jurisdiction listed at table 5(3)3, Furness, 
indicates further variations. It particularly reveals an 
employment of the inquest without post-mortem (12% of deaths 
reported) which, by the mid-1970s, was highly unusual in the 
total British context. The Manchester jurisdiction indicates 
the inquest being held less often (9% of cases) than nationally. 
In this jurisdiction, form B is also used less often (58% of 
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cases reported). The corollary is that in Manchester post- 
mortem examinations were held on only 67% of deaths reported 
during 1975: the national figure was approximately 87% of 
deaths reported to coroners. The next two jurisdictions listed 
at table 5(3)3, Southampton and York, show a very substantial 
difference when compared to Manchester. In Southampton and 
York during 1975, no form As were issued, i. e. post-mortem 
examinations were held on every death reported to these coroners. 
Looking back to the Mid Buckinghamshire jurisdiction, it can be 
seen in contrast that post-mortems were held there on only 53% 
of deaths reported to the coroner in the same year. (It might 
finally be noted that in considering Southampton and York, the 
"extratt post-mortems in Southampton simply meant "extra form 
Bs", while in York there were "extra inquests"). 
Many features can be isolated in comparing apparently 
different practices in different coroners' jurisdictions. No 
doubt some apparently significant differences are spurious, 
especially when a relatively small number of deaths were 
reported, in total, during the year. For this reason, it is 
perhaps unproductive to pursue a lengthy speculative analysis 
of the possible practices of different coroners. Certainly, 
however, the substantial variations between jurisdictions in 
the use of form A, form B, and inquest (and in some cases 
inquest without post-mortem) suggest substantially varying 
practices. It is reasonable to suggest that, for instance, in 
the widely differing use of the post-mortem examination, 
pathological facilities are of some relevance, but the individual 
perceptions of "coroners work" held by coroners themselves are 
also of importance. The comments of coroners in Chapter Three 
above tend to reinforce this conclusion. The discussion of 
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coroners' discretion might also be recalled. 
Two further coroners' jurisdictions, Grimsby and Liverpool, 
complete the statistical illustration of selected jurisdictions 
in table 5(3)3. It can be seen that in the Grimsby area the 
use of form 'A' and form 'B' is broadly comparable: 43% and 
46% respectively. This is considerably different, again, from 
the overall national picture. The Liverpool jurisdiction deals 
with by far the largest number of deaths of jurisdictions 
summarised in table 5(3)3, i. e. 3,100 deaths reported in 1975. 
It is interesting to note that, despite so many deaths being 
reported in Liverpool during that year, not a single case 
involved the inquest-without-post-mortem procedure. 
The inquest statistics from the jurisdictions selected for 
inclusion in table 5(3)3 suggest that national figures for the 
use of form A, B and the inquest have meaning as an aggregate 
summary of what coroners in total are doing, but may have 
limited meaning in considering the nature of coroners' work. in 
a particular jurisdiction. It is clearly necessary, in terms 
of seeking to describe and understand coroners' work, to 
balance overall national material with the detailed study of the 
work of individual coroners. The research elements of interview, 
observation and statistical discussion have been directed toward 
construction of the basis for general statements about coroners' 
work, by referring throughout, as necessary, to the very 
particular. It is not a case of studying the general or the 
particular: the two together can be described in order to 
provide the basis for understanding. 
Leaving aside questions relating to hypes of death 
occurring', it was stated above that coroners' statistics are to 
be seen as accurate records of what coroners are doing, insofar 
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as they are the statistical realities produced by coroners' 
activities. Must it now be concluded, however, that coroners' 
statistics are of no sociological use as records of coroners' 
activity, if indeed the examination of national statistics 
reveals so little of the individual coroner's work? The answer 
seems to be no, for coroners' statistics (e. g. inquest. verdicts 
from 1926 to 1975, recorded at table 5(2)4 above) do present a 
generalised version of what coroners, in total, are doing, 
and this is of some use. It is useful, for instance, to know 
that during the fifty-year period the post-mortem examination 
was increasingly used, and the inquest was held with decreasing 
frequency in England and Wales. The use of such general 
statements, however, must be based on a recognition that they 
are abstractions. An abstract statement, based upon the total 
activities of the total number of coroners, may be a valuable 
aid to understanding: provided it is recognised as not being a 
description of what individual coroners are, necessarily, doing. 
The relationship between the general and the particular is, 
then, complex, but from its complexity understanding may be 
achieved. One of the conclusions of Chapter Three above was 
that "coroner's work" for the individual coroner may be 
"substantially influenced" by that individual coroner's definition 
of what coroners' work - his own work - is. Discretion and 
authority were also discussed. It was clear from the interview 
programme that different coroners have differing definitions and 
perceptions of what their work is supposed to be. A consideration 
of the statistics of coroners' jurisdictions in 1975 is consisLent 
with the conclusion reached in Chapter Three. 
To sum up, let us suggest that to make a statistical 
statement about what coroners, in total, were doing in 1975 
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(what procedures they were adopting, what verdicts they were 
producing) may be useful. It has meaning. Moreover, such a 
statement can contribute to the tasks of description and under- 
standing. However, such a general statement must be treated 
with caution in application to particular jurisdictions. The 
general statement may be useful and meaningful as a general 
(abstract) statement. It may lose meaning in spurious 
application to the particular. The social world of the coroner 
is made "reale in particular ways. 
Table 5(3)4 provides additional information about inquests 
conducted during 1975. The discussion of coroners' ancient 
powers in matters of "treasure trove" may be recalled from 
Chapter Two above. Table 5(3)4 indicates that only 17 inquests 
dealing with treasure trove were conducted during 1975. It 
might also be noted from table 5(3)4 that, throughout England 
and Wales in total, almost 72% of inquests were conducted 
without a jury. There were of course variations between 
jurisdictions in the use of the jury, as in other matters. 
Taking an historical perspective, the decline of the inquest 
as one part of coroners' work as a whole, and the more recent 
decline of the inquest jury to its present - in formal terms - 
peripheral role, are again of interest. 
Two statistical points about the 153,366 deaths reported 
to coroners in England and Wales during 1975 remain to be made. 
Firstly, in addition to the total figure for deaths reported to 
coroners in 1975 given above and throughout this chapter, 
another 33 deaths occurring in England and Wales were dealt 
with under Section 7 of the Visiting Forces Act 1952. * Such 
* Source: Unpublished Home Office statistics 
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TABLE 5(3)4: ADDITIONAL FEATURES OF INQUESTS HELD IN 19753 
Total number inquests 
(excluding treasure' trove) 
with juries 
without juries 
Total number inquests 
dealing with treasure trove 
6,588 (28.1%) 
16,823 (71.9%) 
23,411 
17 
Total number inquests held by 
order of the High Court 3 
Total exhumations ordered by 
coroners 5 
Source: unpublished Home Office statistics 
The total figure 23,411 denotes inquests completed 
during 1975: the larger figure of 23,455 included 
in the previous table includes some inquests not 
completed. 
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deaths do not reach the statistics of sudden death collected 
from coroners' returns to the Home Office. Secondly, it may 
be of interest to note that of the 153,366 deaths which were 
reported in 1975,64,356 (42%) were female, and 89,010 were 
male (58%). 
* 
Finally, to clarify some less central statistical matters, 
it may be recalled that a number of inquests are adjourned 
(and not resumed) each year in circumstances where proceedings 
are to follow in the criminal courts. Table 5(2)4 indicated 
that in 1975 the number of inquests thus adjourned was 1,059. 
It is possible to trace the ultimate result of criminal 
proceedings in such cases, and table 5(3)5 presents a summary 
of the disposal of these cases in 1975. It may be seen that, 
following adjournment, in 703 cases (over 66%) the accused was 
found guilty as charged. 157 cases (almost 15%) resulted in 
acquittal. (The other disposals can be seen at table 5(3)5). 
In the early part of the twentieth century - and for hundreds 
of years before - such verdicts of guilt and innocence would 
effectively have been made not in "another court" but at the 
coroner's inquest itself. Another contemporary aspect of 
such cases is that of those found guilty 497 cases (over 70%) 
concerned the causing of death by dangerous driving. Murder, 
manslaughter and infanticide convictions in the criminal court 
accounted for the remaining cases where the accused was found 
guilty. 
In considering the statistics of coroners' work during one 
year, 1975, it may be concluded that the examination of inquest 
verdicts alone (table 5(2)4) reveals only the formal statistical 
* Source: Unpublished Home Office statistics 
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product of one part of coroners' work. It was necessary, 
therefore, to consider the use of form A, form B, and inquest 
procedures to describe more adequately the content of coroners' 
work, the "typical nature" of their activities. Examination 
of the national figures indicated, for instance, that a coroner's 
"typical disposal" (in 72% of deaths reported) was by post- 
mortem examination alone. This observation has some value: 
it enables, for instance, a broad historical comparison. It 
also describes what the total number of coroners are. in total. 
doing. 
- 
However, it became clear that, in examining the statistics 
from individual coroners' jurisdictions, the overall national 
statistics may be of limited relevance, - or, more specifically, 
have limited meaning - in describing and understanding the 
particular work of particular coroners. The relation between 
the general and the particular must therefore be treated with 
caution. Description of both is necessary. 
In the next section of the discussion, a further approach 
to coroners' statistics is made. Coroners' work in a 
particular jurisdiction - "City" - is examined, through its 
statistical products, over a fifty-year period which, as before, 
refers to the years 1926 - 1975. In this case, there is 
particularity of location in geographical terms, accompanied 
by the generality of a considerable period of time i. e., what 
are the general characteristics of coroners' work in this 
particular jurisdiction over a fifty-year period? 
5(4) One Place: Coroners' Work in 'City' 1926-1975 
Coroners? work in England and Wales has so far been 
approached in two ways. Firstly, national statistics over a 
fifty-year period were considered. Secondly, statistics for 'a 
single year were examined, moving from a concentration on the 
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average national statistics to an emphasis on the importance 
of the particularities of coroners' work in particular areas. 
It seems that some conclusions can properly be drawn about 
coroners' work 'as a whole' by consideration of the total 
statistical product, but if such conclusions are based only on 
accumulated totals or calculated averages, their scope is 
limited. In this section of the discussion, therefore, the 
statistical products of a single coroner's jurisdiction - 
'City' - over a fifty-year period are examined. 
Access to the work of 'City' coroner over the period 1926 
to 1975 was by study of the handwritten 'ledgers' kept in the 
coroner's office. Numerous visits were made to the coroner's 
office over a five month period in order to gather this 
information (see Appendix I). Full access was freely given, 
but the nature of the records involved a rather laborious task 
of collecting information which remained less than systematic: 
for instance, it was not possible to collect details of all, 
inquests, form As, and form Bs over the entire. fifty-year period 
as the different non-inquest cases, in particular, were not 
invariably clearly distinguished. Despite these difficulties, 
it was felt that the 'City' ledgers nonetheless were capable 
of yielding valuable material relevant to the overall project. 
It was decided to concentrate on completed inquests where 
a verdict had been recorded. Even here periodic difficulties 
remained: table 5(4)1 therefore includes notes which amplify 
some of the interpretations necessarily made in the course of 
the field research and also provides additional details for 
particular deaths, particular verdicts or particular years. 
The verdicts of suicide, accident/misadventure and open verdicts 
were selected for inclusion at table 5(4)1: other verdicts, 
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in this single coroner's jurisdiction, were numerically few, 
although notes are added where it appeared relevant. It should 
be added that verdicts of accident and misadventure are merged 
at table 5(4)1 (as they are in coroners' returns to the Home 
Office) although they were recorded separately in the 'ledgers'. 
Thus table 5(4)1 records features of the principal inquest 
categorisations made by the 'City' coroners from 1926 to 1975. 
Conclusions may be drawn about the pattern of coroner's inquest 
work in one jurisdiction over a lengthy period of time. Such 
conclusions may be evaluated in conjunction with the national 
figures for the same fifty-year period: and, more generally, 
with reference to the overall consideration of the statistical 
products of coroners' work. 
The records of the city coroner dated back to the early 
nineteenth century. The opportunity was therefore also taken 
to record some of the verdicts returned at that time, which 
reflect not only some important legal developments and medical 
changes, but also reflect the shift in "levels of adequacy" 
of coroners' verdicts since the nineteenth century. Some 
verdicts from this period are presented at table 5(4)2. 
The search of handwritten records in the 'City' coroner's 
office not only raised the practical question of how to render 
information (of varying quality) manageable, it also raised the 
issue of exactly which details it was relevant to collect, 
present, and subsequently discuss. The aims and emphases of the 
research as a whole allowed a suitable selection to be made. 
The central criterion was recording of material relevant to the 
characteristics of coroners' work in one jurisdiction over a 
period of time, rather than material relating to characteristics 
of the deceased. Had the latter emphasis been chosen instead, 
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details of age and sex characteristics of those despatched into 
the categories of suicide, accident/misadventure and open 
verdict during the fifty-year period in 'City' could, in fact, 
have been collected in a sufficiently systematic form. However, 
such information on the personal characteristics of those whose 
deaths were reported to the 'City' coroner, and upon whom an 
inquest was subsequently held and completed, would have had no 
clear relevance to the study as a whole. It may well have had 
relevance to another study, with different aims and interest. 
However, it would have made little contribution to an under- 
standing of coronersf work. 
Consistent with the perspective adopted throughout the 
study, local statistical material was collected in order to 
illuminate the process of categorisation. It constitutes another 
approach to the statistical facts-of-death produced by the 
coroner, consistent with and complementary to the presentation 
of national statistics over a fifty-year period, and statistics 
from individual jurisdictions for a single year. As might be 
expected, the handwritten records of the 'City' coroner included 
entries which were at times idiosyncratic, but largely the 
following details were available for collection: index number 
of the case; date of death; before whom held (coroner or 
deputy); name and address of the deceased; sex; age; 
occupation; date of inquest where applicable; medical cause 
of death (perhaps accompanied by a sketch of circumstances); 
fees paid to doctors and jurors; the verdict where applicable; 
and the originator of the authority to remove the body (the 
coroner or the police). From this information, table 5(4)1 
was assembled. 
Special features at the beginning and end of the fifty-year 
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period can be noted. Firstly, for the years 1926 to 1928 
inclusive, the total number of verdicts is unavailable, as the 
records recorded inquest cases and non-inquest cases together. 
Secondly, local government re-organisation in 1974 involved a 
major change in the boundaries of the jurisdiction, as 'City' 
became 'County'. In terms of broadly comparable information, 
table 5(4)1 thus covers, essentially, the slightly truncated 
period 1929-1973. 
Table 5(4)1 indicates that 241 verdicts were recorded in 
1929, rising to over 300 verdicts in 1938,1939 and 1941, 
but then falling until 1973, when only 103 verdicts were 
returned. More than twice as many verdicts were recorded in 
1929 than in 1973. However, the fall in the number of inquests 
opened by the coroner during this period would not be quite as 
dramatic as the figures for completed inquests would suggest, 
as indefinite adjournments have become required of the coroner 
in cases of suspected homicide and certain road traffic deaths. 
Notwithstanding the relevance of adjournments, it remains 
clear, from table 5(4)1, that fewer inquests as a whole were 
being conducted in 'city' as the fifty-year period continued. 
The decreasing use of the inquest in 'city', indeed, was 
consistent with the national trend (see table 5(2)2). In this 
instance, the 'particular' and the 'general' are compatible. 
Against this background of a falling number of inquests 
(and verdicts), it is of interest to consider the three selected 
verdicts in turn. In absolute numbers, verdicts of suicide in 
'city' total 32 in 1929, rising to 46 in 1935 and 1936, and to 
50 in 1939. There is a low figure of 21 in 1942. Suicide 
verdicts reach 50 again in 1955, and their maximum of 55 in 1958. 
The lowest figure of all, 19, is recorded in 1973. On the basis 
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of absolute numbers only - which, of course, should be treated 
with caution, especially in isolation from population 
statistics and other points of reference - there appears to be 
no systematic pattern in the recording of suicide verdicts over 
this'; period in 'city'. All that can unarguably be said is that 
the number of suicide verdicts recorded in "city" between 1929 
and 1973 varied between 19 and 55, with no uniform pattern of 
increase or decrease. It will be seen, however, that table 
5(4)1 also recorded suicide verdicts as percentages of all 
verdicts recorded. Suicide amounted to 13.3% of all "city" 
verdicts in 1929; increasing consistently to over 21% in 
1936; falling for the next ten years; and between 1946 and 
1969 remaining at between 20 - 36.5% of all verdicts. Again, 
is there any pattern to this? It seems unlikely. In absolute 
numbers, there were more than twice as many suicide verdicts 
in 1931 than in 1973, but suicide verdicts as proportions of 
all verdicts demonstrate no consistent trends. Such 
variations as occurred in "city" during this period were 
perhaps linked to legal changes (e. g. 1961 -Suicide Act) 
relating to suicide and importantly, to changes in the moral 
and normative environment. Perhaps the latter appears vague, 
yet it is implicitly referred to in the "city" coroners ledger. 
It can be seen, for instance (table 5(4)1 ) that in 1940, 
the only suicide verdict (from a total of 32) to receive the 
special, censorious, label of "self-murder" was that of a 
prisoner. In 1945,1946 and 1951 the only cases to be spec- 
ifically recorded as 'lfelo de se" are, again, the "morally 
unworthy": in these cases, people named as guilty of "wilful 
murder". This "special" kind of suicide implies conscious 
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choice, and, in these cases, a wilful avoidance of the con- 
sequences of the law. At the other end of this continuum are 
those cases of suicide (1949,1953) where the word "lunatic" 
has been added, in red ink, to the standard details. The bare 
statistics of suicide verdicts in "city" reveal relatively little 
about the nature of categorisations: the occasionally appended 
note in the ledger reveals more, especially in terms of the 
reasoning within the generic categorisation. 
Verdicts of accident/misadventure number 134 in 1939; 
slightly over 200 in 1939; rising to 241 in 1941. (The high 
figure of 241 in the latter year is accounted for by the 
effects of the Second World War and the level of bombing: this 
is not to introduce an inappropriate "explanation" for the 
apparent "incidence" of accident/misadventure cases, it is 
simply that the category of "war operations" is an extra basis 
for categorisation as accident/misadventure, absent from all 
years except 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942). From 1946 
until 1973, verdicts of misadventure number figures either 
somewhat greater than, or smaller than, -100 each year. As a 
proportion of all verdicts, accident/misadventure verdicts 
appear to increase: with the exception of 1957, verdicts of 
accident/misadventure amount to more than half the total 
verdicts reached by the city coroner throughout the period 
1929-73, and from 1965 to 1973, such verdicts on average amount 
to more than 70% of all verdicts. It is tempting to conclude 
that accident/misadventure verdicts represent, for coroners 
themselves, the typical form of inquest work: such verdicts 
are after all recorded more often than any other; they are, 
historically, a constant feature of inquest work and indeed, 
in "city", they represent an increasing proportion of inquest 
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work. 
It has already been noted that the accident/misadventure 
verdict is sufficiently nebulous to accomodate changes in what 
common-sense knowledge sees, routinely, as different "sorts" 
of deaths. Ledger-notes point to some of these changes, which 
can be seen as the "renewal" of the wide boundaries within 
which accident/misadventure is legitimately said to "have 
happened". In 1935, the ledger adds "deaths motor vehicles 
involved" to the initial sub-classification of accident/ 
misadventure cases as "falls", "burns", and so on (table 5(4)1). 
War operations were brought into the remit of the verdict in 
temporary circumstances. In 1967, it can also be seen that a 
means of death usually routinely associated with suicide 
verdicts may exceptionally be brought in to the category of 
misadventure. 
In "city", open verdicts have been recorded in relatively 
small numbers throughout the period 1929-73. A maximum of 33 
cases was recorded in 1932, and thereafter numbers tended to 
fall: 20 open verdicts in 1940,11 in 1945,6 in 1950,4 in 
1955,6 in 1960,2 in 1965,4 in 1970. Table 5(4)1 also 
indicates that open verdicts have steadily decreased as a 
proportion of all verdicts, although percentage calculations on 
the basis of such small numbers must be treated with care. 
Fewer open verdicts were recorded at the end of the period than 
at the beginning. What sort of meaning, if any, can this 
development be thought to have? It might be suggested that this 
development is simpler to approach, conceptually, than 'fewer 
accidents' or 'fewer suicides' would be, as laymen and sociologis 
would not see open verdicts as a natural feature of the world: 
one would not talk of 'fewer open verdicts happening'. That 
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would have no meaning at all. So, to talk of 'fewer open 
verdicts' (as opposed to other verdicts) is to talk of fewer 
open verdicts being recorded rather than fewer such verdicts 
happening. The account is already pointed in the direction of 
coroners', and others', activities, rather than toward supposed 
events-in-the-world. 
To consider possible accounts of 'fewer open verdicts' 
in 'city' is to consider numerous different factors: it may be 
that the arrival of a new coroner brought a changed perception 
of the desirability of open verdicts (interviews indicated 
varying perceptions of the worth of this verdict amongst 
coroners); it may be that changes in medical, police, admin- 
istrative or other facilities in and around 'city' rendered the 
open verdict less appropriate so far as the coroner's true 
stories were concerned; it may be, as we have noted above, that 
'levels of adequacy' at the inquest change over time and, in 
the case of 'city', a consequence was that open verdicts were 
recorded less often. There is no definitive account. It can 
only be concluded that (as a statistical product of what coroners 
do) open verdicts in the 'city' jurisdiction decreased as a 
proportion of all inquest verdicts, whereas suicide and accident/ 
misadventure did not. 
The national (England and Wales) statistics of coroners' 
inquest work during the period 1925 to 1975 have already been 
discussed (see table5(2)4). It was suggested that the continuing 
'relevance' (to coroners) of the accident/misadventure verdict 
lay in its capacity to accomodate changed meanings and absorb 
a range of potential true stories. This conclusion can be 
applied both to the national statistics and to the local statistics 
collected from the 'city' ledgers. The comparison of 'national' 
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and 'city' open verdicts is not so simple, as (in terms of 
absolute numbers) the national totals for open verdicts tend to 
show an increased, rather than decreased use, reinforced further 
by the overall fall in numbers of inquests held during the 
fifty-year period. Perhaps this observation lends weight to 
the thesis that national statistics are not 'larger' representations 
of substantially similar proportions of verdicts amongst 
individual coroners, but that particular coroners form their 
categorisations in rather different ways, and this may be 
reflected in the local statistics of any particular verdict. 
In suicide verdicts throughout England and Wales, there was a 
gradual fall in absolute numbers during the fifty-year period. 
There was no consistent trend in the numbers of suicide 
verdicts recorded in 'city' during the same period. Again, it 
is clear that national trends, discernible in total collections 
of many local statistics, do not necessarily indicate the 
particular features of particular coroner's inquest work. 
In summary, table 5(4)1 presented three inquest verdicts 
recorded in 'city' over a fifty-year period. It was not 
possible to include all ledger notes, but not infrequently 
such notes provided valuable additional information, especially 
about statistically unusual features. For instance, a note 
attached to the 1965 totals in the handwritten register of the 
coroner gave brief details of seven inquests which were opened 
but not completed following circumstances where seven people 
were assumed to have died at sea. "Bodies not recovered. 
Presumed dead under Home Office direction, by virtue of 
Coroners (Amendment) Act 1926 Section 18.11 An inquest may be 
held (indeed, it may be completed, unlike the cases above) even 
in the absence of a body. 
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It was not part of the planned project for local study of 
coroner's office statistics to trace coroners' verdicts back 
to the nineteenth century and beyond. Nevertheless, informal 
collection of some verdicts from the mid-nineteenth century 
was felt to be of interest, and details are included at table 
5(4)2. The rapid nature of the changes in coroners' categor- 
isations - and the legal, medical and moral contexts in which 
coroners' activities take place - is quite clear, especially 
viewed in terms of the coroner's eight-hundred year-old history. 
Verdicts listed in table 5(4)2 are, in this sense, part of the 
coroner's recent history. An early twentieth-century popular 
medical encyclopaedia also reveals the changed context of 
coroner's decisions: 
"DEATH, Sudden 
No matter what the cause of'-sudden death 
is, whether an accident or sudden illness, 
the ultimate reason of a person dying is 
always one of the following three: 
Syncope Lheart failureJ, asphyxia, or coma. " 
(111000 Medical Hints. An Encyclopaedic Dictionary 
on the Care of the Body in Health and Disease. " 
No Date). 
TABLE 5(4)2 EXTRACTS FROM "CITY" 
INQUISITION BOOK 1857/1858. 
VERDICTS 
1) Died by the Visitation of God (several) 
2) Accidental Death (several) 
3) Died by Excessive Drinking (several) 
4) Found Dead in Bed 
5) Manslaughter Against (named individual) 
6) Murder Against (named individual) 
7) Hanged/Drowned Himself Whilst Insane 
8) Died of Consumption 
9) Found Dead with Marks of Violence 
10) Found Dead 
11) Died by Overdose of Godfrey's Cordial 
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The anecdotal details given above emphasise that any 
historical consideration of coroners' verdicts (local or 
national) must recognise the changing context of coroners' 
work, the considerable changes in the stocks of technical and 
commonsense knowledge from which coroners draw, and the sub- 
stantial changes in the required 'level of adequacy' of coroners' 
verdicts. (In 1857 - 1858 death through "visitation of God" 
was an adequate account) If specific legal and procedural 
changes in coroners' work are also added, it is a matter for 
surprise that consistent patterns in the use of a particular 
verdict appear at all. Indeed, it may be suggested that in 
considering either a number of coroners' jurisdictions in a 
particular year, or one coroner's jurisdiction over a lengthy 
period of time, some of the apparent regularities in total 
accumulated national statistics disappear. 
The final section of this discussion of the statistics 
of coroners' work gives further consideration to verdicts of 
suicide. 
5(5) Suicide: 1975 - 1980: A Special Case? 
The present study has so far treated suicide much like any 
other coroner's verdict. The formal organisational process of 
'constituting' suicide, (i. e. rendering suicide as, for all 
practical and statistical purposes, 'real') has been considered 
alongside the organisational process of categorising any other 
sudden death and constructing any other verdict. The same 
sociological perspective has been adopted. A brief consideration 
of published suicide statistics for the period 1975 to 1980 
permits an evaluation of whether suicide is a 'special case': 
that is, whether anything needs to be said of suicide (for the 
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purposes at hand) that is not to be said of other verdicts. 
The view taken in this study has been that suicide is not 
an inherently meaningful thing-in-the-world but is, instead, a 
phenomenon (or range of phenomena) that can only be intelligibly 
described and discussed in terms of the methods by which 
'suicide' acquires meaning. This does not imply the absurd 
philosophical position that the experiential world of 'suicide' 
has no existence. Rather, this perspective suggests that 
coroners give meaning, formally, to disorganised events, words, 
documents and other artefacts by producing suicide verdicts - 
and officially sanctioned statistics. Members of society may 
informally give meaning to sudden deaths, and these informal 
categorisations may or may not correspond with those of the 
coroner. Others (such as sociologists of suicide, psychiatric 
researchers or psychologists), using their particular stocks of 
knowledge, may choose to re-define certain deaths, claiming 
a 'more accurate' production of the facts-of-suicide. This may 
or may not be a worthwhile exercise, depending on the aims the 
researcher has in mind, but the result of any exercise in 
redefinition of deaths, from whatever stock of knowledge, is 
merely the production of another true-story. 
For our purposes, the coroner's true story remains solely 
responsible for the publicly known and officially-sanctioned 
facts-of-the-matter. In short, although any member of society 
may personally and informally categorise any death as a suicide, 
this lay process of definition would have no significance for 
the formal, statistical end-product: it would not affect the 
'facts of sudden death' as received through organisational 
processes. Of course, informal categorisations made by community 
members, friends or family involved may have considerable 
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significance for those immediately concerned: an informal 
definition of a death as being a case of suicide may certainly 
have a personal significance. However, such informal categor- 
isations do not constitute the 'facts of suicide' as tangibly 
and formally recorded in suicide statistics. At most, 
informal categorisations only produce 'private facts'. 
Indeed, 'expert' reclassifications of suicide are akin to 
lay classifications, insofar as neither have significance for 
the formal rate-producing process. The significance of 
coroners' categorisations lies in the coroner's formal authority 
to make binding judgements about the nature and meaning of 
'what really happened' and to ensure the transfer of these 
judgements into permanent statistical records: in this case, 
records of suicide. It is from this point that the available 
facts-of-suicide for the period 1975-1980 may be considered. 
The three tables relating to verdicts of suicide present 
the same information in three different ways. Table 5(5)1 
presents the absolute numbers of suicide verdicts for the six 
relevant years, and the progressive annual increase in numbers 
is clear. Table 5(5)2 adds the total number of deaths for each 
of the relevant years, and expresses suicide verdicts as a rate 
per 1,000 deaths. It can be seen that while the year-to-year 
increase does not correspond to that suggested by absolute 
numbers of verdicts alone, the annual increase in suicide 
verdicts remains. Table 5(5)3 expresses the statistics of 
suicide in what is perhaps the more usual form,. i. e. as a rate 
per 100,000 population (years 1976 to 1980), and also treats 
male and female cases separately. Once more, an increase is 
evident, and, indeed, the conventional ratio of female suicide 
to male suicide is confirmed. As the various possible present- 
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TABLE 5(5)1 NUMBERS OF SUICIDE VERDICTS 
AND WALES, 1975-1980* 
YEAR TOTAL SUICIDE VERDICTS 
197511* 3,693 
1976 3,816 
1977 3,944 
1978 4,022 
1979 4,195 
1980 4,321 
TABLE 5(5)2 SUICIDE 
ENGLAND AND WA 
YEAR TOTAL DEATHS 
1975 582,841 
1976 59 8,516 
1977 575,928 
1978 585,901 
1979 593,019 
1980 581 , 385 
S PER 1,000 DEA 
c1'7K_l aRn 3faf*e 
SUICIDE VERDICTS PER 
1,000 DEATHS 
6.34 
6.37 
6.85 
6.86 
7.07 
7.43 
*Source: Central Statistical Office (1981) years 1975 to 1978; 
Central Statistical Office (1983) years 1979 to 1980 
The 1975 figure does not correspond to the total suicide 
verdicts for that year included at table 5(2)4 i. e. 
3,717. It would appear that different accounting 
procedures lead to two different sources giving two 
different figures. See Appendix II for further discussion. 
Source: Central Statistical Office (1981; 1983) : 
Column 2 
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TABLE 5(5)3 Suicide Rates Per 100,000 Population 
England and Wales, 1976-19803 
Year 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Source: 
Suicide Rate Per 100,000 Population 
Male I Female 
9.7 
9.9 
10.2 
10.7 
11 .0 
Office of Populatior 
5.9 
6.3 
6.3 
6.5 
6.7 
i Censuses and Surveys (1983) 
ations of suicide statistics for the period 1975 to 
1980 yield 
such consistent results, there is no doubt that coroners were 
producing more verdicts of suicide during this period. 
Just as 
the 'falling suicide rate' of the early 1970s may be accounted 
for by changes in coroners' activities (the introduction of the 
requirement to prove suicide was important, and so too is 
the 
typical view of coroners at interview that this fall was 'more 
apparent than real'), perhaps the subsequent 'rise' may be simi- 
larly accounted for by the activities of coroners. Eglin et. al. 
(1983) account for the 'suicide epidemic' in a part of Canada in 
terms of changes in coroners' work. This will be discussed in 
more detail in the. concluding chapter below. For now, let us 
consider whether the British figures for the late 1970s mean that 
there has been an increase in suicide and/or an increasing 
suicide rate. 
Insofar as coroners have been recording more suicide verdicts, 
there has indeed been an 'increase in suicide': the greater number 
of verdicts are there to see. Similarly, if one accepts that a 
suicide rate is ordinarily a convenient means of expressing ab- 
solute numbers in relation to given amounts of population (e. g. 
1000 or 100,000) then there has also manifestly been an 'increasing 
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suicide rate' during the period in question. Dispute arises in 
considering the meaning of this. 
It may be that one takes the view that, from 1975 to 1980, 
an event-in-the-world called suicide happened with increasing 
frequency, that coroners, correctly, discovered this event in 
appropriate cases, and that the suicide statistics therefore 
represent, with reasonable accuracy, a real change in the 
behaviour of individuals out-there. This position is internally 
logical, and would tend to lead to a search for why, in short, 
more people are committing suicide. It may then be that a causal 
factor of particular significance is sought and found, or, more 
usually, that a correlation is found between the increase in 
suicide and the increase (or decrease) in something else - 
perhaps, during the late 1970s, the rise in unemployment would be 
particularly examined in this context (e. g. Platt 1982). It is 
permissible, without implying either criticism or approval, to 
describe such an enterprise as positivist. The positivist socio- 
logist ascribes a particular meaning to the facts-of-the-matter 
for the period in question, and then proceeds in the direction 
outlined above. However, judgement about the value of such an 
explanatory enterprise is - in this study - left open. 
Two observations are to be made about suicide in the late 
1970s. Firstly, more suicide verdicts were being recorded in con- 
sidering the period 1975 to 1980. Secondly, the necessary material 
to account for this development is not available, either in this 
study or in existing sociological studies. Apart from further 
elaboration of these and related points in Chapter Seven below, 
little more can be said of suicide verdicts during the relevant 
period. 
In contrast to the position taken here, some existing work 
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within the 'sociology of suicide? has not clearly distinguished 
the issues it is addressing from those it is not. Sociological 
material on suicide is discussed in detail in Chapter Six below, 
and that discussion may be prefaced here by a brief consideration 
of some aims and methods within the sociology of suicide. 
Douglas (1967), for instance, did not satisfactorily demon- 
strate whether he broke (or wished to break) from the Durkheimian 
tradition. Douglas perceived in Durkheim's approach to suicide a 
concern with "social meanings" which Douglas himself adopted 
(1967,41-42). Douglas also read Durkheim's Suicide (1970) as 
ultimately a non-positivist work, insofar as it focussed upon 
such "social meanings" (Douglas 1967,76). Yet Douglas claimed, 
equally, that Durkheim's method was to ascribe essentially common- 
sense meanings to collections of behaviours which thus became 
'suicide' (1967,68). Douglas also appears to regard Durkheim 
as being primarily interested in erecting a particular theoretical/ 
methodological construct, which only secondarily has any bearing 
on suicide at all: a criticism perhaps also to be made of 
Douglas' study, or that of Atkinson (1978). Douglas' theoretical 
position was never clearly stated and, notwithstanding the 
lasting importance of his critique of official statistics, the 
status of suicide statistics as either (more or less) reliable 
indicators of events out-there in the world or as constructions 
or artefacts which, in principle, cannot be linked, reliably or 
unreliably, to events out-there was left unresolved. "Social 
meanings", as a term used by Douglas, served to blur, rather than 
clarify, both the object of study and the method. of study. 
Atkinson's position (1978) is ultimately that of an ethno- 
methodologist, and although his preceding theoretical and method- 
ological positions undergo considerable change, the options are 
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set out explicitly. Atkinson describes the initial concerns of 
his study as "naively 'positivist' in character' (1978,4). The 
next stage was to adopt a "labelling theory" of suicide and 
coroners' activities drawn from interactionism (1971). Ultimately, 
a 'solution' to the 'problem' of coroners' categorisations of 
suicide (and members' categorisations of phenomena, and their 
maintenance of social order) is found in ethnomethodology 
(Atkinson 1978,5-8). The adoption of the ethnomethodological 
position takes place at the close of Atkinson's study: thus the 
description of what an ethnomethodological study would look like 
is entirely 'programmatic' (1978,175-197). However, Atkinson 
claims that criticisms of ethnomethodology as unspecific, 
vague and 'programmatic' are rooted in a misunderstanding of 
ethnomethodology: 
Such a complaint ... reveals a profound mis- 
understanding of the distinction between the 
correspondence and congruence theories of reality 
..... and, in particular, seems to stem from a 
persistent adherence to the correspondence 
version ..... to complain that ethnomethodology fails to tell us what kind of study is indicated 
by their programmatics is to complain that they 
are accepting the logic of their own programmatics, 
namely that the task of formulating a literal 
description of some object in the world (which 
in this case would be lethnomethodological works) 
with that concrete object itself is an infinite 
and impossible task. 
(Atkinson 
1978,180-181) 
In short, it seems that an ethnomethodological study of suicide 
or of coroners' categorisations cannot be described until it 
has actually been completed, and Atkinson does not proceed to 
further work specifically in this area. 
To sum up, it has been argued that, in considering the 
suicide statistics for the years 1975 to 1980, the theoretical 
position adopted will influence the direction in which analysis 
proceeds and the questions which are posed. To adopt a positivist 
position, involving the search for causal factors behind the 
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'increase in suicide', has been said to be an internally logical 
enterprise, but not one which interests us here. The present 
study has adopted a perspective which, in the sense outlined above 
allows that 'suicide' can indeed be said to have 'increased', 
but which does not then proceed to ascribe a meaning to this 
phenomenon which would lead to the search for 'causes' or 
'correlations'. Such areas are outside the scope of the present 
discussion. It has further been argued that neither Douglas 
(1967) nor Atkinson (1978) provide a useful basis on which to 
consider the available facts-of-the-matter, for their theoretical 
and methodological frameworks. are, in the former case, muddled, 
and, in the latter case, unclear on the level of research practice. 
It might briefly be added that the success of Durkheim's 
attempt to provide a sociological explanation of a social fact 
called suicide has still not been finally evaluated. The 
originality of Durkheim's enterprise remains clear, as in the 
following passage: 
Disregarding the individual as such, his motives 
and his ideas, we shall seek directly the states 
of the various social environments ..... in terms of which the variations of suicide occur. 
Only then returning to the individual, shall we 
study how these general causes become individ- 
ualized so as to produce the homicidal results 
involved. (Durkheim, 1970,151) 
In carrying out his project, Durkheim found. his evidence 
of the 'variations of suicide' within the officially-produced 
statistics, the published 'suicide rate', akin to the rate 
expressed in the tables above. Individual characteristics or 
circumstances might accompany instances of suicide, but for 
Durkheim individual factors could not explain the suicide rate 
(1898,297). The "determining causes" of suicide lay elsewhere 
(1970,297). Thus it was possible for Durkheim to speak of 
the "suicidal aptitude" of a society (1970,299). 
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It is reasonable to characterise Durkheim's position as that 
of a positivist, moving from the facts expressed in the suicide- 
rate to a systematic explanation of the determining causes of 
variations in this rate. Douglas' reading was rather different 
insofar as he saw Durkheim's study of suicide as a break with 
positivism, and insofar as it was allegedly concerned with what 
Douglas understood to be "social meanings"(1967.76). Taylor's 
more thorough consideration of Durkheim is expressed more 
cautiously: Durkheim's study "..... represented an important, 
though by no means complete, break with the positivist approaches 
of competing works" (1982,7). 
Theoretical labels can be discussed endlessly, perhaps with 
decreasing meaning. In short, it may be concluded that the 
positivist sociologist (in the sense in which positivism is 
defined at the beginning of the present study) would, on the basis 
of the increase in verdicts of suicide between 1975 and 1980 in 
England and Wales proceed to address questions of cause and ex- 
planation which are outside the scope of the present study. This 
position - of excluding matters which are simply beyond the scope 
of the task at hand - is perhaps more satisfactory than the ob- 
scurity into which discussions of competing theoretical options 
can sometimes lead and preferable to the tendency which views all 
such competing theories and methods as somehow indefensible. 
Are the suicide statistics for the years 1975 to 1980 then 
a 'special case' in any sense? In terms of the statistics' 
meaning and significance for the present study, the answer is no, 
for the statistics are the tangible products of coroners' activities 
like any other coroners' statistics. An increased number of suicide 
verdicts during a recent period of British history poses questions 
which are of interest on many levels, including a "political" level, 
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but the temptation is resisted to explore areas of supposed 
causation and association which are properly the concern of 
another study, with other aims. Suicide verdicts are arrived 
at within an organisational setting, using certain practical 
rules, toward a formal goal, i. e. production of the facts-of- 
the-matter. Suicide verdicts are no more, or less, interesting 
in terms of the sociological analysis of their production than 
any other coroners' verdict. Nor can any special case be found 
here for suicide in terms of any unique relation to 'events in 
the world' - again, this must be looked at like any other 
verdict. Differences will be found in the manner of production 
of particular verdicts, as we noted in Chapter Four, but these 
differences do not signify essential differences in methods of 
producing the facts-of-the-matter. 
Sociologists without doubt will continue to be especially 
interested in suicide, amongst all other areas of coroners' 
inquest and non-inquest work, partly because a body of knowledge 
called "the sociology of suicide" already exists, partly because 
suicide might be held to indicate some prevailing features of 
society, and partly because suicide, since Durkheim, has 
occupied a revered place in the elaboration of particular 
sociological theories, rules, and methods. However, no 
justification can be found here for treating suicide as a 
especial case" within the area of activity known as "coroners' 
work". 
5(6) Conclusions 
The statistics of coroners' work have been examined in a 
number of ways: inquest and non-inquest cases; use of the post-morte: 
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examination; inquest verdicts nationally over a considerable 
period of time; detailed aspects of coroners' work during a 
single year; comparisons between individual coroners' 
jurisdictions; the status of suicide as a 'special case'; 
adjournments; and the work of coroners in one city over a 
lengthy period. All such statistics have been viewed as formal 
products of coroners' activities, the constructed facts arising 
from those processes discussed at interview with coroners and 
observed in attendance at a coroner's court. Statistics have 
been derived from published sources, unpublished sources, and 
field research in a coroner's office and, as a whole, constitute 
the third and final element of empirical material upon which 
the study is based. 
The following conclusions may now be suggested: 
1) The statistics of coroners' work are a rich source of 
descriptive material about coroners' activities. The 
statistics can productively be used'in this way while sus- 
pending all judgements about the 'incidence' of 'different 
types of deaths'. 
2) The national statistics indicate that an ever-increasing 
number of deaths were reported to coroners during the 
period 1926 to 1975. 
3) Coroners' work (form A, form B, and inquest) has become an 
increasing feature of the State system for dealing with 
death in general. 
4) Within the enlarged number and proportion of deaths reported 
to coroners, a decreasing proportion involve an inquest. 
There has not only b, @, en a general change over the fifty-year 
period in the numbers of deaths dealt with by coroners, 
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there has also been a change in the coroner's typical manner 
of 'settling' those deaths: the post-mortem examination is 
now the coroner's key instrument. 
5) There has been a progressive medicalisation of coroners' 
work, based on the increased centrality of medical evidence, 
increased use of the post-mortem examination, curtailment 
of coroners' powers in criminal matters, changes in verdicts 
available, and changes in the "level of adequacy" required 
of and by coroners. 
6) There has been a bureaucratisation of coroners' work. 
Coroners' work is now a major part of the bureaucratic 
system for dealing with death in an advanced industrial 
society. Some ancient functions and powers have been 
abandoned. Coroners' work is an increasing part of the 
social organisation of death in general. 
7) While coroners' work as a whole tends today to form part 
of the medico-bureaucratic system, rather than the criminal- 
investigative -legal system, the inquest itself retains the 
structure associated with its former functions. 
8) Consideration of the total (national) statistics of coroners' 
work over a substantial period exposes some of the legal,, 
moral and normative changes which have occurred in the 
framework of coroners' activities. The effective boundaries 
within which constructions are produced are subject to 
change over time. The script by which coroners write true- 
stories is not static. 
9) Examination of inquest verdicts over a period of time 
reveals that alongside the disappearance of some verdicts 
(murder, manslaughter, infanticide) there has been a re- 
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emergence of others (e. g. addiction to drugs). In the 
former case, the disappearance of a verdict was accounted 
for by formal change in the verdicts available while in 
the latter case, perhaps more interestingly, the 'renewal' 
of a verdict may be accounted for by the renewal of its 
meaning. It is also on the level of meaning that the 
continued central use of the accident/misadventure verdict 
can be accounted for, as this verdict has a particularly 
wide sweep of potential meanings: the potential true- 
stories which ultimately constitute accident/misadventure 
verdicts change over time but remain substantial enough 
in number to ensure its continued use. 
10) Changes in verdicts recorded, and verdicts available, over 
a period of time suggest that normative, moral or ideological 
changes in society may "leave behind" the formal verdict 
and its typical meaning, and that, subsequently, formal 
legal changes in the verdicts available may "catch up" 
with changed moresand meanings in the wider society e. g. 
previously available verdicts such as "felo de se" or 
"excessive drinking". 
11) An adequate account for a coroner at one time may no 
longer be an adequate account a number of years later, 
i. e. the criteria of adequacy, so far as coronerst 
categorisations are concerned, are subject to change, This 
conclusion is meant to apply to general criteria of 
adequacy (which may or may not be formally defined) in 
coroners' work as a whole. Additionally, there may also be 
differences., between individual coroners in what is perceived 
as a necessary adequate account of the death at hand. 
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12) Discussion of inquest verdicts may productively occur even 
when a sceptical attitude, or a suspension of judgement, 
is adopted toward the relation between verdicts and the 
"incidence" of the "sort of death" they ostensibly 
describe. The verdict of still-born, however, may be 
conceptually different from other verdicts, for it may 
refer only to the fact of death and, as such, describe a 
natural event-in-the-world, not a construction. It may 
in some circumstances become a construction (see above) 
but is not necessarily so. In the nineteenth century and 
before, some other verdicts (e. g. "found dead") were akin 
to the verdict of still-born, but they have gradually 
disappeared as the criteria of adequacy have changed. Even 
the verdict of natural causes is not, today, akin to the 
still-born verdict, because for a death to reach the 
inquest stage, and then to become a verdict of "natural 
causes", other potential categorisations must have been 
conceptually possible: "natural causes" at an inquest is 
thus a construction, otherwise it would have been dealt 
with at the form A or form B stages. 
13) Examination of the total statistics of coroners' work 
permitsa description of coroners' total activities. In 
this sense, general statements about what coroners, in 
total, have been doing are possible, and the national 
statistics have a meaning, and a use, on such a level. 
Such statements cannot, however, necessarily be regarded as 
describing what individual coroners are doing. Consideration 
of the statistics of individual jurisdictions suggested that 
different coroners may have rather different practices. 
Conclusions about particular jurisdictions must be based 
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upon study of those particular jurisdictions. This is 
consistent with the differing perceptions of coroners 
described during interview, and the discussion above of 
coroners' discretion. 
14) If, as concluded above, the post-mortem examination is now 
the "key instrument" of the coroner, this would seem to 
bear out the focus of the present study on coroners' work 
as a whole, and not only upon the inquest. Notwithstanding 
this, the inquest remains highly important insofar as it 
is a public display of the process of categorisation, 
where the construction of the facts-of-the-matter is visible 
for sociological study. This is not to suggest that the 
inquest is important only because it is, usually, publicly- 
available. There is also a sense in which the inquest 
alone reveals the "essential form" of coroners' work, 
because the account presented at the inquest is so much 
more a thorough-going (causal) true-story than the minimal 
information required by form A or form B. The inquest 
demands a much greater level of adequacy than form A or B. 
15) In considering suicide verdicts for the years 1975 to 1980, 
it was concluded that suicide (i. e. verdicts of suicide) 
has indeed increased (i. e. more verdicts have been recorded, 
absolutely, in relation to total deaths, and in relation to 
population) during the relevant period. However, a meaning 
was not attached to this development which would permit the 
search for causal accounts or explanations. The choice 
of those sociologists and others who wish to seek such 
explanations was not dismissed, but was regarded as non- 
relevant within the terms of this discussion. It was also 
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concluded that examples of sociological work which gloss 
over the choice between either fully embracing explanations, 
or fully setting them aside, produce ambiguous and 
(theoretically/methodologically) unsteady results. The 
historical importance of the sociology-of-suicide was 
noted, but it was concluded that suicide, as one of the 
verdicts available to coroners, is not a special case when 
the sociological project is to examine the processes of 
categorisation at an inquest or the salient characteristics 
of coroners' work as a whole. 
16) The statistics of coroners' work, to restate, are the 
formal products of coroners' activities. The legal, moral 
and other contexts in which coroners' activities take place 
change over time. The stocks of knowledge from which 
coroners draw also change over time and, on the level of 
commonsense knowledge, may also change from place to place. 
The level of adequacy of coroners' true-stories also 
changes: both in terms of what is required of coroners 
(e. g. statutory changes) and in terms of what is required 
by coroners (in their control over the construction of 
the formal account). Aggregated statistics may not describe 
the particular activities of individual coroners, but they 
can have meaning on an abstracted level: for instance, 
in drawing conclusions about the medicalisation and 
bureaucratisation of coroners' work. It also remains 
possible, and important, to draw conclusions about the 
typical methods by which coroners categorise deaths (and 
produce statistics) and the essential characteristics of 
such methods and activities. 
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Chapters Six and Seven below form the final part of the 
study. The theoretical bases of the approach to coroners' work 
have been elaborated, coroners' activity has been placed in its 
historical context, and the material gained through interviews 
with coroners, observation of the inquest, and examination of 
published and unpublished statistics has been discussed in 
detail. Chapter Six considers "death in society": that is, 
the sociology of death in an industrial society, existing 
sociological work (which has largely concerned suicide in 
particular), ideology, "routinisation" of death, some 
philosophical work, and the situation of coroners' activities 
within some larger contexts. Finally, Chapter Seven elaborates 
some overall conclusions. 
- 278 - 
PART THREE 
CHAPTER SIX: SUICIDE AND DEATH IN SOCIETY 
6(1) Introduction 
As the results of interviews, observation and statistical 
searches have now been discussed - and provisional conclusions 
reached - it is appropriate to consider the wider context in 
which coroners' activity takes place, and to review some available 
stocks of knowledge. Firstly, some attempts at a definition and 
an aetiology of suicide will be critically evaluated. It has 
been suggested above that suicide is not a 'special case' in any 
consideration of coroners' work or the processes of categoris- 
ation. Nevertheless, most writing about sudden death within 
sociology, psychiatry and elsewhere has focussed upon suicide, 
and it is appropriate to discuss in a little more detail some of 
the work already mentioned in passing. Secondly, some 'images' 
of suicide and of death from the realms of literature and 
philosophy will be considered, as a concentration on socio- 
logical and commonsense views may leave out of account potentially 
rewarding 'stocks of knowledge'. Thirdly, the 'images' of 
suicide and death present in Press reports will be briefly 
discussed, reintroducing a topic already examined, in part, during 
discussion of the inquest. Finally, the 'handling' of death in 
general, and the coroner's concern with sudden deaths, will be 
located within identifiable cultural and ideological boundaries. 
Diverse sources are thus being used in order to examine: 
specific theories; images of death in the widest sense; the 
'handling' of sudden death and how it is 'treated' (by the 
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industrial State, by a Press report, or within philosophy or 
sociology); and the contemporary bureaucratic system for dealing 
with death, of which the coroner system is a part. Values and 
ideologies underly the way deaths are conceptualised and dealt 
with. The particular focus of much writing - not only within 
sociology - upon suicide alone must be elaborated. 
In short, 
ways of thinking about and dealing with suicide, sudden 
death 
and death in general will be examined. The immediate concern 
is 
with 'suicide and death in society'. 
6(2) The Search for Definitions and Aetiologies of Suicide 
There are several ways in which the definition of suicide 
can be approached. It was permissible, in examining coroners' 
inquest work, to leave open the question of an abstract, non- 
contextual definition of what-suicide-is: after all, a suicide 
verdict is one verdict amongst many, and to elaborate the many 
possible bases of an abstract definition may not reveal a great 
deal about coroners' work. Nevertheless, the word 'suicide' 
is routinely used by coroners, sociologists and laymen as though 
its definition were self-evident and unproblematic. 'Everybody 
knows' what sucide is on an abstract level, and it would be 
quite possible to retain a personally 'obvious' definition of 
what-suicide-is even if one chose to regard coroners' 
definitions as an entirely separate issue. Because 'everyone 
knows' what suicide is, it is of interest to examine routine, 
taken-for-granted abstract definitions. Perhaps the notion of 
suicide itself is problematic. 
Two dictionaries yield the following definitions of suicide: 
as a noun referring to a person who intentionally kills himself; 
as a noun denoting "intentional self-slaughter"; as a figurative 
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term for some "action destructive to one's own interests or 
continuance in some capacity ..... 11 as in 11political suicide" 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary). Additionally, suicide refers to 
"the act or an instance of killing oneself intentionally"; 
"the self-inflicted ruin of one's own prospects or interests" 
as in "financial suicide"; "ä person who kills himself 
intentionally"; and "(modifier) reckless, extremely dangerous" 
as in a "suicide mission". (Collins English Dictionary). The 
derivation of the word suicide is from the Latin SUI (of oneself) 
and CIDIUM (from CAEDERE, to kill). 
So, leaving aside the figurative use, "suicide" abstractly 
refers to the act or the person performing the act. A definition 
on such a level thus needs to comprise several elements: the 
individual; the act; the intention to die; and the fact of 
death. "Suicide" emerges as an act of killing, directed against 
onself, where this act is intended to succeed, and where it does 
so. This might seem to resemble any commonsense definition of 
suicide. Yet it is unlikely that the layman's answer to the 
question "what is suicide" would include all the elements listed 
above. A lay definition might typically be that "suicide is 
when someone kills him/herself', yet those who die in road 
traffic accidents or mountaineering mishaps equally "kill them- 
selves", if one assumes that nobody else was involved. Further, 
those who die as a demonstrable (in a clinical sense) result of 
their own consumption of alcohol or tobacco "kill themselves", 
literally, but are not routinely considered suicides. The layman 
therefore has to introduce the presence of intention into his 
definition of suicide. However, it is precisely on the level of 
intention that definitions of suicide become problematic. 
Intention is problematic for the coroner because evidence of 
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intention must be retrospective. For the coroner, it is a 
practical problem. It is not only a practical problem however. 
Intention underlies purposeful action. But what does it mean to 
say that the individual's self-destruction was intended? If 
the "balance of mind was disturbed", when some mental imbalance 
was allegedly present, when intoxication by alcohol was present 
or when depression was present, then it would seem that the 
notion of intention becomes rather hazy. Indeed, the existence 
of depression (a central element of lay discussions of suicide) 
would seem to cloud the possibility of straightforward intention 
by introducing irrationality and an element of determination 
(that suicide was caused rather than chosen) into the definition 
of suicide. 
Commonsense definitions of suicide, in short, contain 
potentially contradictory elements: that suicide was chosen, 
intended (it must have been intended to "be suicide") and 
deliberate; yet also that suicide occurs at times of imbalance, 
depression or irresponsibility and was thus not fully intended. 
Yet if not fully intended, it cannot "be suicide". One might 
take this contradiction further by considering suicide and 
homicide. The clinician's definition of the defendant as 
conforming to certain patterns of mental illness may denote that 
the individual was not responsible for his actions, with con- 
sequences for the subsequent application of criminal law. Yet a 
similar definition of the individual suspected of committing 
suicide as mentally ill, while logically removing his responsibility 
for his action, paradoxically confirms his suicidal status. 
The above consideration of an abstract definition is designed 
to indicate that there are contradictions even within a routinely 
'recognised' self-evident concept such as suicide. Lay thinking 
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about suicide is complex and contains inconsistencies. The 
coroner, in his formal construction of a suicide verdict, not 
only adheres to meeting a burden of proof, he also draws from 
'professional' expert practical knowledge about the many 'cases 
of suicide' he has dealt with - and from his own connection with 
lay, commonsense reasoning about (and definition of) suicide. 
The complexity of the coronerts project is evident: so too is 
the ease with which it routinely seems to be completed. A 
central means of smoothing over the difficulties of defining 
suicide ( in coroners' work or in lay reasoning) is language. 
The importance of language in the symbolic process of 
ordering the world and ascribing meaning has already been 
discussed. Let us note that language glosses over difficulties 
and contradictions. It manages inconsistencies and makes the 
world in1lligble and orderly. It is not surprising that the way 
suicide is talked about "itself" renders suicide an unproblematic 
notion. 
It was noted above that some coroners, at interview, were 
more sceptical about the meaning of the (then) "falling suicide 
rate" than researchers, using the rates as the basis for sub- 
sequent explanations, have tended to be. Similarly, at least two 
of the coroners interviewed were rather more aware of the 
problematic status of "intention" than some theorists have been. 
For instance, Lester and Lester (1971) proposed a continuum 
of suicidal behaviour: there were held to be degrees to which 
behaviour might be more, or less, suicidal. Yet given the 
discussion above, there would seem to be different senses in 
which behaviour might be "suicidal", together with complex and 
not always consistent elements to incorporate into the definition 
which could not be dealt with by such a continuum. Lester and 
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Lester's definition of suicide lies in four elements: behaviour, 
lethality, intention, and "degree of consciousness preceding the 
act. " (1971,10). Concern with abstract definitions of every 
possible occurrence of suicide led Neuringer, of the Los Angeles 
Suicide Prevention Centre, to construct a rather daunting list: 
intentional suicide; psychotic suicide; automatization suicide; 
chronic suicide; manipulation suicide; accidental suicide; 
neglect suicide; probability suicide; self-destructive suicide; 
suicidal threats; suicidal thinking; test suicide (Neuringer 
1962,273-278). Incidentally, the category of "self-destructive 
suicide" is taken to include people who 
..... overeat, smoke 
too many cigarettes, climb 
mountains, pass on the right when driving fast 
on the highway, hunt mountain lions, cross the 
street against the signal lights etc. (Neuringer 1962,274) 
Elaborations of such non-contextual definitions of suicide 
could be performed ad infinitum. Let us merely note the extent 
to which such elaborations may go, once divorced from the 
practical problem of dealing with sudden deaths. In terms of 
the present study, the relevant meaning and definition of 
suicide was found in its use: in particular, in coroners' use 
and realisation of suicide as a category. A consideration of 
Blum (1970) is a useful point at which to commence further 
consideration of meaning-in-use. Blum suggested that: 
.... a sociological phenomenon is defined in terms of its production. That is, it is defined 
in terms of the methods and procedures which 
members employ to make the phenomenon describable. (Blum, 1970,32) 
The perspective adopted by Blum is consistent with the 
congruence model of reality. It is not consistent with an 
See Atkinson (1978,176-180) and Chapter One above. 
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abstracted non-contextual approach to definition because 
-i- to understand a use we must see it within a 
context ..... it is the socially organised ways in which meanings are applied that make particular 
usages intelligible. 
(Blum, 1970,37) 
The use of, and definition of, 'suicide' is intelligible in 
the context of coroners' activities, within the organisational 
processes surrounding categorisation of a sudden death. 
Coroners' work is not the only context in which suicide is 
intelligible, of course: it is intelligible (although not 
necessarily synonymous in meaning) in lay use, religious use, 
legal use, and so on. However, the formal setting of immediate 
interest, i. e., the coroner's court, is a means of making not 
only some sudden deaths intelligible 'as suicide', but also 
of making 'suicide itself' intelligible. 
The bases on which definitions are possible are important 
because within the debates about official statistics in sociology, 
and within the practice of positivist theorising lies the 
assumption that if sociologists' "definitions" and coroners' 
"definitions" were somehow matched, or plausibly assumed to be 
similar, then the business of sociological theorising could 
proceed without reservations about the reliability of suicide 
statistics or definitional problems. Definitions-in-use, 
however, could not be non-contextually matched in such a manner. 
In considering the problem of definition, and-locating 
meaning in use, the central focus of the present study re-emerges: 
coroners' production of the practical facts-of-the-matter, the 
ascription of meaning by organisational process, and situating 
meanings and definitions in their day-to-day uses. Consideration 
of the problem of definition also involves a re-emergence of some 
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of the theoretical bases of the study. Symbolic interactionism 
(in the form of G. H. Mead's early philosophical project) and 
phenomenology have already been introduced. Other elements of 
philosophy may also be relevant. 
Routinely, a word 'means'such-and-such insofar as it is 
assumed to refer to some concrete or intangible thing. Yet 
clearly an individual has not defined every word he or she uses, 
nor can it be known that the word refers to something he or she 
has seen, touched or heard about. Even if every word were to be 
defined, it is not clear how past experience of something can be 
linked to what is being said now. The connection is problematic. 
It is the problem of linking definition to subsequent expression 
(Winch, 1958,24-26). This problem, of course, is routinely 
smoothed-over by the use of language, as noted above. Further, 
to address the problem again, one could not know that a word is 
being used now in the same way as on some previous occasion (or 
when compared to its original abstract definition) unless the 
specific context of its use was always known. (This has some 
relation to the ethnomethodologists' discussions of "indexicality"). 
To use Wittgenstein's example, even the expression "the same" 
is not always "the same", unless the circumstances of its use are 
known (1967, paragraph 215). Wittgenstein held that only by 
means of a rule may it be said that "the same" has a specific 
sense. "The use of the word 'rule' and the use of the word 'same' 
are interwoven. " (Wittgenstein, 1967, paragraph 225). What is it, 
then, 'to follow a rule'? 
Rule-following is based in others' reaction to the use of a 
rule by a member of society, i. e. it only makes sense to speak of 
someone following a rule if one can discover, in principle, what 
that rule is. Rules may not necessarily be socially recognised, 
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but they must be socially recognisable. Otherwise, what sense 
would the word 'rule' have? (Winch, 1958,30). Wittgenstein 
suggested that rules produce consequences as a matter of course, 
i. e. routinely. Rules are employed 'without thinking', as part 
of the taken-for-granted fabric of the constructed social world. 
In this sense, rules and language are comparable, and both are 
indispensable elements in 'constituting' the social world. 
Finally, it might be recalled that at the beginning of this 
study the nature of interpretation was held to retain certain 
difficulties, especially for a sociology which does not embrace 
the positivist method. It might now be noted that disembodied 
interpretations, isolated from specific (concrete) usages, are 
problematic. An interpretive sociology must address this issue. 
..... any interpretation still hangs in the air 
along with what it interprets, and cannot give 
it any support. Interpretations by themselves 
do not determine meanings. 
(Wittgenstein, 1967, paragraph 198). 
Meanings are located in use. One of the sociological tasks 
is to make usages visible. This study has been concerned in 
part with this task of 'making visible' - in a formal setting. 
Such a perspective may be taken further. Perhaps ethno- 
methodology, rather than 'taking further' has 'taken in a different 
direction', but Coulter's contention that subjectivity 'itself' 
is not only accessible, but is available for sociological 
investigation, remains of potential importance (Coulter 1977). 
Coulter considers "understanding" and "intending", where under- 
standing is not activity but achievement (1977,323) and where 
the criteria for understanding are "scenic", not private (1977, 
324). Coulter adds that 
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A description of an intention is a description 
of an action (an envisaged action), not of an 
experience. Avowals and ascriptions of intentions, 
then, are organized by, and gain their intelli- 
gibility from, not some mental divinations, but 
the particularities of public states of affairs. 
(Coulter 1977,326, emphasis in original). 
Coulter's comments are of relevance not only to our con- 
tinuing consideration of the problems of description and under- 
standing, but also to the coroner's specific imputation of "an 
intention" in suicide, and the basis on which this process is 
intelligible. For Coulter, intention is made intelligible by 
'public states of affairs"(1977,326). 
The search for a definition of suicide has reintroduced 
some central themes of the study. It is now appropriate to 
consider once more the stock of knowledge and area of activity 
known as 'the sociology of suicide'. 
Douglas (1967), Atkinson (1978) and Durkheim (1970) have 
already been introduced into the discussion. Durkheim's study of 
suicide, first published in 1898, has had, and retains, a con- 
siderable influence upon sociological writing about suicide, yet 
the nature and importance of Durkheim's study has still not been 
finally resolved. Taylor's consideration of Durkheim will be 
discussed below (Taylor 1982). For now, some features of 
Durkheim's project are briefly examined. 
Durkheim's task was to present the archetypal sociological 
study. Psychological factors, as they were then understood, 
... may perhaps cause this or that separate individual to kill himself, but not give society 
as a whole a greater or lesser tendency to 
suicide. 
(Durkheim, 1970,51). 
For Durkheim, suicide, of course, was a social fact, and in 
constructing his four-fold typology of suicide, Durkheim was not 
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only interested in describing "types", he was also linking 
"type" to specific cause. 
a) Egoistic suicide was seen by Durkheim as a direct result 
of inadequate. social integration: 
..... suicide varies 
inversely with the degree 
of integration of the social groups of which 
the individual forms a part. 
(Durkheim 1970,209) 
b) Altruistic suicide was a direct result of what amounts to 
'over integration': 
When man has become detached from society he 
encounters less resistance to suicide in him- 
self, and he does so likewise when social 
integration is too strong. 
(Durkheim 1970,217) 
So for Durkheim there appears to be an optimum level of social 
integration. The concept of altruistic suicide also carries 
within it the assumption of duty, and the subordination of self 
to an actual or perceived will of society. 
c) Anomic suicide is perhaps Durkheim's central type of suicide, 
given the importance of the concept of anomie both in Durkheim's 
work and in the development of sociology. Anomie denotes a 
normative vacuum, a lack of binding mores in society or, as 
Frankenberg has put it, an "alienation from norms". (1966,277). 
Central to anomie are "disturbances of the collective order" 
(Durkheim, 1970,246) and it is important that anomie refers both 
to an objective state in society and to a subjectivity. 
d) Fatalistic suicide, the fourth and final part of the 
typology added by Durkheim "for completeness' sake only" (1970, 
276n. ) is the logical opposite of anomic suicide. It is taken 
to occur when 'too many' norms and constraints bind the individual 
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to a rigid society e. g., the suicide of slaves. Durkheim saw 
this category as of no relevance to late nineteenth-century 
Europe, and for this reason it was not elaborated further. 
Durkheim does not wish to treat his three principal types of 
suicide as exact representations of reality and indeed they have 
tended to be treated as Weberian ideal-types within the sociology 
of suicide as a whole. Whether or not Durkheim's study stands 
as an example of positivist sociology, and whether or not 
Durkheim is obliged to make assumptions about social meanings in 
order to make his material intelligible, are problems that were 
introduced in Chapter One. The difficulties of using officially 
produced suicide statistics are also, of course, relevant. 
Durkheim explicitly seeks to trace 
..... the various currents which generate suicide from their social origins to their individual 
manifestations. (1970,277) 
Consequently, de facto personality types are constructed to 
correspond to the appropriate form of suicide (Durkheim 1970, 
279-284). Durkheim's account seems to contradict its initial 
rejection of psychological factors and assumptions are made about 
the direction of causality (i. e. 'between society and the 
individual) on no very clear basis. 
Durkheim's central concern to establish sociology as an 
independent and legitimate discipline does, of course, account 
for some features of his project which may now be regarded as 
idiosyncratic. The historical location of Durkheim's work also 
accounts for the dualism, the opposition of different "types of 
suicide", which is a striking feature of his study. Although 
Durkheim was ostensibly concerned with the creation of a truly 
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sociological theory (explanation) of suicide, other themes, quite 
unrelated to suicide, are equally apparent: the causal relation 
between social factors and individual behaviour; the interest 
in the tendency of societies as a whole toward a greater or 
lesser manifestation of a given phenomenon (e. g. suicide); the 
problematic relationship between man and society and the 
problem of the subordination of the individual; and the 
importance of establishing sociology as a scientific mode of 
inquiry, separate from all others. 
While sociology has been characterised as a dialogue with 
the ghost of Marx, the sociology of suicide has sometimes 
appeared to be a monologue by the ghost of Durkheim. This is not 
altogether surprising, given Durkheim's importance within 
sociology as a whole, and it would be reasonable to suppose that 
had, say, 'the sociology of work' or 'the sociology of the family' 
been characterised at an initial stage by a study with the force 
and detail of Durkheim's Suicide then the development of those 
areas of interest within sociology would similarly have been 
dominated by that single initial study. The 'sociology of 
suicide' has developed in such a way that it seems quite per- 
missible to speak of a dominant Durkheimian inspiration. Gibbs 
and Martin's "status integration" theory of suicide is an example: 
The theory of status integration was not developed 
to explain individual cases of suicide, but to 
account for variations in the suicide rates of 
populations. It is a sociological theory in 
that it looks to a measurable characteristic 
of the social structure as a source of explanation. (Gibbs and Martin 1964,4). 
This, of course, sounds very familiar. Gibbs and Martin's 
"measurable characteristic" is the degree of integration of the 
individual into the status position, and associated roles, he 
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occupies. Starting from the premise that Durkheim's theory has 
not been formally tested - "..... nor is it testable" (Gibbs and 
Martin 1964,7) - Gibbs and Martin attempt to render Durkheim's 
concept of social integration more precise and specific, and 
thus, in fact, open to empirical testing. Gibbs and Martin 
interpret Durkheim's use of "integration" in terms of 11..... the 
strength of the ties of individuals to society. " 
(1964,16). 
Social relationships are seen as a concrete embodiment of such 
ties. 
Gibbs and Martin derived five postulates from their study. 
Firstly, that 
..... the suicide rate of a population varies inversely with the stability and durability of 
social relationships within that population. (Gibbsand Martin 1964,17). 
Secondly, notwithstanding the above, relationships may be 
influenced by externalities, such as others' expectations, and 
thus the strength of social relationships varies directly with 
the degree to which individuals conform to expectations and social 
demands. (Gibbs and Martin 1964,18). Thirdly, as individuals 
occupy several statuses, and the associated roles may not be 
compatible, Gibbs and Martin hold that an inverse relation 
exists between conformity with social expectations, and the 
degree of role-conflict (1964,19). Fourthly, (and not very 
clearly dissimilar to the previous point) the extent to which 
individuals experience role-conflicts varies directly with the 
extent to which they occupy incompatible statuses (Gibbs and 
Martin 1964,24). Finally, as some combinations of statuses are 
more compatible than others, they tend to occur more frequently: 
the relative frequency with which a certain status-combination 
is occupied is referred to by Gibbs and Martin as the degree of 
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status-integration (1964,26). Hence, the fifth postulate: 
the degree of status-integration is inversely related to the 
extent to which incompatible status-combinations are occupied 
(Gibbs and Martin 1964,26). A general "theorem" is then 
suggested: 
The suicide rate of a population varies inversely 
with the degree of status integration in that 
population. 
(Gibbs and Martin 1964,27) 
Gibbs and Martin's study aimed to render the htuntestablett 
Durkheimian concept of social integration open for empirical 
investigation, by refining "social integration" into the 
ostensibly more rigorous concept of "status integration". Yet 
in operationalising "integration" in this manner, Gibbs and 
Martin succeed only in importing a new stock of meanings: 
those of American positivist sociology of the 1960s. These are 
as culturally-specific as the background meanings within 
Durkheim's own work. Furthermore, despite the use of "natural- 
science" terminology, the essential terms of Gibbs and Martin's 
constructed argument (durability, status integration, social 
expectations, incompatible status-combinations) are open to the 
ascription of so many meanings as to render the final "theorem" a 
virtual parody of the natural-scientific stance. Gibbs and 
Martin could be criticised on more detailed grounds (e. g. 
combinations of statuses may be 'incompatible' for some members 
of society, at certain times, while quite 'compatible' for other 
members, or the same members at other times; or, roles and 
statuses may not be freely chosen as Gibbs and Martin assume). 
However, the object here is not a detailed critique of Gibbs and 
Martin, nor is it an elaboration of the failures of an over- 
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crude attachment to what is taken to be scientific method. 
Taken as a piece of sociological work on suicide, the three 
central criticisms of Gibbs and Martin's study are that 
a) definitional problems are not addressed; 
b) central issues of meaning, and its construction and 
ascription, are not explicitly dealt with; 
c) an apparent emphasis on empirical sociological analysis 
relating to "suicide rates" in fact amounts to a concern 
with individual suicides, a concern with individual 
aetiology. 
The first two criticisms are perhaps by now familiar. The 
third criticism refers to the problem that Gibbs and Martin are 
indeed concerned with the commonsense lay question: "why do 
people commit suicide? " For Gibbs and Martin, the answer to 
this question lies in the individual's degree of status integration. 
Despite a stated concern with the sociology of suicides, the 
actual concern is with the individual aetiology of suicide. 
Moreover, criticisms of such work (in terms of definition, 
meaning, and the de facto concern with explanations of individual 
acts of suicide) do not only apply to Gibbs and Martin's study. 
Work within the "sociology of suicide" which similarly adopts 
an over-simple reading of Durkheim and a neglect of the con- 
structed social world achieves comparable results. Indeed, the 
criticisms outlined above must to some degree be turned on 
Durkheim's study of suicide itself. 
A final point remains in considering Gibbs and Martin's 
study (1964). Even assuming that their postulates are sound, 
and that the topic is being approached rigorously, there appears 
to be no factor which accounts for summe, in contrast to, say, 
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crime, or indeed any other phenomenon, being the product of a 
lack of status-integration. Gibbs and Martin were aware of 
this drawback, but merely note 
.. it will be assumed that the loss of social 
relationships has a specific as opposed to a 
general consequence. (1964,30) 
, 
A further established contribution to the sociology of 
suicide was that of Henry 
both suicide and homicide 
which itself was based in 
males, whites, those over 
be more prone to such fru 
age groups, and so on, as 
and Short (1954). Henry and Short saw 
as aggressive responses to frustration, 
the vagaries of the "business cycle": 
sixty-five years of age were held to 
stration than females, blacks, younger 
in each case 
the group with the higher status position reacts more violently to fluctuations of business 
than does the subordinate status category with 
which it is compared. 
(Henry and Short 1954,41) 
For Henry and Short, the turbulence of the business cycle 
appears to produce a form of anomie, disruptive of authority and 
other relations, which is manifested on the individual level 
in acts of suicide or acts of homicide. It is, of course, 
interesting to consider the relationship between suicide and 
homicide, and the assumptions Henry and Short make about this, 
but it is of more fundamental interest to consider how Henry and 
Short can account for both suicide and homicide in terms of an 
economic system specific to the industrial world at a specific 
stage of development. The historical particularity of the 
approach is - again - of note. 
The "sociology of suicide" is not monolithic in theory or 
methodology. Alongside the quasi-Durkheimian tradition (and 
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leaving aside the issue of how far Durkheim's position has been 
vulgarised by twentieth-century followers) stands the ecological 
approach, with its roots in the Chicago school. Although far 
from mutually exclusive, the two strands are sufficiently distinct 
to allow separate consideration. 
Sainsbury's study of suicide in London (1955) examined the 
relevance of social disorganisation, integration and social 
mobility, reaching conclusions not incompatible with a Durkheimian 
approach, but the city was held to have a particular significance: 
In the city, populations are mobile and relation- 
ships ephemeral, ..... there are few shared 
values or common goals, social cohesion is minimal. 
(Sainsbury, 1955,12) 
Aside from introducing the "ecological" element, Sainsbury 
remained reluctant to claim direct causal links e. g. perhaps 
particular areas of the city with a high suicide rate attract 
those who, for some other reason, are already more likely than 
others to commit acts of suicide. Sainsbury suggested that 
perhaps Durkheim oversimplified the causal relationship between 
suicide rate and lack of social cohesion, and that he also 
dismissed the relevance of psychological factors too readily 
(1955,23). It could be argued, alternatively, that although 
Durkheim ostensibly dismissed psychological factors, he indeed 
fell back upon psychological theorising in completing his project. 
Sainsbury considered several London boroughs in examining 
his hypothesis that the degree of social isolation and mobility 
is related to the rate of suicide. Statistical correlations 
appeared to be found. Clearly, the measures of "social isolations' 
are crucial here, and as an example Sainsbury claimed that 
individuals living alone, in rooms, or in lodgings, were more 
prone to suicide (1955,41). More generally, and moving his 
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discussion to the level of suicide rates, Sainsbury suggested that 
..... the eight highest rankings for mobility 
occurred among the ten boroughs which have the 
high suicide rates. 
(1955,43) 
Sainsbury concluded that 
The variations in suicide rate in the London 
boroughs can be explained by the hypothesis 
that the social character of city districts 
is determined by the extent of social mobility, 
isolation, or cohesion, and that these factors 
also predispose to or diminish the tendency 
to suicide. 
(1955,87) 
There is a certain caution in Sainsbury's study in the 
matter of direct, unmediated, causal links, but certainly the 
theory being propounded remains determinist. Further, the 
consideration of psychological factors is made explicit, and a 
concern with suicide rates gives way to a stated interest in the 
individual tendency to suicide. In these senses, as well as in 
the introduction of the role of the urban environment itself, 
Sainsbury's study may be contrasted with other examples from the 
"sociology of suicide". In other senses, particularly on the 
level of meaning, Sainsbury's study resembles quasi-Durkheimian 
research. 
Sainsbury's study may be considered in the context of the 
early example of Chicago sociology represented by Cavan's research 
on suicide (1928). Cavan's position was stated quite clearly: 
Suicide cannot ..... be compared fairly with deaths due to physiological disorders. Suicide 
belongs in another series: deaths due to 
sociological and psychological causes. (Cavan, 1928,9) 
From this initial statement of interest in causality, Cavan moves 
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on to an historical survey of attitudes to suicide, which appears 
to pre-date Douglas' concern with social meanings while it also 
draws from Durkheim's concern with anomie: 
In the first place, the dependence of suicide 
upon attitudes regarding it is clear ..... The second point is the co-incidence of out- 
breaks of suicide with periods of social 
disorganisation. 
(Cavan 1928,24) 
Cavan emphasises the latter point by also referring to the 
increase in suicide during "periods of great social change. " 
(1928,56). 
Cavan's "ecological" perspective, associated with a con- 
tinuing emphasis on anomie, becomes clear in her investigation 
of "urban conditions" in Chicago, where suicide is held to be 
associated with particular city areas which are characterised 
by both "social" and "personal" disorganisation (1928,103). 
A low suicide rate is said to be linked to stable social organisation 
and coherent social control (Cavan, 1928,106-107). Yet "personal" 
disorganisation may over-ride social factors: 
In even the most stable social organisation 
there is probably. some personal disorganisation, 
some people who cannot fit themselves wholly 
to the demands of customs and institutions (Cavan, 1928,107-108) 
Cavan continues by discussing psychosis and suicide, and the 
relation between personal and social disorganisation. Amongst 
her conclusions is a reference to the city being permanently 
in a state of disorganisation (Cavan, 1928,33O). 
Thus, Cavan is interested in a causal theory about suicide 
which refers both to suicide rates and to individual aetiology. 
Cavan explicitly considers the interplay of "social" and "personal" 
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factors, in the context of a Durkheimian theory of anomie. 
Attitudes to suicide are held to be important. The city itself 
is held to be centrally important. 
Cavan's study cannot be viewed as a simple adaptation of 
Durkheim in the manner of Gibbs and Martin (1964). For Cavan, 
an interest in individual psychology and the specific aetiology 
of acts of suicide was made explicit, rather than being sub- 
merged beneath a structure which purports to be exclusively 
"sociological". Cavan hinted at the relevance of the meanings 
of suicide, in her historical revue, although the argument was 
not developed. Definitional problems were not addressed, and 
Cavan's study, like Sainsbury's later ecological work (1955), 
remains deterministic. Cavan's study of suicide in Chicago 
stands as an early example of research which can draw from more 
than one tradition, raising issues which may, or may not, be 
taken up in later studies. 
It has been suggested that the "sociology of suicide", 
while constituting a stock of knowledge and an established area 
of sociological activity, is not monolithic. The brief con- 
sideration of examples of work within the sociology of suicide 
indicates continuing dominant concerns (causality, anomie) as 
well as points of contrast. It has been suggested that defin- 
itional issues, problems of meaning, and a de facto interest in 
individual aetiology have characterised the sociology of suicide 
as a whole, although specific studies may reveal these difficulties 
to a greater or lesser degree. Despite a stated concern with 
suicide rates in society or part of society, the sociology of 
suicide has implicitly involved a search for the aetiology of 
individual acts of suicide. 
The criticism of the sociology of suicide provided by 
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Douglas (1967) and Atkinson (1978) will be, by this point, 
familiar. A central point, however, must be clarified. To 
describe the sociology of suicide as determinist or positivist, 
does not constitute a critique, nor even an intelligible 
criticism. Within sociology, determinism and positivism denote 
certain assumptions about the nature of the world, the operation 
of causation, and methods of investigation. Sociologists who 
take other theoretical positions make different assumptions about 
these matters. It is to be emphasised, then, that to describe 
the sociology of suicide as determinist is only to describe one 
of its features: it cannot of itself be a sensible criticism. 
The grounds for building a critique of the sociology of suicide 
cannot lie in its positivism: the basis for a critique lies in 
the inconsistency between stated concerns and actual concerns, 
in the neglect of issues (definitions, meanings) which materially 
affect the status of factors claimed to be "social facts", and 
in straightforwardly unwarranted assertions - as in Gibbs and 
Martin's casual assumption that suicide, rather than anything 
else at all, will be assumed to be the result of a lack of 
status-integration (1964,30). 
In short, to state that the sociology of suicide derives 
from a Durkheimian position, adhered to more, or less, closely 
in specific studies, and that this tradition has a broadly common 
theoretical perspective, is not to make a criticism. The 
necessary critique of the sociology of suicide must be built from 
specific inconsistencies and omissions present in particular 
studies. Some of these inconsistencies and omissions have been 
suggested above. 
Finally, Baechler's interpretation of some of the issues 
raised by Douglas may be briefly considered (Baechler, 1979). 
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This is of some relevance, for although Douglas' examination 
of"common patterns of meanings" (1967,284-319) provided 
Baechler with the foundation for his exploration of typical 
meanings, Baechler's study is not universally regarded as a 
sociological study at all. 
The elements of Baechler's study are that it is not 
concerned with a general or explanatory theory of suicide, that 
it is non-Durkheimian, that suicide is seen as having meanings 
which require elaboration and that 'suicides' rather than an act 
of 'suicide' are the appropriate focus for study. Baechler's 
approach is to describe and to seek to understand suicides, 
which are taken to comprise a variety of acts and activities. 
Suicides, then, are seen as meaningful, but as the meanings are 
not self-evident, Baechler aims to describe particular examples 
of meaning. 
Baechler asserts that 
Durkheim was not interested in suicide and 
even less in suicides when he wrote his book. 
He was interested exclusivel in sociology. 
(1979, XIX) 
Baechler's own project is to address the question 
What are human beings doing when they end 
their own lives? 
(1979, XIX) 
After reviewing existing approaches to suicide in sociology 
and psychology, Baechler offers a definition of suicide: 
Suicide denotes all behaviour that seeks and 
finds the solution to an existential problem 
by making an attempt on the life of the 
subject. 
(1979,11) 
- 301 - 
Baechler regards suicides as a solution to the human 
existential struggle, where completed suicides are an 'inelastic' 
statistical feature of society and attempted suicides are much 
more 'elastic' (1979,33-34). Suicides are seen as characteristics 
of the free self-conscious human population, which excludes the 
mentally ill (Baechler 1979,38). For Baechler, suicide is a 
"manifestation of individual freedom" (1979,49). Baechler is 
not concerned with causation in the "because ..... " sense, but 
only with accounts in the "in order to ..... 11 sense , e. g. 
If someone has just killed himself at the end 
of a period of mourning, it would not be 
right to say: he killed himself because he 
lost a dear one, but he killed himself in 
order to resolve the problem posed by the loss 
of this person. Our fundamental thesis is that 
every suicide is a solution to a problem. (Baechler 1979,53) 
From this initial philosophical standpoint, which clearly 
owes more than a little to the existential tradition, (see below) 
Baechler notes that suicides have a multiplicity of possible 
meanings, where 'meaning' refers to the interpretation of 
converging 'elements' of the suicide and their 'realisation' 
(1979,59). Suicides are seen as means to an end, i. e. solutions 
to problems, not as ends-in-themselves. The central argument 
of Baechler's study is that typical meanings of suicides can be 
identified 'and elaborated, as follows 
"Escapist suicides" where the prevailing meaning is to 
"take flight", divisible into three subtypes: 
(a) Flight: "an escape from a situation sensed by the 
subject to be intolerable" 
(b) Grief: "occurs following the loss of a central element 
of the subject's personality or way of life. " 
(c) Punishment: "occurs in order to expiate a real or 
imaginary fault" 
(Baechler, 1979,63) 
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2) "Aggressive suicides" where the prevailing meaning is to 
damage another, divisible into four subtypes: 
a) Vengeance: "is intended either to provoke another's 
remorse or to inflict the opprobium of the community on 
him" 
b) Crime: "involves another in one's own death" 
c) Blackmail: "puts pressure on another by depriving him 
of something he holds dear" 
d) Appeal: "informs one's friends and neighbours that the 
subject is in danger ..... " 
(Baechler, 1979,63) 
3) "Oblative suicides", divisible into two subtypes: 
a) Sacrifice: "seeks to save or to gain a value judged 
to be greater than personal life" 
b) Transfiguration: "seeks to attain a state considered 
by the subject to be infinitely more delightful" 
(Baechler, 1979,63) 
ý) t'Ludic suicides", divisible into two subtypes: 
a) Ordeal: "entails risking one's life in order to prove 
oneself or to solicit the judgement of others" 
b) Game: "to take a chance on killing oneself where the 
sole purpose is to play with one's own life" 
(Baechler, 1979,63) 
Baechler suggests that such typical meanings do not describe 
concretely any particular suicide, but are ideal-typical con- 
structions of meaning. Moreover, causes are not being presented, 
but, instead, description and interpretation is suggested 
(Baechler, 1979,64). Nor are motives being presented: instead, 
the aim is to elucidate suicides as meaningful and intelligible 
(Baechler, 1979,65). The bulk of Baechler's study is an 
elaboration of meanings. 
Finally, Baechler's treatment of the question of aetiology 
is to be noted, given its considerable difference from that of 
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other sociologists. He suggests that "abstractions" such as the 
greater male propensity to suicide are of no use in the task of 
understanding: rather, 
..... one must build a conceptual system that 
allows for the interpretation of masculinity 
and femininity insofar as they have a relation 
to suicide. 
(Baechler 1979,208, emphasis in original) 
Baechler dismisses official statistics on suicide (1979,209) 
and then offers an approach to aetiology as follows: 
The definition of 
namely, that it i 
allows us to pose 
etiology: who is 
to what problem? 
k 19119, 
suicide used in this study, 
sa solution to a problem, 
a central question for its 
looking for what solution 
212, emphasis in original) 
There are for Baechler two aetiological problems of suicide: 
what personal factors'suggest to the individual that a solution 
to a problem is to risk their lives; and what 'problems' are 
relevant? (Baechler, 1979,212) 
To sum up, Baechler treats suicides as meaningful, in- 
telligible phenomena. The meanings of suicide can be described 
and, in this process of description, 'suicides' may to some 
degree be understood. Matters of causation are not dealt with, 
and aetiology is interpreted in a manner unrelated to its 
treatment within the sociology of suicide. Suicides are defined 
as attempts to solve problems. 
Baechler is an historian and sociologist and it is possible 
to read his study as a philosophical, rather than sociological, 
exercise. It may be objected that Baechler was, in fact, offering 
an explanation of suicide-in-general, that is, a general causal 
theory, rather than a descriptive and interpretive study. It 
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might also be objected that Baechler merely lists the various 
possible 'social meanings' of suicide following Douglas (1967) 
without adding further to any understanding of the area of 
study: an objection that might (as was noted at the beginning 
of this study) be stated as merely listing "indexical particulars". 
It might indeed be considered that an excessively discursive 
elaboration of a central theme bears little demonstrable relation 
to actual observation of the constructed social world. 
Notwithstanding such objections, it would seem that 
Baechler does address the problems of definition, meaning and 
aetiology: precisely those problems which the "sociology of 
suicide" has tended to neglect. Moreover, Baechler has adopted 
a non-positivist orientation while still maintaining a central 
focus on suicides per se, which is to be considered with the 
position of Atkinson (1978) who, in rejecting positivism for an 
ethnomethodological approach, appeared to abandon the possibility 
of further understanding of suicides in particular. It may be 
suggested in conclusion that Baechler's study of suicides 
provides a useful example of sociological work on suicide which 
is separate both from the "sociology of suicide" as traditionally 
understood, and from some of the less than productive alter- 
natives. 
Discussion, at this stage, is concerned with the wider 
context of coroners' activities. Coroners' production of a 
categorisation known as suicide has attracted more sociological 
attention than any other aspect of coroners' work, and thus the 
nature of the established body of knowledge known as "the 
sociology of suicide" has been examined. It has been suggested 
that considerable definitional problems exist in any abstract 
consideration of suicide and that lay definitions of the common- 
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sense category of suicide also contain difficulties. The problem 
of intention has been examined. The work of Durkheim 
(1970), 
Gibbs and Martin (1964), Henry and Short (1954), Sainsbury (1955) 
and Cavan (1928) was considered, and although the "sociology 
of suicide" was not found to be a theoretically or methodologic- 
ally monolithic enterprise, it was found to contain difficulties 
on the levels of definition, meaning and aetiology. A possible 
resolution of these difficulties was suggested to be in an 
emphasis on meaning-in-use and definition-in-use, where pre- 
definition is rejected. Baechler's study (1979) provides an 
alternative to the established positions within the sociology 
of suicide, by focussing specifically on the identified 
meanings-of-suicides and rejecting a determinist mode of 
theorising. 
The present study has considered the coroner's "definition- 
in-use", and his construction of verdicts, including verdicts of 
suicide. The coroner is concerned with the realisation of the 
formal, organisational, category of suicide. The "sociology 
of suicide", as discussed and evaluated above, appears at this 
stage to contribute little to the coroner's realisation of 
suicide and production of a true-story. The approach adopted 
by Baechler (1979) is perhaps rather more compatible with our 
overall concerns. 
Some sociological accounts of suicide have been considered. 
It is now of interest to briefly consider some philosophical 
accounts, firstly, because the discussion has already touched 
upon existentialist and other philosophical perspectives and, 
secondly, because philosophy and literature offer "images" of 
suicide and of death which help to situate coroners' work beyond 
the organisational process, in the wider area of culture and 
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ideas. 
6(3) Images of Death and Suicide: Literature and Philosophy 
Western culture, and its manifestations in morality, law, 
religion, literature and philosophy, has been characterised 
historically by profound condemnation of suicide. Whether seen 
as absolute sin, criminal act or deviant behaviour, attitudes 
to suicide have been centrally influenced by the interpretation 
of Christianity offered by Augustine and Aquinas, i. e., that 
man, in receiving life from God, acquires a "right of use"*but 
not of "lordship" (Sprott, 1961,2). Later, the sixth command- 
ment became presented as further reason for a general pro- 
hibition of suicide (Sprott, 1961,5). The office of coroner, 
it will be recalled, has its origin in the twelfth century, 
and clearly the work of coroners has continued during periods of 
considerable moral and legal debate about the nature, meaning 
and permissibility of suicide. It may also be recalled that 
suicide remained a criminal offence in England and Wales until 
1961. 
The basis of the traditional Christian condemnation of 
suicide is open to argument. For instance, Williams traces 
the origins of this attitude to St. Augustine, noting that no 
clear-cut prohibition of suicide is to be found in the Bible: 
the Old Testament includes four suicides, none of which were 
condemned (Williams, 1958,225). Indeed, 
there is no condemnation of suicide in the 
New Testament, and little to be found among the early Christians, who were, indeed, 
morbidly obsessed with death. 
(Williams, 1958,229) 
Williams suggests that the traditional strictures of the Christian 
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church against suicide originated in a "pre-Christian popular 
horror of suicide". (1958,232). Attitudes. to suicide and to 
death itself have not always followed a parallel course. By 
the Middle Ages, when the souls of suicides had effectively 
been lost forever, there was also a widespread preoccupation with 
death in general: 
The great popular image of all this ..... 
was the Dance of Death, in which a jaunty 
skeleton waltzes away forty times with the 
different orders of the living. 
(Alvarez, 1974,173) 
In literature and religious-philosophical thinking, John 
Donne's 'Biathanatos', written at the beginning of the Seventeenth 
Century, was an early example of a challenge to the orthodox 
attitudes to suicide. Alvarez characterises John Donne's work 
not as a defence of the idea of suicide, but as an argument 
that suicide is not necessarily sinful or undesirable (Alvarez 
1974,180). Sprott looks at 'Biathanatos' in detail (Sprott, 
1961). 
Philosophical and literary work on suicide and death cannot 
be given a detailed presentation here. However, having noted 
the prevailing current of religious-philosophical thinking, it is 
interesting to examine in a little more detail a philosophical 
perspective - existentialism - which placed death, suicide and 
'nothingness' (Sartre, 1958) very firmly within its epistemology. 
A consideration of existential philosophy is also of relevance 
insofar as it was derived directly from phenomenology, and 
insofar as it has influenced sociological work such as that of 
Baechler (1979). 
Existentialism may be taken to be represented by the writings 
of, amongst others, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Camus and Sartre. 
It does not denote a fixed body of theory, nor does it represent 
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a discrete strand within philosophy as a whole: Sartre, for 
instance, was equally concerned with elaborations of Marxism 
as he was with existentialism, and Heidegger (according to 
Warnock) gradually moved away from existentialism and 
phenomenology altogether (Warnock 1970,49). Nevertheless, as a 
perspective, existentialism has identifiable features: the 
meaning-less nature of the world and the ways in which meaning 
is ascribed; the rejection of determinism and the concern with 
choice, freedom and the 'moment' of experience; the emphasis 
on authenticity and inauthenticity; the 'absurd' and forms 
of challenging the absurd; the view of death as the only 
certainty of 'being-in-the-world' i. e., the only certainty amongst 
the collection of possibilities which comprise individual human 
experience; the experience of nothingness as a 'thing'; and 
the relevance of suicide, about which views may differ. Suicide 
can be seen as the ultimate existential choice, a revolt against 
absurdity - yet for Camus it was quite the opposite: suicide 
was seen as submission to the absurdity of a meaning-less world, 
an acceptance and, as such, a negation of revolt (Camus, 1975, 
54). 
Existentialism has been elaborated not only in philosophical 
texts, but also in the novel and the play. Karl and Hamalian 
(1973) interpret the concerns of existentialism widely, and 
include extracts from Dostoyevsky, Kafka, Beckett and Tolstoy, 
some of which, of course, pre-dated phenomenological philosophy. 
Like Camus, Pavese dealt directly with the nature of suicide 
(Karl and Hamalian, 1973,198-211). Sartre sketched out the 
elements of his philosophy in the novel Nausea in 1938 before 
writing his central philosophical work in 1943 (Sartre 1965; 
1958). Camus, similarly, developed his philosophical themes 
- 309 - 
primarily in the novel (Camus 1960; 1961) while dealing separately, 
again in quasi-literary form, with the specific topic of suicide, 
to which we refer above (Camas 1975)" 
Existentialism, in both its literary and philosophical 
expression, places death and nothingness at the centre of its 
project. Even where the existential attitude to suicide (i. e. 
rejection) may seem to resemble the Christian-moral-historical 
tradition, the emphases of existentialism are at odds with the 
'images of death and suicide' routinely found in Western culture. 
The development of existentialism from phenomenology, and the 
centrality of 'nothingness' in its view of the world, become 
clear in a more detailed consideration of Sartre's philosophy. 
Sartre talked of being-in-itself and, when consciousness is 
added, of being-for-itself: consciousness is 'of', and cannot 
be considered in the absence of being (1958,73ff). In short, 
consciousness cannot exist unless it is consciousness of some- 
thing. The influence of phenomenology, and the relevance of 
intentionality, are evident here. Sartre was concerned with the 
relation between consciousness and the world. A feature of this 
world is nothingness, and Sartre held that consciousness of such, 
'nothingness' was possible, and also that 'nothingness' and 
'being' were inextricably bound together: 
Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being - like a worm 
(Sartre 1958,21) 
In Sartre's discussion of 'temporality', his emphasis is 
clear.. He saw a paradox in conceiving of the present, which we 
willingly define" as "being" i. e., "..... what the present is - 
in contrast to the future which is not yet and to the past which 
is no longer. " (Sartre, 1958,120, emphasis in original). The 
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paradox lies in conceiving of the present as some form of 
continuing event when, in fact, 
..... a rigorous analysis which would attempt to rid the present of all which is not it - 
i. e., of the past and of the immediate future - 
would find that nothing remained but an 
infinitesimal instant 
(Sartre 1958,120', emphasis added) 
Thus when the 'present' is stripped of the 'past' and the 
'future' it ceases to be what is understood as the present. 
Being and nothingness are bound together. 
In addition to being-in-itself and being-for-itself, 
Sartre elaborates upon being-for-others and here the discussion 
is close to the phenomenological treatment of intersubjectivity. 
Perhaps this will be clear when Sartre says: 
... if the 
Other-as-object is defined in 
connection with the world as the object which 
sees what I see, then my fundamental connection 
with the Other-as-subject must be able to be 
referred back to my permanent possibility of 
being seen by the Other. It is in and through 
the revelation of my being-as-object for the 
Other that I must be able to apprehend the 
presence of his being-as-subject. 
(Sartre, 1958,256, emphasis added) 
The centrality of nothingness in Sartre's philosophy has 
been noted. Finally, it should be added that it is in Sartre's 
discussion of relations with others that nothingness is seen to 
permeate being itself: attitudes of love are self-destructive 
containing within them the annihilation of the self and other 
(1958,364-369) and an attempt to transcend the destructiveness 
of mutual relations leads only to treatment of the Other as 
object, with equally pessimistic implications (1958,379). 
Kaufmann notes that "extreme experiences" figure prominently 
in existential thought (1959,39). It is therefore not surprising 
to find death treated so centrally, as in the words of Kierkegaard: 
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We wish to know how the conception of death 
will transform a man's entire life, when in 
order to think its uncertainty he has to 
think it in every moment, so as to prepare 
himsdlf for it ..... (quoted in Blackham, 1952,108) 
Kierkegaard's words may conveniently close our brief review of 
existentialism. As we have already. noted, existentialism's 
embrace of the 'nothingness' at the core of 'being' is at 
variance with earlier philosophical perspectives, and certainly 
at odds with classical philosophy. Plato condemned suicide 
(St John Stevas, 1961,246). Aristotle saw suicide as both 
cowardly and anti-State in its effect (St John Stevas, 1961, 
247). It is possible for the existentialist to also reject 
suicide - as did Camus 
(1975) - but this is only after a working- 
through of a philosophy which places consideration of death and 
nothingness at its centre. Epicurus appeared to adopt the most 
pragmatic attitude of all: 
Epicurus, who thought that man should live for 
pleasure alone, and denied the interference 
of the gods in human affairs, naturally drew 
the conclusion that the free man was the 
arbiter of his own life and death. If life 
ceased to be a pleasure, the remedy was to 
make an exit. 
(Williams, 1958,227) 
Schopenhauer's conception of magic, as an 'extra-causal' method 
of bringing forces, irrationally, under control was used by 
Wahl to conceive of suicide as a "..... magical act, actuated 
to achieve irrational, delusional, and illusory ends. " (Wahl, 
1957,92) 
It has been suggested that 'images' of death and suicide 
are present in the ways in which philosophers have treated these 
subjects, and that such images have a place in the overall 
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cultural/religious/normative attitudes to death and suicide in 
society. Some philosophers have expressed such 'images' in the 
novel or the play and Meerloo's view of art as "one huge struggle 
with the shape of death" might be noted (Meerloo, 1962,115). 
The world of literature and the arts again produces potentially 
relevant 'images' of suicide and death which cannot, necessarily, 
be dealt with further in the present study. 
The characteristic treatment of death and suicide within 
some of the elements of Western culture (the Christian tradition, 
the law, philosophy) has been discussed. Dominant cultural 
attitudes have been noted, and the example of one particular 
philosophical strand, existentialism, has been examined in a 
little more detail, because it is at variance with other per- 
spectives, and also because it derives from phenomenology, 
which is of continuing interest. 
It has been noted at several points that the coroner works 
in a 'wider context' than that of the individual coroner's 
office. This 'wider context' might denote relations with police 
and medical structures; relations with the bureaucratic State 
system for dealing with deaths as-a-whole; a concern with 
overall social order; and relations with dominant ideas in 
society about sudden death. The very widest 'context' of 
coroners' work refers to the ideas, religious/normative/legal 
traditions, and cultural 'images' of death and suicide discussed 
above. It is possible to talk of ideologies of death and to 
examine coroners' work in terms of these ideologies. Marcuse 
may serve to introduce the discussion: 
In the history of Western thought, the inter- 
pretation of death has run the whole gamut 
from the notion of a mere natural fact, per- 
taining to man as organic matter, to the idea 
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of death as the telos of life, the distinguishing 
feature of human existence. From these two 
opposite poles, two contrasting ethics may be 
derived: on the one hand, the attitude toward 
death is the stoic or skeptic acceptance of 
the inevitable, or even the repression of the 
thought of death by life; on the other hand the 
idealistic glorification of death is that which 
gives "meaning" to life, or is the precondition 
for the "true" life of man. 
(Marcuse, 1959,64) 
Before considering the ideology of death further, it is 
appropriate to briefly re-examine a central means by which 
'images' of death and suicide are publicly produced i. e., the 
media of mass communication in industrial society. 
6(4) Images of Death and Suicide: the Press 
The media of mass communication are highly important 
vehicles for the transmission of cultural images. It has been 
argued that such 'mass media' amplify the deviant behaviour they 
describe (Young, 1973). Such 'amplification' need not concern 
us here, but it may be noted, firstly, that the 'images' of death 
and suicide constructed in and displayed by Press reports are of 
cultural significance and, secondly, that Press reports are the. 
typical means by which coroners' work in general is routinely 
'known' to lay members of the public. 
Atkinson considered newspaper reports of inquest verdicts 
of suicide (1978). Atkinson suggested that Press reports theorise, 
implicitly or explicitly, about suicide and that such theories 
resemble the theories of sociologists (1978,157). 
..... in the vast majority of cases the reader is left with a fairly clear view not only that 
the death was a suicide, but also of why the 
suicide took place. 
(Atkinson, 1978,164 emphasis in original) 
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Consideration of the Press reports of inquests attended 
during the present study (see Chapter Four above), indeed 
reinforces the view that explanations are being offered in reports 
of cases of suicide. However, Atkinson fails to note that the 
newspaper's search for a causal account can fairly be applied 
to the range of verdicts and not only to suicide. For instance, 
it was seen at Inquest B, above, that alcohol was emphasised in 
the Press report as the key causal factor behind all that 
followed, although a misadventure verdict was recorded. Even 
at Inquest A, where a misadventure verdict was also recorded, 
there was a clear search for a causal account, albeit one which 
ended fruitlessly, and where the prevailing message of the news- 
paper report was one of mystery. 
Press reports indeed theorise, and offer causal accounts 
(that is, explanations), about inquests resulting in suicide 
verdicts. Press reports similarly (theorise' in reporting 
inquests in general, irrespective of verdict. Indeed, this is 
hardly surprising. Just as the coroner himself is involved in 
the construction of a causal true-story, so the newspaper, in 
its reconstruction of the coroner's construction, reproduces that 
account, notwithstanding the tendency of Press reports to effect 
such reproduction in a condensed, truncated, expanded or other- 
wise changed form. There seems no justification for considering 
Press reports of suicide in particular: once more, it is not a 
special case. 
Newspaper reports of sudden deaths dealt with at inquests 
differ in emphasis (perhaps aiming for mystery, for a succinct 
and journalistically "complete" explanation, or perhaps raising 
matters of "public concern") and there is no uniform model of a 
newspaper-report-of-an-inquest. Similarities of form do exist 
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in Press reports of coroners' work at inquests, but perhaps the 
sociological task then becomes an examination of journalists' 
accounts and the presentation of news in general rather than 
an extended consideration of further inquest reports. The 
relevance of further study of how coroners' inquests are treated 
in the Press is open to some doubt. Yet the media of mass 
communication remain of central importance in transmitting 
cultural images of sudden death. How then is the study of the 
role of the Press to proceed? 
An available starting point is Cohen and Young's distinction 
between the "mass manipulative" and "commercial laissez-faire" 
models of the media (Cohen and Young, 1973,10). The former is 
taken to denote a model of the 'mass media' which views the 
public as unassertive receivers of whatever monolithic body of 
mystifying information the media care to produce (Cohen and 
Young, 1973,10). The mass-manipulative model assumes social 
control to be a characteristic of the media's handling of news. 
The laissez-faire model hinges on the supposed diversity of 
images presented by the media, and the approximate balance which 
results from this: the ways in which news is constructed may 
reinforce the public's existing views, but its effect is far 
less thoroughgoing than the mass-manipulative model would imply. 
Cohen and Young suggest that the chosen model for examining the. 
role of the media includes within it assumptions about the 
selection, presentation and effects of news (1973,10-11). They 
therefore recommend that these three aspects of 'the manufacture 
of news' be considered separately. 
Cohen and Young's prescription is of some use so far as it 
goes. Readings contained within Cohen and Young's collection 
tend to end on an inconclusive and somewhat bland note: e. g. 
- 316 - 
In conclusion, the findings in this study suggest 
that although the press do present a consistently 
biased impression of crime and criminals through 
their process of selection, there is little 
evidence to suggest that this is very influential 
on public perceptions of, and opinions about, 
these phenomena. 
(Roshier, 1973,39) 
It is reasonable to suggest that 'media studies' of the early 
1970s, following on the discovery of so many hitherto unexplored 
areas within the 'sociology of deviance', tended to be theoret- 
ically weak, reproducing conclusions not dissimilar to those of 
commonsense reasoning. There has been a tendency to present 
sociological truisms as discoveries of great import: e. g. 
Underlying the press's representations of 
reality is a belief in the essential justice 
and desirability of the present organization 
of society. (Chibnall, 1977,14). 
One of the most effective and easy ways of 
implanting bias is one that the public could 
never be aware of. We have no way of knowing 
what news stories the editors decide not to 
print on any given day ..... Newspapers 
handle more news than any other news medium, 
yet what finally ends up in the paper is only 
a small portion of the news that is available. (Cirino, 1973,40) 
In general terms, and certainly in terms of understanding the 
images of sudden death presented by the media, the perspectives 
associated with the National Deviancy Conference have perhaps 
not proved wholly productive. The subsequent elaborations of 
quasi-political perspectives on the role of the mass media 
produced by the Glasgow University Media Group (1976; 1980) 
re-emphasise the initial impetus provided by Cohen and Young (1973), 
and are substantially documented, but again do not always develop 
beyond a restatement of the relationship between the media and the 
state which by now is familiar. * 
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The theoretical and methodological bases of sociological studies 
of the media have been criticised in ethnomethodological terms 
by Sharrock and Anderson (1979). The work of Hall and others 
(1978) provides alternative guidance on how examination of the 
media of mass communication might proceed. For instance, Hall 
et al point to the structural position of primary definers of 
reality, whose definitions of what is real, important and news- 
worthy are re-produced by the media in their capacity as 
secondary definers of reality (Hall and others, 1978,57-60). 
In short, a number of possible methods by which sociological 
study of the media might proceed is available. The applicability 
of existing sociological perspectives within media studies to 
the work of the coroner or the area of sudden death is, however, 
questionable. A continuing examination of newspaper reports of 
coroners' inquests is also of rather limited value, and of 
limited sociological importance. Areas of relevance remain: 
it would be possible, for instance, to examine the very con- 
siderable publicity and coverage given to some inquests in recent 
years, and to consider the bases for their de facto status as 
ºcontroversial' cases. Such an examination would go far beyond 
a consideration of mere 'newsworthiness'. It would also, 
however, shift attention away from precisely those coroners' 
cases referred to earlier as 'normal' sudden deaths and, con- 
comitantly, away from the central concern of the present study 
with everyday mundane coroners' activities. 
In conclusion, an adequate Press report is of course 
different from an adequate sociological or lay or coroner's 
account. Press reports of sudden death may contain identifiable 
# However, Hoggart's foreward to the Glasgow University Media 
Group's first study is of interest (1976, IX-XIII) 
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features. The means of studying how the media transmit images 
of sudden death, however, have not yet been established. The 
concern of the media with images of death and suicide is, 
perhaps, to be located on the level of ideology and overall 
accounts of reality rather than by small-scale study of particular 
newspaper clippings. Coroners' work is indeed routinely 'known' 
to members of the public via the 'mass media' but the tools for 
describing and understanding this process of acquiring lay 
knowledge are not, on present evidence, available. 
6(5) The Ideology and Routinisation of Sudden Death 
To discuss sudden death in ideological terms perhaps appears 
strange. Let us consider, however, the position adopted by 
Marcuse (1959). After examining the arguments for making the 
means of suicide widely and legitimately available, he notes: 
Are there other than irrational arguments against 
such reasoning? Only one. A life with this 
attitude toward death would be incompatible 
with the established institutions and values 
of civilization. It would either lead to mass 
suicide (since for a great part of mankind life 
still is such a burden that the terror of death 
is probably an important factor in keeping it 
going) or to the dissolution of all law and 
order (since the fearful acceptance of death has 
become an integral element of public and private 
morality). The argument might be unshakable, 
but then the traditional notion of death is a 
sociological concept which transforms nasty 
empirical facts into an ideolö . Marcuse 1959, '70, emphasis added) 
Marcuse, of course, simplifies a number of arguments here which 
are dealt with more fully by, for instance, Glover (1977). 
Yet Marcuse also raises the important issue of how far the 
culturally-specific fear of death (reflected in the traditional 
'horror' of suicide and the obsessions of existentialism alike) 
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helps to prevent an amoral attitude to death and a weakening 
or even breakdown of socio-political institutions. To put it 
another way, the question is raised of whether (and, if so, how) 
a dominant ideology of death contributes to the maintenance of 
social order. 
It is important, of course, to distinguish microscopic 
and macroscopic social order. It seems reasonable to conclude 
that social order in the former sense, that is, 'everyday' 
social order, is indeed a product of human activities and inter- 
action, a construction of members of society made 'real' by 
these activities. The everyday social order of sudden death is 
indeed a construction of coroners(formally) and of lay members 
(informally) who both draw from, and help to sustain, a view- 
of-the-world which includes the 'typical' features of sudden 
death. This world-view amounts to a 'mundane ideology' of 
sudden death. The question of whether an ideology of sudden 
death operates on a macro-social level is more contentious. 
The issue might be approached by considering the coroner's role 
within the structures of the industrial State. 
As we have seen, coroners' work has increasingly become part 
of the State system for dealing with deaths in general. The 
growing number of deaths reported to coroners during the 
twentieth century, and the handling of those deaths by one of 
the established medico-legal procedures available to coroners, 
have rendered sudden death a routine feature within the statistical 
and bureaucratic activity of industrial society. The facts of 
birth and death, and the organisation of health-care, have been 
'routinised'; coroners have increasingly had access to pre- 
dictable medical and other facilities; and matters connected 
with death in general have moved from the clergyman's domain to 
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that of the official employed by the State. There has been a 
normalisation of death in society and a routinisation of sudden 
death which have shifted the coroner's role as an agent of social 
control. The curtailment of the coroner's powers in matters of 
overt jurisdiction under criminal law has been discussed. Yet 
the coroner's authority in less tangible areas of social control 
has remained. Aside from the actual authority, coupled with 
considerable discretion, which is available to the coroner in 
any of his investigations lies the crucially important power to 
determine for all 'practical purposes' the 'real facts' of 
sudden death. Coroners' methods of doing this have been a 
central area of interest in the present study. 
It is to be emphasised that the coroner's formal and actual 
independence is not at issue. The point is that the coroner 
occupies a position which formally embodies tangible (e. g. 
statutory) and intangible (e. g. ideological) aspects of current 
attitudes toward sudden death, and that increasingly the coroner 
functions as one element of the overall bureaucratic system for 
disposing of the contingencies of life in an ordered, methodical, 
manner. 
In Chapter Four above, the management of information about 
death was said to be sociologically important (De Vries, 1981, 
1082). The coroner has, of course, a formal, and actual, 
responsibility for the production of information about sudden 
death. De Vries suggests that 11..... it is probably safe to 
regard talk of death and birth as "controlled information" "(1981 , 
1082} and he adds: 
The legal arrangements of society require the 
bureaucractic control of information pertaining 
to birth and death ..... records of birth and death are useful for documenting family 
relationships, property rights, and insurance 
claims ..... (De Vries, 1981,1083) 
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In short, the normalisation and routinisation of death in an 
advanced and industrial society are ! useful?. Complexity is 
rendered manageable. Organisational order is constructed from 
the unformed and meaning-less potentialities of the social world. 
Ideologies of death are relevant to the work of the coroner, 
both at the level of mundane routine theorising about a particular 
sudden death, and at the level of the coroner's formal 
responsibility, on behalf of the State, for producing official 
information about sudden death. 
In Chapter One above, it was suggested that an unmodified 
structural analysis of official statistics and the State, such 
as that offered by Miles and Irvine (1979), must be applied 
with caution in any consideration of coroners' work. It is 
worthwhile to re-emphasise this point, and to re-state that the 
coroner's concern with social control is not necessarily of an 
overt or tangible nature. Equally, it is to be emphasised that 
social control is no less sociologically relevant for being 
diffuse, indirect or on the level of ideas and information. 
Miles and Irvine regard official statistics as "profoundly 
ideological in nature" (1979,126). They suggest that the 
State's 
.... economic and political functions are 
embedded in the production of official statistics, 
structuring both what data are produced and 
how this is done. 
(Miles and Irvine, 1979,125-126) 
Along with normalisation, routinisation and the relevance 
of ideology must be added the process of medicalisation of 
coroners' work. Starting from a specific statutory reference 
point - the 1836 Births and Deaths Registration Act - coroners' 
activity has become increasingly 'medical' in scope and nature; 
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medical evidence has become more central; the post-mortem has 
become the key 'instrument' of the coroner; access to medical 
facilities has become regularised; and a State system of 
dealing with ill-health within a welfare-capitalist rationale 
has developed. The process of medicalisation is itself 
ideological. The development of medical ideology was not, of 
course, confined to coroners' work. The development of psychiatry 
or of the treatment model of justice can also be discussed in 
terms of medical ideology. Conrad has summarised the process by 
which deviant behaviour has become "medicalised", noting that 
medicalisation is itself an effective means of social control 
(Conrad, 1975) 
Blauner has said that 
Modern society controls death through bureau- 
cratization, our characteristic form of social 
structure. (Blauner, 1968,354) 
Blauner examined the ways hospitals deal with death, suggesting 
that 
..... the modern 
hospital as an organization 
is committed to the routinization of the 
handling of death. 
(1968,355, emphasis added) 
It may then be suggested that the routinization of sudden death 
so far as the coroner is concerned is but one part of the 
routinization of death in general. This issue was also examined 
by Sudnow (1967). The study of the social organisation of the 
hospital offered by Sudnow is especially interesting insofar as 
its theoretical starting-point is not dissimilar from the position 
adopted throughout the present study: 
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A central theoretical and methodological 
perspective guides much of the study to follow. 
That perspective says that the categories of 
hospital life e. g. "life", "illness", "patient", 
"dying", "death", or whatever, are to be seen 
as constituted by the practices of hospital 
personnel as they engage in their daily 
routinized interactions within an organizational 
milieu. 
(Sudnow 1967,8, emphasis in original) 
Sudnow suggests that death, insofar as it has a situated meaning 
within the organisational. setting of the hospital, cannot be 
described without reference to its social production (1967, 
9-10). In wards reserved for the critically ill, daily 
organisation was geared 11..... to the occurence of deaths as 
routine, daily events. " (Sudnow, 1967,34). Death and dying 
were for Sudnow not only 'social states of affairs' but were 
also sociologically problematic phenomena, with no obvious pre- 
existing meaning given that-everyone, in the strictest sense, is 
dying (1967,61). The use of the terms 'death' and 'dying' 
is reserved for a limited sort of circumstance, with a particular 
meaning, which Sudnow aimed to describe in the context of the 
hospital. Insofar as Sudnow was concerned with death and dying 
outside the hospital, he suggested that death is a phenomenon 
involving a practical definition of the boundaries of the social 
group involved, where individuals are either included or 
excluded from the phenomenon of death (1967,153-154). It is, 
significantly, customary to talk of 'private grief'. The public 
nature of the British coroner's inquest might be recalled here: 
sudden deaths (that is, deaths dealt with by coroners) are perhaps 
defined as public property in a manner which distinguishes them 
to some degree from other deaths. The question is thus raised of 
to whom sudden deaths belong. The processes of bureaucratisation 
and routinisation are quite compatible with the "public-isation" 
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of sudden death in industrial society. 
Death 'itself' has no universal invariant meaning.. Just 
as Baechler (1979) referred to suicides rather than suicide, 
perhaps it is appropriate to refer to deaths rather than death. 
Such meanings of death have been considered by Kastenbaum, a 
psychologist, who has also outlined the important concept of the 
death system (Kastenbaum, 1977,76). The death system is a 
network, mediating between individuals and the fact of mortality. 
The death system might comprise occupational roles (where we may 
locate the coroner), institutions, places or symbols which, in 
total, carry certain functions (Kastenbaum, 1977,81). The 
functions of the death system might include warning, prevention, 
organised care of the dying, or social cohesion after death 
especially, say, following the death of a leader (Kastenbaum 
1977,81-88). Moreover, the death system makes sense of death. 
(Kastenbaum 1977,88). 
Kastenbaums notion of a death system may be adapted to 
refer to the activities of coroners, and others, within a 
structured legal and normative framework for handling death in 
industrial society. In the broadest sense, the death system 
involves an ideological stance toward the routine everyday 
processing of death which characterises coronerst work. This 
ideological framework, or death system, may also have relevance 
on a macro-cultural level. The coroner's task, as part of a 
wider network, is centrally concerned with the routinisation and 
normalisation of sudden death. The study as a whole has 
described the organisational practices employed by the coroner 
in his central task of producing the facts-of-the-matter. 
To sum up, the work of sociologists within the area of 
suicide has been discussed and evaluated. It has been suggested 
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that although the 'sociology of suicide' is not a monolithic or 
theoretically indivisible body of knowledge, it does have 
identifiable features and some common difficulties: the latter 
include a failure to deal adequately with problems of meaning 
and definition, and an effective concentration on individual 
aetiology despite stated interests in the purely sociological. 
Some problems of meaning and definition have been elaborated, 
and it has been suggested that meaning is to be located in 
practical use, not in abstract pre-definition. Historical and 
cultural perspectives on death and suicide have been outlined, 
drawing examples from religion and philosophy, and it was con- 
cluded that contemporary 'handling' of death by the coroner can 
usefully be viewed in the context of dominant cultural ideas 
and their historical development. The images of death and 
suicide generated by the Press have also been considered, given 
their central role in popular culture, but it was concluded that 
the appropriate. sociological method for study of the 'mass media' 
is not yet available, at least so far as coroners' work is 
concerned. Finally, the 'wider context' of coroners' work can 
be seen in ideological terms as part of a death system, character- 
ised by a routinisation of death and operating both on a formal 
level (as part of the bureaucratic structures of the State) 
and on a cultural level (as part of the dominant modes of 
conceiving of death). 
Part Two of the study (i. e. material drawn from field research) 
was earlier ! situated' historically by an examination of the 
origins and development of the office of coroner. Part Two has 
now also been 'situated' in terms of further sociological sources 
and some relevant 'images' of sudden death. The final chapter 
below is concerned with an overall discussion of the process of 
'accounting'for sudden death'. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ACCOUNTING FOR SUDDEN DEATH 
7(1) Producing Sudden Death 
It is appropriate, in this final chapter, to consider 
further some of the conclusions already reached. The focus of 
study has been the coroner's account of sudden death. The 
process of 'accounting' has been investigated at interview, 
by observation, and by statistical analysis. Some of the 
emerging conclusions have been: 
1) It is permissible to conceive of something called a 'coroner 
system'. This system overlaps with other organisational 
systems (e. g. the police system, the medical system). There 
may be institutional or informal ties between such systems. 
The boundaries of coroners' work as a whole are not 
precisely defined. The inquest is not wholly separate from 
other courts of law. 
2) 'Coroners' work' for a particular coroner is closely linked 
to that particular coroner's views, perceptions, and 
practices. This is not only articulated by coroners in 
talking about their work, but is also clear in a consid- 
eration of the statistics of individual coroners' juris- 
dictions. Discretion is central. Discretion is exercised 
within the framework of considerable authority. 
3) The inquest is the most visible element of the coroner 
system. Its contemporary functions are not uniformly 
consistent with its structure. Historical factors are 
highly relevant. The verdict itself may not even be the 
primary practical function at all inquests. The formal task 
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of the coroner at any inquest, however, is to produce a 
verdict. 
Understanding the assembly of an inquest verdict cannot be 
based upon identification of isolated clues. Construction 
is a process, characterised by points of significance and 
key documents. The initial point of construction is long 
before the inquest, at the scene of death. The nascent 
verdict is contained within the emerging construction. 
Constructions follow a predictable course and have a 
characteristic structure. Causality and explanation are 
sought for and publicly delivered. 
5) Typical processes of construction obtain at the inquest, 
irrespective of verdict and irrespective of the presence of 
a jury. There is no reason for the sociologist interested 
in coroners' work to focus especially upon suicide. It is 
much like any other verdict. 
6) Inquest accounts are not complete: they are adequate, for 
the practical purposes demanded by the coroner, and the 
formal task demanded of him. A very limited account may, 
by these criteria, be quite adequate. The grounds of 
adequacy may change e. g. by statute or by historical changes. 
Historical developments also shift the meaning which specific 
verdicts are taken to have. 
7) Typical processes of construction are identifiable. 
National statistics of coroners' work have a use and value 
as descriptive indicators of what coroners, in total, are 
doing. Such overall statistics, however, do not necessarily 
indicate the particular procedures adopted by individual 
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coroners. The national statistics, as the formal artefacts 
of coroners' work, are the total products of individual 
coroners' work. 
8) tCoroners' works is increasingly part of the bureaucratic 
State system of dealing with death in general. Coroners' 
work has become routinised and medicalised. Insofar as the 
coroner produces the binding facts-of-the-matter within the 
context of considerable discretionary authority, and 
occupies a central role in the production of information, 
the coroner is involved with the maintenance of social 
order and the exercise of social control. Further, the 
typical manner of dealing with death in contemporary 
industrial society is closely linked to the dominant ideology 
of death. 
g) No conclusions have been made about the relation between 
coroners' verdicts and 'types of death occurring'. It is 
not suggested that consideration of 'types of death occurring' 
is impossible. However, such conclusions properly belong in 
another study with different aims and a different theoretical/ 
methodological framework. 
10) The end-product of coroners' activity is the true-story. 
The available facts-of-the-matter, that is, the facts of 
sudden death, are constituted by the activities of coroners. 
Coroners make sense of sudden death, impose order, and 
construct the formal publicly-available reality. Coroners' 
accounts, are, in practise, the binding definitions of the 
reality of sudden death. 
Sociologists such as Douglas (1967), Atkinson (1978), and 
Taylor (1982) who have to some degree examined the coroner's 
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role in accounting for sudden death, have done so from the 
perspective of sociologists primarily interested in suicide, 
rather than primarily interested in the work of coroners. Not 
surprisingly, their conclusions have similarly referred to 
suicide. Let us briefly consider, then, an American study which 
was concerned with: 
..... an analysis of 
the coroner/medical 
examiner role with attention to how its various 
components might affect the production of 
manner of death statistics. 
(Henson, 1978,5) 
Henson was concerned to some degree with the practical policy 
issues of reducing statistical 'error' and of 'improving' the 
operation of the coroner/medical examiner office (1978,4-5). 
In this sense, her concerns diverge from those of the present 
study, but Henson's focus on "manner of death" statistics as a 
whole, rather than suicide statistics alone, is of interest. 
Henson discusses the role of the coroner/medical examiner on 
three levels: statutory requirements (which might vary from 
state to state); the occupants' definition of their roles; 
and the "actual role performance" of coroners/medical examiners 
(1978,5). Henson's review of the problems of official statistics 
(1978,8-16) indicates an adherence to a correspondence model 
of reality, that is, "manner of death statistics" are seen as 
capable of improvement up to the point where they accurately, 
or more accurately, represent a reality-out-there. The principal 
theoretical position is that of role-theory: the job of the 
coroner/medical examiner is said to be characterised by role- 
conflict and role-strain, evident both in relations between 
coroners/medical examiners and other officials, and in conflicts 
within the three levels of coroners'/medical-examiners' work 
mentioned above. 
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The choices a medicolegal official makes in role 
strain and role conflict situations affect his 
verdicts which become the official statistics 
of manner of death and cause of death. 
Examination of these role conflicts and role 
strains and the ways in which they are resolved 
is an important step toward more complete 
understanding of the nature of the weaknesses in 
official statistics. Such understanding could 
make it possible to adjust for some of the bias 
in the statistics and reduce error resulting 
from their use in social science research. 
(Henson, 1978,28-29) 
Henson's study as a whole is devoted to an elaboration of 
these themes. Field research was carried out with both coroners 
and medical examiners using personal interviews, mail 
questionnaires, observation, and examination of case records. 
As the theoretical orientation was rather different from that 
adopted in the present study, the questions which were addressed, 
particularly in terms of the accuracy of information, were also 
rather different: and of course, the organisational, legal and 
historical differences between the British coroner system and 
the American coroner/medical-examiner systems are very sub- 
stantial. Nevertheless, Henson's research stands as a socio- 
logical study of coroner's/medical examiner's work as a whole 
and in this sense is of relevance to our overall concerns. It 
would also, potentially, provide the basis for comparison 
between the British and American systems, in particular by detail 
of the wide state-by-state variations in the organisation of 
medico-legal investigation in the United States (Henson, 1978, 
58-81). Henson's conclusion that three factors may produce 
differences in "manner of death" statistics is also perhaps of 
relevance. The three factors are said to be: 
Size of the medicolegal office, availability 
of trained personnel and testing facilities, 
and the type of system in operation and the 
qualifications of its central official. (1978,172) 
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This conclusion may bear a relation to our observations upon 
differences between individual coroners' jurisdictions, 
differences in attitude and background of. coroners themselves, 
and the subsequent production of the statistical facts of sudden 
death. There is also a relation here to the Canadian study by 
Eglin, Abwunza and Hallman (1983) which concluded that an 
apparent 'suicide epidemic' in. Ontario could be accounted for 
primarily by changes in the coroner system itself: that is, 
by features of the rate-producing process. 
Eglin et. al. detail the many changes in the Ontario coroner 
system since 1960 (1983,16-26), concluding that there has been 
a reduction in the legal significance of coroners' decisions, 
a more pronounced 'public safety' role, a move toward bureau- 
cratisation, a change in the status of the inquest from court 
of law to public inquiry, a reduction in the coroners' powers 
in matters of criminal law (including decriminalisation of 
suicide) and a relaxation in the criteria for finding that a 
sudden death was, indeed, a case of suicide (Eglin et. al., 1983, 
25). The increased number of deaths reported to coroners between 
1969 and 1980, and the fall in. the number of inquests held during 
the same period, is detailed (Eglin et. al., 1983,24). On the 
basis of these factors, Eglin et. al. tentatively suggest that 
the figures for 'teenage suicide' in this part of Canada during 
this period were far short of being an 'epidemic', and that 
increased numbers of suicides as a. whole arose from an increased 
number of coroners' investigations and changes in practice (1983, 
28-29). Nevertheless, they note, the official suicide rate for the 
age-group 15 to 19 years has risen faster than for the total popu- 
lation (Eglin et. al., 1983,29-30). To account for this latter 
development, Eglin et. al. look to the rise of psychiatric ideology, 
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its focus upon the teenager, and the perception of 'teenage 
suicide' as a problem which, in turn, generates 'more' teenage- 
suicide in terms of the perceptions of schools, coroners, and 
doctors (1983,30-35). Eglin et. al. conclude that suicidal 
intent is to be considered in terms of officials' (and others') 
perceptions, in terms of cultural notions of what constitutes 
an act of suicide, and they suggest that the identification of 
suicide also depends upon "..... the organizational apparatus 
and practices in which these conceptual notions are embedded 
and must be applied. " (1983,36) 
Eglin's study is oriented toward the problematic nature of 
the suicide rate. It is not a study of coroners' work as a 
whole. Nevertheless, it presents a further perspective upon the 
manner in which the facts of sudden death are produced which is 
of relevance in considering the conclusions of the present study. 
Overall conclusions may now be summarised in the context 
of the aims of the study. Inquests and verdicts may now be 
finally considered. Taylor's observation is useful: 
A historical account ....., whether of the French Revolution or Joe Soap's sudden and unnatural 
death, is a selective reconstruction: an inter- 
pretation of ast events shaped first by the 
acknowledged) availability of evidence and, 
second, by the (less commonly acknowledged) 
values, beliefs, theories, common-sense under- 
standings, etc., of the observer. While reports 
certainly contain verifiable facts, such as the 
storming of the Bastille, the empty gun lying 
by the body, etc., such facts are only meaning- 
ful, i. e. only make sense when organised within 
contexts of meaning. It is erroneous to assume 
that if one is diligent enough in searching out 
'all the facts', the meaning will evolve by 
itself. 
(Taylor 1982,74, emphasis in original). 
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7(2) Producing True Stories: The Coroner's Inquest and the 
Verdict. 
The inquest is the most visible element of the work of the 
coroner. Although most cases reported to coroners are dealt 
with by a post-mortem examination, and no inquest, the inquest 
retains a central importance: it. is a court of law where the 
coroner exercises, publicly, a considerable authority; it 
produces verdicts which are formally recognised as binding 
definitions-of-the-situation and informally recognised as official 
conclusions about 'what happened'; and it systematically 
ascribes meaning to disordered events by producing an account of 
reality. To put it simply, the coroner, at his inquest, 
publicly constructs the social order of unexpected death, and 
the verdict is the formal embodiment of this. 
The emerging construction, the 'true story', of a sudden 
death is a process. It may be of interest to identify isolated 
'cues' or 'clues' used by the coroner in arriving at a particular 
verdict, but these have little meaning when separated from the 
total process. The process of construction may begin as early 
as the scene of death. Within the process are key events and 
points of significance which may shift the emphasis of the 
emerging true story, or confirm it. In his discussion of suicide 
verdicts, Atkinson says 
In this depiction of how the coroner proceeds 
..... is a process whereby 'bits and pieces', 'relics' and so on lead him towards a suicide 
or some other verdict. These I referred to in 
my original formulation as 'cues', and my 
concern here is with the kind of cues which 
specifically point towards a verdict of suicide (1978,112) 
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Although Atkinson refers to 'process', it seems that the emphasis 
of his statement should be reversed: process is crucially 
important, while particular 'cues', although relevant, are not 
central. The emerging categorisation begins at the time of 
reporting a death to a coroner, and a. provisional categorisation 
is routinely built from the impression of initial circumstances, 
the accounts of policemen, doctors and others, and the coroner's 
stock of experience. The emerging categorisation is 'recognised'. 
By the time specific cues are explicitly identified, the con- 
struction may be, for coroners' purposes, practically complete: 
the public display of discrete 'pieces of evidence' at the 
inquest does not necessarily give them the significance they may 
appear to have. Two issues arise from this: firstly, the 
extent to which categorisations are already 'accomplished' 
before the inquest even begins; and, secondly, the extent to 
which the inquest reveals only part of the available facts-of- 
the-matter. 
Verdicts are routinely 'known' before the inquest begins. 
As one coroner put it at interview (see Chapter Three) the 
inquest is a "public recital" or t1resume" of parts of the 
evidence. An informal assembly of the categorisation has already 
occurred, starting from the initial visit to the scene of death 
by police and medical personnel (and perhaps by the coroner 
himself) and continuing with the collection of written statements, 
post-mortem reports and other artefacts. The inquest publicly 
displays key parts (especially the 'points of significance') 
of the informal categorisation, before formally recording a 
verdict. In this process, the structure of the inquest, and its 
status as a court of law, are important in publicly signifying 
that disordered events have been explained, potential incon- 
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sistencies resolved, and the matter for-all-practical-purposes 
closed. The inquest's formal function is thus crucial. This 
should not be confused with the relative informality of pro- 
ceedings during the inquest: the point is that the formal role 
of the inquest is to publicly record a verdict, 'settle' the 
matter, or, in short, to account for the sudden death under 
consideration. Herein lies the special importance, for the 
sociologist, in focussing on the inquest in more detail than, 
say, the post-mortem or the form 'A' procedure. Herein can also 
be located the coroner's formal task in relation to the 
bureaucratic organisation of death in general, the production 
of officially-sanctioned information, and, in the widest sense, 
the maintenance of social order. 
The "public recital" of parts of the evidence at the 
inquest is also of relevance, insofar as it points to the 
limited nature of the coroner's account: and to the fact that 
a limited account may nevertheless fulfil the grounds of 
adequacy so far as coroners are concerned. Let us also note 
that officially-produced records, in general, may be limited 
in their nature while being, for the purpose at hand, quite 
adequate. Discussing the juvenile court, Lemert says 
records are made and cited ..... to satisfy a 
number of routine purposes, to comply with 
substantive and procedural law, and to validate 
or defend a particular recommendation or court 
order. But because cases sometimes lead to 
choice of a disposition not easily defensible 
in the light of the professed goals of the 
court there is much that is left unsaid in 
records. From this point of view the record 
is a residue of action, whose fuller impli- 
cations are best inferred from the active 
processes by which records are made. 
(Lemert, 1969,360, emphasis added) 
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The evidence presented at an inquest, and subsumed within the 
overall, formal, true-story, may omit parts of the potential 
account of the death at hand, even though such 'hidden' areas 
may be known to the participants at the inquest. Inquest C 
(Chapter Four) suggested that an "undercover" true story may 
exist alongside the publicly-revealed true story, but remains 
hidden because, in terms of the formal task at hand, 'nothing 
would be gained' from its unveiling. It is also worthwhile 
recalling, from the historical and procedural discussion of 
the inquest in Chapter Two, that its role is, in legal and 
formal terms, a limited one: it has never been required to 
produce a 'complete account' even if one were to suppose that a 
complete account is possible. 
The verdict is a formal summary of the adequate account. 
The methods of producing a verdict tend to obtain, in general, 
irrespective of whether a jury is present, and irrespective of 
which particular verdict is recorded. It has also been seen 
above that the meaning of a particular verdict is not static. 
The stock of verdicts available to the coroner may be changed by 
legal amendment e. g. the disappearance of felo-de-se and 
justifiable homicide. Changes in the use of a particular 
verdict may denote shifts in medical knowledge e. g. about 
industrial diseases or may denote a changed normative climate 
e. g. addiction to drugs or self-neglect. The verdict of 
accident/misadventure is conceptually wide enough to embrace 
several sorts of true-story, whose meanings may vary, so long as 
they match the criteria of adequacy for accident/misadventure 
as a whole. The open verdict is still wider, of course, but it 
has been seen that an open verdict may denote a potential true 
story not otherwise open to definite categorisation, or a 
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situation where more than one definite verdict (e. g. suicide and 
unlawful killing) is seen as a potential but inadequate or 
conflicting true-story, as well as circumstances where there is 
simply 'not enough' evidence. In short, the open verdict may 
have an informal positive meaning, although it formally indicates 
an 'absence' of meaning. 
It may also be concluded that the assembly of inquest 
verdicts involves the use of rules. Such rules may be formal/ 
legal; informal/conventional; or based in the individual 
coroner's specific perception of his role. For instance, the 
coroner at Inquest F (Chapter Four above) defined the role of 
the inquest as that of a de facto public inquiry, and thus the 
formal verdict became almost subsidiary to the informally- 
defined primary task. Yet even here, typical methods of con- 
structing the true-story, using typical rules, were seen to be 
in operation, from the visit to the scene of death to the 
inquest itself. 
The concern of the study has been with all coroners' 
verdicts. Reference has been made to sociological studies which 
have focussed exclusively or mainly on suicide, and it has been 
argued that suicide verdicts are much like any other verdicts: 
the processes of construction apply in much the same manner. 
A little more can be said of this, for Taylor suggests, in his 
discussion of the coroner's search for evidence, that 
there is only a detailed search into the 
deceased's biography if, from the circum- 
stances of death, suicide or foul play is 
suggested. 
(Taylor, 1982,76-77). 
The evidence of the present study suggests that this is not so. 
It may certainly seem so, if the researcher's, starting-point is 
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an interest in suicide in particular, or in open verdicts and 
accidents insofar as these might be 'possible' suicides. 
However, a focus upon coroners' work as a whole suggests that 
the coroner's search for biographical information takes place 
to some extent irrespective of verdict. A concern, for instance, 
with the deceased's previous health is a general feature of the 
assembly of any verdict. The burden of proof required in 
suicide verdicts, however, perhaps does involve a more detailed 
search of biographical - and other - factors in comparison to 
other verdicts. 
Finally, it has been suggested throughout the study that 
verdicts are constructions: that is, verdicts are the products 
of an active process involving the assembly of an account of 
reality which one might call the true-story. There is one 
exception i. e. one verdict which is not necessarily a con- 
struction and that is the verdict of still-born. The verdict 
may refer solely to the fact-of-death. If so, the verdict 
denotes a natural event in the world: not a construction or an 
explanation. All other verdicts are constructions, assembled 
through the processes described throughout the study. Even the 
still-born verdict may become a construction (see Chapter Five): 
but it is not necessarily so, and in this sense it is different 
from other verdicts. Prior to the twentieth century, some other 
verdicts e. g. 'found dead' could similarly be regarded as 
descriptions of a natural event in the world, rather than as 
constructions. The criteria of adequacy of coroners' accounts 
has shifted over time, for today coroners' accounts must be 
explanatory true-stories of what-really-happened. The contem- 
porary range of verdicts available to the coroner - with the 
possible single exception above - embody the requirement to 
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construct an adequate, causal, account of the reality of sudden 
death. Indeed, this movement in the required criteria of 
adequacy can be seen, in part, in terms of the bureaucratisation 
and medicalisation of coroners' work already discussed, and the 
coroner's role as one element in the State system of accounting 
for and disposing of the contingencies of life and death. 
The verdict, then, is the formal summary of the coroner's 
account. Methods of producing verdicts have been described 
throughout the study. Some coroners interviewed - for instance, 
in discussing the 'reliability' of statistics or the 'incomplete' 
nature of the inquest - appeared to adopt a perspective not 
dissimilar from the perspective of the present study. Others, 
of course, did not, but it might be noted in passing that 
coroners themselves have written about their own work and coroners' 
work in general (e. g., Pilling 1969; Chambers 1981; 
McHugh 1976; McHugh 1983). No doubt coroners' own 'academic' 
accounts of their work could be an interesting topic for further 
study. At the very least, more would be learned of what 
coroners do than is the case in some sociological writing: as 
an example of the latter, one might consider Atkinson and Drew's 
lengthy analysis of the words "be upstanding in court for 
Her Majesty's Coroner". (Atkinson and Drew, 1979,91). 
Coroners' activities become tangible and permanent through 
their translation into statistics, the 'residues of action' 
referred to by Lemert (1969,360). Our concluding comments may 
now include brief reconsideration of the process of producing 
statistics. 
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7(3) Producing Statistics 
The statistics of coroners' work have, throughout the 
study, been read as descriptive indicators of what coroners do, 
i. e. as reliable records of coroners' activities. National 
statistics usefully summarise the total activities of coroners. 
However, it has been concluded above that national statistics 
may not reliably describe the activities of individual coroners 
due to the differing perceptions of coroners, the widely 
varying use of form A, form B and inquest procedures, and 
coroners' own varying definitions of what constitutes coroners' 
work. A consideration of coroners' statistics, in total and in 
relation to individual jurisdictions, was presented in Chapter 
Five. Additional statistics, which have since been published, 
by the Home Office, are included in an appendix to the study. 
No conclusions have been made about the relation between 
the 'statistics of sudden death' and the 'types of death' to 
which they might be held to refer, correspond or otherwise 
represent. As the focus of the study has been on coroners' 
activities, and the statistics help to provide a description of 
such activites, it has not been considered useful or relevant 
to draw conclusions about the relationship between statistics 
and events 'out there'. That is altogether another issue: 
and one which has already been referred to in the discussions 
above of theory, methodology, 'official statistics' in sociology, 
and the construction of social reality. It has been seen that 
sociologists have traditionally discussed, first of all, the 
relationship between 'the facts' and 'the statistics' (e. g. of 
crime or of suicide): have then drawn conclusions about the 
greäter or lesser degree of accuracy of the statistics; and have 
then proceeded to theorising - preferably, causal theorising 
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within the positivist mode of explanation - about the phenomenon 
supposedly described by the statistics. Let it be emphasised 
that the present study does not draw conclusions about the 
permissibility of such a project-for sociologists who wish to 
adopt such a programme with its attendant theoretical and 
methodological elements. Such a project is simply outside our 
area of concern. Statistics have been seen as objects of study 
in their own right and as useful empirical material in describin / 
the activities of those who produce them. This emphasis was 
evident in the discussion of the British suicide rate, to which 
we may now briefly return. 
In Chapter Five, it was concluded that verdicts of suicide 
have increased in number over the period 1975 to 1980, whether 
numbers of verdicts of suicide are considered in absolute terms, 
in relation to total number of deaths, or in relation to popu- 
lation. Viewing suicide as a natural event in the world, no 
conclusions or causal explanations were offered, for this would 
have been to embark upon a process of theorising outside our 
area of concern: or, to restate a point made earlier, if a real 
rate of suicide somewhere does exist, it appears at present to 
be both unknown and unknowable. However, viewing suicide as an 
organisational product, some conclusions about the relevance of 
the rate-producing process to an increasing or decreasing number 
of suicide verdicts are possible. 
Firstly, it can be noted that the apparently falling suicide 
rate of the arl 1970s may be partly accounted for by the 
newly introduced burden of proof in the recording of a suicide 
verdict. The legal obligation to prove suicide was stated in 
the case of R. vs. Cardiff Coroner, ex Parte Thomas (cited in 
McHugh, 1976,357). This has since been restated at appeal e. g. 
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R. vs. City of London Coroner, ex parte Barber (cited in Current 
Law Year Book, 1975, item 458). The latter case meant that 
..... suicide must 
be strictly proved at a 
coroner's inquest; it is not a verdict which 
should be reached as being the most likely 
cause of death. (Current Law Year Book, 1975, item 458). 
In our terms, this legal ruling involved a . 
change in the criteria 
of adequacy so far as coroners' suicide verdicts were concerned. 
Through a formal change in the basis of constructing the suicide 
verdict beyond the control of the individual coroner, categor- 
isations of suicide would tend to occur less often than before. 
Secondly, a further element in the 'decrease' in suicide 
during this period may - the matter is speculative - have been 
the disappearance of domestic gas and its replacement, as cause 
of death, by agents of poison: most typically, by drugs over- 
dose. It will be recalled from Chapter. Three that the drugs 
overdose is less 'obviously' a case of suicide to the coroner 
than domestic gas was: the cause of death itself does not so 
readily imply the eventual categorisation. To put it another 
way, changes in cause of death perhaps made the process of 
writing the true story more difficult. This may have affected 
the number of suicide verdicts recorded. 
Thirdly, the problem exists of how to account for the 
increase in suicide verdicts in the late 1970s if the above two 
points are applicable, for the burden of proof and the pre- 
dominant cause of death did not cease to apply as the decade 
progressed. Eglin et. al. (1983) linked an apparent increase in 
suicide in Ontario to features of the rate-producing process 
but the features outlined by Eglin et. al. - e. g. the decriminal- 
isation of suicide, a relaxation of the criteria for recording 
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a verdict of suicide, a move toward the inquest becoming a 
public inquiry rather than a court of law - do not apply to 
England and Wales during the relevant period. It can only be 
concluded that if an account of the increase in verdicts of 
suicide during this period is possible, then the necessary 
material for such an account has not been found. 
The search for an account of changes in the numbers of 
suicide verdicts rests, then, on an inconclusive note. The 
comments of some coroners at interview, in which scepticism was 
expressed about the conventionally accepted meaning of suicide 
statistics, might be recalled. Indeed, further research on the 
nature of suicide statistics hinges on the question of meaning. 
The meaning attributed. to the statistics by the researcher, 
the coroner and the layman determines not only the account which 
is likely to follow, but the type of search which is to be made 
for a relevant account. The theoretical options, as was noted 
at the beginning of the study, are numerous. 
Suicide statistics represent only a small proportion of the 
statistics of inquest verdicts. Verdicts themselves are only a 
part of the statistics produced by coroners' work as a whole, 
covering form A and form B procedures as well as the inquest. 
Reading national statistics as descriptions of what coroners, 
in total, have been doing, let us restate some of the con- 
clusions made in Chapter Five. Firstly, during the period 1926 
to 1975 an increasing number of deaths were reported to coroners 
and, in consequence, "coroners' work" (that is, form A, form B, 
and inquest) has become an increasing part of the bureaucratic 
State system for dealing with deaths in general. Of the increasing 
number of deaths reported to coroners during the fifty-year 
period, a decreasing proportion involved an inquest. Thus the 
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bulk of coroners' work centred upon the post-mortem examination 
alone. The traditional image of the coroner, holding searching 
inquests into mysterious deaths in dusty courtrooms, has 
virtually no applicability today. In the minority of coroners' 
cases where an inquest is held at all, there is unlikely to be 
any element of intrigue, homicide or suspicion. If there is, 
the inquest's powers to take any action are now very limited: 
although the coroner's authority remains very considerable. 
This is one of the internal inconsistencies of the coroner's 
work today. 
Sociological debates upon the nature of 'official statisticst 
were introduced in Chapter One and have been a recurring focus 
of attention. The position taken throughout the study has been 
that if the sociologist chooses to use official statistics at 
all, those statistics can either be used as more, or less, 
reliable measurements of the real phenomenon in the world 
(crime, suicide, murder or whatever) they supposedly refer to 
and arise from or those statistics can be used as reliable records 
of the activities of rate-producing agencies. If the former 
option is chosen, the sociologist is likely then to employ those 
official statistics in order to theorise about the phenomenon 
in which he or she is interested, such as crime, suicide or 
murder. This might be done quite boldly if the statistics are 
seen as 'reliable', or it might be hedged around with reservations 
if problems of reliability are given more emphasis. In either 
event, this option did not seem to be productive within the terms 
of the study of coroners' work. Instead, coroners' statistics 
were seen as reliable records of coroners' activities. Other 
matters were left open. 
It is important to note that the choice of one option or the 
- 345 - 
other in the use of official statistics in sociology carries 
with it methodological and theoretical assumptions and con- 
sequences. It should also be emphasised that the present stage 
of the development of sociology does not convincingly allow any 
absolute judgement about the degree to which particular 
theoretical and methodological choices are correct or per- 
missible (The important choice is the one which creates internal 
coherence). Further, it would seem that the choice is not 
whether official statistics should or should not be used: it 
is, rather, a matter of what official statistics are to be used 
as, and to be used for, in sociology. On this basis, further 
material relating to 'official statistics' might be briefly 
considered. 
It has been seen that the concern of Eglin et. al. (1983) 
and Henson (1978) with the coroner's production of statistics 
to some degree matches the interests of the present study. 
Echoing the discussion above, let us note Taylor's succinct 
summary of the matter: 
The 'problem of official statistics' is not 
whether or not they are 'accurate' (i. e. 
the extent to which they reflect the real, or 
true, rates), or that they are 'unacceptable' 
because they are the result of human judge- 
ment, background expectancies, etc., but 
whether or not a correspondence has been 
established between the researcher's use of 
some set of statistics and the nature of 
those statistics. (Taylor, 1982,122) 
Wayne studied the process "by means of which suicide as a manner 
of death is assigned" (1969,2). This was in the context of a 
view of the problem as being one of inaccuracy and "under- 
enumeration"'in suicide statistics (Wayne 1969,1). Wayne's 
study of the rate-producing process uncovered varying and 
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inconsistent death certification and other documents (1969,2-4). 
Given the American context, and the wide state-by-state 
variations in practice, this lack of standardised procedure was 
unsurprising. Proceeding by personal interviews and postal 
questionnaires, Wayne developed the hypothesis that medical 
examiners would produce a higher proportion of suicide verdicts 
than coroners. No evidence was found to support the hypothesis 
(Wayne 1969,19). Indeed, the study ended on afi inconclusive 
note. Its relevance here is in simply noting that the study was, 
firstly, concerned with suicide (rather than verdicts as a whole) 
and, secondly, that it was concerned with matters of reliability 
and accuracy of the statistics. In terms of these twin concerns, 
'nothing was found'. Yet had Wayne been concerned with the 
rate-producing process itself, and with those views articulated 
by coroners to which he only alludes in passing, a wealth of 
material on coroners' and medical examiners' production of 
statistics could have been collected. 
The coroner's production of statistics is bound-up with 
his other record-keeping concerns: the 'key artefact' of the 
post-mortem report, the transformation of verbal evidence of 
witnesses into written accounts, the reliance on formal police 
and medical evidence. The coroner's record-keeping role has a 
link to the increasing role of coroners' work within the general 
bureaucratic management of death as a whole in society. It 
might be recalled that one coroner at interview interpreted 
'court of record' in terms of record-keeping. The coroner's 
record-keeping role is important sociologically, in transferring 
constructions of the world, events, impressions etc. into 
tangible permanent artefacts. It is also important in terms of 
what the 'record-keeper' is saying about himself. Wheeler 
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suggested that organisations which produce records (about other 
people, events or things) usually also produce records about 
the organisation itself (Wheeler 1969,15). One might consider 
coroners' annual returns to the Home Office. Such returns 
constitute information about what are taken to be events in the 
world, such as the number of accidents on the road, and also 
amount to information about the practices of coroners, giving 
a further meaning to 'accounts'. 
In addition to the importance of the coroner's own role as 
record-producer and record-keeper, one might also consider the 
different roles adopted by researchers who make use of such 
records. We do not refer here to the different theoretical/ 
methodological uses of such records already discussed, but to 
the issue alluded to by Bottomley and Coleman in their discussion 
of crime rates: 
Even within criminology itself a single con- 
sensually agreed approach towards the inter- 
pretation of such rates seems unlikely when 
criminologists adopt a range of radically 
different roles, including handmaidens to 
policy makers and administrators, debunkers 
or demystifiers of established institutions 
and practices, and more radical critics who 
would replace the entire set of existing 
economic and political arrangements. 
(Bottomley and Coleman 1981,17) 
It should be noted, then, that in addition to the 'sociological' 
problems of official statistics there are also 'social' factors, 
relating to the position of the record-keeper and the researcher, 
to consider. Social problems and sociological problems, as we 
have already noted, are of course quite distinct. 
Wheeler suggests that written records have special signif- 
icance in comparison to other sorts of information: 
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To begin with, a file or dossier is likely to 
attain a legitimacy and authority that is 
lacking in more informal types of communication. 
(1969,5, emphasis in original) 
This legitimacy and authority may arise from the permanence of 
written records; from the ease of copying and transfer; and 
because the written record may have a '"career"' which is separate 
not only from the person to which it refers but also from the 
organisation which produced it (Wheeler, 1969,5). Wheeler 
suggested that the functions of record-keeping include, broadly, 
social control; "identity-giving"; and "memory-tracing" i. e. 
they provide a permanent record of what-was (Wheeler 1969,14-15). 
Bottomley and Coleman concluded that the process of record- 
keeping is "worthy of study in its own right" (1981,146). 
Bottomley and Coleman's approach to the study of police records 
mirrors the portrayal by Taylor 
(1982) of sub ide statistics and 
the position taken in the present study in respect of the 
statistics of coroners' work: 
Questions about the usefulness of police records 
as a research resource cannot be answered 
without specification of the objectives of that 
research and a consideration of the objectives 
and conditions under which those records were 
assembled in the first place. 
(Bottomley and Coleman, 1981,146) 
The coroners' production of statistics is part of the social 
order of sudden death. Indeed, it is part of the social order 
of death in society as a whole, given the developments in 
coroners' work discussed above. The coroner produces the statistical 
facts-of-the-matter which, for all practical purposes, are 
permanent records of the reality of sudden death. In these 
senses - rather than ones arising from a superficial impression 
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of an inquest as a court of law much like any other - the 
coroner is concerned with social control. Coroners' activities 
in the production of statistics are to be located within the 
bureaucratic ideology of the contemporary State. 
The consideration of statistics from individual coroner's 
jurisdictions, together with the views of coroners themselves 
collected at interview, suggests that coroners' work is based in 
informal and discretionary practice to a large degree, and is 
made dynamic by the operationalisation of individual coroner's 
opinions and perceptions of their work. Yet the formal organ- 
isational context of coroners' work, and the formal structure of 
the inquest, have been, and remain, the vehicle by which coroners' 
categorisations are produced and completed. It is thus 
necessary to examine again this apparent tension between structure 
and function, and between formality and informality. 
7(4) Organisation, Ideology and Discretion 
Doyal suggests that 
.... in Britain the information available on both health and illness, as well as medical 
care, is extremely limited. It reflects the 
functional orientation of western scientific 
medicine, which is concerned not with the 
physical and mental well-being of the whole 
person in any qualitative and holistic sense, 
but rather with mending broken people so that 
they can return to their tasks, in many 
instances simply to be broken again. 
(Doyal 1979,248) 
Doyal appears to be referring to the ideologically limited 
nature of medical statistics (rather than a limited 'amount' of 
such statistics) and the orientation of the medical system toward 
the prevailing economic order. It would be a crude over- 
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simplification to transfer Doyal's perspective, unmodified, on 
to the coroner system. As we have seen, the coroner's concern 
with social order is rather more subtle and complex than a 
straightforward macro-political perspective would allow. Never- 
theless, Doyal's position reminds us that the coroner operates 
within the wider bureaucratic and medical structures defined- 
by the State, and carries with it ideological assumptions about 
death and the handling of sudden death. Indeed, the exercise 
of coroners' authority within this broad ideological setting 
may be seen as a unifying element, in view of the possible 
tension between the 'formal' and 'informal' aspects of coroners' 
work. Let us elaborate this point. 
It was concluded in Chapter Three that the boundaries of 
coroners' work are not rigidly defined. Although statute and 
case-law from time-to-time limit or extend the specific duties 
of coroners, the nature of coroners' work for individual coroners 
(and coroners' work as distinct from, say, police work or 
medical work) is substantially influenced by the coroner's own 
perceptions and subjective definitions of his work. The boundaries 
of coroners' work are defined in use. (The discussion of 
definition-in-use might be recalled from Chapter Six). Thus 
informality and discretion are central. What constitutes 
'coroners' work' has a lot to. do with the choices made by the 
individual coroner. This conclusion is based not only upon the 
evidence provided through interviews (Chapter Three) but also 
upon the statistical analysis of individual coroner's juris- 
dictions (Chapter Five). In addition to the informally - and 
practically-defined boundaries of coroners' work, the activity 
taking place within those boundaries is also substantially 
influenced by the varying positions taken by coroners. For 
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instance, the range of theories of suicide, the differing 
estimations of the role of the jury, and the various conceptions 
of the meaning of the open verdict were examples of how the 
differing views of different coroners may have implications 
for practice. There are also clear-cut examples of the exercise 
of coroners' discretion in matters such as deciding whether an 
inquest will be held, whether evidence is admissible, how 
witnesses are to be questioned, whether a post-mortem examination 
will be held, or whether certain categories of deaths 
(e. g. 
shortly after admission to hospital) will be notified to the 
coroner at all. 
Yet aside from such very considerable areas of informality, 
where discretion and authority are exercised according to the 
judgements of the individual coroner, there paradoxically remains 
a 
. 
formally structured system for dealing with sudden death. The 
'coroner system' is one part of the wider formal. system of 
death certification and registration. The routes by which 
particular sudden deaths are to be processed are, on a pro- 
cedural level, specified quite clearly (see Figure 2(2)1, 
Chapter Two above). The circumstances in which inquests are to 
be held and completed, or opened and adjourned, are specified 
in law. The inquest is linked to other courts of law despite 
its ostensible separation e. g. the notes of inquest proceedings 
may be used in a subsequent prosecution in another court. 
Chapter Two presented in detail the formal/procedural aspects 
of the coroner system and, in particular, the inquest. The 
inquest itself is indeed the most formally-structured, as well 
as the most visible, element of coroners' work. 
There appears, then, to be a 'tension' or a 'disjunction' 
- there may or may not be a 'conflict' - between the formal and 
informal layers of coroner's work. The production of accounts 
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of sudden death, whether at the inquest or through form A and 
form B procedures, is based in organisational processes which 
are both formal and informal. 
Observation of inquests (Chapter Four) suggested an awareness 
of this disjunction by the coroner himself. Within the formal 
setting and procedures of the courtroom, the coroner appeared 
to minimise the significance of this very formality by speaking 
to witnesses conversationally, addressing them by their forenames, 
and so on. No doubt this was merely to some degree the 'style' 
of this particular coroner, but Inquest F (see Chapter Four) 
indicated a similar minimisation of the significance of the 
formal surroundings. Indeed, at the inquest - as distinct from 
other parts of the coroner's work - it is possible to view the 
disjunction between formality and informality as an inconsistency 
between structure and function. We have already noted that 
inquests are a relatively minor part of coroners' day-to-day 
work. The point has also been made, in passing, by Atkinson 
(1978,102) and by Taylor (1982,67). Yet as a public forum 
the inquest retains particular importance. It is also the only 
court of law which may be presided over by a doctor, with 
considerable discretion, and no legal background. For our 
purposes, the 'inquest renders the processes of construction and 
account-production uniquely visible. 
An understanding of the inconsistency between structure and 
function at the inquest must be based in a familiarity with its 
development over several hundred years (see Chapter Two). 
Historically, the functions of the inquest have been gradually 
curtailed: from being concerned with many sorts of crime and 
wrong-doing the inquest came only to be concerned with sudden 
death. Much later, it came to be only concerned with certain 
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sudden deaths- the others were now dealt with outside the inquest. 
Even within those deaths dealt with at the inquest, functions 
in matters of criminal law have all but disappeared. A 
suspicion of homicide involves immediate adjournment and the 
transfer of the case to the criminal courts. The functions of 
the inquest have become more closely circumscribed, just as the 
role of the coroner has itself changed very considerably over 
the centuries. In addition to specific statutory changes in 
the functions of the inquest and the range of available verdicts, 
there have been equally important changes in the moral, normative 
and political context in which the inquest is held. The 
meaning of particular verdicts has changed (see Chapter Five). 
It might be remembered that the inquest has existed since society 
was organised along feudal lines, and the scope of the changes 
in the environment in which it has operated from that time can 
scarcely be exaggerated. 
Alongside such substantial changes in the role of the 
inquest, its formal structure has undergone relatively little 
change. Jurors no longer have to view the body in the centre 
of the courtroom. Juries are summoned to only a minority of 
inquests. Solicitors and police officers - neither of whom 
existed in a recognisable form when the first inquests were held 
- now routinely attend inquests. Yet structurally the inquest 
today is not essentially different from the medieval inquest. 
Thus the structural 'shell' of the inquest continues to be the 
vehicle for producing accounts of sudden deaths, while its 
functions have undergone considerable change. A particularly 
important factor underlying the processes of categorisation 
which take place within the vehicle of the contemporary inquest 
has been the rise of medicine. This development includes the rise 
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of medical ideology (visible in areas of mental illness and the 
response to crime as well as in coroners' work), the development 
of specific areas of medical knowledge (e. g. about heart-attacks 
which were, to coroners and others, formerly 'acts of God'), 
the introduction of new medical procedures (centrally, the 
post-mortem examination), and the blurring of the distinctions 
between 'medical work' and 'coroners' work'. 
The processes of medicalisation have now been embedded very 
firmly within coroners' work. Yet the coroner's form of public 
enquiry remains a court of law, structurally 'referringr to 
functions long since abandoned. This disjunction between 
formality and informality runs through coroners' work as a whole. 
It is most clearly revealed at the inquest. 
We have seen that, in practise, coroners may effectively 
'deny' the significance of the formal setting in which they 
find themselves. Coroners' authority -exercised within the 
ideological context to which we have referred - is the central 
means of 'unifying' the formal and the informal, the gap between 
structure and function. On a mundane level, the coroner is 
vested with sufficient authority to smooth over any incon- 
sistencies in the emerging true story and to arbitrate - with 
the final say - amongst any competing versions of the true-story 
which might be offered by other personnel e. g. police and doctors. 
Let us recall that 'coroners' work', 'police work' and 'medical 
work' merge at certain points of the process of construction, 
and that the coroner is by no means the only official involved 
in categorising a sudden death. The fact that there appear to 
be so few conflicts between-different officials in the emergence 
of the true-story implies a recognition by these` officials of the 
coroner's authority over the investigation. More abstractly, 
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the coroner's authority is an authority 
of sudden death insofar as. those facts, 
organisationally produced. The coroner 
dominant, officially-produced, reality 
sense, as we have noted, the coroner is 
control of sudden death. 
over the very 'facts' 
for our purposes, are 
has authority over the 
of sudden death. In this 
concerned with the social 
The coroner does not produce his accounts and exercise his 
authority within a vacuum. The coroner's 'perceptions' and his 
formal activities to some degree draw from those cultural and 
normative attitudes to sudden death discussed in Chapter Six. 
The coroner's activities also refer to those conventions and 
practices built up over the centuries: and, of course, the 
activity of the coroner also refers to statutory and other formal 
and procedural requirements. It would seem that the authority 
of the coroner unifies the diverse strands from which coroners' 
work is constituted. Herein also lies the systematic and 
'unproblematic' nature of the coroner's account, for the coroner, 
to put the matter simply, has the power to determine the course 
of his investigations. 
Reference has been made to the routinisation and bureau- 
cratisation of coroners' work, which are the central means of 
locating the work of the coroner within the State system of 
handling death in general. The process of medicalisation means 
that the coroner is even less of an isolated official engaged 
in some self-contained area of work. Kastenbaum's concept of 
the death system allows a situating of the coroner's work both 
occupationally and culturally (Kastenbaum 1977). The death 
system includes individuals, occupational roles, places, objects, 
methods of physical care, actual disposal of the deceased, and 
methods of explaining (giving meaning to) particular deaths and 
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death in general (Kastenbaum 1979,187-190). 
In conclusion, perhaps there can be no 'complete? socio- 
logical account of coroners' work but (to turn our perspective 
back upon the study itself) it is possible to produce a study 
of coroners' work which is complete-for-sociological purposes 
i. e. fulfils the criteria of adequacy. Such an account, it may 
now be suggested, must consider the whole range of verdicts and 
not only suicide; it must refer to coroners' activity as a 
whole and not only to those cases dealt with at inquests; it 
must refer to the activities of other officials whose work 
essentially comprises a part of coroners' work itself; and it 
must consider a range of events and concepts, from the first 
visit to the scene of death, through a consideration of historical 
factors, to the more abstract level of the ideological and 
cultural death system. 
In discussing discretionary authority, one is referring to 
a central dynamic of the coroner system: a 'motive force' 
in the process of production of accounts. The elements of 
'discretion' and 'authority' warrant equal emphasis. We have 
seen that discretion mundanely and routinely operates at the 
inquest, and indeed Atkinson (1978,101) and Taylor (1982,69) 
also refer to the coroner's discretionary powers at the inquest. 
It might be noted, incidentally, that the Brodrick Report 
recommended that coroners should have greater discretionary 
powers e. g. a complete discretion in deciding when an-inquest 
is to be held (1971,158). 
In the production of coroners' accounts,. there is a 
fundamental interplay between the formal (bureaucracy, authority, 
statutory responsibilities and procedures, the structure of the 
inquest) and the informal (the interpretation of statutory 
requirements, discretion, interaction between coroners and others, 
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coroners' individual perceptions of what constitutes coroners' 
work, coroners' individual theories). -Informal processes may 
themselves be 'structured', as in the systematic construction 
of the true-story. Discretionary authority binds together the 
formal and the informal. 
The study opened with a review of sociological theory and 
methodology. The perspective to be adopted in the task of 
seeking to describe and understand coroners' accounts of sudden 
death was set out with reference to the central theoretical 
'options' within sociology and some general methodological issues. 
It is now appropriate to finally re-evaluate some questions of 
sociological theory and method. 
7(5) Sociological Theories and Methods 
A theoretical position is contained within the adoption 
of a particular methodology and the activity of sociological 
description. The present study has aimed to make the processes 
of accounting for sudden death 'visible' and has also aimed to 
make the activity of research, and the theoretical assumptions 
which underlie it, 'visible'. Theory and method have been 
regarded as inseparable. Thus, while some 'technical' details 
of methodology (the interview format, dates of fieldwork etc. ) 
are included in an appendix below, the study itself has discussed 
methodology in relation to sociological theory. 
The impetus for the study lies in phenomenological 
sociology. The social world and phenomena 'within it', such as 
sudden death, have been seen as dependent for their sense of 
reality on the activities of members of society. Reality, that f 
is, is constituted by such activities, and in examini the ng 
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production of sudden 
methods of producing 
substantive bases of 
sociological work of 
pinnings in the work 
The perspective 
death the study has focussed upon coroners' 
this reality. Chapter One considered the 
the phenomenological perspective in the 
Schutz (1954) and its philosophical under- 
of Husserl (1970; and Koestenbaum 1964). 
adopted has allowed the sociological study 
of coroners' accounts to proceed as planned. Several points, 
for the sake of clarification, can now be added. 
Firstly, the positivist world-view and method have not 
been regarded as useful in the present study. Definitions of 
positivism were considered in Chapter One. Briefly, it can be 
suggested that the perspective which aims to proceed, without 
presuppositions, toward higher, generalised, 'scientific' 
conclusions about the objective world had little to offer, 
especially as positivism's denial of the sociological relevance 
of meaning appears to exclude from consideration the most 
central sociological element of coroners' activity. More 
specifically, Durkheim's contention that sociological method 
is to be based "wholly" on the view of "social facts" as "things", 
as realities external to the individual, has not been accepted 
(Durkheim 1970,37-38). The study, then, has declared itself 
as non-positivist. It lays no claims to be anti-positivist, 
however. The sociologist who wishes to proceed along the 
positivist path will no doubt continue to design studies and 
produce results, in particular those concerned with causality 
and explanation, which satisfy his or her aims. That, however, 
is an enterprise the ultimate value of which we prefer to leave 
entirely open. 
Secondly, although a broadly phenomenological orientation 
has been adopted, it will have become clear by now that the 
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study does not share the concerns of ethnomethodology. It has 
argued, for instance with reference to Atkinson's concluding 
discussion (1978,175-197), that ethnomethodology is no longer 
a methodology within the phenomenological tradition, but is 
something else. That 'something else' -a concern with how 
individuals transform the context-bound into the apparently 
objective, an interest in linguistic expressions, a central 
concern with how reality is produced on the most microscopic 
level - is a distinct. theoretical/methodological option in 
itself. It can be criticised from a number of standpoints: for 
instance. Gleeson and Erben offer a tentative critique from a 
quasi-Marxist position (1976). which is, it must be said, 
considerably less polemical than the similar viewpoint offered 
by Bauman (1973; 1976). Possibly the most central criticism 
to be made of ethnomethodology is that it appears to cut the 
ground from beneath itself, adopting typical concerns and a 
characteristic method which is destined to fail to yield any 
substantial insights into the phenomenon being studied. For 
instance, Atkinson concludes that 
..... it seems unlikely that it can 
be warrantably 
demonstrated that there is anything special about 
the procedures used in arriving at recognizably 
correct possible descriptions of suicidal deaths 
as opposed to those used in describing any other 
describable events in the world. 
(Atkinson, 1978,196) 
On the basis of Atkinson's position, there seems to be no 
'warrantable' reason for sociologists to have any special interest 
in any feature of the social world, as all sociological study 
would focus upon matters both general and microscopic. This 
appears to hold no prospect for continuing sociological work. 
Thirdly, the broadly phenomenological perspective adopted 
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in the present study has aimed to be rigorous. Phenomenological 
sociology is not a loose or undisciplined quasi-philosophical 
pastime. Schutz emphasised that the aim of sociology is to 
acquire organised knowledge of the social world (1954,261). 
Phenomenological sociology aims to describe and understand the 
social world by focussing upon meaning, the construction of social 
reality, interaction and experience. The present study has 
examined the formal and informal organisation of these elements. 
The use of, for instance, statistical material is quite com- 
patible with this perspective, although of course such statistics 
might be used differently by the positivist sociologist. 
Moreover, it is quite compatible with the phenomenological 
perspective to identify general conclusions, built from concrete 
observation and description of the particular. 
There is little doubt that an excessive (and spurious) 
significance can be attached to. theoretical labels within 
sociology. The development of the present study suggests that 
the crucial research task is to ensure consistency between 
methods, theoretical base, and the overall aims of the study. 
If these elements are consistent and rigorous, then internal 
coherence should follow. The choice of a particular theoretical 
option does not seem to be a matter about which absolute judge- 
ments can be made, for sociology remains a pluralist discipline. 
There would, however, be obvious dangers in shifting the theoretical 
basis of the research from one perspective to another - and 
perhaps still further - as the study proceeds (e. g. Atkinson 
1977,31-46). Equally, there are dangers in an inflexible 
devotion to a theoretical position which is inappropriate, e. g. 
in not matching the objectives of the research. 
To restate, the present study has aimed to render its own 
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research process 'visible', just as it has sought to make 
visible the process of categorising sudden deaths. A reflexive 
sociology is understood here to be one which can turn the 
analysis back upon itself, thus illuminating the practice of 
research itself. As was noted in Chapter One, this process can 
of course be taken too far, as little is to be gained through 
a self-contemplating sociology-of-sociology. A more fundamental 
problem is the degree to which sociologists generate or 
essentially 'produce' (rather than merely record) their own 
data. This problem is common to sociologies whatever their 
theoretical hue. The positivist sociologist, for instance, will 
'detect' social facts such as suicide, will then 'find' that 
such facts are-represented in total and as a proportion of the 
population in the form of suicide rates, and will then import 
the conceptual equipment required for linking the suicide rate 
to some feature of society as a whole. Phenomenologists, 
ethnomethodologists, interactionists and Marxist theorists in 
sociology similarly seek out those phenomena in which they have 
a prior interest; apply the tools of analysis; and thus 
generate the results. This matter can be resolved in a number 
of ways. Firstly, the research process can be made 'visible', 
as discussed above. Secondly, the sociologist can recognise 
the centrality of concepts, and their two-way link with the 
phenomena being studied. Bulmer suggested that 
..... concept-formation in the analysis of 
sociological data proceeds neither from observation 
to category, nor from category to observation, 
but in both directions at once and in inter- 
action ..... The process is one in which 
concepts are formed and modified both in the 
light of empirical evidence and in the context 
of theory. Both theory and evidence can 
exercise compelling influence on what emerges. (Bulmer, 1979,653 emphasis in original) 
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Bulmer was writing of the use of concepts in the handling of 
qualitative information. His point, however, has a general 
relevance. 
The 'sociology of suicide', as an established body of 
knowledge within sociology, has been referred to in passing 
throughout the study, and was discussed in a little more detail 
in Chapter Six. The studies of Durkheim (1970), Gibbs and 
Martin (1964), Henry and Short (1954), Sainsbury (1955) and 
Cavan (1928) were said to be of limited relevance in an approach 
to sudden death (including suicide) which focusses upon the rate- 
producing process. In more general terms, the traditionally 
conceived 'sociology of suicide' appeared to be problematic in 
the areas of definition, meaning and aetiology. Baechler's 
reinterpretation of meaning and aetiology was outlined (1979). 
The location of definition in use. was also elaborated, as an 
approach to coroners' activity and as a further element of the 
developing perspective of the study as a whole. It might be 
noted that a quasi-Durkheimian sociology of suicide still 
flourishes, although the extent to which it still refers to the 
Durkheimian approach is open to argument: Gibbs and Martin 
contend, long after the publication of their main study, that 
the status-integration theory of suicide remains systematic, 
predictive and testable (Gibbs and Martin 1981,821). It must 
finally be emphasised that the sociology of suicide is a far 
richer and more theoretically diverse area within sociology"than 
implied by the (necessarily. limited) sketch included in a study 
which has not been primarily concerned with suicide at all. 
Halbwachs, for instance, was responsible for a study which 
included officially-derived statistical information (including 
British statistics) and was broadly located in the Durkheimian 
See, for instance, Sacks (1966), Watson (1975) 
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tradition, yet took issue with Durkheim at several points e. g. 
Halbwachs disputed both the meaning and 'amount? of anomie: 
The complexity of urban society is not identical 
with what Durkheim called anomie (Halbwachs 1978,320) 
... while the influence of modern social life does not extend to all details of life, 
or to all the situations which are encountered, 
this was certainly also the case with old 
types of regulation, and nothing permits us to 
assert that there is relatively more anomie 
now than formerly. 
(Halbwachs 1978,322) 
Halbwachs also suggested that regional suicide rates tend to 
converge, at a rising level, "wherever the same style of life, 
the same type of civilization, succeeds in taking root" (1978, 
312). Halbwachs found this development normal; Durkheim found 
it abnormal. More generally, Halbwachs integrated psychological 
factors into his definition and explanation of suicide in sharp 
contrast to Durkheim's rejection of any consideration of 
individual psychology (Halbwachs 1978,262-290). 
Halbwach's study, first published in 1930, would form a 
part of any comprehensive consideration of the sociology of 
suicide. Such a consideration might also usefully refer to 
Coenen's thesis that there is no necessary or essential opposition 
between Durkheimian sociology and. phenomenological sociology 
(Coenen 1981). Coenen suggests that a phenomenological reading 
of Durkheim's work has become possible as phenomenological 
sociology has moved toward a greater inclusion of empirical 
information and the unstated assumptions of such information, 
and away from a search for pure eidetic understanding (Coenen 
1981,962). The discussion of the eidos will be recalled from 
Chapter One. 
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Finally, it was suggested at the beginning of the study 
that explanation is to be distinguished from understanding. 
Explanation has been specifically referred to as the causal 
method of theorising characteristic of positivism. Dallmayr 
and McCarthy drew attention to the historical roots of the 
divergence between the positivist mode of explanation (with 
its imitation of natural-scientific method) and an alternative 
emphasis on understanding (Dallmayr and McCarthy 1977,2). 
It was decided, then, at the beginning of the study to seek to 
understand rather than, in the above sense, to 'explain' the 
process of accounting for sudden death. The basis of under- 
standing is description: not complete description, which we 
have argued is in principle impossible, but description which 
fulfils the criteria of 'adequacy'. Thus a description has been 
provided which is sufficiently complete to understand the socio- 
logical processes involved in the work of the coroner. The 
emphasis on understanding rather than explanation can also be 
seen to be compatible with the overall theoretical/methodological 
framework. In conclusion, the necessary basis for carrying out 
the study as a whole was indeed provided, and no grounds were 
suggested for having adopted a different position. 
The relationship between understanding and explanation 
is complex. It could be argued that the two are quite separate; 
or are inseparable; or that explanations 'lead to' understanding; 
or that understanding, when it is somehow sufficiently 'advanced', 
then 'becomes' explanation. The. debate will be taken no further 
here. A summary of some of the issues is succinctly drawn by 
Wrighton (1981). The question of description could also, of 
course, be taken further. Coulter, for instance, after referring 
to the issue of whether descriptions may be judged by ttdecon- 
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textualisedtt criteria adds, importantly, that: 
The description of an action is an occasioned 
event, itself an action, undertaken for some 
purpose, or guided by some particular 
interest, which informs our judgements about 
its adequacy. 
(Coulter, 1979,14, emphasis added) 
If descriptions are, then, to be regarded as actions, the 
possibilities - and pitfalls - of a reflexive sociology turning 
its methods back upon itself are again apparent. Even a term 
such as determinism allows much further discussion. Balandier 
characterises the early work of Gurvitch as carrying within it 
a "conditional" determinism: a definition of determinism wide 
enough to contain a "certain indetermination. " (Balandier 1975, 
14). 
The above examples indicate that the theoretical issues 
which have been raised and discussed in the present study permit 
considerable further discussion. Nevertheless, the tasks of 
providing an appropriate framework for the study as a whole, 
and of situating methodology within a context which pays more 
than passing reference to some major theoretical issues, appear 
now to have been adequately fulfilled. 
Some brief concluding comments now complete the study. 
7(6) Accounting for Sudden Death 
It is the duty of coroners to investigate the 
death of the deceased and not, as some of them 
seem to think, the lives of the living. Even 
an inquest can be too inquisitive. * 
The words above, written in the 1930s, serve as a reminder 
From A. P. Herbert's criticism of ""Dr. Busy", the coroner: 
quoted in Rights (1980,6). 
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that criticism and controversy surrounding the work of the 
coroner are not only recent phenomena. Indeed, one might consider 
this case from the year 1249: 
Robert the son of Henry Badding, in climbing 
up a hayrick in Segre meadow, fell from the 
rick so that he broke his neck ..... William Skywe, accused of the death of Robert, comes 
and denies the said death ..... The jurors 
say he is guilty of the said death, for they 
say that Robert fell from the rick on to 
William Skywe and William, startled by this, 
struck Robert twice on the head with his 
staff, so that he killed him. But they say 
that William did not do this in felony but 
rather out of witlessness because he is under 
age being twelve years old. So it is awarded 
that William be taken into custody and this 
case be told the King etc. It is testified 
that Henry of Hertham the coroner received one 
mark to conceal this matter. Henry himself 
is present and cannot deny this, so he is in 
mercy. 
(Rothwell, 1975,836) 
As noted in the introduction to the present study, the late 
1970s and early 1980s have involved the coroner and the inquest 
in several controversial cases. Public discussion has focussed 
upon the proper role of the coroner and the nature of the inquest 
proceedings and verdict. This study has not been concerned 
with any policy or quasi-political matters. Let us note merely 
that, firstly, the history of the coroner system is a history 
of controversies, conflicts, statutory changes and changing 
functions, and, secondly, that 'policy' debates. which refer 
only to the formal procedural model of the inquest, and the 
statutory powers of the coroner, thus leaving out of account the 
organisational processes described in the study, are bound to 
be seriously incomplete. 
However, the interests of the present study have been rather 
different. A sociological study of the work of the coroner as a 
whole has been presented. Commencing with a description of the 
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historical context, research proceeded by interviews with 
coroners, observation of the coroner's inquest, and consideration 
of the statistics of coroners' work. The main conclusions 
have been presented chapter-by-chapter. It was then possible 
to situate coroners' work in the-context of the wider cultural 
and bureaucratic arrangements for dealing with death in general. 
Some additional concluding comments can now be made. 
In the introduction to the study it was suggested that a 
coroner system exists in three senses: firstly, coroners' 
activity constitutes a recognisable (although not discrete) 
social system; secondly, the inquest is a formal inquisitorial 
system for classifying sudden deaths; and thirdly, coroners' 
categorisations have a systematic nature. It can now be added 
that the coroner system is itself one part of the State bureau- 
cratic system for handling death, and that the systematic nature 
of the certification, registration and disposal of deaths is 
linked to the day-to-day demands of the industrial State. The 
medicalisation and routinisation of coroners' work is consistent 
with the bureaucratic ideology of society, and 'coroners'work' 
per se cannot be isolated from this context. Nor can the coroner 
system be isolated from the. police system or the medical system 
which themselves constitute part of coroners' work. Any 
sociological approach to coroners' activity, then, must to some 
degree take into consideration the operation of systems-within- 
systems, and the points of contact and overlap between coroners' 
work and others' work. 
It might also be noted that the 'contexts' in which coroners' 
activity is to be located for the purposes of sociological study 
are numerous: the historical development of the office of coroner; 
the legal framework; the informal/conventional framework; the 
- 368 - 
development of police work; the development of medicine (and 
specific elements such as the post-mortem examination); the 
dominant cultural ideas about death within society; and, of 
course, the procedures for dealing with death in general. Again, 
a sociological approach to the work of the coroner must, at 
the very least, be aware of. such contexts. 
The introduction to the study referred to the relevance of 
coroners' accounts in terms of: verdicts as accounts of sudden 
death; verbal accounts presented at inquests; statistical 
records as overall accounts of coroners' activity; and the 
accounts of their own work offered by coroners at interview. 
The central importance of 'accounting' is to be emphasised. 
Further study of the work of the coroner might usefully explore 
the coroner's production of information; the transformation 
of categorisations into permanent written records; the binding 
nature of the coroner's production of the social reality of 
sudden death when represented by 'official statistics'. All 
these are aspects of 'accounting' which are. of sociological 
relevance. The relationship between the production of accounts 
and the exercise of social control might also be productively 
developed: through detailed description of accounting processes. 
There appears to be no reason for further consideration of 
accounts to be confined to inquest verdicts. Even when the 
coroner uses form A or form B procedures, he is involved in 
accounting for the sudden death at hand. It is more difficult 
to collect detailed information on such non-inquest cases but 
that does not diminish their sociological importance. 
The inquest itself may perhaps be approached by the socio- 
logist in two possible ways: firstly, as a necessary element in 
the study of coroners' work; and/or secondly, as a court of law, 
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warranting study in its own right. The latter area is a 
potentially rich and largely uncharted region for further study. 
It is of interest to note, for instance, that although the 
inquisitorial system is. at variance with the adversary system 
in British courts of law as a whole, the inquisitorial model in 
fact underlies the judicial systems of many continental 
countries (Roshier and Teff, 1980,163-164). The inquest jury 
is another topic of potential relevance. 
The study has aimed to render the processes of categorising 
sudden deaths 'visible'. An attempt has also been made to render 
the assumptions, methodology and development of the study 
similarly 'visible'. In exposing processes of categorisation to 
the methods of sociological description, it has been possible 
to examine the coroner's construction of the true-story of 
sudden deaths. In producing the true-story, the coroner is 
constructing the reality of sudden death. This process signifies 
more than giving meaning to this or that particular death: 
in two senses. Firstly, the coroner employs systematic methods 
in the production of accounts. Secondly, the coroner is engaged 
in producing the officially-sanctioned reality of a substantial 
number of all deaths in England and Wales and thus completing 
the total account of what is otherwise the routine responsibility 
of general medical practitioners, i. e. the 'facts of death'. 
It has been seen that there has been a steady decline of 
the coroner's powers in criminal law. There has been a 
medicalisation of coroners' work. The functions of the inquest 
have changed massively over the centuries, yet its formal 
structure has altered, in comparison, only. in details. There 
has arisen a disjunction between the formal and the informal 
elements of coroners' work, a distinction between the legal/ 
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procedural elements and those based in convention and negotiation. 
The coroner himself has retained a considerable authority, 
but has fewer areas in which it can be specifically exercised. 
Coroners' discretion, and the differing perceptions of individual 
coroners about the very nature of. their work, would appear to 
be central areas for further sociological study of the work of 
the coroner. 
Luckmann wrote: 
The social sciences face a basic theoretical 
and methodological problem. The human world, 
whatever else it may be, is a man-experienced 
world and in part a man-made world. The 
objective features of historical social 
realities rest in some fashion on universal 
structures of subjective orientation in the 
world. But precisely how they rest on them, 
and what precisely these structures are, seem 
to be questions that an empirical science is 
not equipped to answer. These questions may 
be taken as the point of articulation between 
phenomenology and social theory. (Luckmann, 1978,10-11) 
Death, of course, is a pervasive feature of the experienced 
world. 'Sudden death', viewed as organisational product, is. an 
important element of the socially constructed world. The 
seemingly objective facts of sudden death are linked to sub- 
jective and interactive processes and, more generally, coroners' 
accounts are central elements of routine knowledge about death 
in society. Sociological research has, from these bases, 
substantial areas in which to proceed. 
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APPENDIX I 
Further Methodological Details 
Statistical Search Twenty-seven visits were made to the 'City' 
coroner!. s office to search through statistics from handwritten 
ledgers. This element of the fieldwork took place between July 
and November 1979. 
Observation Fifty inquests were attended in 'City' between 
March and November 1977. These were held at three locations 
in City. 
The additional inquest - referred to in Chapter Four as 
Inquest F- took place in another jurisdiction in July 1978. 
Further inquests were attended informally in City in June 
1979. 
Interviews Seven interviews (six with coroners and one with 
the coroner's officer) were conducted in February, March and 
April 1978. The remaining eight interviews were conducted in 
August, September and October 1979. The interview questionnaire 
is reproduced below. 
INTERVIEWS name of coroner: 
jurisdiction: 
date of interview: 
1) How long have you been a coroner? 
2) Are you a full-time or* part-time coroner? 
3) IF PART-TIME: are you also ..... a doctor? 
a solicitor? 
a barrister? 
other? 
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do you have any other professional qualifications? 
IF FULL-TIME: what was your occupation before becoming a 
coroner? 
do you have any other professional qualifications? 
4) Do you see the 
the 
the 
the 
non 
coroner's job as part of: 
legal system? 
judicial system? 
medical system? 
/several of these? 
.. comments? ..... 
5) The inquest - do you see this as a court of record in 
contrast to a 'law court' or court of trial? 
6) The coroner's officer - 
1) how much of the everyday work of the coroner's office 
are your officers responsible for? 
2) do the same police officers regularly serve as your 
officers? 
3) to what extent does the coroner's officer act on his 
own initiative - e. g. in arranging post-mortems or 
inquests? 
k) do you consider it necessary that the coroner's officer 
be drawn from the police: or could the job be done by 
a trained civilian? 
5) have you ever disagreed with one of your officers about 
how to deal with a particular case, or about the verdict 
at an inquest? 
6) do you have any comments/opinions on the role of the 
police generally in relation to coroners' work? 
7) The pathologist - 
1) do you establish regular working relationships with 
particular pathologists? 
2) have you ever experienced any difficulty in getting a 
post-mortem examination done? 
3) how 'routine' is the ordering of a post-mortem examination: 
are there sorts of cases where a post-mortem would be 
carried out as a matter of course? 
do problems ever arise in the interpretation of p. m. 
reports? 
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5) how significant is the post-mortem report for your 
decision about a particular death - would it be 
particularly important at an inquest, or in a 'pink form 
B' case? 
8) Pathology and medicine - 
1) advances in medical knowledge and pathology seem to be 
making medicine an increasingly important element in 
the work of the coroner - do you welcome this develop- 
ment, or do you think it undermines the traditional 
authority of the coroner? 
2) what do you see as the advantages/disadvantages of the 
American medical-examiner system, where the coroner's 
work is done by someone trained in pathology, and the 
emphasis is purely 'medical'? 
g) What do you see as the 
10) The inquest - 
most important part of your work? 
the inquest? 
pink form A? 
pink form B? 
informal contact with doctors and 
others? 
..... comments? ..... 
1) what do you see as the main purpose_of holding an 
inquest? 
to rule out criminality? 
to discover exact cause of death? 
to discover circumstances of the death? 
some other purpose? (specify) 
2) are you happy with the public nature of the inquest - 
or should it be a private inquiry? 
3) what"is your opinion of the Press, and newspaper 
reports of coroners' cases? 
4) do you think the jury serves any useful purpose at 
an inquest? 
5) are you ever conscious of any external pressure -- 
such as, from the family of the deceased, or from the 
police -- towards you bringing in a particular verdict 
at an inquest? 
6) do you usually have a fairly clear-cut idea of what 
the inquest verdict is likely to be before the inquest 
begins -- for instance, are road accidents, or suicides, fairly'obvious' from the start? 
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7) suicide - 
a) do you use the phrase 'while the balance of mind 
was disturbed? ' 
- why/why not? 
b) what sorts of evidence do you look for in arriving 
at a suicide verdict? 
a suicide note? 
a history of ill-health? 
evidence of depression? 
previous suicide attempts? 
other factors? (specify) 
c) the decline of domestic gas as an agent of suicide 
has been matched by an increase in self-poisoning 
as a method of self-destruction -- what are your 
comments on this development? 
d) do you have any personal theories of suicide -- 
of 'why people do it'? - do you think men and 
women commit suicide for broadly similar, or 
different, reasons? definitions? 
e) the suicide rate in this country is falling - 
why do you think this is so? 
have the Samaritans been important? 
is it related to changes in methods of suicide? 
f) 'attempted suicide' seems to be increasing - 
why do you think this is so? 
8) in what sorts of circumstance would you record an 
open verdict? 
9) what are the functions of the solicitors and senior 
police officers who attend inquests? 
11) As a coroner, how much discretion do you exercise in your 
work - for instance, in accepting a referral; in deciding 
which procedure to use? 
12) How do you see your job, as a part of the whole process 
of death certification and registration in this country 
.....? (open-ended ..... comments ..... ) 
13) The duties of the coroner have greatly changed over the 
centuries, along with changes in the law, medicine, society 
and so on. 
1) do you think the coroner system will continue to 
change and adapt - or will a time come when another 
sort of system will be introduced? 
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2) what sort of changes (if any) relating to coroners 
would you personally advocate? 
14) That completes the interview as such - are there any 
points or comments you wish to make about the topics we 
have covered or about other issues? 
15) Interviewer's notes. 
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APPENDIX II 
Additional Statistics 1976-1982 
The statistics relating to the work of the 'City' coroner, 
discussed in Chapter Five, were collected by a manual search of 
records in the coroner's office. Aside from these local 
statistics, almost all statistical material presented in Chapter 
Five was drawn directly or indirectly from Home Office sources, 
i. e. published national statistics up to the year 1969 contained 
in the Report of the Committee on Death Certification and 
Coroners - the 'Brodrick Report' - (1971); and unpublished 
statistics covering the years 1970 to 1975, obtained from the 
Home Office. 
In 1981 the Home Office began to publish annual statistical 
summaries of coroners' work for the first time (see Home 
Office 1981; 1982; 1983). Although these published statistical 
summaries do not include some details to which we were able to 
refer in Chapter Five by using unpublished figures (e. g. 
breakdown by individual jurisdiction), they do present total 
numbers of form A and form B cases, inquests held and verdicts 
returned, and the particular verdicts recorded. The summary 
of coroners' statistics from 1976 to 1982, appended here, is 
drawn from the published statistical bulletins. It might be 
considered in conjunction with the statistics for the years 
1926 to 1975 presented above. Inclusion here provides further 
material for any future consideration of the statistical 
products of coroners' work. 
Discussion. The intended purpose of this appendix was to 
provide some simple descriptive statistics for the period 1976 
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to 1982, without further discussion, for possible future use. 
However, certain features of the statistics are problematic 
and require brief comment. 
1) The statistics collected here. as tables Al and A2 
are approximate. They are reproduced from the published 
sources which were, in their original form, approximate and 
simplified. This need not be an essential problem, but it is 
a matter of which to be aware. 
2) There is a divergence between the figures for suicide 
presented at table 5(5)1 above, and the figures for suicide 
presented at table A3, in respect of the years 1976 to 1980. 
(During this period, the annual divergence between the two sets 
of figures ranged between 19 and 50 'suicides'). Indeed, for 
these years the Chapter Five suicide figures derived from one 
published source (Central Statistical Office (1981; 1983) ) 
were consistently higher than the suicide figures derived from 
another published source (Home Office, 1983). Different 
accounting procedures are evidently being used and the 
discrepancy may partly lie in the Central Statistical Office's 
use of the category of deaths caused by "suicide and other 
self-inflicted injuries". Yet, if this is so, it is by no 
means clear where such 'extra' cases of suicide came from: 
apparently not from a simple reading of coroners' verdicts. 
The periods of time for annual totalling may, of course, have 
varied. Whatever account is offered, this particular example 
of statistical difficulty and apparent imprecision only 
reinforces the emphasis placed, throughout the study above, on 
the importance of the rate-producing process. Perhaps further 
considerations of suicide statistics might first address the 
question: which suicide statistics? More is said of this below. 
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TABLE Al: DEATHS REPORTED TO CORONERS 1976-1982* 
YEAR TOTAL DEATHS 
REGISTERED 
ENGLAND & WALES 
TOTAL DEATHS REPORTED 
TO CORONERS/PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL NATIONAL DEATHS 
1976 589,500 160,700 27.3% 
1977 575,900 158,400 27.5% 
1978 585,900 166,600 28.4% 
1979 593,000 171,300 28.9% 
1980 589,200 170,200 28.9% 
1981 578,100 173,600 30.0% 
1982 590,000 174,300 29.5% 
Derived from Home Office summary of coroners' statistics 
(1983,6). The rounding-off of total figures occurs in 
the original: where some of the totals for deaths 
registered are noted to be provisional. The above figures 
should therefore be seen as an approximation for the 
purposes of simple summary. 
TABLE A2: FORM A, FORM B AND INQUESTS, 
1976-1982* 
YEAR (TOTAL DEATHS1 TOTAL INQUESTS I TOTAL FORMT TOTAL FORM 
REPORTED TO 
CORONERS 
HELD/PERCENTAGE 
OF DEATHS 
REPORTED 
A CASES/ 
PERCENTAGE 
OF DEATHS 
REPORTED 
B CASES/ 
PERCENTAGE 
OF DEATHS 
REPORTED 
1976 16o, 700 23,400 14.6% 21,300 13.3% 116,100 72.2% 
1977 158,400 22,900 14.4% 21,700 13. '7% 113,800 71.8% 
1978 166,600 23,700 14.2% 23,900 14.3% 119,000 71.4% 
1979 171,300 23,800 13.9% 26,300 15.4% 121,300 70.8% 
1980 170,200 23,100 13.6% 28,600 16.8% 118,500 69.6% 
1981 173,600 22,900 13.2% 30,800 17.7% 119,700 69.0% 
1982 174,300 23,000 13.2% 32,100 18.1% 119,100 68.3% 
# Derived from Home Office summary of coroners' statistics (1983,6-7). Again, the rounding-off of figures occurs in the original. It can readily be seen that the total figures for inquests, form As and form Bs for the years 1976,1979, 
1981 and 1982 do not in fact add up to the 'total deaths 
reported to coroners' reproduced here. Such figures are 
quite clearly of approximate value only. Percentages have been calculated from the 'total deaths reported' to the 
nearest decimal point. 
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TABLE A3: CORONERS' VERDICTS 1976-1982* 
VERDICT 
1 976 1977 1978 
YEAR 
1979 1980 1981 1982 
a) Unlawful Killing (112) (74) 89 93 76 113 138 
b) Lawful Killing i (1) (2) (-) (4) 2 6 2 
c)Execution of Death - - - - - - - Sentence 
d)Suicide** 3,769 3,909 4,003 4,145 4,282 4,471 , 356 
e)Attempted/Self- - - - - - - - Induced Abortion 
f)Lack of Care/Self- 47 51 55 65 57 43 41 Neglect 
g)Chronic Alcoholism 395 372 457 524 669 703 712 
h)Addiction to Drugs . 
44 54 74 95 65 57 91 
i)Want of Attention a 16 15 19 14 10 16 18 
Birth 
j)Industrial Diseases 784 784 764 809 787 862 1,002 
k) Accident/Misadventure 13,453 12,843 13,778 13,533 12,700 12,232 12,189 
l)Natural Causes 1,647 1,752 1,690 1,747 1,810 1,692 1,810 
m)Still-Born 6 5 4 7 11 7 11 
n)Open Verdicts/'All 1,983 1,860 1,868 1,886 1,966 1,890 1,958 
Other Verdicts ** 
TOTAL VERDICTS 22,257 21,721 22,801 22,922 22,435 22,092 22,328 RETURNED 
o)Adjourned and not 1,135 987 823 750 727 762 791 
Resumed 
p)Treasure Trove 32 29 45 52 57 59 51 
t 'Unlawful killing' superceded murder, manslaughter and 
infanticide from the beginning of 1978. 
t 'Lawful killing' superceded justifiable or excusable homicide 
during 1980. 
Derived from Home Office summary of coroners' statistics (1983,8-9). 
3f3ý These figures for suicide do not correspond to those covering 
the period 1976 to 1980 presented in Chapter Five, and 
originating from a different source, i. e. Central Statistical 
Office (1981; 1983) See discussion. 
***The published figures indicate no open verdicts between 1976 
and 1980 - the figure occurs instead within 'all other 
verdicts'. For 1981 and 1982 the published statistics revert to previous practice. The figures are merged here for clarity. 
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3) The published Home Office material from which tables 
Al, A2 and A3 are drawn includes some observations on coroners' 
work in general. It might be particularly noted that the number 
of deaths reported to coroners, as a proportion of all deaths 
in England and Wales, continued to increase during the period 
1976 to 1981. This tends to support the conclusion of the 
preceding study that coroners' work is becoming an ever-more 
central part of the system for dealing with deaths in general. 
Table A2 suggests that this increased number of coroners' cases 
has been located to a disproportionate degree in 'Form A' cases. 
The commentary attached to the published statistics suggests 
that this development may be partly accounted for by 
the growth in deputizing services, so that the 
doctor who attended at or after death was not 
the deceased's medical attendant. 
(Home Office 1983,1). 
Hence, such deaths could not be routinely certified and 
registered, and would tend to become coroners' 'Form A' cases. 
The total number of deaths reported to coroners has thus 
expanded. More generally, an earlier statistical bulletin 
notes: 
The number of deaths reported to coroners 
rose by over a quarter from 1970 to 1980 and 
increased from 23 per cent to 29 per cent of 
the total number of deaths registered. The 
increase was in those deaths on which no 
inquest was held. 
(Home Office 1981,1) 
The relative decline of the inquest as a part of the coroner's 
total work is again of relevance. One might, less centrally, 
wish to note the perhaps surprising increase in the number of 
cases of treasure trove dealt with by the coroner during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The establishment of the Treasure 
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Trove Reviewing Committee in 1977 may have had a bearing on the 
number of subsequent 'finds'. Treasure trove, of course, is 
a continuing reminder of the ancient origins of what is today 
an element of the everyday bureaucratic system for dealing 
with death. 
ý) The discrepancy between suicide statistics obtained 
from different sources might be considered in a little more 
* detail. It may be due in part to the use of I. C. D. categories 
in some published sources - which would not be reflected in 
simple counts of coroners' suicide verdicts. The I. C. D. is 
commonly used for comparisons, on a standardised basis, of 
mortality statistics. and the incidence of fatal diseases 
between different countries. What is of interest is that I. C. D. 
categories are periodically revised, and their 'catchment' 
is thus widened or narrowed accordingly. Bulusu and Alderson 
draw attention to the 8th revision of I. C. D. categories which 
introduced a classification called "suicide by late effects 
of self-inflicted injury". (Bulusu and Alderson, 1984,12). 
Although it is pointed out that the category "rarely contains 
any deaths", an identifiable point of contrast between 
coroners' totalled returns to the Home Office and standardised 
classifications of suicide. is introduced. Another relevant 
I. C. D. category, in this respect, is "suicide by other and 
unspecified means". 
5) The I. C. D. refers to all manner of mortality statistics, 
and not only those which are relevant to deaths'dealt with by 
the coroner. It might be noted (for the purpose of future 
work based on mortality statistics) that the 9th revision of 
* International Classification of Diseases 
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the I. C. D. was made in 1975 and accepted in England and Wales 
at the beginning of 1979: thus many areas of statistical 
material on mortality are from 1979 onward not precisely 
comparable with earlier years at all 
(Office of Population, 
Censuses and Surveys, 1984,54). 
6) To conclude our comments on the inconsistencies of 
suicide statistics, brief reference can be made to Bulusu and 
Alderson's statistical review (1984). They refer to "the total 
number of deaths by suicide in England and Wales" as 5,714 
in 1963,3,693 in 1975, and 4,279 in 1982 (Bulusu and Alderson, 
1984,11). These figures are all lower, than the suicide 
statistics for the same years cited within the preceding study: 
table 5(2)4 indicates total suicide verdicts of 5,727 in 1963 
(Source: Brodrick Report,. 1971,386-387); table 5(2)4 also 
indicates total suicide verdicts of 3,717 in 1975 (Source: 
unpublished Home Office statistics); and table A3 indicates a 
total of 4,356 suicide verdicts 1982 
(Source: Home Office, 
1983,8-9). This apparent problem in fact brings understanding 
closer, by pointing to the sources used for each of the 
figures. Throughout the preceding study, suicide statistics 
have referred to total numbers of. coroners' verdicts of suicide 
recorded in a particular year - derived directly or indirectly 
from coroners' returns to the Home Office. Given the central 
interest in coroners' verdicts, this of course is precisely the 
relevant figure. Bulusu and Alderson's accounting procedure, 
however, gives them lower annual totals. Evidently such totals 
are not collected directly from coroners' verdicts. Factors 
referred to above (the basis for annual totalling, the use of 
standardising classifications) may of course also be relevant. 
Indeed, Bulusu and Alderson proceed from the totals of "deaths 
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by suicide" referred to above to further present adjusted 
totals, adopting a calculation for constant population size. 
(Bulusu and Alderson, 1984,11). Yet another version of 
annual suicide statistics is thus produced. To add a final 
point to this complexity, as we noted above some published 
sources (Central Statistical Office (1981; 1983) ) yield 
suicide statistics which are higher, not lower, than the number 
of coroners' verdicts of. suicide notified to the Home Office. 
Here, iz's. e of. I. C. D. categories and other standardised class- 
ifications, along with their periodic revision, may be relevant 
in expanding the figure derived from coroners' returns to the 
Home Office. 
7) The problems associated with the use of statistical 
material relating to coroners' work are complex but not 
impenetrable. Indeed, it is of some relevance to the perspective 
of the study as a whole that so many versions of statistical 
reality are possible. Future work on the rate producing 
process might consider the minutae of classification systems 
alongside the substantive theoretical and methodological issues 
in sociology- Future work on the statistics presented in the 
study, referring to coroners' work from 1926 to 1982, has 
considerable scope for further exploration of the rate-producing 
process, and of the manner of assembly of official statistics - 
from wherever those statistics originate. 
8) Underlying any consideration of the statistics of 
coroners' work are the changing powers and duties of the coroner 
and the cor onerts jury. Verdicts are abolished and other 
verdicts introduced. The meaning of the same verdict may 
undergo considerable change. It can finally. be noted that from 
1st. July 1984 juries became unable to record a verdict of 
-3.4- 
"lack of care" (see row (9), table 5(2)4); row (f), table A3) 
except where it is recorded as an addition to one of the four 
specific verdicts of natural causes, industrial disease, 
addiction to drugs or want of attention at birth. The change 
occurred through amendment to the Coroners' Rules and, like 
some earlier changes, perhaps had the object of curtailing the 
use of a verdict which implied censure. Without doubt, the 
meaning of particular verdicts, and from time to time their 
availability, will continue to be subject to change. 
'Additional statistics' for years to come may need to take into 
account yet further changes. 
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